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Abstract 
Background/Purpose: Experienced fireground commanders are often required to make 
important decisions in time-pressured and dynamic environments that are characterized by a 
wide range of task constraints. The nature of these environments is such that firefighters are 
sometimes faced with novel situations that seek to challenge their expertise and therefore 
necessitate making knowledge-based as opposed to rule-based decisions. The purpose of 
this study is to elicit the tacitly held knowledge which largely underpinned expert competence 
when managing non-routine fire incidents.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study utilized a formal knowledge elicitation tool 
known as the critical decision method (CDM). The CDM method was preferred to other 
cognitive task analysis (CTA) methods as it is specifically designed to probe the cognitive 
strategies of domain experts with reference to a single incident that was both challenging 
and memorable. Thirty experienced firefighters and one staff development officer were 
interviewed in-depth across different fire stations in the UK and Nigeria (UK=15, Nigeria=16). 
The interview transcripts were analyzed using the emergent themes analysis (ETA) 
approach.  
Findings: Findings from the study revealed 42 salient cues that were sought by experts at 
each decision point. A critical cue inventory (CCI) was developed and cues were categorized 
into five distinct types based on the type of information each cue generated to an incident 
commander. The study also developed a decision making model — information filtering and 
intuitive decision making model (IFID), which describes how the experienced firefighters 
were able to make difficult fireground decisions amidst multiple informational sources without 
having to deliberate on their courses of action. The study also compiled and indexed the 
elicited tacit knowledge into a competence assessment framework (CAF) with which the 
competence of future incident commanders could potentially be assessed.  
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Practical Implications: Through the knowledge elicitation process, training needs were 
identified, and the practical implications for transferring the elicited experts’ knowledge to 
novice firefighters were also discussed. The four component instructional design model 
aided the conceptualization of the CDM outputs for training purposes.  
Originality/Value: Although it is widely believed that experts perform exceptionally well in 
their domains of practice, the difficulty still lies in finding how best to unmask expert (tacit) 
knowledge, particularly when it is intended for training purposes. Since tacit knowledge 
operates in the unconscious realm, articulating and describing it has been shown to be 
challenging even for experts themselves. This study is therefore timely since its outputs can 
facilitate the development of training curricula for novices, who then will not have to wait for 
real fires to occur before learning new skills. This statement holds true particularly in this era 
where the rate of real fires and therefore the opportunity to gain experience has been on a 
decline. The current study also presents and discusses insights based on the cultural 
differences that were observed between the UK and the Nigerian fire service.  
 
Keywords: experts, tacit knowledge, decision making, decision points, critical decision 
method, firefighters, cues, training, and four component instructional design (4C/ID) 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
It has been widely reported that the outcome of managing any major incident will 
much more depend on the way proceedings were handled on-scene and less on the 
possible causes or scale of the incident (Flin, 1996; Tissington and Flin, 2005; 
MacLennan et al., 2006; Lipschitz et al., 2007; Boin and Hart, 2007; Klein et al., 
2010; Clancy, 2011). Hence, managing any major incident will undoubtedly require 
making good and timely decisions, often supported by sound domain knowledge.  
 
Prior research has shown that firefighters typically operate in an environment that is 
characterized by a number of task constraints (Burke and Hendry, 1997; Omodei et 
al., 2005; Lipschitz et al., 2007; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Ingham, 2008; Frye and 
Wearing, 2011) which include: 
• Uncertainty, ambiguity and missing data 
• Shifting and competing goals 
• Dynamic and continually changing conditions 
• Action feedback loops (distance between real time reactions and changed 
conditions) 
• Time pressure (having to make crucial decisions in seconds) 
• High stakes involved  
• Multiple players/team factors that need to be effectively coordinated 
• Organizational goals and norms that could negatively impact decision making 
 
However, despite these task constraints, civilians whose lives and properties are at 
stake often expect a lot from fire crews. In fact, it has been shown that members of 
the public mainly judge the effectiveness of any response effort based on the amount 
of valuable properties response crews were able to salvage (Tissington and Flin, 
2005; Ingham, 2008; Okoli et al., 2014). Thus, considering such huge expectations 
on fire crews, it becomes logical to expect that managing more dangerous and 
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unpredictable fires will require the skills and knowledge of the more experienced 
officers.  
 
The field of cognitive psychology has been broadly divided into two schools of 
thought. The first comprises scholars who believe experts are themselves vulnerable 
to some of the cognitive biases that are common with novices (Caverni, 2001; 
Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman, 2002). This community of scholars are mainly 
concerned with questioning the extent to which experts’ competence can/should be 
trusted (see Kahneman and Klein, 2009 for a review). The second school of thought 
consists of a body of research that explores “cognition in the wild”, for which scholars 
are particularly interested in studying what experts know and do in the real world, 
and how they use their experience to solve difficult domain tasks (Hutchins, 1995; 
Lipschitz et al., 2001; Salas and Klein, 2001; McLennan, Omodei, Holgate and 
Wearing, 2004; Gore et al., 2006; Klein, 2008; Salas et al. 2010). The phrase 
“naturalistic decision making” (NDM) is widely used to describe this body of 
knowledge since most NDM studies are conducted in valid environments where 
tasks are “real” and “natural”. The early study that led to this approach that is now 
called NDM was an attempt by Klein and his colleagues to describe the decision 
making approaches that were used by some group of fireground commanders (Klein, 
Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) 
 
In contrast to the normative decision model that prescribes how decisions should be 
made, the naturalistic decision making (NDM) describes how people actually make 
decisions using their experience. In this way, NDM researchers try to learn from 
expert professionals by identifying the cues experts use to arrive at their judgments, 
even if those cues involve tacit knowledge that is difficult to articulate (Wong, 2000; 
Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Okoli et al., 2014). Thus researchers in this field, 
amongst other things, strive to make prescriptions based on what they learn from 
experts (Yates, Veinott and Patalano, 2003; Montgomery et al., 2005). According to 
Lipshitz and Ben Shaul (1996), a common feature of the NDM domain is that it uses 
both the intuitive and deliberative modes, which are both happening in an ongoing 
simultaneous cycle of thinking and acting. As Orasanu and Connolly (1993, p.19) put 
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it: “people think a little, act a little and then evaluate the outcomes and think and act 
some more”. The focus of a decision maker in such domains is thus not on a single 
decision point or a choice dilemma, but in solving sets of dynamic and interrelated 
problems extremely rapidly (Burke and Miller, 1999; Wong and Blandford, 2002). A 
number of scholars have suggested that experts are likely to approach problems 
using both intuition and analysis, switching between both decision styles as 
conditions warrant (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Klein, 2003; Evans, 2008; Dane 
and Pratt, 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011), but it still remains unclear how 
such sequence is followed. Do experts draw on intuition and analysis as separate 
‘inputs’ when making critical decisions, or do they allow their intuition to guide their 
analysis, or do they make intuitive decisions first and then deliberate a bit? These 
questions form part of the underlying issues to be addressed in the current study. It 
is hoped that more insights are gained into when/how expert firefighters (both in the 
UK and Nigeria) utilize their intuitive knowledge while performing fireground tasks. 
 
Prior research, starting from the seminal work of Polanyi (1962) has shown that 
experts are able to spot certain cues just like others do, but act upon such cues 
differently, and most times in ways that seem inexplicable. This is exactly the type of 
knowledge driving the interest of the current study ─ tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge in this context represents the type of knowledge that comes to mind 
without any necessary explicit awareness of how the decision maker arrived at their 
judgment. This type of knowledge includes, for example, a firefighter’s decision to 
withdraw his firemen after sensing the potential for a building to collapse (Klein et al., 
2010); an experienced nurse sensing the need to place a newly born baby under a 
closer surveillance even when the baby is not showing any visible sign of illness 
(Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993); a chess master seeing promising moves that 
are hidden from other novice players (Chase and Simon, 1973); and a qualified 
geneticist that is able to find out the gender of about 2,000 newly hatched chickens 
in one hour, with 98% rate of accuracy (Biederman and Shiffrar, 1987). 
 
Furthermore, the study aims to compare and contrast the decision making strategies 
of the UK and Nigerian firefighters across both cognitive (mental processes and 
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decision making strategies) and non-cognitive (e.g. organizational and cultural 
factors) dimensions. The Nigerian fire service has been accused of being highly 
disorganized based on evidence from their work ethics when responding to fire calls 
(Adedoyin and Olanrewaju, 2006; Alinnor, 2007; Esinwoke, 2011). For example, in 
his study covering the economic implications of fire incidents in Lagos state (the 
largest commercial city in Nigeria), Cobin (2013) explained that properties worth 
millions of dollars (and sometimes human lives) are often lost when a serious fire 
breaks out in the state. The author claimed serious gaps exist in the operational 
procedures and approaches to firefighting across some major states in Nigeria. The 
saddest part of the story relates to the helplessness surrounding these Nigerian 
firefighters when managing major fire incidents. In fairness to the firefighters, 
however, a few have argued that the moribund state of the fire service in the country 
is mainly due to the gross neglect of the institution by the Nigerian government 
(Esinwoke, 2011; Angus Fire, 2011; Cobin, 2013). The lackadaisical attitude of the 
firemen, including their late arrival to fire scenes has been attributed to the weak 
infrastructural and technological advancement in the fire service. What remains 
unclear and therefore worthy of investigation is whether or not these conditions affect 
the overall performance of the Nigerian fire service, and to what extent.    
 
How do the Nigerian firefighters cope despite all the challenges they are plagued 
with? Would the Nigerian fire service become more effective if it were to be provided 
with better equipment? Would they be better-off if provided with more advanced 
training? What cultural differences exist from the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects 
of fire-fighting between the UK and the Nigerian fire service? What can the two 
groups learn from each other, if anything? These important questions also form part 
of the issues this study aims to address. It is therefore hypothesised that culture will 
play a significant role in the decision making process since it is one element that 
shapes people’s beliefs, values, attitudes and work ethics.  
 
In order to enhance the process of knowledge elicitation and contribute to existing 
knowledge on fireground decision making, the current study will employ a formal 
knowledge elicitation tool known as the critical decision method (CDM). Klein et al. 
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(1989, p.464) defined the critical decision method as “a retrospective interview 
strategy that applies a set of cognitive probes to actual non-routine incidents that 
required expert judgment or decision making”. Current evidence, based on 
comparison between pre-training and post-training performances of learners, 
suggests that the CDM when utilized for instructional design is able to increase the 
amount of gained knowledge by about 30% (Clark, 2014). In addition, the CDM 
method being a qualitative method, is hoped to provide more detailed information 
regarding the basis of expert competence — something NDM proponents believe is 
often difficult to achieve with the use of quantitative or experimental approaches 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001; Tsoukas, 2003; Lipshitz and Cohen, 2005; Klein, 2008; Nonaka 
and Krogh, 2009).  
 
1.1. AIM OF STUDY 
The overall aim of this study is to investigate, using the critical decision method, how 
expert firefighters in the UK and Nigeria make important fireground decisions and to 
discuss the implications of transferring elicited expert knowledge to novices. 
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 To investigate how experienced firefighters in the UK and Nigeria make 
difficult decisions under various task constraints on the fireground and to 
capture the (tacit) knowledge that underpins experts’ judgment 
 
 To design a conceptual model that describes the decision making strategies 
used by expert firefighters and to evaluate the model against other existing 
models in the field of cognitive psychology 
 
 To compare and contrast the various approaches to firefighting between the 
UK and Nigerian firefighters, with particular interest on the cultural differences 
that exist between both groups.  
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 To discuss the implications of knowledge transfer from experts to novices 
using information generated from objectives 1 & 2 above.  
 
1.2.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The overarching question this study aims to answer is stated thus: 
 
How can tacit knowledge best be elicited from expert firefighters particularly when it 
is needed to enhance instructional design for training novice firefighters?  
 
In the attempt to provide answers to the above question, the following subsidiary 
questions will be addressed: 
  
 How do experts utilize their tacit skills when managing complex non-routine 
incidents? 
 
  How can elicited expert knowledge be transformed into useful knowledge 
outputs that will facilitate learning for potential incident commanders?  
 
 What cognitive and contextual (cultural) differences exist between the UK and 
Nigerian firefighters, and what/how can the two groups possibly learn from 
each other? 
 
 
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT: WHY BOTHER WITH UNDERSTANDING 
HOW EXPERIENCED FIREFIGHTERS MAKE FIREGROUND DECISIONS? 
 
Research involving expert knowledge elicitation has in more recent years continued 
to gain prominence across a wide range of domains (Shadbolt and Burton, 1990; 
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Zsambok, 1997; Wong, 2000; Pliske, McCloskey and Klein, 2001; Ericsson et al. 
2007; Sarfo and Elen, 2007). Scholars are increasingly becoming aware of the 
importance of examining how top managers make difficult and vital decisions while 
performing tasks under varying degrees of task constraints (See Hoffman, Crandall 
and Shadbolt, 1998 for a review). By so doing, a number of models and frameworks 
have been developed to describe how experts translate what they know into useful 
actions (e.g. Hammond et al., 1987; Endsley, 1995; Freeman, Cohen and 
Thompson, 1998; Wong, 2000; Lipshitz et al., 2007; Lamb et al., 2014). For 
example, in their study with urban fire-fighters Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-
Cirocco (1988) showed that experienced fire-ground commanders are able to rely on 
their previous experiences to recognise cues in the current environment, and then 
deploy strategies that had been successful in the past. This insight eventually 
inspired the development of the now known “recognition primed decision making 
model” (Klein, 1997). Similarly Cohen, Freeman and Wolf (1996) in their study with 
active duty naval officers also developed a naturalistic decision-making framework 
known as the Recognition/Metacognition model. The model suggests that in high 
novel situations where recognizing patterns might prove slightly difficult, experienced 
officers tend to rely more on their metacognitive skill. In such circumstances 
experienced officers are more likely to employ a story building strategy — developing 
useful “stories” from several unrelated events to make a workable action plan.  
 
However, despite burgeoning research in the aspect of expert knowledge elicitation, 
the emergence of decision making models that are particular to the domain of 
firefighting remain relatively rare. Yet developing useful expert models that attempt to 
describe what experienced firefighters know and do arguably remains one of the 
most crucial tasks for both current and future research. This is even more true in this 
present era where the rate of fires has been on a decline particularly in the UK, 
meaning the less experienced officers have even less chances of gaining real life 
experience (Lamb et al., 2014). This further underlines the need to develop more 
useful decision making models that will aid demystifying the complexity associated 
with fireground decision making. The model proposed in this study is deemed useful 
for training purposes since: (i) it was developed directly from high ranked operational 
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commanders in the fire service (ii) it emerged from non-routine incidents that 
challenged experts’ skills.    
 
The current research is further necessitated from compelling evidence that experts 
are not fully aware of about 70% of their own decisions and mental analysis of tasks 
and are therefore unable to explain them explicitly, particularly when such 
explanation is needed to support the design of training, assessment or job 
descriptions (Clark and Elen, 2006; Feldon and Clark, 2006). Hence, although 
experts possess extensive domain and procedural knowledge than novices (c/f 
Ericsson et al., 2007), they often still find it difficult to express what they both know 
and do. This difficulty provides a useful opportunity to explore more effective 
strategies for capturing tacit knowledge — which has been regarded as the most 
important type of knowledge (Polanyi, 1962; Redding, 1992; Alavi and Leidner, 2001; 
Clark et al., 2006; Feldon, 2007; Grant, 2007; Spender, 2008). The current study is 
therefore largely inspired by the fact that although tacit knowledge dwells in the 
unconscious and hence difficult to verbalize, eliciting it seems not only realistic but 
also worthwhile if the right knowledge elicitation tool is employed (Hoffman et al., 
1995; Hoffman et al., 1998; Bontis, 2001; Klein et al., 2010; Horberry & Cooke, 2010; 
Okoli et al., 2014).  
 
Finally, despite growing evidence suggesting that decision making within the 
naturalistic setting involves more than one reasoning strategy in practice, there is still 
ongoing debate about what the dominant thinking mode is (Dane and Pratt, 2009; 
Hodgkinson et al., 2009). There is currently little or no research agreement 
concerning the preferred sequence by which individuals should employ these 
thinking modes. It thus still remains unclear whether people should take stock of their 
intuition first and then engage in analysis, or whether deliberative thinking should 
come first before invoking the intuitive mind?   
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1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY: INTENDED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM 
THE STUDY  
A few instances have been reported where subjects were seen to rate themselves as 
experts even when their records indicated the contrary (Kruger and Dunning, 1999; 
Dunning et al., 2003; Ericsson et al., 2007). These self-acclaimed experts have been 
termed pseudo-experts (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) who might not be aware “they 
actually do not know what they thought they knew”. Since the current study is 
focused on investigating what expert firefighters know and do, it is expected that the 
products that emerge from it will serve as a useful framework in defining who true 
experts are. It is also expected that a competence assessment framework (CAF) that 
will be developed in the study, which is a compilation of tacit knowledge that 
underpinned experts’ judgment, will serve as a useful tool for designing training 
curriculum for novices.  
 
Secondly, the study will contribute to the body of knowledge by comparing and 
contrasting the decision making and problem solving strategies employed by the UK 
and Nigerian firefighters. Most of the existing expert studies have been conducted 
either within a particular geographical region or across different countries with similar 
cultural characteristics (Klein et al., 1988; Calderwood, Crandall and Baynes, 1990; 
Burke and Hendry, 1997; Omodei et al., 2005; McLennan et al., 2006; Lipshitz et al., 
2007; Ingham, 2008). Rarely was any study found that compared the cognitive 
process of experts from two or more countries with distinct cultural orientations. For 
example, could it be that the competence of the UK firefighters is largely influenced 
by the advanced level of firefighting technology in place? Would the Nigerian 
firefighters be able to perform better if they had the same level of technology? “Does 
smart technology actually make people stupid?” Following the dearth of knowledge 
in this area, this study hypothesises that cultural differences in the aspect of 
technology would likely influence decision outcomes.  
 
Thirdly, following Winterton, Delamare-LeDeist and Stringfellow’s (2005) definition of 
knowledge as the interaction between intelligence (capacity to learn) and situation 
(opportunity to learn), this study is designed not only to understand how expert 
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firefighters make decisions, but also to elucidate how knowledge elicited from these 
firefighters can best be utilized for training purposes. This means that people must 
first be given the opportunity to learn before making attempts to assess their level of 
competence. Hannabuss (2000) identified four “states of knowing” and explained 
how each relates to competence (see Fig 1.1). The framework starts from a state 
where people show a complete lack of awareness of how little they know 
(unconscious incompetence) to a state where people know so much without realizing 
how much they actually know (unconscious competence). The current study aims to 
advance the competence framework by providing useful insights through which 
knowledge gathered from the “conscious competence” group (the expert firefighters) 
can be applied as a potential recipe for equipping the “conscious incompetence” 
group (the potential incident commanders). 
 
 
 
Figure 1:1 Four levels of competence (Hannabuss, 2000)  
          
1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The next chapter will present a review of the literature, which will cover a wide range 
of themes/concepts specific to the study. Key theories, models and frameworks such 
as cognitive continuum theory, recognition primed decision model, 
recognition/metacognition model and tacit knowledge will be explored. Evidence will 
also be provided from theoretical, empirical and experimental studies and some of 
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the main debates surrounding topics such as tacit knowledge, implicit learning, 
intuition and expertise will be evaluated. 
 
Chapter three will discuss the research design as well as the methods employed in 
achieving the study aim. It will address the epistemological and ontological stance of 
the researcher and provide adequate justifications regarding the various tools and 
instruments that were employed in the study. Drawing on the research methods 
literature, the sampling strategy, sample size, as well as the quality control process 
from data collection to data analysis will all be discussed.  
 
Chapter four will be dedicated to explaining the knowledge elicitation tool that was 
utilized in the study — the critical decision method. The method will be introduced 
and discussed in relation to its role in eliciting expert knowledge. A conscious effort 
will made to justify why the method was preferred to other available methods in the 
cognitive task analysis family. Issues of validity and reliability of the critical decision 
method will be discussed and some of the limitations associated with the methods 
will also be outlined. 
 
Chapter five will present and discuss the results and key findings from the study. The 
outputs from the knowledge elicitation protocol, which include an intuitive decision 
making model, a competence assessment framework, a critical cue inventory, a goal 
decomposition table will also be presented and discussed. For ease of 
understanding, presentation of the findings will be done alongside with their 
discussion. 
 
Chapter six will discuss the implications for learning the elicited knowledge, and 
suggest how such could be taught to novices. In doing so, the four component 
instructional design (4C/ID) will be adopted to show the breakdown of skill 
hierarchies, learning tasks, cognitive rules, procedural information and the pre-
requisite knowledge used by the various experts. This chapter will specifically 
address the issue of knowledge transfer 
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Chapter seven will conclude the entire thesis, with relevant recommendations for the 
UK fire service, the Nigerian fire service and for researchers in the areas of expert 
studies, educational psychology, knowledge management and judgment and 
decision making. Possible areas for future research will also be identified and 
discussed. 
 
   
 
                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRE-FIGHTING DOMAIN 
 
Fire is a complex object in itself, and in a threatening context such as the 
engulfment of an inhabited building, it can create a complex environment 
which might in turn require a complex method of inquiry (Ingham, 2007:Para 
9).  
A building on fire poses serious threats to human lives, properties, livestock, 
communities, local economies, natural resources and the environment at large 
(McLennan, Holgate, Omodei and Wearing, 2006). The complexity of managing fire 
incidents mainly stems from the need to manage uncertainties, ensure the safety of 
crew members, rescue trapped victims, manage members of the public, adhere to 
some of the statutory obligations binding fire fighters and verify media perceptions 
(Ingham, 2007). The dynamic and extremely dramatic environment where such 
events occur further increases the possibility of exposing firefighters to all sorts of 
risks and dangers (Grimwood, 2003; HSE, 1997). The unpredictable nature of the 
firefighting job therefore explains why firefighters still encounter novel and difficult 
situations that sometimes shock them, despite being equipped with advanced 
equipment and gadgets such as breathing apparatus, fire resistant clothing and all 
sorts of hose-lines (Tissington and Flin, 2005; Ingham, 2008).  
Arguably, one of the main tests of character for incident commanders is that of 
finding possible solutions to current problems amidst uncertainty, yet finding a way to 
act as quickly as possible (Marold, Wagner, Schobel, and Manzey, 2012; Mitroff, 
1988; Riabacke, 2006; Lipshitz et al., 2007). Since uncertainty in this context is 
defined as a sense of doubt that inhibits or delays action (Lipshitz et al., 2001), the 
dilemma therefore remains that making quick decisions on the fireground can 
become quite challenging as key information are sometimes not just available. As a 
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result, decision makers find themselves in situations where they have to “think and 
act at the same time” (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993; Fink, 2002; Boin and Hart, 
2007; Milasinovic, Kesetovic and Nadic, 2010). 
The following excerpt from the work of Flin (1996) sheds more light on some of the 
complexities associated with firefighting, including the web of decisions that confront 
firefighters mostly under time pressure: 
“On arrival at the scene of a fire, officers are bombarded with a mass of visual 
and other information relating to the incident, its progress and its context. On a 
short time scale, often under great pressure, the officer in charge must grasp 
the situation, understand the problem being faced, prioritize fire service actions 
on the basis of reasonable strategy, deploy available resources, know when to 
ask for reinforcements and what these should be” (Flin, 1996, p.140) 
2.1.1 Complex fires as a form of crisis  
 
According to Boin and Lagadec (2000), there is no such thing as a routine crisis. 
Every crisis confronts decision-makers with hard dilemmas that must somehow be 
negotiated. An event or a series of events is therefore referred to as a crisis precisely 
because something out of the ordinary happened which in turn necessitates some 
form of intervention (Smith, 2000). Essentially, a crisis differs from other related 
terms such as hazard or incident in that successful decisions are not usually based 
on documented procedures and appropriate pre-defined responses may not exist, 
and even if they do, they may have conflicting meaning in practice. Those 
responsible for managing crises must therefore think through a situation and respond 
in more creative and flexible ways (Borodzicz and van Haperen, 2002). This further 
justifies why high cognitive demands are usually placed on operational firefighters in 
terms of being creative, flexible and adaptive to changing conditions (Orasanu and 
Connolly, 1993; Cokely, 2007). Therefore considering the level of uncertainty and 
unpredictability associated with complex fires, their scale and impacts, it appears 
logical to place such fires into the category of a crisis (Turner, 1976; Wallace, 1981; 
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Smith, 1990; Fink, 2002; Vakalis et al., 2004; Elliot & Smith, 2006; Wales and 
Thompson, 2013; Cobin, 2013).  
Interestingly, and in line with the context of the current study, the terms “crisis” 
and “decision-making” have been viewed as two inseparable entities i.e. two sides 
of the same coin (Shrivastava, 1992; Fink, 2002; Shaluf, Ahmadun and Said, 
2003). This relationship is evident from the crisis definitions reviewed below:  
   
Table 2.1 A review of crisis definitions 
Crisis definition  Author (s) 
“…a serious threat to the basic structure or the fundamental values 
and norms of a social system, which—under time pressure and 
highly uncertain circumstances—necessitates making critical 
decisions” 
(Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and 
Charles, 1989) 
 
“…a situation that threatens high-priority goals of the decision-
making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response 
before the decision is transformed and surprises the members of the 
decision-making unit by its occurrence” 
(Herman, 1997) 
 
….. a point of indecision; the moment when uncertainty looms at the 
same time as disruption.  
Ogrizek and Guillery (1997)  
a turning point for better or worse; a decisive moment, a crucial time  (Fink, 1982, 2002) 
“A fit of uncertainty and distress where everything is in 
suspense.......in anticipation of imminent resolution. A sort of 
moment of truth and choice where everything changes fast and 
irreversibly” 
Boin and t’Hart (2007) 
 
A dominant emerging theme from the above crisis definitions is that almost all crisis 
situations require swift and rapid decisions. Having sound domain knowledge or 
understanding the cognitive rules associated with various tasks may be insufficient if 
officers are in the end unable to act intuitively under time pressure.  
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2.1.2. Dynamic Risk Assessment on the Fireground 
As with many other work practices, the firefighting domain is usually characterized by 
a number of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that guide safe performance at 
the incident ground (Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, 1987). These SOPs are a 
combination of technical procedures (e.g. using the right type of equipment such as 
hose reels, main jets, ladder, fireman’s axe etc.) as well as the modus operandi of 
managing incidents (e.g. splitting crews between the front and rear of a building).  
In the UK, for instance, one of the philosophical rules or tenets guiding the decision 
making process of incident commanders is that:  
  “Firefighters will take ‘some’ risk to save saveable lives 
 Firefighters will take ‘a little’ risk to save saveable property 
 Firefighters will ‘not take any risk at all’ to try to save lives or property that are 
already lost” 
                                         (HM Fire Service Inspectorate, 1999b, p.30) 
While it is worth acknowledging that rules and philosophical principles of these sorts 
are useful in most high risk domains as they help establish risk tolerance levels for 
task operators, what remains a challenge is finding an appropriate way of 
interpreting phrases such as ‘some risk’, ‘a little risk’ and ‘any risk at all’ (Grimwood 
2003; Tissington and Flin 2005; HM Government 2008). Previous studies have 
shown that making decisions about what is/not risky on the fireground tends be more 
subjective than objective (Shanteau 1992; Adams 2003; Perry and Wiggins 2008; 
Okoli et al. 2013). For example, the fact that a particular procedure is marked “high 
risk” in a training manual does not necessarily imply that officers must take a 
defensive position when faced with a similar situation in real-life. Some level of risk 
must be accepted and managed on the fireground. Evidence from empirical studies 
has shown that solving certain fire ground tasks by strictly following domain rules 
could sometimes be counter-productive (Burke, 1997; McLennan et al. 2006; Ingham 
2008; Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco 2010) 
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What then is dynamic risk assessment? The DRA model as proposed by several 
authors (e.g. Clancy, 2011; Tissington and Flin 2005; HM Government, 2008) 
requires that fire-ground commanders: 
• Continuously monitor and evaluate a situation, the tasks, the people and 
properties at risk 
• Select the most appropriate systems of operation 
• Assess and re-assess the chosen systems of operation 
• Introduce additional controls if required 
• Modify and implement action plans as events unfold 
 
The strength of the DRA model lies in the fact that it gives decision makers the 
opportunity to use their experience to select the most appropriate strategy that would 
achieve desired response goals. Commanders are allowed to decide whether to 
follow the “bog standard” ways of doing things or make some level of adjustments to 
existing rules. Contrary to claims by the classical theorists, the model advocates that 
decision making is not static or linear, but highly dependent on current environmental 
and informational cues (Reimer and Hoffrage, 2006; Katsikopoulos, 2010).  
However, since the DRA model does not indicate, for example, the precise amount 
of risk that should be tolerated by a commander, the experience of the decision 
maker therefore becomes a critical component of the model (Ericsson, Prietula and 
Cokely, 2007). In other words, the accuracy of the subjective interpretations that an 
officer would potentially make regarding an incident, as well as the decisions 
accruing from such interpretations depends largely on the officer’s level of expertise 
(Klein, 2003; Shanteau, 1992; Ericsson et al, 2007).  Experience is vital in making 
critical fire ground decisions such as whether to employ an offensive attack or to go 
defensive, whether to commit crews into a building or become more precautionary, 
whether to allocate more resources at the beginning of an incident or wait till a later 
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stage when more information must have been obtained (Liptschitz et al., 2007; 
McLennan et al., 2004; Omodei et al., 2005). 
Experienced fire fighters always strive to draw from their rich base of mental model, 
which helps them describe, explain and predict events better (Phillips, Klein and 
Sieck, 2003). Since the commanders are aware that generating and evaluating a 
large set of options will likely cause a fire to grow out of control and then become 
impossible to manage, they use their experience to generate a workable option, 
which is usually the first, and possibly the only option they might have to consider 
(Johnson and Raab, 2003). These themes are discussed further in section 2.7.1  
2.2. THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE IN CRISIS DECISION MAKING 
It has been shown that studies within the naturalistic decision making environment 
are somewhat incomplete in the absence of domain experts (Shanteau, 1992; Elliot, 
2005; Hoffman et al., 1998; Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007; Klein, Calderwood 
and Clinton-Cirocco, 2010). However, what remains unclear from most of the 
previous studies is how the cognitive functioning of experts differs from that of 
novices. This lack of clarity continues to generate questions in the expertise literature 
as researchers are becoming increasingly curious to gain a better understanding of 
the cognitive functioning of experts and novices (see Elliot, 2005; Phillips, Klein and 
Sieck, 2004). One of the fundamental challenges yet to overcome in this regard lies 
in defining who an expert actually is (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006; Kahneman 
and Klein, 2009; Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007). It is perceived that most of the 
confusion in the expertise literature is hinged upon the lack of consensus in agreeing 
at a universal definition for the term ‘expert’, with definitions varying across a wide 
range of disciplines and contexts (Shanteau, 1992; Shanteau et al., 2002; Hoffman 
et al., 1998). Many criteria for measuring expertise have been reported. For 
example, Klein et al. (1986) in their initial research with firefighters used ‘years of 
experience’ as a yardstick for defining experts. They suggested that a repertoire of at 
least 10 years of experience is generally acceptable to qualify a person as expert 
(Lesgold et al., 1988; Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1986).  
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Other scholars, however, argue that it is not enough to solely rely on years of 
experience in defining experts (Shanteau, 1989; Shanteau et al., 2002; Phillips, Klein 
and Sieck, 2004; Gore, 2006). These authors suggest that the “quality” of people’s 
experience and the nature of the problems they solve should also be considered. In 
line with this logic, it is believed that experts who are more exposed to complex and 
non-routine tasks but have 5 years of experience are more likely to be superior to 
experts with 10 years of experience who mostly perform routine tasks (Hatano and 
Inagaki, 2000; Tissington and Flin, 2005; Feldon, 2007; Ericsson, Prietula and 
Cokely, 2007). This also supports the findings of Serfaty et al. (1997) who, in their 
study with battle ground commanders, revealed that good performance on job tasks 
was neither correlated with the participants’ years of experience nor rank.  
Other scholars have also defined experts on the basis of peer nomination i.e. by 
asking colleagues within an organization to identify who they think the experts are 
(Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton and Klein, 1995). Defining experts this way seems to 
suggest that expertise is domain specific and that people who are external to a 
particular organization might have to rely on the advice of in-house staff to be able to 
identify individuals with exceptional abilities (Shanteau, 1992; Hoffman, Crandall and 
Shadbolt, 1998).  
In other instances, still, the term “expert” has been defined on the basis of how 
competent people are in performing domain tasks. For example, Hoffman, Shadbolt, 
Burton and Klein (1995) reported how college students were used as experts in a 
wide range of studies focused on football, reading or wedding apparel. In these 
studies, expertise was strictly defined on the basis of how competent an individual 
was on any of these tasks (regardless of whether or not they were college students). 
On this school of thought, Means and Voss (1985) relied on the participation of 
nursery children who were passionate fans of the “star wars” movies in a study 
aimed at investigating the performances of school children across different class 
levels. 
Two contrasting paradigms have therefore generally emerged from the expert and 
expertise literature, depending on the lens with which people decide to view experts. 
Firstly, researchers within the judgment and decision making (JDM) discipline see 
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experts as people who are similarly prone to making flawed decisions, just like 
novices (for example see Meehl, 1954; Dawes, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 
Kahneman, 2003; Evan and Over, 2010; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010). Scholars 
here believe experts are not necessarily immune to the cognitive biases and human 
factors that affect novices. On the other hand, scholars in the field of cognitive 
science show a significant level of trust in experts’ competence (see Klein, 1993, 
2003; Shanteau, 1992; Ericsson, 2004; Baylor, 2001; Philips, Klein and Sieck, 2004; 
Zsambok, 1997). The naturalistic decision making community which is a sub-unit of 
cognitive science draw inspiration from the notion that experts make better decisions 
than novices in all aspects of cognitive functioning (Salas et al., 2010; Keller et al., 
2010; Lipschitz et al., 2001; Klein, 2008; Okoli et al., 2014)  
This divergent view of expertise has perhaps encouraged further disagreement 
amongst scholars (Meehl, 1986; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Driskell, Copper and 
Moran, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Falzer, 2004; Gobet, 2005), which has in turn 
generated more questions for researchers within the field of expert studies. Some 
such questions include: is expertise synonymous with experience? Do experts rely 
on their intuition more than novices when solving complex problems? Do experts 
suffer from the same judgmental biases that have been demonstrated in novices? To 
what extent do experts display overconfidence when faced with novel situations? 
How best can people attain expertise?   
Nonetheless, two definitions of the term ‘expert’ have been found to be particularly 
relevant for the purpose of this study. The first by Shanteau (1992) is that experts 
are “those who have been recognized within their profession as having the 
necessary skills and abilities to perform at the highest level” while the second by 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) used an analogy within the domain of fire-fighting to 
define expert in the sense that When colleagues say, “If Person X had been there 
instead of Person Y, the fire would not have spread so far,” then Person X is an 
expert in that organization. 
Although the first definition relates expertise to acquiring the right skills and 
knowledge while the second links it to peer nomination, the common ground with 
both definitions is that experts know and do better than their novice counterparts 
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(see also Elliot, 2005; Shanteau, 1992; Glaser and Chi 1988; Ericsson et al., 2007; 
Gore, 2006; Klein, 1997; Klein, 2003; Chi and Glazer, 1981). This justifies the need 
to explore both the characteristics and qualities that make experts who they are. 
2.3.1. Expert and Novice dichotomy: exploring the skills and 
strategies used by experts  
Since finding a universally accepted definition for the term “expert” has proved quite 
challenging, some scholars have reverted into comparing the performance of experts 
with that of novices, using the result from such comparison as the basis for 
understanding who experts are (see Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1988; 
Crandall & Gretchell-Leiter, 1993; King and Clark, 2002; Dreyfus, 2004). It is 
however worthy of note that the terms “expert” and “novice” are used as relative 
terms throughout this thesis to refer to higher and lower levels of skills and 
experience (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton and Klein, 1995).  
Experts are not necessarily better than novices because they think faster or possess 
a wider range of skills; they do mainly because they are able to organize and apply 
their knowledge and skills better through a schema-based network that makes the 
process of  information retrieval relatively easier and less effortful (Sweller, 1994; 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus, 2004; Calderwood, Crandall and Baynes, 1990; 
Means and Gott, 1988; Beach and Lipshitz, 1997; Anderson, 1982; Glaser and Chi, 
1988; Phillip et al., 2003; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010). Experts use their existing 
knowledge to facilitate situation assessment and gain a perceptual advantage as 
events unfold (Hutton and Klein, 1999). As a result, they are able to see what is 
invisible to novices such as situation typicality, identification of patterns, relationships 
and potential consequences of action (Lewandowsky and Kirsner, 2000; Hutton and 
Klein, 1999; Means et al. 1993; Elliot 2005). For instance, in an empirical study 
aimed at identifying the rules used by experts to assess roof squishiness (a term 
used to measure the structural integrity of a roof), Calderwood et al. (1987) 
discovered rather surprisingly that no visible rule exists for making such a decision. 
One of the experienced firefighters interviewed by the authors explained that: 
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"You simply have to stand on enough squishy roofs and enough un-squishy 
roofs until you know the difference. To a novice, all roofs are squishy". 
(Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, 1987, p.19).  
A summary of some specialized techniques used by experts in gaining these 
perceptual advantage are briefly discussed below: 
 Information filtering: Experts are able to systematically sift relevant from 
irrelevant information, thereby increasing the cognitive capacity of their 
working memory (Randel et al., 1996; Federico, 1995; Hutton and Klein, 1999; 
Hutchins, Pirolli and Card, 2004). This technique helps to reduce the risk of 
cognitive overload in experts since there will now be more space to 
accommodate useful data (Tulving, 2002). Experts organize their schemata 
such that they are able to ignore mental noise, allowing closer attention to be 
given to the pressing cognitive demands (Klein, 2003; Salas, Rosen and 
DiazGranados, 2010) 
 
 Chunking:  this is the ability to condense a complex and problematic task into 
manageable “chunks” rather than tackle as a whole entity (Dreyfus, 2004; 
Elliot, 2005, p.29). Managing problems in chunks helps decision makers to 
more easily apply various treatment strategies to each chunk in their 
manageable state, exactly what is required for managing complex world 
problems (Klein, 2003)  
 
 Rich knowledge base and mental model: With the ability to organize 
knowledge using inferences and principles that allows the construction of rich 
mental model, experts tend to generally possess greater domain knowledge 
than novices (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006; Montgomery, Lipshitz and 
Brehmer, 2005; Zsambok, 1997). A Mental model is defined as a mental 
representation of how things work, or simply put, an internal representation of 
the external world (Chi and Glaser, 1981). Experts understand the dynamics 
of events in their domain and know how tasks and subtasks are supposed to 
be performed, how equipment is supposed to function, and how teams are 
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supposed to operate (Phillips, Klein and Sieck, 2004). Their wide pool of 
experience also allows them to understand a situation in terms of the 
plausible goals, relevant cues, expectancies and typical actions (van 
Merrienboer, Clark and de Croock, 2002; Klein, 1993). And because experts 
know what to expect in advance they are then able to free up more energy to 
respond to the more difficult tasks (Wulf and Shea, 2002; Ingham, 2007) 
 
 Pattern matching: this is the ability to address a current situation by 
recognizing patterns as similar to those previously stored in one’s memory 
(Watkins, 2007; Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hutchinson and Robin, 1998). This 
characteristic feature of experts has elsewhere been termed recognition-
triggered reasoning (Lesgold et al., 1988) or recognition primed decision 
(Klein, 1993, 1997). Experts tend to identify cues collectively (patterns), 
whereas novices focus more on fragmented cues without having much 
understanding of how cues link up (Van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005; 
Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993).  
 
 Finding leverage points:  this is the ability to form effective improvisation 
strategies when faced with novel (atypical) situations ─ also known as 
creative decision making (Okoli et al., 2014). For example, Klein (1998) 
reported how a fire ground commander used a belt intended to secure 
firefighters to a ladder to rescue a woman dangling on a highway sign. 
According to Klein, the commander was able to mentally simulate a series of 
approaches aimed at rescuing the woman and eventually determined that the 
ladder belt would do the trick better. This creative quality is evident in experts 
because they spend relatively more time to analyze a situation than to 
deliberate on a course of action (Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely (2007). 
Novices tend to do it the other way round.  
 
 Mental simulation: this is the ability to project the environment’s status into the 
future (Artman, 2008). Once an option is generated, experts use mental 
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simulation to work it through at a deeper level, looking for pitfalls and/or 
potential opportunities. This process is also known as progressive deepening 
(Gobet, 2005). However, the accuracy of people’s mental simulation seems to 
be influenced by the quality of their mental model. As Salas et al. (2010) put it: 
mental simulation is simply “running a mental model”. 
 
If experts are therefore known for exceptional performances, there must likely be 
something that motivates them to do so. Zimmerman (2006) found a positive 
correlation between motivation and the development of expertise and identified four 
themes in the process: (i) experts are mostly propelled to set higher goals for 
themselves because of their high level of self-efficacy. This self-efficacy in turn 
increases their level of commitment in achieving their set goals (ii) experts are by 
default keen on improving their level of performance which explains why they tend to 
value continuous learning and deliberate practice (iii) experts are particularly 
motivated by their achievement of success and often build their confidence from their 
success stories. As confidence grows, the fear of failure continues to get less 
attention (iv) experts are naturally motivated within their domain of practice, always 
showing great respect for their job even when extrinsic reward falls short of their 
input.       
The characteristics of experts can therefore be thematically summarized as: 
 Expertise is domain specific ─ i.e. experts’ skills are diminished outside their area 
of expertise. 
 Experts see patterns. 
 Experts are faster in thinking and make fewer errors. 
 Experts have superior memory in their domain (environmental cues are an aid to 
recall). 
 Experts see and represent a problem at a deeper level i.e. experts see what is 
normally invisible to others  
 Experts first assess a situation before acting in order to identify the relevant cues 
and to understand their implications for action. 
 Experts have strong self-monitoring skills (metacognition). 
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 Experts have refined perceptual abilities. 
 Expertise is acquired through stages of development (e.g. increasing levels of 
training)  and there are no shortcuts to attaining expertise 
 Experts produce concrete results and superior performances than their peers 
 True expertise can be measured and replicated in the laboratory (e.g. through 
serious games, role-playing or simulation exercises). This implies that knowledge 
elicited from experts can be developed into useful forms, which is then utilized for 
designing learning tasks.  
2.4. SKILL ACQUISITION, SKILL DEVELOPMENT AND MEMORY 
SYSTEMS 
A skill, for the purpose of this study, is defined as any combination of mental, 
physical or behavioral qualities that is useful for task performance and requires a 
considerable amount of training and practice to be acquired (Winterton, Delamare-
LeDeist and Stringfellow, 2005). It can therefore be inferred that (i) skills develop 
over time, but with continuous practice (Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007) (ii) 
skills are goal oriented i.e. they are meant to respond to or address some external 
environmental demands (Anderson, 1982) (iii) the acquisition of skills is facilitated 
when components of behaviour are structured into coherent patterns (Rasmussen, 
1983), and (iv) the cognitive efforts required for the application and utilization of skills 
are drastically reduced as skills develop (Proctor and Dutta, 1995).  
Four categories of skills have been broadly identified in the cognitive science 
literature: (i) perceptual skills  ─ the ability to make clear distinctions and judgments 
and to discriminate between and within cues (Phillips, Klein and Sieck, 2004; 
Calderwood, Klein and Crandall, 1988); (ii) response selection skills/ decision-
making skills ─ the ability to choose the most workable option from the various 
available alternatives (Klein, 1997; Alberti, 2002; Flin, O’Connor and Crichton, 2008); 
(iii) motor skills ─ concerned with the manual aspects of performance e.g. the speed 
and accuracy of physical movements (Proctor and Dutta, 1995; Wulf and Shea, 
2002; Winterton et al. 2005); and (iv) problem-solving skills ─ the ability to creatively 
proffer solutions to novel challenges and atypical problems (Proctor and Dutta, 1995; 
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Ingham, 2007; Cokely, 2007; Falzer, 2004). Besides the motor skills, which are non-
cognitive skills, the other three skill categories are all classified as cognitive skills.  
In their book entitled “Safety at the sharp end: a guide to non-technical skills”, Flin, 
O’Connors & Crichton (2008) used the term non-technical skills (NTS) to differentiate 
between the more “obvious” technical skills and the tacit (soft) skills, and strongly 
criticized the notion that possessing technical knowledge about a task is sufficient for 
effective performance. The authors made a strong case to justify why professionals 
must also possess non-technical skills (NTS) in addition to their technical knowledge. 
Non-technical skills generally represent the cognitive and social skills of team 
members, not directly related to the control of a system or standard operating 
procedures (SOP), but that complement the technical skills and contribute to safe 
and effective performance of tasks (Crichton and Flin, 2008; Fletcher et al., 2003; 
Flin, O’Connor and Mearns, 2002; Proctor and Dutta, 1995, p.262; Keller et al., 
2010). The authors identified seven non-technical skills which includes 
communication, leadership, stress management, fatigue management, situation 
awareness, teamwork and decision-making (Crichton and Flin, 2004; Flin, 
O’Connors and Crichton, 2008). In explaining the value of NTS, Endsley and 
Garland (2000) observed that about 85% of the accidents that occurred in the 
aviation industry were as a result of pilots losing their situation awareness at critical 
points on motion despite possessing ample technical skills.  
Understanding how skills develop in people over time has been shown to facilitate a 
better understanding of experts’ cognitive architecture (Elliot, 2005; Shanteau, 1992; 
Glaser, 1987; Spender, 2008). However this would require that one first understands 
how skills are committed to the memory (Winterton, Delamare-LeDeist and 
Stringfellow, 2005). Below is an outline of the basic principles involved in learning, 
memorizing and utilizing skills, based on the work of Welford (1968) whose early 
research focused on examining various aspects of skilled performance. Welford 
posits that all the stages in the framework must have to take place before a skill can 
be effectively learnt or transferred: 
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•  The actor must understand the task (material must be perceived and 
comprehended). 
• Material must be held in short term memory (STM) until there is time for a 
more permanent registration to take place. 
• A memory trace has to be established and must be able to withstand any form 
of interference. 
• The memory trace must endure (must not be distorted) until time of recall. 
• The actor must be able to recognize an appropriate situation to apply the 
information stored in the memory. 
• Material stored in memory must be recovered correctly 
•  Recalled material should be used to produce a workable action 
 
Consistent with Welford’s model of skill acquisition, Shanteau (1992) categorized the 
process of skill development into three different but inter-related stages. The first 
stage is what he referred to as the cognitive stage where specific facts are 
committed into memory through rehearsal (Anderson, 1982). The second is the 
associative stage where links are made between facts and attempts are made to 
reduce interference from the outside environment (Cooper, 1998; Eraut, 2004). 
Finally, the automatic stage is where the links formed in the associative stage 
become smooth and continuous; where task performance requires only minimal 
conscious effort (Feldon, 2007; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Klein, 2003; Falzer, 2004).  
In essence, before a skill can be used to aid performance, it has to firstly be stored in 
the memory, retrieved and then converted into behavior (Tulving, 2002). Routinized 
skills and previous experiences are stored in the memory for ease of recollection 
(Tulving, 1989).  
2.4.1. What is memory?  
Although a complicated subject, attempts have been made over many decades to 
define what it is and how it operates. William James, one of the founders of 
Psychology defined memory as “the present conscious awareness of an event that 
has happened in the rememberer’s own past” (Williams, 1890; cited in Tulving, 
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1989). The initial assumption had been that people are able to retrieve useful 
information from their memory only if they were also able to recollect the key events 
that took place at the point of information encoding (Tulving, 1985). But over the 
years, this assumption was debunked as new studies began to reveal that both the 
knowledge of learned facts and the recollection of past events represent operations 
of different memory systems (Cooper, 1998; Tulving, 1989, 2002; Anderson and 
Schooler, 2000). It was also shown that these memory systems are most times 
independent of each other.  
Three memory systems have been distinguished and widely reported in the 
literature: (i) Procedural memory — which enables individuals to retain learned 
associations and connections between cues and actions so as to avoid learning 
those associations over again. Simply put, procedural memory is where the 
knowledge of “how best to do things” is stored. (ii) Semantic memory — stores 
factual knowledge and ensures that individuals are able to construct their own 
meaning of the external world. It includes such things as types of cars, name of 
countries, social cultures, functions of equipment, vocabulary, understanding of 
subjects, etc. (iii) Episodic memory — ensures that previous episodes and events 
are stored such that individuals are able to mentally “travel back” and retrieve 
particular information from their past experiences.  
How then do people manage to access information in their memory when needed? 
This question refers to the operation of short-term memory (Tulving, 1989; Sweller, 
1994; Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 2006). STM represents a “temporary store” 
where effortful and conscious internal computations are performed (Cooper, 1998; 
Cowan, 2008). It is also designed to remind us about facts that have previously been 
stored in long term memory, for the sake of precision when performing current work 
tasks e.g. when recalling a specific event (analogue) from among the many episodes 
that are chunked together in the memory (prototypes). It therefore implies that skills, 
if not properly learnt or correctly stored in long term memory, may prove difficult or 
even impossible to recall (Paas and van Merrienboer, 1994).  
However, understanding how skills in individuals develop over time does not seem 
an easy task as other factors other than the characteristics of the skill also influence 
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the learning of skills (Ericsson et al., 2006; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Horberry and 
Cooke, 2010; Ericsson, 2006; Phillips, et al., 2004). These include for example, the 
learning environment, learner’s level of engagement and motivation, individual 
attitude of learners as well as their talent level (c/f Pollock et al., 2002). The difficulty 
in understanding how skills develop in people have led a number of scholars to 
propose an alternative way of understanding the process of skill development i.e. by 
examining the various developmental stages of expertise and consciously monitor 
skill performance at each stage (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; King and Clark, 2002; 
Dreyfus, 2004; Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007; Winterton et al., 2005). As 
opposed to concentrating on the ‘ready-made’ experts, this approach will provide a 
clearer assessment of how human cognition develops with expertise.  
Studies have attempted to compare the cognitive architectures of novices and 
experts as a way of understanding skill development (Calderwood, Crandall and 
Klein, 1987; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Chase and Ericsson, 1981; Calderwood, 
Crandall and Baynes, 1990). Dreyfus (1972) identified six developmental stages 
along the chain of expertise: Novice ― Advanced ― Beginner ― Competent ― 
Proficient ― Expert. Similarly, Hoffman et al. (1995) identified seven developmental 
levels using completely different terminologies from Dreyfus: Naivette ― Novice ― 
Initiate ― Apprentice ― Journeyman ― Expert ― Master.  
2.4.2. Skills, Rules and Knowledge 
The notion that experts are able to perform recurrent aspects of tasks due to their 
extensive domain knowledge has been widely reported in the cognitive science 
literature (Sweller, 1994; Anderson and Schooler, 2000; Paas, 2005; Cowan, 2008; 
Clark et al., 2014). These authors attributed this ability mainly to the efficient 
functioning of schemas. Schemas contain rules and procedures that can 
systematically link particular features of a problem to a possible course of action (IF 
condition, THEN action). In other words, experts use the general knowledge they 
have about a domain, or the knowledge they are able to recall from concrete cases, 
or knowledge from both to form action plans and solve new problems (Klein, 1998; 
2003). On this note therefore, a direct relationship seems to exist between the skills 
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possessed by experts, their knowledge of the domain and the domain rules that 
guide their actions.  
Ten Berge and Van Hezewijk (1999) identified two major types of knowledge used 
for task performance: declarative knowledge (knowing-that) and procedural 
knowledge (knowing-how) and argued that both knowledge types are not competitive 
but complementary to each other. Declarative knowledge supports performance 
through conceptual understanding of the procedures and principles that surround 
particular tasks or domain in general (Anderson, 1983). It is often expressed verbally 
and explicitly by professionals as it is made up of stored facts and events (Tulving, 
1985; Anderson, 2000; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nichols, 2000; Cowan, 2008).  
The acquisition of declarative knowledge begins by learning skills in hierarchically 
structured and sequential patterns (Clark et al. 2006). As experts acquire more skills 
and gain more domain knowledge, their declarative knowledge automatically 
becomes more extensive, thereby requiring a more structured and coherent 
organization of the various cognitive elements. Such organization takes place in 
schemas, and it is this schema-based network that makes information retention and 
recall possible for domain experts with a high degree of accuracy (Orasanu and 
Connolly, 1993; Elliot, 2005; Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997; Falzer, 2004; Salas, Rosen 
and DiazGranados, 2010).  
The challenge, however, is that declarative knowledge is insufficient for generating 
skilled performances or for subsequent use in designing training materials (Ritter et 
al., 2007). This is because experts can unintentionally misrepresent the conceptual 
knowledge upon which their competence is based: a paradox where professionals 
are able to refer to scientific data, theoretical manuals and SOPs in clear explicit 
terms, yet use such knowledge in ways that are largely tacit (Skriver and Flin, 1996; 
Nichols, 2000; Tsoukas, 2003; Eraut, 2004). It therefore appears that expert 
performance is qualified by another type of knowledge other than declarative 
knowledge, which is procedural or automated knowledge — also known as 
knowledge of knowing-how (Eraut, 2004; Cooke, 1994; Cooper, 1998). Knowledge of 
wine tasting, maintaining balance while riding a bicycle or crafting a violin are all 
typical examples of this type of knowledge (Nonaka and Krogh, 2009)  
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It is true that experts sometimes apply certain rules and procedures to arrive at their 
judgments, however, analyzing such rules have only provided limited information 
regarding how decisions were actually made (Polanyi, 1962; Shanteau et al. 2002; 
Ingham, 2008). At best, “rules” and “methods” are useful in explaining this type of 
knowledge only after solutions to problems have been proffered, not before (Dörfler 
and Ackermann, 2012). For example, Cooke and Breedin (1994) found that 
knowledge elicitors were unable to arrive at the same conclusions with expert 
physicists even after adopting exactly the same procedures and explanations 
stipulated by the experts. This therefore implies that procedural knowledge operates 
outside the conscious awareness of professionals (Reber 1989; Eraut, 2004; 
Hogarth, 2003) and involves a good understanding of how a system operates (how 
to do things). This knowledge type is thus a compulsory requirement for all skilled 
performance and is characterized by both situational and strategic procedural 
qualities i.e. assessing, deciding, acting and monitoring (Billett, 2010; Wei and 
Salvendy, 2004).  
Without adequate knowledge about a particular procedure, skills cannot be 
transferred for solving difficult problems (Feldon, 2007). One of the features of higher 
level competence is that knowledge becomes increasingly ‘proceduralized’ and 
readily converted into skills (Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012). Simply “knowing that” 
(declarative knowledge) is not enough for most job tasks in high reliability 
organizations such as firefighting. Knowing what to do with what is already known 
and knowing how to combine what is known differently is usually of greater 
importance in these domains (Shanteau et al., 2002).  
On this note, one of the main differences between procedural knowledge and 
declarative knowledge is therefore that the former has more utility over the latter. 
This means procedural knowledge has already been contextualized and ready for 
use, whereas the latter is still based on other people’s perspectives and therefore not 
readily available for use (Ten Berge and Van Hezewijk, 1999; Eraut, 2004).  
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2.5. TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND TACIT KNOWING: POLANYI’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
“Something that we know when no one asks us but no longer know when 
we are supposed to give account of it is something we need to remind 
ourselves of”   
                               (Wittgenstein, 1958: No 89) 
 
Michael Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher, was the first person to use the term 
tacit knowledge ― a term that has now become popular in the knowledge 
management literature (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Tsoukas, 2003; Grant, 2007). 
In his article entitled “do we really understand tacit knowledge” Tsoukas (2003) noted 
that Polanyi is an author who has been heavily referenced, but whose work is 
actually understood by only a few. Polanyi’s main line of thought is that creative acts 
(or acts of discovery) are imbued with strong personal feelings and commitments, 
and that knowledge is highly dependent on human action. These assertions were 
well documented in his early work, specifically in one of his most famous books 
titled Personal Knowledge. In the book, Polanyi (1958, p.3) refuted the then 
dominant belief that science was value-free, arguing instead that the informed 
guesses, gut-feelings and intuitions which are part of exploratory acts are motivated 
by what he called ‘passions’. The assumption that codified (or theoretical knowledge) 
is totally objective was the major bone of contention for Polanyi. He argued that 
taking a closer look at how the so called codified knowledge is used in practice 
reveals it is grounded on “personal judgments” and “tacit commitments”, implying 
therefore that theoretical or codified knowledge is not as objective, or explicit, or self-
sustaining as it was taken to be at the time (Polanyi, 1962, 1966; Grant, 2007).  
 
All forms of knowledge contain what Polanyi (1962, p.17) termed personal 
coefficient. It is this personal knowledge that makes the interpretation of facts or 
application of knowledge unique from one individual to another — since individuals 
acquire and utilize skills differently. To him all knowing is personal, to which the 
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knower necessarily participates in all acts of understanding — what was also termed 
“participation through indwelling” (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p.44).  
 
To simplify the above, Polanyi presented a map reading scenario. A map, according 
to him, is an explicit representation of a particular territory which, in logical terms, is 
not different from a theoretical system or a system of rules (in this case enabling the 
map user to move from point A to point B). To use a map, Polanyi identified three 
things the user must do: (i) they must identify their current position on the map (“I am 
here”) (ii) they must find their route on the map (e.g. “I want to get to the train station, 
which is 2 miles away”) and (iii) they must identify the routes on the map using 
various landmarks that allows them get to their destination (e.g. “I have to get past 
the clinic and then turn left”). The salient point here is that a map cannot read itself 
no matter how elaborate or well-designed it seems; it will require some level of 
judgment and interpretation from its user who will have to relate the map to the 
outside world through cognitive and sensual means (Polanyi, 1962)     
 
However, since every act of knowing contains a personal coefficient, which is 
evidenced through skilful performance, how much influence then does an actor have 
on their skilled performance? For Polanyi, an actor actually achieves skilled 
performance by observing a set of rules they know little or nothing about e.g. a 
cyclist does not normally know the rule that helps them maintain good balance on 
the bicycle neither does a swimmer know the rule that keeps them afloat. 
Interestingly, being ignorant to these rules is not necessarily detrimental to task 
performance since a rule is effective in guiding actions in the first place only when it 
has been assimilated and “lapsed into unconsciousness” (Polanyi, 1962, p.62). For 
example, in learning how to drive, one can learn a great deal about how to use the 
gear box or how to press the accelerator, but to be able to drive, such knowledge 
has to lapse into unconsciousness. 
 
Do individuals actually know how to exercise their skills? Polanyi (1962) believes 
they usually don’t, instead a mental effort is mostly relied upon (along with its 
accompanying heuristic effect).  This mental effort captures and incorporates other 
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elements of a situation, provided such elements are related to the task at hand, 
without the performer knowing them as they would appear in themselves. The 
features of the elements are subsidiarily known by the actor as long as they 
contribute to the task being performed. Putting it in Polanyi’s words: 
 
“This is the usual process of unconscious trial and error by which we feel our 
way to success and may continue to improve on our success without 
specifiably knowing how we do it” (italics in the original). This is how we invent 
a method of swimming without knowing that we actually regulate our breath in 
a particular manner” 
                                                                          (Polanyi, 1962, p.62)   
 
In exercising one’s skills, Polanyi identified two different kinds of awareness; one he 
called subsidiary and the other focal. Using the scenario of “hitting a nail with a 
hammer”, he explained that the carpenter, for example, is aware of both the nail and 
the hammer, but in different ways. The main object of attention for the carpenter is to 
drive the nail down (which s/he is focally aware of), but in doing so, the carpenter is 
also aware of the feelings of holding the hammer in their palm (subsidiary 
awareness). This feeling is not the object of the decision maker’s attention, but an 
instrument of it. To perform the task well, we can therefore say that the carpenter 
has a subsidiary awareness of the feelings in his hand which is then merged into his 
focal awareness of driving the nail.  
 
If we switch our focal attention to features of which we initially had only subsidiary 
awareness of, their meaning is lost, which will affect performance negatively. For 
example, a pianist who shifts their attention away from the musical piece to focus on 
their finger movement; a public speaker who shifts attention away from the speech to 
focus on individual phrases that make up each sentence; a carpenter who shifts 
attention away from hitting the nail to focus on how the hammer was being held, 
would all struggle to perform at optimum capacity. In order to make skilled 
performance more effective, actors must therefore rely subsidiarily (tacitly) on some 
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features while attending to the main tasks i.e. knowing a set of features without being 
able to identify them (Polanyi, 1966).  
 
One of the insights from Polanyi’s work relates to how he perceived the 
relationship between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge to be. Whilst some 
scholars (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Ten Berge and Van Hezewijk, 1999; 
Clark et al., 2006) have viewed tacit and explicit knowledge as competitive, 
Polanyi largely believes in their complementarity. He explained that the two 
systems are mutually inclusive and that knowing is only possible when tacit and 
explicit knowledge are integrated. 
 
Putting this in his words: 
 
“Now we see tacit knowledge opposed to explicit knowledge; but these two 
are not sharply divided. While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, 
explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence 
all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit 
knowledge is unthinkable” (Polanyi 1966, p.7 — italics in the original) 
  
Polanyi noted that although these sub-conscious processes (subsidiary awareness) 
are aimed at discovering ‘truth’, they are not necessarily in a form that can be 
expressed formally. In other words, personal judgement cannot be prescribed by 
rules, they rely essentially on the use of our senses. As Polanyi puts it in what most 
believes to be one of his most remarkable phrases:  
 
                  ‘We can know more than we can tell’.  
                                                             (Polanyi, 1966, p.4) 
        
Drawing on Polanyi’s work, Tsoukas (2003) conceptualized tacit knowledge using a 
triangle, with each of the corners representing subsidiary features, focal target, and 
the knower who joins the two. No knowledge is therefore possible without integrating 
subsidiary awareness with focal target ─ an act which can only be carried out by the 
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performer. It is in this regard that Polanyi referred to all knowledge as personal and 
all knowing as action. For him, there is no significant difference between tangible 
instruments such as a probe (for a dentist), a map (for a geographer), a hammer (for 
a carpenter), or a hosereel (for a firefighter) on one hand, and intangible 
constructions such as linguistics, scientific knowledge, radiological or cultural 
knowledge on the other hand ― they are all tools that enable people perform their 
tasks effectively. Thus, to use a tool effectively we must assimilate it and dwell in it, 
otherwise our use of the tool will become clumsy and get in the way of getting tasks 
done. Hence, for a tool to be used effectively it must become an instrument through 
which we carry out our actions subsidiarily, and not an object of attention. In 
Polanyi’s original words: 
 
“We may say that we learn to use language, or a probe, or a tool, and thus 
make ourselves aware of these things as we are our body, we interiorize these 
things and make ourselves dwell in them” (Polanyi, 1969, p.148 — italics in the 
original)       
 
Polanyi emphasized this notion of indwelling in most of his publications (Polanyi, 
1958, 1962, 1966). To dwell in a tool, for him, simply means that one uncritically 
accepts the tool and unconsciously commits to it. A novice driver, for example, will 
still be conscious of what to do; he feels the impact of the pedals as he presses his 
leg on them as well as the impact of the gear lever on his palm. He has not learned 
to unconsciously integrate the movement of the car with the specific bodily actions 
he undertakes as a driver. The experienced driver, on the other hand, is unconscious 
of his driving procedures because they have been interiorized (or mastered) and is 
therefore able to use them automatically for the purpose of driving.  
2.6. AUTOMATICITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN 
Automaticity, which is regarded as one of the hallmarks of expertise, has been 
conceptualized as the act of executing cognitive procedures effortlessly (Ericsson, 
2000; Baylor, 2001). It is acquired by consistently and repeatedly mapping stimuli to 
responses over a given period of time, until such procedures become routinized 
49 
 
 
 
(Anderson, 1982; Anderson and Milson, 1989; Sweller, 1994; Wulf and Shea, 2002; 
Feldon, 2007). Although skill acquisition begins with the learning of procedures, 
attaining automaticity however requires deliberate and continuous practice of what 
was learnt (Chase and Ericsson, 1981; Anderson, 1982; Wegner, Erber and 
Raymond, 1991; Schempp et al., 2007). This association gets better through practice 
and procedures become less effortful over time and eventually takes a ‘second 
nature’ position in professionals.  
To be able to cope with the inadvertent pressures associated with performing time-
pressured tasks in dynamic environments, managers need to develop automated 
knowledge (Matzler, Bailom and Mooradian, 2007). Automated knowledge helps to 
relieve the working memory of excessive cognitive load, thereby freeing up mental 
energy for handling the more difficult problems (Sweller, 1994; Sarfo and Elen, 2007; 
Clark et al., 2014). In effect, when the skills required to perform a particular task 
become automated, such a task can be performed alongside other tasks with little or 
no interference.  
At the other extreme, however, automaticity has been regarded as the greatest 
threat to attaining expertise (Ericsson, 2004; Clark and Feldon, 2008). If we take 
expertise to mean successful adaptation to unusual tasks, as opposed to routine 
tasks, and automaticity as the ability to perform a given procedure unconsciously, it 
then appears the latter contradicts the principle of adaptive and reflexive practice — 
which are themselves key features of expertise. Furthermore, concerns have been 
raised regarding the effect of automated knowledge in the design of training curricula 
e.g. knowledge could become so internalized that experts struggle to explain what 
they know or do (Tulving, 1989; Hannabuss, 2000; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004; 
Clark et al., 2006; Feldon, 2007; Clark, 2014).  
Prior research has identified a negative correlation between people’s ability to 
recount the principles governing task mastery on one hand, and the level of skills 
they possess on the other hand (Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent, Fitzgerald and 
Broadbent, 1986; Eraut, 2004). These studies showed that highly skilled individuals 
struggled more to explicate “what they know” than the less skilled ones. In a 
particular study, Ericsson and Simon (1993) analysed the “think aloud” protocols of 
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both experts and novices and found that novices were more likely to recall the 
memory traces surrounding their cognitive processes than their expert counterparts. 
This was attributed to the fact that novices performed their tasks in ways that were 
deliberate and stepwise, thereby leaving a memory trace in the process. Experts, in 
contrast, start to take “shortcuts” unconsciously, owing to their wide domain 
knowledge (Eraut, 2004). These shortcuts, on the long run, begin to impair the 
“replicability” of their performance.  
The ease of access to memory trace, the ability to recall and/or verbalize pre-stored 
information and the willingness to deliberately travel back memory lanes have all 
been shown to have huge implications for instructional design (Wiley, 1998; Tulving, 
2002; Pollock, Chandler and Sweller, 2002; Paas et al., 2003; Clark et al. 2006; 
Feldon, 2007; Cowan, 2008). Despite compelling evidence that most routine tasks 
are performed tacitly (Polanyi, 1962; Wegner, 2002; Dreyfus, 2004; Grant, 2007; 
Spender, 2008), experts sometimes deny this fact and instead prefer to attribute 
most of their actions, if not all, to intentional (deliberative) thinking. This cognitive 
bias has been termed doctrine of concordance (Tulving, 1989). When people fail to 
acknowledge the link between automaticity and expertise, they can start to fabricate 
consciously reasoned explanations for their unconscious actions during knowledge 
elicitation, albeit, unintentionally (Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Wiley, 1998).  
To illustrate the above claims further, Eraut and his colleagues studied a group of 
nurses and midwives to understand how they utilize scientific knowledge in their 
domain of practice (Eraut, Alderton, Boylan & Wraight, 1995). The authors focused 
on six themes from which the respondents were asked to narrate recent incidents 
that contained any of the themes. Data obtained from the study was analyzed and a 
series of knowledge maps that had aspects of the scientific knowledge on one hand, 
and the activities carried out by the participants on the other hand were developed. 
As expected, the authors found that the experienced nurses had more awareness of 
the rules and procedures binding their work practice, but were helpless in accounting 
for this knowledge when required to do so (for details see Eraut, Alderton, Boylan 
and Wraight, 1995). 
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2.7. THE CONCEPT OF INTUITION  
 
“The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. 
Unfortunately, we have created a society that honours the servant and has 
forgotten the gift” 
                                     (Albert Einstein, 1879–1955) 
Defining intuition is seemingly a difficult task as it is a concept that deals with tacitly 
held knowledge which is, itself, difficult to verbalize and articulate (Hannabuss, 2000; 
Hogarth, 2003; Tsoukas, 2003; Nonaka and Von Krogh, 2009). As a process that 
operates within the sub-conscious realm, intuition has generated a great deal of 
controversy in the fields of cognitive science and decision making (Gilovich, Griffin, 
Kahneman, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Acker, 2008; Waroquier et al., 2010). Some 
scholars perceive intuition and its outcome (intuitive judgment) as a mysterious 
concept that is far from any scientific measurement (Meehl, 1986; Lamond and 
Thompson, 2000; Caverni, 2001; Bonabeau, 2003; Maqsood, Finegan and Walker, 
2004). Others, though not denying that intuition is an important part of human 
cognition, remain adamant that the outcome of such process would, more often than 
not, provide a favourable ground for judgmental bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; 
Meehl, 1986; English, 1993; Paley, 1996, 2006; Dana and Dawes, 2004; Gigerenzer 
et al. 2008; Evans and Over, 2010). In the words of Albert Einstein, modern society 
has been taught to mistrust intuition, preferring explicitly articulated expressions, 
theoretical or codified knowledge instead (Albert Einstein, 1879–1955).  
One of the reasons that has been attributed to most of the controversies surrounding 
the concept of intuition is that it lacks the monolithic definition and the well-defined 
qualities that are characterized with the deliberate/analytical/rational strategy (Bargh 
and Morsella, 2008). For instance, an analytical thinker should typically be able to 
display some level of intentionality, accessibility to awareness and high mental 
engagement, and will therefore not to be seen as an analytical thinker in the absence 
of any of these qualities. In the world of intuition, unfortunately, no such overt 
“expression” yet exists to assess intuitive thinking. The main bone of contention for 
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sceptics is thus the lack of “transparency” of the so called intuitive knowledge i.e. the 
fact that the underlying values and beliefs supporting someone’s decisions are only 
known to the person (Lamond and Thompson, 2000). This lack of explication, 
according to critics, may also be considered morally reprehensible. According to 
Pellegrino: 
“To resort to terms like ‘art’ or ‘intuition’ is to impede explication of a socially 
significant process. Whatever name we use to subsume the indefinable 
elements in the process, the effort to explicate them further is a moral as well 
as an intellectual responsibility” (Pellegrino,1979, p.187) 
 
Thankfully, the scientific measurement of intuition and how it can be taught is 
increasingly gaining ground in recent years across disciplines such as management, 
education, healthcare, military, informatics and firefighting. (Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 
2003; Tanner, 2006; Plessner and Czenna, 2008; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Salas, 
Rosen and DiazGranados, 2010; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012; Okoli et al., 2015).  
The following reasons have been attributed to the relentless effort shown by scholars 
who have, over the last two decades, continued in their pursuit to gain a better 
understanding of intuition and how it can be better utilized at the workplace:    
• The limitations of the so called analytical approach in coping with the 
requirements of dynamic and time-pressured environments  
• The feeling that intuition is probably one of the least understood aspects of 
human cognition  
• A belief that gaining a better understanding of intuition and its scientific 
measurement will go a long way to guide more meaningful conceptualization 
of human cognition (Khatri and Ng, 2000; Isenman, 1997; Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy, 2003; Nonaka and Von Krogh, 2009; Salas, Rosen and 
DiazGranados, 2010).  
In his important book entitled “The power of intuition” Klein (2003), who although 
acknowledged that our intuition can sometimes be flawed, suggested we are all 
intuitive decision makers and can rarely survive or excel in life without it. Prior 
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research has shown that intuition is an integral part of human decision making and 
cannot be replaced by any form of data, analysis or rules (Khatri and Ng, 2000; 
Matzler, Bailom and Mooradian, 2007; Hayashi, 2001; King and Appleton, 1997; 
Klein 2003; Hogarth, 2003). The work of Waroquier et al. (2010) revealed that 
individuals who often fail to trust their intuition generally come across as the poor 
decision makers and are likely to remain so. In the study, subjects were first asked to 
create a first impression, after which they were presented with a decision task (the 
task of choosing an apartment). Decision mechanisms were then tested against 
three different conditions. The first set of participants were asked to make their 
choices immediately they received information about the task was, the second set 
were given another task before being asked to select their choices (with the aim of 
distracting them), while the last set of participants were allowed to deliberate and 
think consciously (for about 4mins) before selecting their choices. Findings from the 
study showed that participants who responded immediately made the best decisions 
about the apartment, but only when their first impression was rich. In contrast, the 
last set of participants made the poorest decisions as the subjects were tempted to 
re-adjust and redefine their first impressions. Subjects in the last group were 
consciously re-examining their memory in search of attributes that relates to the 
apartment — a process known as option deliberation (Johnson and Raab, 2003).  
The main insight that was generated from the above study was that unconscious 
thought process is superior to the conscious/deliberative strategy, not necessarily 
because deliberation is in itself a wrong thing to do but because too much 
deliberation tends to disrupt the naturally flowing first impressions (Phillip, Klein and 
Sieck, 2004)  
If we are to advance the concept of intuition beyond its current state then merely 
developing our newly gained knowledge into frameworks that are theoretically sound 
might prove insufficient (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). The first step to making the 
concept of intuition less mysterious, as suggested by Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005), 
is to refrain from definitions that tend to portray it by what it is not. Definitions such as 
“anything that does not fit into the category of analysis or rationality” should be 
discarded as intuition is not the opposite of analysis. Similarly, a number of authors 
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have advised that care must be taken when describing intuition using affective and 
emotional phrases such as sixth-sense, gut feelings, instinct, foreboding, inner 
feelings, common sense, premonitions, hunches and presentiment as these could 
encourage sceptics to continue to question the scientific base of the term (Polanyi, 
1962; King and Appleton, 1997; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Burke and Miller, 1999; Khatri 
and Ng, 2000; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Matzler, Bailom and Mooradian, 2007).   
What then is intuition? Dane and Pratt (2007) defined it as ‘affectively charged 
judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations, while 
Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) defined it as a non-sequential information processing 
mode which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct 
knowing without any use of conscious reasoning. Regardless of the way it is being 
defined, a general consensus amongst scholars is that intuitive judgment incurs little 
or no information processing costs and enables individuals to quickly integrate 
multiple reasons in their decisions in a compensatory way (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; 
Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010; Katsikopoulos, 2010). Intuition therefore supersedes 
mere emotions; it is not a magical sixth sense neither is it a paranormal process but 
an integral part of our daily experiences of memory. 
In the course of this research, seven distinct characteristics of intuition were 
identified and compiled across the literature (Isenman, 1997; Gilovich, Griffin and 
Kahneman, 2002; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005; Kahneman, 2003; Hogarth, 2003; 
Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2010; Acker, 2008; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012). 
The first four relate to the process itself i.e. intuiting, while the last three apply to the 
outcome i.e. intuitive knowledge: 
Intuiting itself: 
 is fast, rapid and instantaneous 
 requires unconscious processing of information and a minimal mental effort 
 is alogical i.e. neither logical (does not follow the rules of logic) nor illogical 
(does not contradict the rules of logic) 
 is frequently accompanied by emotion 
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The outcome of the intuitive process: 
  is usually tacit  i.e. intuitors find it difficult to describe how they arrived at their 
judgment 
 is holistic ─ information is processed holistically i.e. unconnected elements 
are integrated to generate more meaningful insights.  
  is such that the intuitors feel confident about their judgment, despite not 
having a clear evidence to justify their chosen course of action. According to 
Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2003), intuition is usually accompanied by a sense of 
assurance, which is what differentiates it from mere guesses.  
One of the most recent contributions that have been made on the subject of intuition 
can be traced to the work of Dörfler and Ackermann (2012). Building upon the work 
of Polanyi (1962), the authors attempted to categorize intuition into two distinct 
forms: intuitive judgement and intuitive insight. Although Dörfler and Ackermann 
(2012) were not the first to categorize intuition, their work was found particularly 
important in advancing current research on intuition. The motivation of their research 
stemmed primarily from the fact that most of the studies on intuition seemed to have 
emphasised its role in judgment/decision making (intuitive judgment), with little or no 
emphasis on its creative role (intuitive insight). In substantiating their argument, the 
authors made reference to one of the most influential phrases in the field of 
psychology:  
“It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover”   
        (Poincare, 1914, p.129)   
The role of mindfulness in gaining and maintaining intuitive insights is also beginning 
to gain attention in the literature (Herndon, 2008; Dane, 2011; Dörfler and 
Ackermann, 2012). The term mindfulness, which holds a different meaning from 
deliberative thinking, has been defined as a state of consciousness in which 
attention ─ both internally and externally ─ is focused on present-moment 
phenomena (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). To be mindful, individuals must be strictly 
attentive to the “here and now” as opposed to being preoccupied by other mind 
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wandering thoughts about the past or future (Herndon, 2008). This thus suggests 
why revelation mainly occurs when the conscious mind finally exposes what the sub-
conscious mind had already known (Klein, Moon, Hoffman, 2006a; Klein, Moon, 
Hoffman, 2006b; Hayashi, 2011). Mindfulness attunes individuals to the operations 
going on within the unconscious system thereby shedding more light to intuition ─ 
discovering new insights (Ackoff, 1989; Dane, 2011; Hogarth, 2001; Yi et al., 2008). 
Unfortunately, not all intuitive thoughts receive adequate attention; some arise and 
disappear in the absence of any conscious focus from the decision maker.  
A good illustration of how intuition can be used to generate creative insights through 
mindfulness was demonstrated by Doctor Apgar, whose work to date has been 
credited for the reduction in infant mortality (Apgar, 1953). Before Apgar got her 
revelation in 1952, the field of medicine was plagued with inconsistencies and a lack 
of standardized procedures for determining whether or not a new born infant was in 
distress. Physicians and midwives were allowed to use their clinical judgment to 
determine how much help a baby that was perceived to be in distress needs. As a 
result, cues were identified and interpreted differently by various medical officers. But 
the breakthrough started when a medical resident asked how Apgar would 
personally assess the health conditions of a new born baby. That’s easy, she replied, 
you would do it like this ─ Apgar listed down five variables (heart rate, respiration, 
reflex, muscle tone, and colour) against three scores (0, 1, 2, depending on the 
severity of each of the variables). Following her encounter with the young resident 
doctor, Apgar herself began rating infants by this rule one minute after they were 
born. A baby with a total score of eight or above was likely to be pink, crying, 
squirming, grimacing, with a pulse of 100 or more, and such baby is adjudged to be 
in good fit. Conversely, a baby with a score of four or below is likely to be bluish, 
lifeless, passive, with a slow or weak pulse and would likely need an immediate 
intervention. Apgar’s score has, till date, provided a considerable level of consistency 
to doctors and midwives in determining which babies were in desperate need upon 
delivery (Adapted from Kahneman, 2011: 227).  
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2.7.1 Intuition, expertise and memory Systems 
Over the last decade or so, cognitive researchers have sought to validate intuition as 
a scientific discourse, evidenced from the increasing number of theoretical models 
and frameworks that have been advanced (Khatri and Ng, 2000; Wong, 2000; 
Hayashi, 2001; Hogarth, 2003; Klein, 2003; Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004; Klein et 
al., 2006; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010; Frye and Wearing, 2011; Dorfler and 
Ackermann, 2012). The main reason that people, and sceptics in particular, find the 
concept of intuition less scientific has been attributed to their lack of understanding 
on how it relates to experiential knowledge or other macro-cognitive processes 
(Anderson and Schooler, 2000; Tulving, 2002; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm and Glöckner, 
2009). In their important article entitled conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to 
disagree, Kahneman and Klein (2009) argued people will often marvel at the story of 
a fire fighter who, for instance, had a sudden urge to escape a burning building just 
before it collapsed (simply because the firefighter knew the danger intuitively “without 
knowing how he knows”). The authors however explained that the mystery of 
knowing without knowing is not necessarily a distinctive feature of intuition but the 
norm of mental life. People learn implicitly on a daily basis without knowing when, 
how or where learning took place (Tulving, 1989; Dodgson, 1993; Fessey, 2002; 
Eraut, 2004).  
The relationship between intuition and the human memory is demystified from the 
early works of Simon (1992) who defined intuition as: the situation has provided a 
cue; the cue has given the expert access to information stored in the memory, and 
the information provided the answer. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) put it more 
succinctly as: intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition.  
Yet a few scholars still remain sceptical about the validity of some of the information 
that is recalled from the human memory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Gilovich, 
Griffin, Kahneman, 2002; Paley, 1996, 2006; Kahneman, 2003). Lamond and 
Thompson (2000) using the term falsae memoriae argued that people are 
sometimes not able to fully recollect past events from their memory, contrary to 
claims made by proponents of intuition. The term was also used to explain the act of 
deja vu i.e. a feeling people have that they have been in a situation before, whether 
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true or false. The authors therefore advocated for an analytical way of making high-
staked decisions with the notion that people are not always guaranteed to remember 
their past.  
Whilst it is true that people do learn implicitly and from past experiences —whether 
good or bad — it appears worthwhile, for the purpose of the current study, to 
examine how the information that supports intuition gets committed into memory and 
recalled when needed. Klein (2003) defined intuition as the process of translating our 
experience into action. This definition is consistent with the assumption that every 
individual is embedded in a continuous flow of experience throughout their lifetime, 
consciously or unconsciously, implying therefore that the quality of people’s intuition 
will only be as good as the experience upon which it was built (Eraut, 2004, Gobet, 
2005; Billett, 2010).                                                                         
One of the simplest ways of describing the modus operandus of intuition is by 
thinking of it as an advanced pattern recognition mechanism. That is, the 
subconscious mind somehow finds a link between a current situation (e.g. the 
problem to be solved) and the various “patterns” that had been stored in memory, 
mainly from past experiences (Eraut, 2004). The sub-conscious mind rapidly projects 
the new problem onto the pre-stored patterns and then sends a “message of 
wisdom” to the decision maker. The message often comes as an inner voice and is 
most times expressed in the language of one’s feelings, in the form of calmness or 
relief, or as a burst of enthusiasm and energy (Khatri and Ng, 2000; Hayashi, 2001; 
Matzler, Bailom and Mooradian, 2007). The onus is thus on decision makers to 
understand the best way through which the “voice of wisdom” is conveyed to them. 
By so doing, they will also be able to differentiate more easily between correct 
intuitions and other “emotional noise” (Ackoff, 1989; Weick, 1993; Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy, 2003)  
Similar to the notion of intuitive decision making is the concept of phronesis, which 
originated from Aristotle (2002) in his book titled the “Nicomachean Ethics”. Aristotle 
distinguished between three types of knowledge — episteme, techne, and phronesis. 
Episteme represents universal truth, objective, scientific (explicit) knowledge that 
focuses on universal applicability and therefore context-independent. Techne roughly 
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translates to technique, technology and art and is context-dependent, unlike 
episteme. It is the practical (tacit) knowledge required to solve a problem (“know-
how”). Finally, phronesis, which roughly translates today as prudence, ethics, 
practical wisdom or practical rationality, often encompasses the first two (Von Krogh 
and Nonaka, 2008).  Phronesis is generally understood as the ability to determine 
and undertake the best action in a specific situation to serve the common good, 
hence its notion as an intellectual virtue (Eisner, 2002; Nonaka and Toyama, 2007). 
“Phronesis is acquired through the effort to perfect one’s craft, which makes one a 
virtuous artisan” (Nonaka and Toyama, 2007:378). Phronesis is the synthesizing 
glue that joins “knowing why” as in scientific evidence, with “knowing how” as in 
hands-on skill, and “knowing what” as in goal to be realized. It is the ability to 
synthesize a general, universal knowledge with the particular knowledge of a 
concrete situation as actions originate from a current environment. Hence, in 
managing complex incidents phronetic leaders must be able to synthesize contextual 
knowledge accumulated through real-life experience, with universal knowledge 
gained through training (Nonaka and Toyama, 2007) 
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Figure 2:1 The Pattern Recognition Process (Klein, 2003, p.26) 
 
The recognition/metacognition model (Fig. 2.1) shows the relationship between 
intuitive decision making and experiential knowledge. The model suggests a sense 
of a situation is potentially gained once a pattern is recognized. Following the pattern 
recognition process, the decision maker is then able to predict the most important 
cues to focus on, the goals to pursue, the likely things to expect and more 
importantly how best to react —action scripts (Klein, 1998; 2003). While patterns tell 
experts what to do, action scripts suggests how things should be done. One 
important aspect of the model is its inclusion of a “decision check” component where 
decision makers have the opportunity to mentally simulate, test and validate their 
action scripts before acting (Klein, 1997; Driskell, Cooper and Moran, 1994; 
Calderwood, Klein and Crandall, 1988; De Groot, 1978). The model also posits that 
the quality of experience people have gained over time largely determines the quality 
of their action scripts. This obviously has implications for training in that individuals 
with less experience should first be made to enrich their mental models, build 
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sufficient patterns and gain more real life experiences before thrown into tasks that 
require mental simulation (Cohen, Freeman and Wolf, 1996).  
The relationship between pattern recognition and intuitive decision making can 
therefore be summarized thus: 
 Cues let us recognize patterns 
 Patterns trigger action scripts 
 Action scripts are assessed and refined through mental simulation 
 Mental simulation is underpinned by mental models. 
                                                                           
It is important to note that not all intuitive judgments come from skills (Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Waroquier, Marchiori., Klein, Cleeremans, 2010; Evans and Over, 2010; 
Doherty, 1993; Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman, 2002). Hence, although incorrect 
intuitions just like the valid ones tend to arise from the operations of memory, the 
mechanisms that produce them only operate in the absence of skills (Lesgold et al., 
1988; Winterton, Delamare-LeDeist & Stringfellow, 2005; Kahneman, 2011). The 
difficulty is that people have no clear-cut way of knowing where their intuition 
originates from, neither is there any subjective marker that distinguishes correct 
intuition from those produced by highly imperfect heuristics (Kruger and Dunning, 
1999; Dunning et al., 2003). More so, checking the authenticity of one’s intuition is 
an effortful operation of system 2 (the effortful cognitive mode) and people are 
sometimes lazy to carry out such mental task.  
A distinction has therefore been made between expert-based intuition and the more 
general intuition, on the basis that the former is built upon extensive domain-specific 
knowledge. For example, King and Clark (2002) studied how different nurses across 
four levels of expertise (advanced beginners, competent, proficient and expert 
nurses) utilized their intuition. Findings from the study showed that all the nurses, 
regardless of their level of expertise, employed both intuitive and analytical decision 
making styles. However the rate of use of intuition and the level of confidence 
associated with intuiting were found to increase as the nurses climbed the ladder of 
expertise. In another study, Baylor (2001) provided an interesting insight as she 
attempted to differentiate between mature and immature intuition using a U-shaped 
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curve (see Fig 2.2 below). The X-axis of the curve represents the level of expertise 
while the Y-axis represents the rate at which intuitive decisions were made. Similar 
to experts, novices also relied on their intuition to make difficult decisions only that 
their intuition were found to be immature compared to those of experts. Baylor 
(2001) used the term immature to explain a type of intuitive knowledge that is not 
built upon extensive-rich-domain knowledge.  
According to Baylor, as novices gain more experience and advance along the chain 
of expertise the rate at which they rely on their intuition decreases. This is because a 
higher level of expertise consequently increases the scope of task difficulty, thereby 
placing additional cognitive demands on operators. This additional cognitive demand 
essentially pushes the “potential experts” to the more analytical end as they will now 
require more time to process the various task related information. This is shown at 
the bottom end of the U shaped curve in Fig 2.2. But as individuals approach the 
upper scale of expertise the use of intuition once again becomes the dominant 
decision making strategy. At this stage, a minimal mental effort is required to process 
various task related informational cues. Interestingly, the mature intuition that was 
described by Baylor (2001) at the upper scale of expertise has also been referred to 
in the literature as educated intuition (Hogarth, 2001); intuitive expertise (Kahneman 
and Klein, 2009); intuition-as-expertise (Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004) and expert-
based intuition (Salas et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2.2: A U-shaped model of the development of intuition by level of expertise 
(Baylor, 2001) 
 
Notwithstanding that expert intuition has generally been perceived to be more 
trustworthy than that of novices, a few concerns have been raised regarding if and 
when it should be trusted (e.g. Shynkaruk and Thompson, 2006; Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). For instance, in his book entitled “Thinking fast and 
slow”, Kahneman (2011, p.240) explained that the confidence people attach to their 
intuition does not necessary correlate with its validity but that people’s intuition 
should only be trusted when the following two conditions have been met: 
• the task environment is sufficiently regular to be predictable i.e. an 
environment that is able to generate valid cues to support action plans 
 
• actors have had the opportunity to learn the regularities in the environment 
through prolonged practice and training  
 
In the absence of the above two conditions, the author argued that an intuitive 
judgment will mostly be based on “trial and error”. However, since true skills cannot 
easily develop in irregular or highly unpredictable environments, performers in such 
environments have to rely more on chance than on experience to make the right 
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decisions (Arkes, 2001). This explains why experts’ intuition in unpredictable (or 
wicked) environments (such as stock markets, nuclear power plants) has been 
advised to be treated with caution and suspicion (Kahneman, 2011) 
2.8. OVERCONFIDENCE IN EXPERTS 
In reality, experts need confidence, intelligence, and moral strength to be able to 
make difficult and complex decisions, such traits, however, must be tempered with 
prudence, openness and an accurate appraisal of skills so as to avoid 
overconfidence (Messick and Bazerman, 1996). The act of overconfidence poses a 
serious threat to decision making, with the real danger lying in people’s reluctance to 
seek additional information to update their knowledge bank (Kruger and Dunning, 
1999; Dunning et al., 2003; Doherty, 1993; Hallinan, 2009). This reluctance could 
sometimes be as a result of “failure of success” syndrome i.e. the illusion that 
solutions will always emerge just as they have done in the past (Kets de Vries, 
1991).  
Terminologies such as egocentrism (Bazerman and Watkins, 2008) and narcissism 
(King III, 2007) have been used to describe certain type of experts who overly pride 
themselves as infallible. King III (2007) warned that such egocentric behaviour 
provides a fertile ground for overconfidence to grow if not checked. There is 
compelling evidence from both theoretical and empirical studies to show that experts 
do not always have control over all the possible factors that aid effective response 
(Dawes, 1979; Smith, 1990; Shanteau, 1992; Weick, 1993; Messick and Bazerman, 
1996; Wegner, 2002). Some experts ignorantly deny this “uncertainty view” of the 
world and hold on to the deterministic nature of events, exaggerating the extent to 
which they can control crisis events. This act has elsewhere been termed illusion of 
control (Messick and Bazerman, 1996) or illusion of superiority (Gasaway, 2013). In 
the firefighting domain for example, some factors (task constraints) have been 
identified that often exceed the remit of expertise (Grimwood, 1992; Gasaway, 
2012). These include extreme adverse weather conditions (e.g. intense wind speed, 
high external temperature), fire behaviour (backdraft and flashover) and human 
errors (mistakes, stress).  
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The concern about overconfidence is not new; early researchers have previously 
made attempts to challenge the validity of expert judgment (Simon, 1955; 1956; 
Meehl, 1954; Oskamp, 1965; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Dawes, Faust and 
Meehl, 1989). For example, Meehl (1954) in one of his experimental studies showed 
that predictions made from statistical computations were found to be superior to 
experts’ predictions. In another study, Oskamp (1965) tested the level of 
competence displayed by 32 judges using 25 multiple-choice personality judgement 
questions on a published case. The judges were allowed to read through sections of 
the case before being assessed and findings revealed that although competence did 
not necessarily increase as the judges gained more information, the level of 
confidence increased significantly and steadily as more information was acquired. 
Simply put, confidence continued to increase as more information was received to 
the point that judges became overconfident. Unfortunately, overconfidence, on this 
account did not translate to better performance.    
There is evidence to suggest that the judgment of experts is not always accurate. 
For example, Kahneman and Klein (2009) revealed two conditions in which experts’ 
judgment should be trusted i.e. a valid environment with identifiable cues and a prior 
experience of events. They argued that trusting experts’ judgement solely on the 
basis of years of experience or the extent of subjective confidence could be 
misleading. Other authors have also shown that people’s account of expertise can 
sometimes be “over rated” and should therefore not be taken at surface level (Meehl, 
1986; Shynkaruk and Thompson, 2006; Dunning et al., 2003).  
Most of the questions raised by previous scholars have over the years necessitated 
the need to further investigate overconfidence in experts. Researchers now seem to 
be interested in knowing how subjects/participants are been recruited for 
participation in expert studies. This includes, but not limited to, having pre-set criteria 
to discriminate between ‘real’ experts and ‘pseudo-experts’ (Kruger and Dunning, 
1999; Ericsson et al. 2007; Shanteau et al., 2002). For example, in his paper entitled 
“competence in experts” Shanteau (1992) warned that knowledge elicitors could 
easily be cajoled into interviewing self-acclaimed experts rather than real experts. 
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Kahneman (2011, p.239) described these self-acclaimed experts as ‘pseudo-experts’ 
who have no idea that they do not know what they think they know.  
While confidence is thus a good trait that needs to be developed by professionals, 
subjective confidence on the other hand is mostly illusive and misleading. The main 
challenge, however, lies in differentiating between the two. Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) noted a useful rule of thumb for making such differentiation: 
“True experts, it is said, know when they don’t know, and that non-experts 
(whether or not they think they are) certainly do not know when they don’t 
know” (Kahneman and Klein, 2009, p.524) 
Subjective confidence is thus an unreliable indication of how valid one’s intuition is 
(Shynkaruk and Thompson, 2006). People often assume they are right when the 
story they tell comes easily to mind (cognitive ease) with little or no contradictions or 
opposition (coherence) (Evans and Over, 2010). Unfortunately, findings have shown 
that cognitive ease and coherence do not guarantee that a belief held with 
confidence is true (Messick and Bazerman, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Hallinan, 2009). 
Although some actors actually recognize the fact that they are skilled (conscious 
competence), but remain largely unaware of the boundaries of their skills and when 
they are likely to be betrayed by them (Krunger and Dunning, 1999; Johansson, 
Hollnagel, and Granlund, 2002; Dunning et al., 2003; Kahneman, 2011, p.241). This 
is another fertile ground for overconfidence.   
Furthermore, the extensive knowledge and skill sets possessed by experts can also 
serve as a potential source of overconfidence. When experts attain a certain level of 
competence they resort to mainly relying on automated knowledge. This sometimes 
means ignoring certain cues which they feel are not worth attending to and focusing 
on the more relevant and pressing cues (Rasmussen, 1983; Feldon, 2007; Salas 
and Klein, 2001; Pliske, McCloskey and Klein, 2001; Horstmann et al., 2009; Myers, 
2002). The danger, however, lies in missing out or ignoring some important cues 
simply because an operator is not familiar with them (Dane, 2011; King III, 2007). 
Klein (2003) used the term fixation to explain how actors can sometimes choose a 
particular course of action and tenaciously cling to it without the willingness to 
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compromise. This tendency has been termed cognitive narrowing (Weick, 1993); 
tunnel vision (William, 1985) and failure of foresight (Turner, 1976), all of which have 
the effect of limiting the creative power of decision makers. A number of scholars 
have shown that experts are significantly more likely to approach problems with a 
flexible and adaptive mindset while novices on the other hand tend to be more rigid 
with the way they develop and implement their action plans (Calderwood, Crandall 
and Baynes, 1990; Paley, 1996; Baylor, 2001; Dreyfus, 2004). A commander’s 
adherence to false and erroneous perceptions may create a breakdown in collective 
sense-making of a crisis management team such that shared perceptions about risk 
and success fail to align with current situation (Lagadec, 1997). 
Another consequence of fixation is that experts may be tempted to actively “explain 
away” data that appears unfamiliar to them (Perrow, 1999; Klein, Moon and 
Hoffman, 2006b). In one study, for example, Ingham (2007) reported how a 
commander discarded the reading from a firefighting appliance as incorrect, with the 
assumption that the appliance was faulty. Further analysis from the study showed 
that the commander’s conclusion was mainly influenced by a mis-match between the 
recorded data and his expectations (mental model). What people perceive to be 
useful information is what actually appears relevant to their world — both in data and 
meaning (Spender, 2008). Meanings are therefore lenses that individuals put over 
the data they receive, through which they are able to bring data into their world.  
Overconfidence can prevent experts from objectively challenging their pre-conceived 
belief about a particular course of action (Turner, 1978; Kahneman 2011, p.225). 
Moreover, even when the need for additional information is acknowledged, 
processing such information may be biased to conform to prior beliefs and 
hypotheses. This cognitive tendency has been termed belief bias (Evans, 2007) or 
confirmation bias (Bazerman, 2008). 
What then can experts do to be able to mitigate the risk of overconfidence? The 
recognition-metacognition (R/M) framework which was pioneered by Cohen, 
Freeman and Wolf (1996) seems to provide a useful guide. The framework provides 
a systematic way of explaining how best experts can develop action plans under 
novel conditions, especially where pattern recognition proves less helpful. The main 
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strength of the model is the fact that decision makers are able to conduct a series of 
cognitive tests before implementing any course of action (Thompson, Cohen and 
Freeman, 1995; Lipshitz and Cohen, 2005; Frye and Wearing, 2014).  
2.8.1. Recognition/Metacognition Model 
The role that experience plays in intuitive decision making has been widely reported 
in the naturalistic decision making literature (Shanteau, 1992; Federico, 1995; Flin, 
1996; Falzer, 2004; Gore et al., 2006; Klein, 2008; Hoffman and Militello, 2008). A 
number of models have been developed in the field of cognitive psychology to 
describe how actors make decisions, and each model is focused on one or more 
macro-cognitive elements e.g. situation awareness, sense making, teamwork, pre-
planning etc. (Klein 2003; Endsley, 1995; Lipschitz and Strauss, 1997; Cohen et al. 
1996). For instance, the recognition primed decision (RPD) model (see section 
2.11.3.1), which appears popular as a prototypical decision making model in the 
naturalistic decision making community, holds that proficient decision makers are 
mainly “recognitionally skilled” i.e. are able to recognize familiar situations from the 
repertoire of patterns stored in their memory, accumulated over years of deliberate 
practice (Gobet, 2005; Fessey 2002; Shanteau et al., 2002). According to Klein 
(2008), these patterns are what help decision makers to recognize the most relevant 
cues, provide expectancies, identify the main goals to be pursued, and then suggest 
the most plausible action plan. Simply put, the RPD model suggests that 
experienced officers mostly rely on patterns recalled from previous experiences (in 
the form of cues, expectancies, goals and actions) to solve current problems. But in 
their study aimed at investigating how actors make decisions in novel and time 
pressured environments, Cohen et al. (1996) emphasized one of the limitations of 
the recognition primed decision model. The authors drew attention to the possibility 
of rare or novel situations occurring that could altogether defy existing knowledge. 
This insight eventually propelled them to develop another useful cognitive model 
which they termed the recognition/metacognition (RM) model. Thus in contrast to the 
RPD model which suggests that proficient decision makers often rely on recognized 
patterns in solving current tasks, the R/M model argues that decision makers must, 
in addition to being recognitionally skilled, be metacognitionally skilled. 
69 
 
 
 
The model, as shown in Fig 2.4 below follows a two-tier process: 
 
 An activation stage where action scripts are developed through pattern 
recognition 
 The critiquing and correcting stage where the products of recognition are 
evaluated where and when necessary.  
 
 
 Figure 2.3 The Recognition-Metacognition Model (Cohen et al. 1996, p.5) 
Together, these two processes help in building, verifying and modifying the mental 
model of the decision makers even as events unfold (Calderwood, Crandall & Klein, 
1987).  
Quick test: A quick test is a control function that helps decision makers decide 
whether to immediately act on a recognized pattern or delay actions a bit more 
(Calderwood et al., 1987). The decision to conduct a quick test and the extent to 
which the test should be conducted are influenced by several factors such as the 
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level of stakes involved, how familiar the current situation is, and the amount of time 
available to make decisions (Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997). During a quick test, the 
mental model of the decision maker is subjected to cycles of critical thinking till the 
point where the cost of further delay becomes too high. The quick test stage is quite 
important when making high-staked decisions since the urge to act often tends to 
precede reflective thinking (Bargh and Morsella, 2008).  
Critiquing & Correcting: Critiquing involves a deliberate act to search for faults in 
one’s mental model and to deal with such faults accordingly (Proctor and Dutta, 
1995). Through critiquing, three kinds of faults can be identified in a potential action 
plan: (i) incompleteness ― when there is not enough information with which to 
formulate an action plan (ii) unreliability ― where information to support potential 
actions or goals is subject to alternative interpretations or questionable premises (iii) 
conflict ― a situation where available data, although reasonably supporting a 
proposed action plan, seems to contradict expectations of the decision maker 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu and Salas, 2001) 
Correcting, on the other hand, is aimed at responding to identified problems or 
knowledge gaps accruing from the critiquing process. Correcting might also require 
that further observations are made, that additional information is generated, that 
current assumptions are revised, or all of the above (Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 
2006).  
The strength of the R/M model therefore lies in the fact that the critiquing and 
correcting phases are iterative, so that solving one problem in a proposed action 
plan could eventually result in identifying a new/unforseen problem (Kaempf et al., 
1996). For example, it would be expected that a decision maker would fill in the 
required gaps in the event that a proposed action plan was found to be incomplete 
(e.g. by collecting additional information). However, in the process of collecting 
additional information some form of cognitive conflicts could be generated if the new 
information appears to be inconsistent with the mental model of the decision maker. 
At the same time, an attempt to resolve the generated conflicts might also require, 
for example, that assumptions about the trustworthiness of the sources of 
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information are questioned. Hence, through this iterative process decision makers 
continue to improve their understanding of a situation.                                     
2.8.2 Team decisions 
The dynamic nature of crisis environments, mostly characterized by complexity, ill-
defined goals and time-pressure, has encouraged research in the area of team 
decision making and support systems (Shanteau, 1992; Desanctis and Gallupe, 
1987). Developing and maintaining an effective crisis management team has hence 
been regarded as one of the most important steps towards building good crisis 
management culture (Gore, Banks, Millward and Kyriakidou, 2006; Crichton and Flin, 
2004; Flin et al, 2002). 
In reality, the demands encountered when responding to crises are usually beyond 
individual capabilities (Paton and Flin, 1999). No single individual can possibly cope 
with the collective pressures associated with task constraints or with the intellectual 
resources required for solving complex crisis problems. This therefore implies that a 
combined team effort usually exceeds contributions from individual team members 
(Alexander, 2000; Paton and Flin, 1999; Paris, Salas and Canon-Bowers, 2000; 
Zander 1982; McLennan, Holgate, Omodei and Wearing, 2006). Furthermore, a 
team seems to have better retentive ability, known as transactive memory ― a 
shared system for encoding knowledge (Wegner, Erber and Raymond, 1991). A 
team can collectively remember more information than even the best single 
individual in the team (Elliot, 2005).  
Good teamwork provides a number of benefits, for instance, it facilitates decisions 
and actions by accelerating the flow of information and resources, increases the 
variety of perspectives and skills available, fosters synergistic contributions and 
enhances access to essential resources (Salas and Canon-Bowers, 1993; Zander, 
1982; Flin, O’connor, Crichton, 2008). Psychological research has also shown that 
teamwork generates a higher degree of motivation among team members. In other 
words, people tend to be more confident when they realize that the physical or 
mental pressure associated with solving a difficult task is somehow shared amongst 
the team members (Descantis and Gallupe, 1987; Salas 2003).  
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Lave and Wenger (1991) in their seminal work introduced the term community of 
practice to explain the notion that learning is not a property of individuals or the 
representations in their heads (the cognitive view), but rather a more relational 
property of individuals in context and in interaction with each other (the situated 
view). The concept of communities of practice, which has now gained popularity in 
the literature, has been used by scholars to describe the way learning takes place 
within a social as opposed to a conventional didactic setting; amongst groups of 
people who share a burden, a set of problem tasks, or a passion about a theme, and 
hence deepen their knowledge and expertise in these areas by interacting on an 
ongoing basis (Lave and Wnger, 1991; Lave, 1993; Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, 
2002, p.4; Erden, Von Krogh and Nonaka, 2008; Hoadley, 2012, p.288). As 
members of a “community” of practice spend time together, they implicitly begin to 
share information, develop insights, and build cognitive patterns, developing what 
Erden, Von Krogh and Nonaka (2008) called Group tacit knowledge   
 
Johnson and Johnson (1987) defined a “team” as a structured setting in which each 
member of a group has a role and works interdependently towards fulfilling a 
meaningful goal. For the purpose of this study the term “team” was preferred to 
“group” for a number of reasons. First, a team has a history and a future whereas a 
group most times gets disbanded after achieving specific short-term tasks (Paris, 
Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Also, cohesiveness might be irrelevant in a group 
since arriving at good decision outcomes is usually the primary objective. On the 
other hand, whilst effective task performance is also a desired objective for teams, 
ensuring cohesiveness amongst the team members is even more crucial. Strong 
morale, long term cooperation and conformity to group norms are all important 
factors that can sustain a team (Desanctis and Gallupe, 1987). Hence, one of the 
major tasks for future research in the aspect of team decision making lies with 
finding a desirable balance between optimum task performance and team cohesion 
(Pennington, 1986). 
But how can team performance be made more effective? Several possible options 
have been reported in the literature. The first is by addressing the way information is 
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communicated among team members. The pattern through which information flows 
within a team has been shown to determine, to a large extent, the decision making 
strategy that is adopted by incident commanders (Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 
2006). Two main communication styles are common in the crisis communication 
literature depending on team size, task type and the time available for making 
decisions (Desanctis and Gallupe, 1987; MacMillan, Entin and Serfarty, 2004; 
McLennan, Holgate, Omodei and Wearing, 2006). These are: (i) open 
communication, which is more demographic and where an incident commander 
seeks support from other team members (ii) a restricted communication structure, 
which is a more militaristic or autocratic approach and limits the level of contribution 
that can be made by team members at any given time.  
Studies have, however, shown that employing the open communication style is 
mostly problematic in time-critical and high staked domains such as firefighting (Flin, 
1996; Orasanu and Martin, 1998; Grimwood, 1992). This is because collaborative 
decision making under time pressure and attempts to justify potential courses of 
action are likely to slow down the speed of events and subsequently affect overall 
team performance (Dane, 2011; Dickson, McLennan and Omodei, 2000).   
Team effectiveness can also be enhanced by properly managing the perceptual and 
cognitive differences that exist amongst team members. It has been shown that 
differences exist in the way various officers perceive what is more/less risky and how 
they recognize and interpret different cues. Such perceptual differences could even 
get more complicated if the team has a wide variation in their level of expertise 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Baylor, 2001; Salas, 2003). In such circumstances, 
most authors believe cognitive differences amongst team members can best be 
managed when the most experienced individual within the group, or the person 
appointed as incident commander, takes responsibility for the more strategic 
decisions (Klein, 1998; Tissington and Flin, 2005; HM Government, 2008). However, 
consultation with other team members might be required if conditions become more 
uncertain or novel. This way, new patterns may be recognized by other team 
members, and weaknesses in the proposed course(s) of action may also be 
discovered and corrected.     
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Further to the above, Paton and Flin (1999) identified three factors necessary for 
enhancing team effectiveness i.e. a proper analysis of the required team roles, 
sufficient training regarding the required skills and the existence of a favourable work 
climate. Flexible sets of behaviour, adaptability, shared situational awareness, 
performance monitoring, evaluation and feedback and a well-defined leadership 
structure have all been identified as important ingredients for effective teamwork 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu and Salas, 2001).  
Despite the importance that has been ascribed to having an effective crisis 
management team, a number of scholars yet argue that the progress made in 
understanding how teams make decisions is still relatively slow within the naturalistic 
decision making community (Caverni, 2001; Salas, 2003; Marold et al. 2012). This 
was attributed to two major reasons. First, the scarcity of empirical studies on team 
decision making — there seem to be more laboratory studies on teamwork than 
those conducted in the naturalistic settings (Pearson and Clair, 1998; Lipshitz et al., 
2001; Salas, 2003). Second, the complexities, rigour and cost associated with 
studying team decision making are quite high compared to studying how single 
individuals make decisions (Azuma, Daily and Furmanski 2006; Salas, 2003). In the 
words of Lipshitz et al. (2001, p.342) “it takes a team to be able to study another 
team in context”. There therefore seems to be a compelling need to step up research 
efforts, especially in naturalistic studies in order to gain a better understanding of the 
dynamics of decision making within teams (Salas, 2003; Crichton and Flin, 2004; 
Crichton, 2009).  
2.9. THE ROLE OF TASK ENVIRONMENT IN DECISION MAKING 
In one of his articles entitled “competence in experts: the role of task characteristics”, 
Shanteau (1992) highlighted five conditions upon which experts’ competence 
depend. These are: (i) a sufficient knowledge about the domain (ii) the psychological 
traits associated with expertise (iii) the cognitive skills required to make difficult 
decisions (iv) the ability to use the most appropriate decision making strategies, and 
(v) a task with suitable characteristics. The author argued that whilst the first four 
conditions are attainable e.g. through training and experience, the last condition 
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tends to lie beyond the control of experts. This is because people cannot easily alter 
the features of the environment where they operate (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
2002).  
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) in their famous fast and frugal heuristics theory 
explained the role of task environment in the overall decision making process. As an 
analogy, the authors used a pair of scissors to analyse how human beings 
rationalize their behaviour while performing a complex task. One side of the scissors 
was said to represent the structure of the task environment, while the other 
represents the computational capabilities of the decision maker. Gigerenzer and his 
colleagues later used the term ecological rationality to demonstrate that rationality 
and behaviour are not only bounded, but also ecological (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Gigerenzer, 2004). The term ecological suggests that performance is context-based 
and driven by the features of a particular environment.  
The task types and the environment in which they are performed are becoming 
important variables for assessing competence in the expertise literature (Simon, 
1990, p.7; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Goldstein, 2008; Comfort, 1994; Shanteau, 
1992; Keller, Cokley, Katsikopolous and Wegworth, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2010). For 
example, Desanctis and Gallupe (1987) noted that task type accounts for up to 50% 
of the variance that is likely to occur in both individual and team performances. 
Certain characteristics differentiate one task environment from another, such as the 
nature of goals pursued by decision makers, criteria for task completion, availability 
of domain rules and the extent to which such rules must be adhered to, time stress, 
presence or absence of environmental stressors (e.g. severe weather conditions), 
and the consequences of success or failure (Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2010; 
Dickson, McLennan and Omodei, 2000).  
All the afore-mentioned factors ultimately determine the dominant decision making 
strategy that experts are likely to default to. For example, in complex environments 
where tasks are required to be performed amidst incomplete information and time 
pressure, intuitive decision making is most likely to be more effective than the 
analytical/deliberative strategies (Hammond et al., 1987; Hammond, 1996). Part of 
the reason for this is that the analytical mode possesses a “low capacity” and can 
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therefore be easily inundated with large amounts of information. The intuitive mode 
on the other hand possesses a higher capacity as it is designed to process 
information quicker and is thus more appropriate in time-pressured and high-staked 
environments. Hence, employing the intuitive decision making strategy, or what 
Epstein (2010) called experiential knowledge, will more likely provide actors with the 
ability to integrate complex sets of cues concurrently ─ exactly what is required for 
solving complex problems (Salas et al. 2010)   
There is a growing body of evidence to show that the strength of competence in 
experts varies across different disciplines (Meehl, 1954; Calderwood, Crandall and 
Klein, 1987; Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993). It is therefore more of the 
characteristics of the particular domain people operate in and not necessarily their 
level of experience that determines competence (Shanteau, 1992; Salas, Rosen and 
DiazGranados, 2010; Dane, 2011). This assertion is well supported by the work of 
Hammond et al. (1987) who developed the popular intuitive/analytical decision 
making framework. In their research with expert highway engineers, Hammond and 
his colleagues showed that applying intuitive reasoning did not lead to a better or 
poorer performance than analytical reasoning. Instead, all that mattered was whether 
or not the environment provided adequate informational cues upon which decisions 
were based.  
Furthermore, a number of scholars have studied experts in the behavioural domain 
i.e. a domain involving the study of, or interaction with human beings, such as 
medicine (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Marewski, 2009) and in more static domains (Shanteau, 1992; Cooke and Breedin, 
1994) and comparative analyses of findings from both domains showed that experts 
in the behavioural domain mostly perform less well than their counterparts (see 
Table 2.4 below). This is because experts in the behavioural domain are expected to 
evaluate situations that are dynamic as well as make decisions about moving targets 
(Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, 1987; Dickson, McLennan and Omodei, 2000; 
Shanteau, 1988; Dane, 2011; Eraut, 2004). For example, Shanteau (1992) studied a 
wide range of experts across different disciplines and found some level of variation in 
their competence levels. More specifically, the author discovered that proficiency of 
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experts in certain domains such as weather forecasting, medicine, auditing and 
livestock management was quite high, but somewhat discouraging in other domains 
such as nuclear power stations, stock brokers etc.  
 
 
Table 2.2: Task characteristics associated with good and poor performance in experts (Adapted from 
Shanteau, 1992) 
Good performance Poor performance 
Static stimuli Dynamic and changing stimuli 
Decisions about things Decisions about behaviour 
Experts agree on stimuli Experts disagree on stimuli 
More predictable problems Less predictable problems 
Some errors expected Few or no error expected 
Routine tasks Non-routine or unique tasks 
Feedback available No available feedback 
Objective evaluation available Limited to subjective evaluation  
Problems decomposable Problems not decomposable 
Decision aids are common Decision aids are rare 
 
Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of task environments with emphasis on the 
conditions that make good or poor performances possible. It therefore seems that 
commanders now need to better understand the environments where they operate, 
the constraints and affordances of those environments, and the kinds of knowledge 
and skills required to respond to task demands (Lipshitz et al., 2001).   
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2.9.1. The relevance of cues and feedback in the task environment 
Intuitive skill performance depends largely on the structure of the informational cues 
available in an environment; the distribution and validity of the cues and the 
correlation between the cues and the ease of identifying them (Broder, 2003; Reimer 
and Otto, 2006). For example, if an environment provides valid cues and good 
feedback, skill and expert intuition is more likely to develop in individuals with 
sufficient talent (Clark et al., 2006).  
Wong (1996) defined a cue as any stimulus with implications for action. Task 
environments have been broadly categorized into “high-validity”, “low-validity” or 
“zero-validity” depending on the ease with which useful cues are identified by 
decision makers (Kahneman, 2011, p.241). A high validity environment is one where 
a stable relationship exists between objectively identifiable cues and the events that 
eventually happened i.e. a situation in which identified cues accurately predict the 
outcomes of events. In high validity environments, valid cues are usually specifiable, 
at least in principle, thereby putting the onus of cue identification and interpretation 
on the decision makers. 
Zero-validity, at the other extreme, describes an environment where future outcomes 
are extremely unpredictable (Wong et al., 1997). Examples that fit into this 
environment include predictions of the future value of individual stocks, long-term 
forecasts of political events, detection of frauds, predictability of industrial accidents 
etc. (Pliske, McCloskey and Klein, 2001; Kahneman 2011). This explains why it is 
difficult or even almost impossible to attain expertise in such domains because 
actors often tend to rely more on validated scoring rules or decision aids over human 
judgment (Meehl, 1986; Phillips, Klein and Sieck, 2004).  
It must however be noted that validity and uncertainty are not incompatible; some 
environments have been shown to be highly valid and yet substantially uncertain 
(Comfort, 1994). Professionals performing within such environments rarely have the 
opportunity to receive accurate and timely feedback on their judgments, and when 
they do, it only seems to be relevant in the short term (Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 2003). 
For example, physicians in an emergency room can only receive short-term 
79 
 
 
 
feedback on how patients responded to their immediate actions such as drug 
prescriptions. The physicians will rarely find out the longer-term effects of their 
actions on the patients as some patients might never return to the same hospital, 
and when they do, they might not be attended to by the same physician (Hogarth, 
2003). But other domains such as weather forecast tend to give experts both short 
and long term feedback e.g. the fact that the eventual weather condition is not 
influenced by the predictions of meteorologists makes it easier for experts to learn 
from their mistakes in such a domain 
The role of feedback cannot be overemphasized in developing domain expertise. In 
his book entitled “Educating intuition in the 21st century”, Hogarth (2003) explained 
that deficiencies in the feedback people receive tend to be one of the greatest 
barriers to developing intuitive skills. Poor quality feedback over a long period of time 
will end up distorting the knowledge base of operators and ultimately weaken their 
level of competence (Hogarth and Karelaia, 2007). Hence, people’s mental models 
can only be strengthened when they are provided quality feedback that is both 
‘relevant and exacting’ (Dane and Pratt, 2007). Accurate and timely feedback plays a 
critical role in any learning process; it ensures that the validity of the experience 
encountered is reinforced and subsequently indexed into the long term memory for 
future use (McCaffrey, 2007)  
Although some domains are characterized by slow and prolonged feedback as 
earlier discussed, the good news is that operators in such domains could still be 
encouraged to develop their skills by imitating and learning from the most successful 
members in the team (Chaiklin, 2003; Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2008). This is one of the primary goals of the current study. In 
addition to learning from others, individuals can also receive feedback from 
themselves by scrutinizing their “not too good” decisions and congratulating 
themselves on the good ones (Klein, 2003). However, this tendency of self-appraisal 
would require a high level of discipline on the part of the decision maker and must be 
devoid of self-serving bias, confirmation bias or hindsight bias (Bazerman and 
Watkins, 2008).  
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It is also important that the whole feedback mechanism has learning at its centre. 
Feedback is only effective if people are willing to learn from their mistakes and 
subsequently develop strategies to overcome such mistakes (Schon, 1983; Ericsson, 
Prietula and Cokely, 2007). This aligns with Senge’s (1990) definition of learning as 
the process of detecting and correcting errors. The study of Dunning et al., (2003) 
also provides additional evidence to suggest that most novices are likely to learn 
from their errors, but only if they are shown how to recognize and avoid them.  
2.10. TRAINING INTUITIVE SKILLS  
A number of authors are generally convinced that new ways of thinking as well as 
new methods of training are needed if emergency managers are to become better 
equipped for the challenges posed by present day crises (see Boin and Lagadec 
2000; Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001; Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Alexander 2000). 
These scholars argue that knowledge derived from ‘normal’ training procedures 
coupled with the emphasis on routine skills seem no longer sufficient in coping with 
modern crises. This therefore suggests the need to develop collective capabilities 
and to acquire “soft” skills that transcend beyond mere technical knowledge (Boin 
and Lagadec, 2000; Rosenthal et al., 2001).  
Although intuitive skills are difficult to acquire in practice, evidence suggests the 
process of gaining them can be effectively propelled through training (Klein, 1993; 
Flin, O’Connor and Mearns, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Clark et al. 2006; Sarfo and Ellen, 
2007; Gasaway, 2012). The over-arching goal of training is to help people climb the 
learning curve at a faster rate (Hutton, Miller and Thordsen, 2003; Phillips, Sieck and 
Klein, 2004).  Thankfully nowadays, the scientific measurement of intuition and how 
it can be taught or transferred is increasingly gaining more ground as the concept is 
becoming better understood (Hogarth, 2001). Training people to become better 
intuitive decision makers basically entails strengthening their experience base, such 
that their schemata (action scripts, repertoires and mental models) are developed 
through the training they receive and the lessons learnt from such training. Training 
allows operators to gain more confidence until they are able to perform non-recurrent 
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tasks or attain automaticity in the tasks they are already familiar with (O’Hare et al., 
1998; van Merrienboer, Clark and de Croock, 2002) 
In his book entitled “The power of intuition”, Klein (2003, p.52) highlighted some 
intuitive skills that can be developed through training, showing that less experienced 
personnel can be trained to become proficient in: 
 Sizing up situations faster and more efficiently 
 Having a good sense of problem recognition 
 Feeling very confident that the first option selected will most likely be a good 
one 
 Having a good sense of what is going to happen next 
 Understanding how to filter information to avoid data overload 
 Managing pressure and uncertainties more professionally 
 Finding alternative solutions when a plan runs into difficulty  
 Developing a sense of acknowledging the importance of critical cues and 
patterns  
 Building and validating stories during situational assessment 
                                                                                                  (Klein, 2003, p.52) 
A variety of training methods are available for improving expertise, depending on the 
available resources and the type of tasks involved (Gaba, 2004). Intuitive skill 
training does not necessarily have to be complicated (Desanctis and Gallupe, 1987), 
in fact, it could be as simple as helping personnel make good sense of the decisions 
they routinely make, or to identify difficulties in the tasks they perform and propose 
ways to overcome such difficulties in the future  (Klein, 2003; Freitas and Neumann, 
2008). Examples of training techniques that can thus be explored by emergency 
response organizations include: Map tactical decision games, sand-table exercises, 
computer generated simulation exercises, large scale field simulation exercises, and 
real-life training (Borodzicz and Haperen, 2002; McLennan, Omodei, Holgate and 
Wearing, 2006; Flin et al., 2008). Depending on the purpose of training, small scale 
and table top exercises could be used to develop simple routine and recurrent skills, 
while large-scale field exercises can be focused on developing key skills such as 
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information processing and incident command skills, communication skills and team 
metacognition.  
Sceptics have consistently displayed concerns about the inherent limitations of 
training officers with simulation games or other decision support systems (Shanteau, 
1988; Shanteau, 1992; Serfaty, Mac Millan, Entin and Entin, 1997; Clark et al. 2006; 
Spender, 2008). Some of these concerns were based on the assumption that 
simulations cannot absolutely mimic the psychological and cognitive traits of experts. 
This is because game developers often seem to emphasize aspects of declarative 
(or codified) knowledge in their design, overlooking the most important aspect of 
expertise — tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, 1962; Clark and Elen, 2006; Grant, 
2007). Shanteau (1992) argued that most decision support systems are quite rigid 
and that expert systems would be more useful if they could be designed to be as 
flexible as the experts they aim to mimic (since rigidity is taken to be a characteristic 
of novices).  
But, regardless of the training method employed, it is important to ensure that 
scenarios and procedures within the training package accurately reflect the context 
in which they would normally be applied in real life (Wong, Sallis and O’Hare, 1997; 
Patton and Flin, 1999; Crichton, 2009; Gasaway, 2012). The best training strategy 
according to van Merrienboer (2002) is therefore one that showcases the challenges 
that would likely be encountered by decision makers in real life. Also, since the 
domains referred to here are also characterized by time-pressure and complexities, 
Wong (2000) suggested that training programmes and instructional curricula should 
be designed so as to improve the intuitive skills of decision makers through pattern 
recognition rather than through analytical comparism of options. In other words, 
trainees should be made to learn new tasks by applying what they already know in 
solving current problems. 
How then do we determine the tasks to be included in a training package? A few 
strategies have been reported in the literature. First, facilitators can convert people’s 
personal field experiences into a scenario based on what went right or wrong 
(Gasaway, 2012). Second, facilitators could capitalize on the particular task 
constraints that crew members seem to be repeatedly struggling with and then 
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design a part-task practice [i.e. training conducted in repeated sessions until learners 
gain automaticity (Kirschner and van Merrienboer, 2007; Gaba, 2004)]. Third, taking 
a new or upcoming project (such as the installation of a new equipment) and turning 
it into a decision making exercise or scenario (Klein, 2003, p.50). This will ensure, 
inter alia, that team members are aware of the project apriori thereby making the 
learning of it a lot easier when the equipment is eventually installed. Depending on 
the difficulty of each task, training sessions can be repeated as much as necessary 
till learners are able to fully master the required skills (van Merrienboer and 
Kirschner, 2007). The first and second strategies are the focus of the current 
research i.e. converting expert knowledge to forms that can be used to enhance 
learning.  
2.11. A REVIEW OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO DECISION MAKING 
IN THE NATURALISTIC ENVIRONMENT  
 
“The failure of the incident commanders to cope with the problems they faced 
on the night of the disaster clearly demonstrates that conventional selection 
and training of staff and experts is no guarantee of the ability to cope if the 
responders themselves are not in the end able to take critical decisions and 
lead those under their command in a time of extreme stress”                             
                                (Cullen, 1990, p.353) 
In his Nobel Prize winning work, Simon (1957) noted that the field of decision making 
is roughly divided into two: the normative and the descriptive models. A normative 
theorist will, for example, suggest a mathematical model that might help decision 
makers to act rationally and perhaps optimally (Dougherty, Franco-Watkins and 
Thomas, 2008). The descriptive decision model, on the other hand, describes how 
decisions are actually made (Montgomery, Lipshitz and Brehmer, 2005) and 
emphasizes the reasons why the normative model will not work in time-pressured 
environments (Ross et al., 2004; Cokely, Kelley and Gilchrist, 2006; Riabacke, 2006)   
Managing real-world crises poses numerous challenges to professionals such as 
having to cope with intense time pressure, uncertainty, dynamic and changing 
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conditions, ill-defined goals, ambiguity and high stakes (see Orasanu and Connolly, 
1993; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu and Salas, 2001; Falzer, 2004; Klein, 2008). 
However, ample evidence exists to show that experienced decision makers still carry 
on despite these challenges and also perform reasonably (and sometimes 
exceptionally) well under these conditions (Lipshitz, 1993; Lipshitz and Strauss, 
1997; Matzler, Bailom and Mooradian, 2007; Klein et al., 1995; Serfaty, MacMillan, 
Entin and Entin, 1997; Burke, 1997; Fessey, 2002).  
This section aims to explore the various decision making models used by actors 
under different conditions. It is assumed that understanding the decision making 
strategies used by experts will help clarify where novices are likely to make 
mistakes. Such understanding would also help suggest how novices can best be 
made to learn from experts. Three decision making strategies will be examined in 
this section i.e. the classical decision making theories, the heuristic and biases 
approach and the recognition primed decision model (RPDM). The section will then 
conclude by suggesting how the two modes of thinking ― generally known as 
system 1 and system 2 (Bazerman and Moore, 2006) ― operate under time 
pressure, and how they are interchangeably used by domain experts.  
2.11.1. The traditional decision making model 
The traditional or classical decision making model is similar to the concept of 
unbounded rationality (see Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010) which 
assumes that people have all the relevant information that aids effective 
performance. For example, it assumes that people are aware of all the possible 
choice options and the potential impacts of each. The classical theory also assumes 
that people have unfailing memory and also possess large computational ability 
needed to run complex decision calculations (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994; Scott, 2000). 
In theory, this approach should allow people to take the “best” option provided they 
have the mental energy, unlimited time and all the relevant information to analyse 
their thought processes (Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010, p.104).  
The classical model also includes, for example, laboratory experiments where 
subjects perform trivial tasks, or where individuals are given several hours or days to 
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carefully evaluate their options (Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1988). At its 
simplest form, the classical model consists of the following stages:  
• Identifying the problem 
• Generating a set of options for solving the problem/choice alternatives 
• Evaluating these options concurrently using one of a number of strategies e.g. 
cost/benefit analysis 
• Choosing and implementing the preferred option. 
 
The prescription made by classical decision theorists is – and often continues to be – 
that professionals should avoid making intuitive decisions as much as possible and 
think more deliberately instead (e.g. Simon, 1955, 1956; Bonabeau, 2003; 
Schoemaker and Russo, 1993; Scott, 2000).  
Unfortunately, the ‘rationality’ and ‘optimality’ claimed by the classical theorists have 
been proved to be unrealistic from the point of view of the naturalistic decision 
making paradigm (Tsoukas, 2003; Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 2006; Klein, 2003 
p.21). For example, studies have shown that even when decision makers attempt to 
keep an open mind by considering several options, they often still know a priori what 
option they want for themselves (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Wegner, 2002; 
Kahneman, 2003). People frequently tweak pre-set evaluation criteria in order to 
arrive at the option(s) they originally wanted (Spender, 2008). Polanyi, in his early 
research, emphasized this notion, claiming that no knowledge can be regarded as 
wholly explicit or totally objective but is rather influenced by the beliefs and values of 
individual decision makers (Polanyi, 1962, 1966) 
In more recent years the shortcomings of the classical model seem even more 
obvious as organizational decision-making environments became increasingly fast 
paced and dynamic (Tissington and Flin, 2005; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). 
Hence, although theoretically stronger than its counterparts, the rational choice 
model has been criticized for over-simplifying decision making as it is rarely 
concerned with the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity that are peculiar 
to the more dynamic settings (McCaffrey, 2007; Ingham, 2007; Spender, 2008). 
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There is little doubt that performance could be improved if conditions allowed 
sufficient time; unfortunately, time, knowledge, computational ability and other forms 
of valuable resources seem to be limited in real life emergency situations (Keller, 
Cokely, Katsikopoulos and Wegwarth 2010).  
For instance, in two different experiments conducted by Howell (1984), it was 
demonstrated that time pressure seriously infringed upon participants’ ability to apply 
some pre-set decision formulas. These studies showed that time pressure interacted 
with other variables to produce a more intuitive approach to problem solving (see 
Zsambok, 1997). This suggests that, although unbounded rationality may be a 
convenient way of modelling decision making outcomes, it is an unrealistic way of 
describing how people actually make high-staked and time-pressured decisions 
(Kahneman, 2003; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). Thus, the classical model mostly 
seem to be applicable in environments with routine tasks for which problems are 
often artificial in nature, where inexperienced decision makers are involved, or where 
stakes are relatively low (Flin, 1996; Gore et al., 2006; Dane and Pratt, 2009). 
As Spender (2008) puts it, there is no other option left but to think outside 
rationality’s box. The concept of naturalistic decision making and other “fast thinking” 
models have therefore emerged from an initial rejection of the classical decision 
theory and have collectively inspired further research aimed at considering faster 
ways of making decisions. An example of such a movement is the heuristic and bias 
approach which is discussed next (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008; Schooler and 
Hertwig, 2005; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010; Reimer and Rieskamp, 2007; 
Gigerenzer, 2007; Hogarth, 2003; Marewski, 2009; Keller et al. 2010; Matzler, 
Bailom and Mooradian, 2007; Katsikopoulos, 2010). 
2.11.2. Heuristics and Biases (HB) Approach 
The heuristics and biases (HB) approach initiated by Kahneman and Tversky in the 
1970s is one of the popular routes in studying how people make decisions (Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu and Salas, 2001). This body of research is mainly concerned with the 
intuitive judgments that arise from simplifying heuristics rather than from specific 
experiences as claimed by the naturalistic decision making (NDM) community (see 
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Kahneman and Klein, 2009 for a review on the differences between NDM and HB 
paradigms). The major difference between the NDM and the HB schools is that NDM 
researchers compare the performance of professionals with that of the most 
successful experts in their field, whereas HB researchers prefer to compare the 
judgments of professionals with the outcome of decision support systems or 
algorithms (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Meehl, 1954; 1986). Proponents of 
the HB school believe it is entirely possible for the predictions of an experienced 
clinician, for example, to be superior to those of novices in the same field but appear 
inferior to those from a mathematical model or an intelligent system.  As a result, HB 
researchers also view experts as possible victims of the same cognitive illusions and 
biases novices suffer from (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Caverni, 2001; Evans 
and Over, 2010).   
Up until now, several efforts have been made to redress the meaning and application 
of heuristics, especially in time-pressured domains (Cioffi, 1997).  For instance, 
many believe that defining heuristics as rules of thumb or irrational shortcuts that 
result in judgmental bias is probably too harsh (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Reimer and Rieskamp, 2007; Gigerenzer, 2008; Dougherty et al., 2008; Marewski, 
2009). These authors remain adamant that heuristics, regardless of their 
shortcomings, make judgments and decisions easier in one form or another and that 
using them does not necessarily affect the accuracy of decision outcomes. Since the 
original Greek etymology of the term means “to find out” or “to discover”, authors 
such as Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2010) have questioned the logic 
behind the assumption that heuristics are a source of judgmental bias?  
Heuristics have been regarded as a powerful decision making tools when applied 
properly (Keller et al., 2010). They offer a more resource-frugal and yet robust way of 
managing complex tasks (Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2011; Rieskamp and Otto, 
2006). The use of heuristics therefore help decision makers to arrive at faster 
judgments since they are naturally designed to reduce mental effort which helps to 
relieve the mind of unnecessary arduous computations (Gigerenzer, 2007; 
Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010; Katsikopoulos, 2010; Hilbig, Scholl 
and Pohl, 2010)   
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2.11.2.1. Heuristic versus Intuition 
Should the terms “heuristic” and “intuition” be used interchangeably? There is 
considerable evidence to believe they should not (Benner and Tanner, 1987; Cioffi, 
1997; Bonabeau, 2003; Evans, 2008; Epstein, 2010). Intuition entails an “automatic 
integration of information” and involves a direct knowing without necessarily knowing 
how one knew (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005) while heuristics on the other hand 
involve a mere simplification of thoughts, mainly by ignoring information that is 
judged unimportant (Maqsood, Finegan and Walker, 2004; Marewski, 2009; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2008).  
In their experimental research and contrary to existing beliefs, Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl 
(2010) demonstrated that the application of heuristics is not necessarily a 
consequence of intuitive thinking, but rather an effort-reduction feature that people 
call upon when thinking deliberately. A similar conclusion was reached by Plessner 
and Czenna (2008) who asked subjects to answer a set of questions, comprising of 
both simple and difficult questions. The authors found that when participants were 
made to think more analytically (i.e. to answer the difficult questions) their reliance 
on the anchoring heuristics increased. The anchoring heuristics is a mental shortcut 
that allows people to make judgments by making adjustments from the initial 
information they have received (Cioffi, 1997). Conversely, by drastically reducing the 
time available to deliberate upon the questions, participants were found to rely more 
on their previous experiences. This therefore suggests that the intuitive judgments 
produced in the absence of skills are those that are most likely to invoke the 
operation of heuristics (Cioffi, 1997; Kahneman, 2003). 
The debates regarding the role and application of heuristics still remain unresolved in 
the judgment and decision making literature (see Evans, 2010 for an overview). For 
example, it has been asked how discussions about heuristics could point scholars in 
such opposite directions, with suggestions that researchers who see heuristics as a 
rational decision making tool are only “hiding the real truth” (Evans, 2008; Evans and 
Over, 2010). Most “anti-heuristic” researchers maintain that relying on one’s 
heuristics in making difficult decisions, particularly under unusual circumstances, will 
often lead to some degree of judgmental bias.  
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Thus, although the NDM community favors the term intuition over heuristics, both 
terms still have certain features in common. They both process information rapidly, 
and also have tacit properties alike. Integrating both concepts might therefore result 
in generating more useful fast thinking models for actors operating in time-pressured 
and high staked environments (See Cioffi, 1997)   
2.11.3. Naturalistic decision making 
Naturalistic decision making (NDM) is mainly concerned with how experts make 
decisions in the real world using their experience (Klein 1991; 1993; Salas and Klein, 
2001; Zsambok and Klein, 1997; Lipshitz et al., 2001; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; 
Shanteau, 1992; Flin, 1996; Montgomery, Lipshitz & Brehmer, 2005; Jenkins et al., 
2010). This stands in contrast to the normative model that prescribes how decisions 
are to be made. The primary motive driving most NDM studies has been made 
explicit in the words of Kahneman and Klein (2009):  
“A central goal of NDM is to demystify intuition by identifying the cues that 
experts use to make their judgments, even if those cues involve tacit 
knowledge that is difficult to articulate. This way, NDM researchers try to 
learn from expert professionals” (Kahneman and Klein, 2009, p.516) 
Research on NDM grew out of the early studies on chess by De Groot (1946/1978) 
and later by Chase and Simon (1973). De Groot showed that chess grand masters 
were generally able to identify the most promising moves rapidly, while mediocre 
players often did not even consider the best moves. The author discovered that the 
main difference between the chess grand masters and their weaker counterparts 
was the fact that the former were able to appreciate the dynamics of the complex 
positions and quickly judged a line of play as either promising or fruitless. Chase and 
Simon (1973) later described the performance of these chess experts as a form of 
perceptual skill where complex patterns were recognized on the basis of the 
repertoire of patterns stored in the actors’ memory (i.e. between 50,000 to 100,000 
immediately recognizable patterns). 
Over the years, the number of expert studies conducted within the NDM domain 
appears encouraging, and still growing (see Lipshitz et al., 2001; Elliot, 2005; Gore 
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et al., 2006; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 2010 for a review). For example, authors have 
studied how:  
• Acute medical teams regularly deal with patients with uncertain diagnosis 
and/or rapidly changing medical conditions (Crandall and Gamblian, 1991; 
Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993),  
• Airline pilots make rapid decisions within seconds when faced with changing 
demands (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993; Orasanu and Martins, 1998; Endsley, 
1995),  
• Emergency ambulance control room make decisions of dispatching 
ambulances amidst limited resources (Wong, 1996; Wong, 2000),  
• Battle ground and military commanders successfully strategize against their 
enemies in the face of external pressures (Ross et al., 2004; Klein and 
Thordsen, 1988; Schmitt and Klein, 1996),  
• Industrial and production managers make decisions against a backdrop of 
highly fluctuating production and economic risks  (Muhlemann, Oakland and 
Lockyer, 1992),  
• Offshore oil installation managers cope amidst the high risks associated with 
various drilling and mining activities (Flin, Slaven and Stewart, 1996; Crichton, 
Lauche and Flin, 2005 ) and how  
• Fireground commanders make time-pressured decisions amidst conflicting 
and incomplete information (Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, 1987; Brehmer, 
1996; Tissington and Flin, 2005; Klein et al., 2010; Okoli et al., 2015).   
In their theoretical review paper, Lipshitz et al. (2001) identified four criteria that 
distinguish NDM studies from other research areas:  
• The characteristics of domain tasks: NDM studies are context rich and domain 
specific 
• The actors under investigation: NDM studies mostly utilize experts, although 
novices are sometimes used in the need for comparison. 
• The intention of the research: NDM studies usually explore and describe the 
strategies experts utilize in solving difficult problems in their domain 
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• The point of interest within the decision points: NDM researchers mostly 
define their area(s) of interest from the overall knowledge elicitation process 
e.g. they can decide to focus on situation awareness, sense making, 
information filtering, teamwork, decision type etc. 
 
Despite remarkable progress reported in the NDM literature, the field has not been 
devoid of its own criticisms. Caverni (2001) argued that naturalistic events are 
beyond what the NDM community can capture and therefore advised that a change 
of name from naturalistic decision making (NDM) to expert decision making (EDM) 
would seem more realistic. Furthermore, the methodologies applied in some NDM 
studies have been criticized for having low experimental control and for being 
relatively soft; producing only data that favours the NDM model (Doherty, 1993; 
Rosen et al. 2010; Caverni, 2001; Jungermann, 2001; Yates et al., 2003). Most 
experimental psychologists believe that an experimental approach to studying 
experts tends to be superior to those used by NDM field researchers in terms of 
rigour (Tulving, 1989; Dougherty, Franco-Watkins and Thomas, 2008; Dreyfus, 2004; 
Waroquier et al., 2010; Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
However, NDM scholars have mostly debunked these claims, arguing that every 
research approach deserves to be judged solely on the basis of its driving principles 
and not out of context (Kobus, Lipshitz et al., 2001; Proctor, Holste, 2001; Salas and 
Klein, 2001; Montgomery, Lipshitz and Brehmer, 2005; Klein, 2008). NDM 
proponents have emphasized that the normative decision models (how decisions 
should be made) and descriptive decision models (how decisions are actually made) 
pursue different goals. It has been argued that most experimental studies on expert 
cognition stand the chance of producing misleading results or artificially validating 
theories (Oppenheimer, 2003; Dreyfus, 1972). Many authors believe that such 
experimental studies should rather be tested against NDM studies since the latter is 
closer to real life experience (Klein et al., 1989; Hoffman et al., 1998; Hilbig, Scholl 
and Pohl, 2010; Keller et al., 2010; Broadbent et al., 1986; Salas, 2003; Ross et al., 
2004; Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2010).  
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2.11.3.1. Recognition-Primed Decision Model (RPDM)  
The recognition primed decision making model, originally developed by Klein and his 
colleagues (Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) has remained a 
prototypical model in the field of naturalistic decision making. The model has been 
widely used by various authors to either compare or benchmark the decision making 
process of experts (Skriver and Flin, 1996; Wong, 2000; Gore et al., 2006; Jenkins et 
al., 2010; Frye and Wearing, 2011; Okoli et al., 2014)  
The research that led to the development of the RPD model stemmed from an 
attempt to describe and analyse the decision making strategies used by fireground 
commanders who were required to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
and time pressure (Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco 1986). Klein and his 
colleagues became interested in knowing how these commanders could make 
accurate decisions without comparing options. Their initial hypothesis was that the 
commanders would restrict their analysis to only a pair of options. But to their 
surprise, all that the commanders generated was mainly a single option, which was 
all they also needed. This was possible because the officers could actually draw on 
the repertoire of patterns they had compiled during more than a decade of 
experience to identify a plausible option that was considered first (Falzer, 2004).  
Recognition primed decisions are decisions for which action alternatives are directly 
derived from the recognition of critical information and prior experiential knowledge 
(Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor, 1989). According to Klein et al. (1989), the 
patterns stored in the memory of the decision maker highlight the most relevant 
cues, provide expectancies, identify plausible goals, and then suggest workable 
action plans. In other words, the model typically involves using recognized patterns 
to solve current problems. The recognition primed decision model links decision 
making to perceptual learning, pattern matching and the development of prototypes 
in the memory, and suggests that decision making and behaviour can no longer be 
well understood independent of these psychological processes (Feldon, 2007; Elliot, 
2005).  
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One important feature of the model is that experts, due to time constraints, typically 
aim for the courses of action that are satisfactory even if they are not the best option 
(Hoffman and Militello, 2008) 
The RPD model has evolved into three basic levels depending on the severity and 
complexity of an incident (see Figure 2.4). At level 1 (least complex events), the 
decision maker recognizes the situation, knows the appropriate response plan to 
implement and acts promptly. This includes making decisions concerning routine 
incidents that have formed part of an individual’s day to day work ethos (Rasmussen, 
2005).  
However, as the incident increases in dynamism and complexity, the need for a 
more thorough diagnosis of the situation becomes obvious. This takes place in level 
2 of the model, as shown in Figure 2.4. For the purpose of clarity, the situation 
assessment phase does not necessarily require deliberating amongst options, rather 
it is where additional information is sought until an acceptable level of knowledge is 
reached by the actor (O’Hare et al., 1998; Wong and Blandford, 2002; Kobus, 
Proctor and Holste, 2001). Generally, decision makers are said to be situationally 
aware if their mental model represents an up-to-date version of proceedings in the 
environment (Wong, 2000). Several authors agree that situation assessment can be 
performed either through feature-matching or story-building (Klein, 1997, 2003; 
Thompson, Cohen and Freeman, 1995; Salas, 2003; Kobus, Proctor and Holste, 
2001; Lipshitz and Shaul, 1996; Elliot, 2005). In the case of feature matching, a 
decision maker will have to think of several interpretations of the situation using their 
experience and then use key features to determine the particular interpretation that 
provides the best match. Alternatively, the decision maker may have to combine 
these features to construct a plausible explanation for the situation through a 
process known as story building (Phillips et al., 2004).  
Story building, also known as gestalt intuition (Cioffi, 1997), has proved quite useful 
in situations where it is difficult to identify familiar patterns (Thompson, Cohen and 
Freeman, 1995; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2003, p.145). It is important to emphasise that 
stories, if constructed and interpreted properly, can be powerful tools for organizing 
and explaining less obvious cues, or for making sense of more complex situations 
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(McCaffrey, 2007). As with other meta-cognitive skills, decision makers could be 
trained on how to effectively construct and spot gaps in stories (Lipshitz, et al., 
2001). An example of such training package is one developed by Cohen and his 
colleagues (Cohen, Freeman and Wolf, 1997) termed the STEP (construct a Story, 
Test, Evaluate, and Plan). The STEP framework was originally designed for training 
naval officers in dealing with ambiguous situations and for making decisions 
concerning hostile intent.     
The final stage of the RPD model comes to play in situations where decision makers 
are uncertain about their chosen course of action (see Fig 2.4). This stage requires 
that experts conduct a brief mental simulation before implementing any course of 
action, consciously looking-out for potential problems or loopholes in proposed 
action plans (Klein and Crandall 1995; Kobus, Proctor and Holste, 2001). With 
mental simulation, decision makers are able to envision a scenario, build a picture of 
what is likely to happen and then ready to “pull the trigger” once satisfied with what is 
being played out in the “scripts” (McCaffrey, 2007; Klein, 2003, p.26).  
One of the distinguishing features of the RPD model is its ability to effectively blend 
intuition (level 1) with analysis (level 3). This arrangement helps mitigate post-
decision regrets, since decision makers have the opportunity to pre-test the validity 
of their judgement before acting (Johnson and Raab, 2003). For example, level 1 of 
the model occurs when a firefighter understands from previous experience of having 
managed several incidents that they need to employ an offensive strategy. However, 
simply acting on recognized patterns could prove counter-productive if the officer is 
not in the end able to assess whether the tactics that came to mind would work in the 
current situation (level 2). When assessing the new situation against previous 
experiences an officer could decide to compare the size of the current building, its 
location relative to other buildings, the team composition and the layout of the egress 
routes, and then make more informed judgment regarding the workability of his 
action plans (level 3). This type of assessment in which existing knowledge is 
compared against current situations before acting is what Klein (1997) termed 
mental simulation.  
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At this juncture it is deemed necessary to emphasize that the RPD model hugely 
relies on the experience of a decision maker across the three levels of the model. In 
other words, option recognition, situation assessment and mental simulation all 
require that decision makers have gained a substantial amount of knowledge of how 
things work in their domain (Randel, 1996; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001; Ross et 
al., 2004; Ward et al., 2011). Expertise is therefore required to recognize and 
categorize a situation as typical, to construct a useful story that would help determine 
whether or not a particular option is more workable than another, or to mentally 
simulate a course of action and predict how it will play out (Lewandowsky and 
Kirsner, 2000).  
 
 Figure. 2.4: The recognition primed decision model (Klein, 1998, p.24-25) 
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In sum, the key attributes of the recognition-primed decision model are highlighted 
below: 
 The focus of evaluation is mainly on situation assessment rather than option 
generation 
 The major aim of decision making is to “satisfice” rather than optimize. This 
principle means finding the best options that work, even if they are not the 
“best” option (Almerbalti, 2002)  
 The first option generated is usually satisfactory for experienced decision 
makers (Johnson and Raab, 2003)       
 The model applies a serial evaluation of options rather than concurrent 
deliberation between options. This means that the RPD model does not 
compare an option against other alternatives; rather it compares an option 
against the current situation in a serial manner (Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 
2006).  
 The RPDM uses mental simulation to check the workability of an option 
 Decision makers are often primed to act fast 
 
Despite the differences that exist amongst the various decision-making strategies 
discussed above, there also seems to be points of commonality, particularly between 
the recognition primed decision model and the heuristics and biases approach. 
Whilst the RPD heavily relies on pattern matching and mental simulation skills as the 
basis for assessing expertise, the validity of these skills becomes the main point of 
investigation for the heuristic and bias community, mainly through laboratory 
investigations. Gore et al. (2006) compared the NDM research with the heuristics 
and biases approach and observed that the HB community is quite obsessed with 
studying what experts do wrong while the NDM community is more concerned with 
what experts do right. There is therefore no best decision making research strategy, 
they all seem to be investigating important cognitive elements but in different ways.  
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2.12. TWO MODES OF THINKING: THE INTUITIVE VS THE ANALYTICAL 
It has been widely reported that individuals generally make task related decisions 
using two main cognitive modes. Interestingly, a number of authors have described 
these cognitive modes with different terminologies. For example, Kahneman (2011) 
called them  — slow vs. fast thinking; Dane and Pratt (2007) — intuitive vs. 
analytical; Bazerman and Moore (2006) — system 1 vs. system 2 thinking; Bargh 
and Morsella (2008) — conscious vs. unconscious, and Evans (2008) — rational vs. 
experiential strategies. However, despite reaching an agreement that effective 
decision making may in some instances involve combined use of intuition and 
analysis, agreeing on the dominant thinking mode still appears unresolved 
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Evans, 2008; Dane and Pratt, 
2009; Epstein, 2010; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012). Little consensus has emerged 
concerning the preferred sequence by which individuals do, or should, employ the 
two cognitive modes (See Hammond, Hamm, Grassia and Pearson, 1987; Klein, 
2003; Evans, 2008; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010). Some of 
the lingering questions continue to be: should people take stock of their intuition first 
and then engage in analysis, or should intuition guide analysis? In other words, it is 
not entirely clear whether intuitive and deliberative thinking represents two different 
modes of thinking or whether they are end points of the same dimension.  
Scholars have expressed varying opinions regarding the sequence of operation 
between the intuitive and the analytical modes (Simon, 1987; English, 1993; Lamond 
and Thompson, 2000; Jungermann, 2001; Lipshitz and Cohen, 2005; Evans and 
Over, 2010; Kahneman, 2011, p.223). For example, Gary Klein argues that the most 
effective way of combining these two thinking modes is to allow intuition to guide 
analysis (Klein, 2003, p.64). He considers that intuition ensures that patterns are 
recognized faster, making it possible for actors to react quicker to more pressing task 
demands. In most cases the intuitive (tacit) mode serves as the default system as 
mental energy is more easily freed up for performing difficult tasks. The deliberative 
mode is only invoked when the former struggles to solve a problem at hand, or when 
there is need to make some form of conscious decisions (Wulf and Shea, 2002; 
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Hogarth, 2003; Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 2006), or when there is need to justify 
one’s actions (King and Clark, 2002; McCaffrey, 2007).  
Interestingly, the way the intuitive and analytical mind operates has been likened to 
the functions of the eyes (see Broadbent, 1977; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012). Just 
like the peripheral vision of the eyes, the intuitive mind helps actors become more 
aware of their surrounding environment, and having a lower “capacity” than the 
analytical mode, actors are thus able to subliminally track other activities going on 
within and around them simultaneously. This function contrasts the analytical mode 
which is mainly designed to focus on one element at a time — similar to the foveal 
vision of the eyes. The analytical mode can only illuminate one element at a time i.e. 
the particular thing the decision maker is conscious of. This lack of flexibility hence 
makes it less viable in the dynamic environments (Polanyi, 1966; Dörfler and 
Ackermann, 2012; Dane, 2011).  
A few sceptics have voiced their lack of trust for intuition, instead preferring the 
analytical style whenever and wherever possible (Messick and Bazerman, 1996; 
Lamond and Thompson, 2000; Falzer, 2004). These authors argue that the strength 
of the analytical/deliberative mode lies in the fact that it is mainly driven by the need 
to think more explicitly about one’s actions in the past, present or future. It entails the 
conscious use of one’s prior knowledge, sometimes in familiar ways, sometimes in 
entirely new ways that require creativity, and sometimes in ways that appear more 
critical (Lamond and Thompson, 2000). It is strongly believed that understanding the 
conditions where analysis is likely to be flawed remains a unique feature of 
expertise. This includes, for example, complex and dynamic environments where 
multiple cues need to be attended to, under time pressure. In these circumstances, it 
has been shown that deliberating on multiple choice options at the expense of 
trusting one’s intuition will often prove detrimental to performance (Dijksterhuis, 
2004).  
The debates regarding the preferred thinking mode have, amongst other things, 
point to the inherent difficulty, at least in practice, of separating intuition from 
analysis. Evidence exists to show that intuition and analysis are complementary 
rather than competitive (Simon, 1990; Epstein, 1994; Ten Berge and Van Hezewijk, 
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1999; Sinclair an Ashkanasy, 2003; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Sinclair, 2010; 
Kahneman, 2011). Hence, although intuition operates in the sub-conscious realm, it 
does not necessarily contradict analysis, neither is it the opposite of analysis (Khatri 
and Ng, 2000). The words of Simon (1987, p.63) — “intuition is analyses frozen into 
habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition” — has gained 
prominence in understanding the relationship that exists between the two cognitive 
modes. Simon explained that intuition and analysis are mainly distinguished on the 
basis of the speed of recognition, implying therefore that intuition is made possible 
because the skills required for task performance have become ingrained in an 
actor’s subconscious mode. Polanyi and Prosch (1975, p.144) also referred to this 
as participation through indwelling   
Deliberating on possible options does not always translate into incompetence, what 
matters is to understand the circumstances that best suit a particular cognitive 
strategy (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Marewski et al., 
2009; Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010; Evans and Over, 2010). 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) used the term adaptive toolbox to explain how 
people adapt their decision-making styles to environmental structures and the 
degree to which various decision strategies fit into different conditions. The authors 
defined the adaptive toolbox as a collection of various cognitive strategies and the 
core capacities they exploit (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2004). 
The adaptive toolbox is based on the assumption that no universal tool can solve all 
tasks ― simple and complex ones alike (Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2011; Reimer and 
Hoffrage, 2006).  Just like a hammer is ideal for hammering-in nails and useless for 
tightening nuts, so also are certain decision strategies useful for solving specific 
problems and useless for others (Broder, 2003; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Goldstein, 
2008). The adaptive toolbox therefore contains heuristics that allow people to make 
inferences (e.g. to estimate the intensity of a blazing fire), develop preferences (e.g. 
whether to deploy an offensive or a defensive strategy) and plan interactions with 
others (e.g. using an open or closed communication style)  
The cognitive continuum theory (Hammond et al., 1987) plays a role in explaining the 
interplay between various cognitive strategies and how they may possibly combine 
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during task performance. The theory classifies task characteristics into “analysis-
inducing” and “intuition-inducing” tasks, and asserts that intuition is only one of the 
many different modes of thinking available to decision makers (see Figure 2.5). The 
analysis-inducing class includes decomposable tasks with reliably measured cues, 
while the intuition-inducing class includes non-decomposable tasks with unreliably 
measured cues, an ill-structured environment with ill-defined goals. The cognitive 
continuum theory, similar to other theories (e.g. R/M model Cohen et al., 1996; 
sense-making theory, Klein et al. 2006), suggests that the amount of information and 
time available to a decision maker determines the dominant decision making 
strategy they are likely to employ (Hammond, 1996) 
 
 Figure 2.5: The intuitive-analytical decision making framework (Hamm, 1988:33) 
 
In his popular book entitled “Thought and choice in chess”, de Groot (1986) reported 
how grand masters used their intuition to recognize some promising moves that 
required close examination and then switched to a more analytical mode afterwards. 
According to de Groot, the transition from intuitive to analytical mode gave the chess 
players a little more time to reflect on their potential moves as the game progressed. 
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De Groot reported that the chess players were able to analyse their potential moves 
through the process of mental simulation where moves that were perceived to be 
less rewarding were screened out, leaving the grand masters with a single move 
they considered playable. De Groot’s study, which has been advanced by other 
scholars (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Simon, 1996; Gobet 2005; Ericsson, 
2006), provides additional evidence to the fact that intuition and analysis can be 
used interchangeably in practice.  
However, to avoid post-decision regret when switching between the intuitive and 
analytical modes it might be worth revisiting the advice of Hogarth (2003), who 
emphasized the role of self-awareness and advised decision makers to consistently 
regulate their natural tendencies to intuit e.g. by imposing “circuit breakers” (self-
regulating mechanisms).  
2.13. THE HUMAN MEMORY VERSUS DECISION AIDS 
The competition over superiority between the human memory and decision support 
systems has created much interest in the field of judgment and decision making. 
Some authors have questioned the acclaimed infallibility of the human memory, 
insisting that decision aids will always outperform human beings (Meehl, 1957; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Dawes, 1979; Dawes et al., 1989; Gilovich, Griffin 
and Kahneman, 2002; Riabacke, 2006). For example, Meehl (1957) carried out a 
series of meta-analyses in which he reviewed the findings from twenty studies that 
had compared the clinical predictions of trained professionals to the statistical 
predictions made by rule based ratings or decision aids. The essence of Meehl’s 
investigation was to test which predictions were more accurate, to which he found 
that the accuracy of experts’ clinical judgment was matched or exceeded by a simple 
algorithm in every case.   
Some explanations have been put forward as to why algorithms would perform better 
than humans (Kahneman, 2011, p.223). In situations where cues are difficult to 
identify or completely missing, algorithms (e.g. statistical analysis) can more easily 
identify such missing or uncorrelated cues (Dana and Dawes, 2004). Human beings 
in such circumstances would possibly attempt to be clever and seek other 
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alternatives e.g. by thinking outside the box. In so doing, they apply complex 
combinations of variables in making their judgments. Although it is true that creative 
problem solving is obviously one of the hallmarks of expertise, the challenge remains 
that unnecessary cues might be introduced into the system in such simple 
circumstances, thereby adding extra noise to the environment (Weick, 1993)   
In another meta-analytical study, Hogarth and Karelaia (2008) showed that 
consistency is what accounts for much of the advantage algorithms have over 
humans. For example, when humans are asked to evaluate a piece of information 
twice, there is tendency they will give different answers. Such inconsistency in 
human judgment has been shown to be a major concern for scholars. In the words of 
Kahneman (2011, p.225) such act “is destructive of any predictive validity”. Most of 
the inconsistencies associated with human judgment are engendered from the 
unnoticed stimuli in the environment that tacitly manipulates the thought processes 
and actions of decision makers. As these external stimuli portray themselves in 
different ways actors tend to also fluctuate their judgments in response, most times 
unconsciously (Meehl, 1954). But algorithms and formulas do not seem to suffer 
from such inconsistencies; given the same input they always produce the same 
result (Meehl, 1986; Dana and Dawes, 2004).  
On the basis of the perceived differences in predictive accuracy between humans 
and algorithms, Meehl (1986) concluded that the responsibility for making predictive 
judgments should be left to algorithms, especially in low-validity environments 
(environments characterized with high level of uncertainty). But the problem with this 
proposition, according to Salas et al. (2010), is that critics of human judgement (e.g. 
Meehl and co) have limited the task environments where decisions are being made 
to suit the purposes of their evaluation. It is difficult to see, from the point of view of 
the naturalistic settings, how algorithms can replace human judgment (Khatri and 
Ng, 2000; Dreyfus, 2004). It has been shown that some of the assumptions that 
underpin the construction and use of algorithms are too stringent, and thus contradict 
the possible circumstances that could be encountered in real-life (Shanteau, 1992; 
Kahneman, 2011). Such faulty assumptions relate to:   
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I. The confidence placed in the adequacy of variables included in algorithms i.e. 
the assumption that such variables can cover all possible circumstances in 
real life 
II. The belief that performance is measurable and that the criterion for measuring 
it is also reliable  
III. The notion that a body of similar cases will always be encountered in real-life 
IV. The belief that the changing conditions in real life incidents would not render 
the algorithm obsolete. 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) also warned that introducing algorithms would most 
likely encounter opposition or unexpected problems of implementation in 
organizations. The authors attributed this to the egocentric nature of human beings 
as only very few people enjoy being replaced by mechanical devices. To further 
illustrate this claim, Marewski, Gaissmaier and Goldstein (2010) reported how 
physicians in a Michigan rural hospital disapproved of the use of a decision support 
system that was introduced to the hospital. The heart disease predictive instrument 
(HDPI) was launched to assist physicians in determining whether patients were to be 
assigned to a coronary care unit or to a regular nursing bed.  Marewski and his 
colleagues (2010) found that the physicians disliked using the machine because it 
was cumbersome, complicated, and non-transparent, despite the fact that the 
machine made the decision process relatively easier. Also, because the physicians 
were required to compute the combinations of seven symptoms and insert their 
corresponding probabilities into a pocket calculator ─ they saw the equipment as a 
major threat to their human judgment.  
Experts have always disagreed about whether algorithms outperform their own 
judgment (Yates, Veinott and Patalano, 2003; Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007; 
Kahneman, 2011). Their argument has included views that algorithms are 
“mechanical, atomistic, additive, unreal, arbitrary, incomplete, fractionated, trivial, 
forced, static, superficial, rigid, pseudoscientific and blind” (Marewski, Gaissmaier 
and Goldstein, 2010). Humans are naturally created as sense-making and intuitive 
beings; therefore expecting them to make such creative abilities redundant is 
perhaps tantamount to relegating them as dummies.    
104 
 
 
 
2.14. Chapter summary  
A building on fire poses serious threats to human lives, properties, livestock, 
communities, local economies, natural resources and the environment at large. 
Although managing real-world fire incidents often pose numerous challenges to 
professionals such as having to cope with intense time pressure, uncertainty, 
dynamic and changing conditions, ill-defined goals, ambiguity and high stakes, 
evidence was found to suggest that experienced decision makers still carry on 
despite these challenges and also perform reasonably (and sometimes 
exceptionally) well under these conditions. 
 
This chapter evaluated the role of expertise in fireground decision making and 
examined some of the salient features that make experts who they are. One of such 
feature was seen as experts’ ability to perform recurrent aspects of tasks using their 
extensive domain knowledge, mainly through the efficient functioning of schemas. 
Schemas contain rules and procedures that can systematically link particular 
features of a problem to a possible course of action (IF condition, THEN action). In 
other words, experts tend to be imbued with the ability to use the general knowledge 
they have about a domain, or the knowledge they are able to recall from concrete 
cases, or both, to form action plans and solve new problems. A direct relationship 
was thus found to exist between the skills possessed by experts, their knowledge of 
the domain and the domain rules that guide their actions.  
Two definitions of the term ‘expert’ were particularly found to be relevant in the 
current study: Shanteau (1992) defined experts as “those who have been recognized 
within their profession as having the necessary skills and abilities to perform at the 
highest level”. Kahneman and Klein (2009) also used an analogy within the domain 
of firefighting, stating that when colleagues say, “If Person X had been there instead 
of Person Y, the fire would not have spread so far,” then Person X is an expert in 
that organization. 
 
Building on existing theories and frameworks within the naturalistic decision making 
domain, the current study explored the concept of intuition, tacit knowledge and 
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other associated concepts such as phronesis and automaticity. Being a process that 
operates within the sub-conscious realm, intuition tended to have generated a great 
deal of controversy in the fields of cognitive science and decision making. This can 
be attributed to the fact that it deals with tacitly held knowledge which is, itself, 
difficult to verbalize and articulate. The review also showed that the way intuition was 
perceived by authors was mixed in the literature. Whilst some scholars see intuition 
and its outcome (intuitive judgment) as a mysterious concept that is far from any 
scientific measurement, others, though not denying that intuition is an important part 
of human cognition, remain adamant that the outcome of such process will, more 
often than not, usually provide a favourable ground for judgmental bias.  
 
Despite some of the debates surrounding the role of intuition at workplace, it was 
found that the scientific measurement of intuition and how it can be taught is 
increasingly gaining ground in recent years across disciplines such as management, 
education, healthcare, military, informatics etc. The following reasons were attributed 
to the relentless effort shown by scholars over the last two decades in gaining a 
better understanding of intuition and how it can be better utilized at the workplace:    
• The limitations of the so called analytical approach in coping with the 
requirements of dynamic and time-pressured environments  
• The feeling that intuition is probably one of the least understood aspects of 
human cognition  
• A belief that gaining a better understanding of intuition and its scientific 
measurement will go a long way to guide more meaningful conceptualization 
of human cognition  
Three decision making strategies were critically evaluated in this chapter i.e. the 
classical decision making model, the heuristic and biases approach and the 
recognition primed decision model (RPD). In more recent years the shortcomings of 
the classical model became even more obvious as organizational decision-making 
environments became increasingly fast paced and dynamic. The concept of 
naturalistic decision making and other “fast thinking” models was therefore found to 
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have emerged from an initial rejection of the classical decision theory and have 
collectively inspired further research aimed at considering faster ways of making 
decisions. Hence, although theoretically stronger than its counterparts, the classical 
decision model has been criticized for over-simplifying decision making as it is rarely 
concerned with the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity that are peculiar 
to the more dynamic settings. Despite the differences that exist amongst the various 
decision-making strategies discussed above, there also seems to be points of 
commonality, particularly between the recognition primed decision model and the 
heuristics and biases approach. Whilst the RPD model heavily relies on pattern 
matching and mental simulation skills as the basis for measuring expertise, the 
validity of these skills becomes the main point of investigation for the heuristic and 
bias community, mainly through laboratory experiments. Comparing the NDM 
research with the heuristics and biases approach showed that the latter is obsessed 
with studying what experts do wrong while the former is more concerned with what 
experts do right. No best decision making research strategy was therefore believed 
to exist, rather they all seem to be investigating important cognitive elements but in 
different ways. 
 
In sum, the arguments regarding the preferred thinking mode have, amongst other 
things, pointed to the inherent difficulty, at least in practice, of separating intuition 
from analysis. It therefore seems that intuition and analysis are complementary 
rather than competitive i.e. although intuition operates in the sub-conscious realm, it 
does not necessarily contradict analysis, neither is it the opposite of analysis.  
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 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0. INTRODUCTION 
Three critical questions are central to the design of any research methodology 
(Creswell, 2003): (i) what knowledge claims are being made by the researcher and 
what key theories underpin such claims? (ii) What strategies of inquiry will best 
inform the research aim and objectives? (iii) What methods are most appropriate for 
collecting and analysing relevant data for the research? The answers provided to 
these questions will form the basis of the methodological framework that will guide 
and inform the overall research design. Hence this chapter is structured to provide 
appropriate justifications for the chosen methods and tools that were used in the 
study.      
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3.1. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
The field of social science is predicated upon various assumptions and beliefs about 
the nature of the social world, which subsequently determine the particular way in 
which social scientists investigate their subjects (Gibbs, 2008). For example, the 
choice of the data collection method which a researcher decides to employ at the 
beginning of a study (whether survey or interview or other methods) would, implicitly 
or explicitly, be influenced by the research methodology the author chooses to 
employ, which would in turn be influenced by the theoretical perspectives s/he 
adopts, and ultimately by the researcher’s epistemological position (See Fig 3.1). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) in their popular book entitled “Sociological paradigms and 
organizational analysis” discussed four sets of assumptions upon which the 
foundation of every social science research is hinged. The first are assumptions of 
an ontological nature i.e. assumptions that concern the very essence of the 
phenomena under study. Here, social scientists are faced with some basic 
ontological questions such as whether the 'reality' to be studied is external to the 
researcher — compelling itself on individual consciousness from the outside or 
whether it is the product of individual consciousness; whether the nature of 'reality' is 
'objective' or the product of individual cognitive construction; whether 'reality' is a 
given 'out there' in the world or the product of one's mind 
 
The second set of assumptions relate to the epistemological nature. These are 
assumptions about the tenets of knowledge, about how one might begin to 
understand the social world and communicate this as knowledge to other 
stakeholders (Guba and Lincoln, 1985). These assumptions entail presuppositions 
about the nature of knowledge and how it can be obtained and communicated; how 
one differentiates between what is to be taken as 'true' from what is to be regarded 
as 'false'. The epistemological assumptions also determine extreme positions on the 
issue of whether knowledge is something that can be transferred to others or 
something that has to be personally experienced strictly on individual basis. Gray 
(2014, p.19) pointed out the importance of having an epistemological perspective, 
and posited that understanding one’s epistemological stance can help demystify 
some of the issues surrounding research design. This means more than just the 
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design of research tools, but also the overarching structure of a research, which 
includes the kind of evidence that would be gathered, from whom, and how such 
evidence would be interpreted.  
 
The third set of assumptions that underpin social science research, which is 
conceptually different from the two mentioned above, is concerned with human 
nature and, in particular, the relationship between human beings and their 
environment. Following this assumption, some social scientists hold the view that 
human beings often respond to the situations they encounter in their external 
environment mostly in a mechanistic or deterministic fashion. Such researchers see 
human beings alongside their experiences as products of the environment, wherein 
people are shaped by their external circumstances (Braun and Clarke, 2008). In 
contrast to this extreme perspective is another line of thought which advances the 
voluntariness of the human nature and thereby attribute a much more creative role to 
human beings. Here, human beings are regarded as people who have the ability to 
create their own environment — the controller as opposed to the controlled, the 
master rather than the servant. A stark difference regarding the relationship between 
human beings and their environment thus seems to be evident between these two 
extreme views: one proclaims the deterministic nature of human beings while the 
other believes that every individual has “self-will” through which they can make 
decisions about their world. The final set of assumptions refers to the methodological 
nature of a research, which is influenced by the three sets of assumptions outlined 
above. Each of the assumptions mentioned earlier has important implications for the 
way a researcher would eventually go about obtaining knowledge regarding the 
phenomena under study. Different ontologies, epistemologies and models of human 
nature are therefore likely to suggest different methodologies to social scientists 
(See Fig 3.1) 
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 Figure 3.1: Relationship between epistemology, theoretical perspectives, 
methodology and research methods (Adapted from Crotty, 1998, p.5) 
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3.1.1. Research epistemology 
The work of Crotty (1998) clarifies the relationships that exist between the various 
research epistemologies, theoretical perspectives, methodologies and methods of 
data collection (Creswell, 2003; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2008; Gibbs, 2008; 
Gray, 2014). Crotty identified at least three (qualitative) epistemological positions 
that have emerged over the years in the research literature: objective epistemology, 
constructivism and subjectivism (Fig 3.1). Objectivist epistemology holds the view 
that reality exists independently of consciousness, thereby implying that an objective 
reality exists ‘out there’. In this regard, objectivists argue that the essence of 
research is about discovering this “objective truth”, which is expected to be free from 
the researcher’s personal feelings and values. Gray (2014, p.20) noted, however, 
that objectivism does not necessarily mean the rejection of subjectivity: it is alright to 
study peoples’ subjective views (their opinions, attitudes and beliefs), but this should 
only be carried out objectively.  
 
Constructivism on the other hand opines that “truth” and meaning do not exist in the 
external world, but are created and constructed by the subjects’ interactions with the 
social world (Silverman, 2000; Bradley et al., 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Weller, 
2014). For constructivists, every individual, even in relation to the same 
phenomenon, construct their own meaning in different but unique ways. This way, 
multiple contradictory but equally valid accounts of a phenomenon is seen to emerge 
(Patton, 2002). Interpretivism is one theoretical perspective that is linked to 
constructivism.  
 
The final epistemological position based on Crotty’s framework is subjectivism, which 
shares a similar characteristic with constructivism in that subjects also construct 
meaning. The difference between the two epistemological assumptions, however, is 
that, with subjectivism, meaning does not emerge from the interplay between the 
subject and the outside world, rather it is imposed on the subject from within 
collective unconsciousness, dreams, religious beliefs, etc. 
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As shown in Table 3.1, Creswell (1994, 2003) similarly identified several paradigms 
or schools of thought about knowledge claims, which include: post-positivism (which 
views reality as objective), constructivism (which views reality as individually or 
culturally constructed), Advocacy (which aims to rigorously challenge existing 
reality), pragmatism (action research focused on solving specific problems). The 
author argued that all of the paradigms entail contradictory worldviews and remain 
distinct and distant from each other, meaning they will see things differently and as a 
result, ask questions differently (Sandelowski, 2000). Consequently, each paradigm 
would address a similar research question through different methods and 
techniques.  
 
Table 3.1 Alternative knowledge claim positions (Research Paradigms) 
 
Post-positivism 
• Determination 
• Reductionism 
• Empirical observation and 
measurement 
• Theory testing 
 
Constructivism 
• Understanding 
• Interpretative 
• Multiple participant meanings 
• Social, historical and cultural 
construction 
• Theory building 
Advocacy/Participatory 
• Political 
• Empowerment issue oriented 
• Collaborative 
• Change-oriented 
Pragmatism 
• Consequences of actions 
• Problem-centred 
• Pluralistic 
• Real-world practice oriented 
  
 Adapted from Creswell (2003, p.6): Research Design 
 
Considering the various research paradigms identified above, this current study is 
therefore deemed to be best approached from a constructivist worldview. This 
worldview, as discussed below, suggests that people construct their own 
understanding and knowledge of the world through the things they experience on a 
daily basis.  
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3.1.2. Constructivism 
The idea of the social construction of reality came from the early work of Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) but became even more popular from the work of Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) tagged “naturalistic inquiry”. The term social constructivism stems from the 
belief that people’s nature (their skills, competence, experiences and values) are not 
just imprinted in them, rather people develop useful traits as a result of their 
interaction with others, as well as through their historical and cultural background 
(Billett, 2010; Fessey, 2002; Eraut, 2004; Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). The duty 
of the researcher or inquirer operating in this worldview is therefore to search out the 
complexity of views or meanings across all participants rather than compress 
meanings into a few categories or ideas, as is the case with post-positivism (Fereday 
and Muir-Cochrane, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, in contrast to the positivist and post-positivist paradigm which assumes 
that knowledge is “objective” and “pure” and that it can be accurately measured (for 
example, using some statistical tools), the constructivist paradigm posits that 
knowledge is subjective and contextual. The term “subjective” implies that meanings 
are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are trying to 
interpret (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). Hence, a constructivist believes that the 
inquirer cannot be separated from what is being studied whereas a positivist holds 
the view that investigators do not and should not interfere with the phenomena being 
measured (Schutt, 2011).  
 
Constructivism was therefore deemed most appropriate for this study as it fits 
perfectly with the exploratory nature of the naturalistic decision making paradigm 
(which is the framework that supports the current study). Since expert fire-fighters 
attain expertise following the multiple experiences they have acquired over time, the 
constructivist approach can therefore provide an opportunity to engage participants 
in a fruitful discussion. This in-depth discussion then allows participants to construct 
meanings from the particular incident they chose to narrate. From a constructivist 
perspective therefore, care must be taken in the selection of participants to ensure 
that only those who meet the requirements of the study are selected (see section 3.4 
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for selection criteria). It is also important that the investigator chooses the most 
appropriate tool for inquiry. Hence the decision to favour the critical decision method 
over concurrent verbal protocol and semi-structured cognitive interview probes over 
a close ended questionnaire in this study.  
 
Another useful philosophical view relevant to this study is what Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) called naturalistic inquiry. According to Sandelowski (2000), naturalistic 
inquiry entails studying subjects or characters in their “natural” state, with little or no 
manipulation to the variables under investigation. The main duty of the naturalistic 
inquirer is to deploy strategies (in this case, the critical decision method) that allow 
participants to present themselves as they would even if they were not under study 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.1, another key feature of the constructivist world 
view is its emphasis on theory-building, as it is mostly concerned with inductive and 
exploratory studies. This is seen to align well with the aim of this current study i.e. to 
explore the decision making and problem solving strategies used by expert 
firefighters and to seek adequate interpretations for such strategies. This approach 
stands in contrast to other research strategies that emphasise hypothesis testing and 
make deductive inferences from a population sample, as is the case with the 
positivist approach (Thomas, 2006). Employing such approaches will certainly be 
inadequate here because studying how experts make decisions in dynamic and 
time-pressured environments is unlikely to align with strict rationalistic assumptions 
about behaviour. For this reason, it became necessary to allow experts narrate their 
experiences, how they do things as well as the rationale behind their actions. Each 
of these elements is then captured inductively and directly from the CDM data (Pope 
et al. 2000; Thomas, 2006; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2008). 
 
Quantitative or statistical measurements have been shown to frequently fall short in 
providing rich answers to some of the important research questions that apply to this 
study. For example, questions such as how best can we elicit the tacit knowledge 
used by experts in making critical decisions, how can we unmask the intuitive skills 
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that typify experts’ performance — all seem best answered using a qualitative 
approach (Lipshitz et al., 2001)  
3.2. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Table 3.2 below shows a summary of the various strategies used in conducting 
research within the qualitative and quantitative spheres. Despite the various options 
that are available within the qualitative sphere, phenomenology was seen as the 
most appropriate strategy for this study, as discussed below: 
    
Table 3.2: Strategies of inquiry 
STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Experimental designs 
 
Non-experimental designs e.g. 
surveys 
Narratives 
Phenomenology 
Ethnographies 
Grounded theory 
Case studies 
Adapted from Creswell (2003, p. 13); Research Design 
    
3.2.1. Phenomenology  
The term phenomenology, although used frequently in research scholarship, is 
accompanied with much confusion concerning its nature (Dowling, 2007). Part of the 
reasons for this is the fact that phenomenology is not only a research method bust 
also a philosophy, having many perspectives and styles (see Crotty, 1996 and 
Dowling, 2007 for a review). For example, Crotty (1996) argued that the 
transformations which have been experienced over the years with the numerous 
applications of the phenomenological school have resulted in it being categorized as 
traditional phenomenology (e.g. Spiegelberg, 1982) and new phenomenology 
(Crotty, 1996). Crotty (1996, p.272) summarized the later thus: 
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This later form of phenomenology presents itself as an attempt to 
understand and describe people's subjective experience. For this to 
happen, we are told, things need to be seen from the other person's 
perspective. Researchers are urged to engage in a single-minded effort 
to 'bracket' their own presuppositions, prior knowledge and espoused 
viewpoints and allow the data to speak for themselves  
 
The concept of phenomenology was reportedly made popular by Edmund Husserl, 
who drew his inspiration from the early works of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) who 
first introduced the word as “descriptive phenomenology” (c/f Dowling, 2007). 
Husserl’s concept of phenomenology has since then gained a wider coverage both 
as a methodology of inquiry and also as a philosophical position in the research 
literature (Moustakas, 1994; Crotty, 1996; Garman, 1996; Racher and Robinson, 
2003; Weller, 2014). The word phenomenon according to Moustakas (1994) was 
derived from the Greek word phaenesthai, which means to flare up, to show itself, to 
appear. Husserlian phenomenology, as it is popularly known, is notable for its 
dogged epistemological position for which the author regards experience as the 
fundamental source of knowledge (Racher and Robinson, 2003). Husserl’s main 
goal was therefore to establish the idea that researchers intending to embark on a 
phenomenological inquiry must first set aside all previous habits of thoughts and 
learn to see what stands before their eyes, what he termed phenomenological 
reduction (Husserl, 1931, p.43). Similarly Heidegger (1962, p.96) emphasized the 
need to thrust aside one’s interpretative tendencies as such tendencies tend to 
conceal the entities that one is likely to encounter. The phenomenological procedure 
involves a thorough study of a given number of subjects (or actors) through 
prolonged engagement that allows patterns and relationships of meaning to be 
developed (Moustakas, 1994; Graneheim and Lundman, 2004; Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane, 2008). Husserl (1931) developed the idea as a descriptive and 
interpretive theory that aims to explore the subjective experiences of individuals 
within the taken-for-granted world of their daily life experiences. Hence 
phenomenology calls to question what is taken for granted, thus making it also a 
critical methodology (Crotty, 1996).  
117 
 
 
 
 
The interest of this current study is driven by the desire to better understand, inter 
alia, how expert fire fighters assess and interpret a wide range of informational and 
environmental cues on the fire ground; how they carry on amidst various task 
constraints and yet able to make good decisions. The phenomenological approach is 
therefore deemed important so as to safeguard and preserve important knowledge 
from real experts. This is aimed to ensure, amongst other things, that the world of 
social reality (in this case, tacit knowledge in the firefighting domain) is not replaced 
with some fictitious or trivial conclusions that are constructed from other untested 
sources.  
 
Phenomenological research emphasizes the need for researchers to discard their 
own experiences in order to freely understand those of the participants (Creswell, 
2003), which implies that explanations are not permitted to be imposed until the 
phenomena have first been understood from within (Racher and Robinson, 2003). It 
is experiencing things exactly as they are before thinking of ways to understand and 
explain them (Crotty, 1996, p.95). In this regard, phenomenologists, and Husserl’s 
phenomenology in particular, talk much about putting oneself in the place of the 
person being investigated, what Crotty (1996) termed “the great phenomenological 
principle”.  
 
So phenomenology is about saying 'No' to our meaning system. It is 
about putting that meaning system in abeyance. Instead of inviting us to 
explore our everyday meanings as they stand, it calls upon us to lay 
them aside for the moment and to open ourselves to phenomena in their 
stark immediacy to see what emerges for us (Crotty, 1996, p.275). 
 
Social phenomenology purports that individuals in their respective endeavours (e.g. 
workplaces) are able to ascribe meanings to a situation, which subsequently inform 
the judgments they make. This therefore implies that an inquirer must constantly 
reflect upon his/her culture and beliefs, doing everything possible to “bracket” such 
pre-conceived assumptions and beliefs in order to make real sense of the meanings 
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ascribed to a phenomenon under study. This is precisely one of the dominant 
doctrines of the phenomenological inquiry. The need to shove aside, as far as one 
can, all ideas, judgments, connotations, assumptions, beliefs and feelings that 
usually come to mind when one thinks about a phenomenon, cannot be 
overemphasized in a phenomenological study. This is because such pre-conceived 
notions do not only stand for things but also come to stand between the inquirer and 
things, or to be more precise, between the inquirer and his/her immediate experience 
of the phenomenon. They tend to inhibit the immediate experience of the things the 
inquirer, through them, make sense of. In other words, our culture tends to substitute 
itself for what we actually hear, see, smell, feel or even imagine (Schein, 2004) 
 
How then can a phenomenological study be conducted? Crotty (1996, p.279) 
although acknowledging that the act of putting oneself in the position of others is not 
something straightforward, summarized the process of phenomenology under three 
main steps that require the researcher to:  
 
• Focus strictly on the phenomenon being studied (what is being experienced) 
and not on one’s self (the one experiencing). 
• Make a conscious and sustained effort to ignore all the usual understandings 
s/he tends to attribute to the phenomenon under study. 
• Focus on the phenomenon purely and simply as it is being experienced, in its 
immediacy — to the exclusion of every other thing. This implies that the 
researcher opens themselves to what is being experienced, surrender to it, 
critique and contemplate it and listen to it.  
3.2.2. How researcher’s bias was managed in this study 
Many authors agree that researchers always enter a field of research with certain 
opinions and/or preconceptions about what research entails. It was also suggested 
that such preconceptions often emerge from personal or professional experiences or 
from theoretical perspectives and foundations related to the field of interest 
(Malterud, 2001). Denying the existence of these pre-conceived beliefs might 
therefore prove counter-productive in the end (Sandelowski, 2000). This is what 
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phenomenology does — making researchers explain and perhaps question the basis 
of their pre-conceived ideas rather than holding deluded thoughts that such pre-
conceived notions do not exist. Malterud (2001) explained that preconception is not 
the same as bias, as long as the researcher mentions them a priori. Stating these 
beliefs and making them clear from the beginning of the study ensures that any new 
knowledge or theme that subsequently emerges from the analysis of the data is not 
confused with those intuitively held in the mind of the researcher (Firestone, 1987; 
Creswell, 2003).  
 
Since every real phenomenological study is expected to provide evidence as to how 
it intends to minimize researcher bias, this issue is addressed in the section below as 
it relates to the current study:  
 
As earlier stated, it is worth reiterating that phenomenologists do not deny pre-
conceived beliefs, rather they acknowledge the fact that every researcher comes into 
a field with their own personal experiences and expectations. Hence one of the ways 
to avoid researcher bias, from the point of view of phenomenologists, is to first 
identify what the potential biases are. This way, it becomes easier to design 
strategies to minimize them. In this study therefore, although the conceptual 
framework (i.e. the naturalistic decision making paradigm) and the methods (the 
critical decision method) that were utilized played a key role in designing the 
interview guide, they did not necessarily influence the themes that emerged from the 
data. Rather conscious efforts were made to ensure that findings from this study 
were derived directly from the experiences of the participants by allowing the data to 
speak for themselves. The data analytical method employed in this study, the 
emerging theme approach, proved effective for this purpose (See section 3.6 for 
details)   
 
Also since the outcomes of any phenomenological study should be ones that are 
grounded in the subjective meaning of the experiences shared by the participants 
(Thomas, 2006), this study ensured that any product developed from it had a 
traceable link to the participants. Appendix F shows the audit trail for the thematic 
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analysis, which details how the narratives from the CDM data were coded, how the 
codes were developed into categories and how the categories were merged into 
themes.  
 
The whole essence of making the audit trail of the analysis available as well as 
discussing the analytical process with my supervisors is to attain, as much as 
possible, an unbiased interpretation of the participants’ views. This makes sense 
since everything said in an interview is said in context; removing context out of any 
analysis is therefore tantamount to distorting the meaning of what was originally said 
(Burnard, 1991).  
 
Data collection was designed to ensure that all the interviewed fire officers were 
randomly selected from the outset, without having any prior relationship to the 
interviewer. The recruitment process was mainly based on a snowballing sampling 
strategy, also known as referral or chain sampling (Morgan, 2008). See section 3.4 
for details of sampling strategy and the selection process.  
 
Finally, some of the findings from the study benefitted from expert scrutiny and have 
been published in two peer-reviewed journals (Okoli et al., 2014; Okoli et al., 2015) 
and one conference proceedings (Okoli et al., 2013). This was to provide a platform 
to consider authenticity, credibility and dependability of the findings, which are useful 
ways of assessing qualitative research (Appleton, 1995) 
3.3. THE NATURE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Before discussing the nature, components and qualities of a piece of qualitative 
research, it is deemed necessary to first define what qualitative research is. Malterud 
(2001) and Bryman (2004, p.266) both defined qualitative research as an approach 
to the study of the social world that involves collecting data either from talking to 
people or observing them, as well as the organization and interpretation of such 
data, usually in textual format. From the point of view of this study, a qualitative 
approach was preferred to its quantitative counterpart because it is holistic, inductive 
and naturalistic in nature (Marshall, 1996). Thus, by asking experts to recall a 
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memorable incident, qualitatively rich accounts of experts’ reasoning mechanisms 
can become more easily accessible (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). To the realists or 
positivists, the social world exists independent of an individual. An individual is 
therefore seen as only living within a social world which has a “reality” of its own, a 
world no one can create because it is already existing 'out there'. Thus, ontologically, 
positivists strongly believe that whatever phenomenon is being studied had already 
being in existence prior to the consciousness of any single human being (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979, p.4). This current study is based upon what Burrell and Morgan 
(1979, p.5) called the anti-positivist epistemology which, as with this study, argues 
that the social world is relativistic in nature and can only be understood from the 
perspective of the individuals who are directly involved in the activities that are to be 
researched. The approach of this current study is therefore to “understand from the 
inside rather than the outside”  
 
Although some sceptics accuse the proponents of qualitative methods of professing 
a research paradigm that is both subjective and value-laden (Firestone, 1987) which 
they regard as a limitation, most qualitative research experts believe it is exactly 
those same attributes that make the method uniquely suitable for exploring human 
behaviours compared to other research methods (Burnard, 1991; Crotty, 1996; 
Bradley et al. 2007; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2008). According to this view, 
qualitative research is imbued with standards such as credibility, confirmability, 
dependability and transferability that are to a very large extent non-negotiable. In 
relation to the first three standards, qualitative researchers have been praised for 
their willingness to question findings and interpretations from a qualitative study 
rather than taking such findings at face value. Garman (1996) lamented on how 
scholars, especially those who belong to the quantitative or scientific camp, often fail 
to grasp the notion that qualitative assertions are primarily designed to illuminate, 
explain, interpret rather than verify. Other qualitative researchers have also noted a 
common mistake people make in thinking that X or Y has simply been “proven” 
because two or three people have been found to make similar statements, as in 
samples of interview transcripts (Bassey, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006). On this 
note, therefore, it becomes important to mention that the current study primarily aims 
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to develop a deeper understanding of the decision making processes and problem 
solving strategies of expert fire-fighters in the UK and Nigeria, as opposed to 
consciously verifying the phenomenon under study.  
 
Qualitative researchers also strive to reflect on the effect of context and bias on their 
findings rather than assuming the human mind does not influence the outcome of 
research, as is the case with quantitative researchers (Graneheim and Lundman, 
2004; Bryman and Bell, 2011). In his important book: “The enlightened eye”, Eisner 
(1991) highlighted one of the most remarkable characteristics of qualitative 
investigation, which is the fact that “the self” is what engages and facilitates the 
phenomenon under study, and makes sense of it. In other words, it is the 
investigators that, themselves, see and interpret significant aspects of the discourse, 
and it is this characteristic that eventually generates the desired insights into the 
experience being investigated. Qualitative researchers do not deny this fact. 
 
The last standard, transferability, explains the notion that qualitative research 
embraces a systematic and reflective process in developing knowledge that can be 
contested and shared beyond the study’s settings. In other words, it should be 
possible, for example, for the research design to facilitate understanding of the 
extent to which it is possible to transfer the tacit knowledge checklist that was 
developed in this study to other domains besides firefighting. In line with this, 
Malterud (2001) asserts that scientific standards, guidelines and checklists exist as 
guides for qualitative researchers, in order to ensure qualitative studies are 
conducted thoroughly and with adequate rigour. An example of such a checklist is 
shown in Table 3.3 below.     
 
 Table 3.3: Guidelines for assessing the integrity of qualitative studies 
Aim 
• Is the research question a relevant issue? 
• Is the aim sufficiently focused, and stated clearly? 
• Does the title of the article give a clear account of the aim? 
 
Reflexivity 
• Are the researcher's motives, background, perspectives, and preliminary 
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hypotheses presented, and are the effects of these issues sufficiently dealt 
with? 
 
Method and design 
• Are qualitative research methods suitable for the exploration of the research 
question? 
• Has the best method of inquiry been chosen with respect to the research 
question? 
 
Data collection and sampling 
• Is the strategy for data collection clearly stated (usually purposive or 
theoretical, rarely random or representative)? 
• Are the reasons for this choice stated? 
• Has the best approach for data collection been chosen, in view of the research 
question? 
• Are the consequences of the chosen strategy discussed and compared with 
other options? 
• Are the characteristics of the sample presented in enough depth to understand 
the study site and context? 
 
Theoretical framework 
• Are the perspectives and ideas used for data interpretation presented? 
• Is the framework adequate, in view of the aim of the study? 
• Does the author account for the role given to the theoretical framework during 
analysis? 
 
Analysis 
• Are the principles and procedures for data organisation and analysis fully 
described, allowing the reader to understand what happened to the raw 
material to arrive at the results? 
• Were the various categories identified from theory or preconceptions in 
advance, or were they developed from the data? 
• Which principles were followed to organise the presentation of the findings? 
• Are strategies used to validate results presented, such as cross-checks for 
rivalling explanations, member checks, or triangulation? 
Findings 
• Are the findings relevant with respect to the aim of the study? 
• Did the findings provide new insights? 
• Is the presentation of the findings well organised and best suited to ensure that 
they were drawn from systematic analysis of material, rather than from 
preconceptions? 
• Are quotes used adequately to support and enrich the researcher's synopsis of 
the patterns identified by systematic analysis? 
 
Discussion 
• Are questions about internal validity (what the study is actually about), external 
validity (to what other settings the findings or notions can be applied), and 
reflexivity (the effects of the researcher on processes, interpretations, findings, 
and conclusions) addressed? 
• Has the research design been well scrutinised? 
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• Are the shortcomings accounted for and discussed, without denying the 
responsibility of choices taken? 
• Have the findings been compared with appropriate theoretical and empirical 
references? 
• Are a few clear consequences of the study proposed? 
 
Presentation 
• Is the report easy to understand and clearly contextualised? 
• Is it possible to distinguish between the voices of the informants and those of 
the researcher? 
 
References 
• Are important and specific sources in the field covered, and have they been 
appropriately presented and applied in the text? 
     
Adapted from Malterud (2001, p.485); Qualitative research: standards, challenges and 
guidelines 
3.4. SAMPLING STRATEGY AND SAMPLE SIZE 
One of the most important distinguishing features between a qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry is the type of sampling strategy both approaches are likely to 
employ (Pidgeon and Henwood, 2004, p.634).  For example, in qualitative research, 
random sampling is rarely utilized for collecting data because findings from 
qualitative studies are not designed for hypothesis testing or for calculating 
probabilities from a population sample (Thomas, 2006). Thus, the major goal of a 
qualitative study is not to generalize across a population, but to provide a clearer and 
deeper understanding or explanation from interviewees’ perspectives (Pope et al. 
2000; Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003). In other words, as is the case with this 
study, qualitative research will, more often than not, attempt to answer questions 
such as what is unique about this individual, group, situation, or incident?  
 
It is important to note that the sampling strategy that is employed in a particular study 
is closely related to both the internal and external validities, as well as to the 
transferability of the findings from such study. This therefore explains why the 
number of participants that is expected in qualitative studies is often lower than that 
expected in quantitative studies. In a qualitative study the sample size, although an 
important factor, may not necessarily influence the outcome of the study as much as 
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the type of participants selected and their process of selection would. These factors 
are important determinants of the quality of conclusions drawn from a qualitative 
study.  
 
In this current study, a combination of purposeful sampling strategies were 
employed, as shown below. It was important, for the purpose of this study, to ensure 
that any sampling strategy that was to be considered was one that facilitated the 
knowledge elicitation process for obtaining qualitative information from experts and 
from the incident accounts being reported (Sandlewoski, 2000). Purposeful sampling 
is inclined towards the development of idiographic knowledge i.e. knowledge from 
and about specific cases, which is quite difficult to obtain through probabilistic 
sampling (Patton, 1990). Probabilistic or simple random sampling is typical of 
quantitative research as most quantitative studies are more inclined towards the 
development of nomothetic knowledge i.e. knowledge derived from investigations 
that are made from samples which are then generalized to the wider population 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Patton, 2002). Since this current research is concerned 
with the development of idiographic knowledge (i.e. what expert firefighters know 
and do), it thus became logical to turn to purposeful sampling. 
 
Patton (1990, p.182-183) identified sixteen different sampling sub-types within the 
purposeful sampling class — a list that proved quite useful as it allowed an 
appreciation of the variety of sampling strategies that exist in the qualitative research 
family to be possible. After a careful evaluation, four of the sampling strategies were 
found to be applicable to this current study:  
 
Criterion sampling:  This was an important purposive sampling strategy in this 
study. Some criteria which served as the basis for screening the participants were 
set prior to data collection. To ensure that expertise was verified and not assumed, 
participants were carefully selected on the basis of their rank/position and also 
through peer nomination. All participants had to have personally been involved in 
managing real-life fire incidents for which they made critical decisions independently. 
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Also, they had to have at least operated as incident or operational commander i.e. 
managing at least one fire engine and leading certain number of fire crews out to a 
fire call.  
 
Extreme or deviant case sampling: Searching for extreme and critical fire cases 
that particularly challenged experts’ knowledge as opposed to typical or routine fire 
cases. This strategy fits well with the scope of the current study since it has been 
shown that experts typically utilize tacit knowledge when managing complex 
incidents than they would do when managing simple incidents (Wipawayangkool and 
Teng, 2014)  
  
Stratified purposeful sampling: This illustrates the characteristics of particular 
subgroups of interest, thereby facilitating comparisons. By collecting data about 
experts’ performances (both in the UK and Nigeria), this study aimed to compare and 
contrast the decision making strategies used by experts from both groups, with 
particular interest on the cultural differences that exist between the two groups.   
 
Snowball or chain sampling: Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling 
technique that is used by investigators to identify potential subjects (Morgan, 2008). 
This method is common in studies where subjects with some characteristics of 
interest tend to be relatively difficult to track down. One of the benefits of the 
snowball sampling strategy lies in its ability to identify cases of interest from 
“someone who knows someone”, and the chain goes on and on till the investigator 
perceives that data saturation has been reached (Cohen and Arieli, 2011). It can 
therefore be inferred that the method is an effective way of identifying and gaining 
access to subjects, especially where a researcher anticipates difficulties in creating a 
representative sample of the study population. Although it is true that a number of 
officers referred the author to other officers during the interview process (either from 
the same fire station or from another), not all the participants emerged from the 
snowballing process. Thus, snowballing was used in this study as a complementary 
strategy rather than as an alternative sampling strategy.  
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Perhaps one of the most remarkable advantages of using the snowballing strategy 
was that it allowed past ties and communication with prior participants to enhance 
cooperation from, as well as trust with the potential participants. This was much 
evident from this study, particularly in Nigeria where referral seemed to be taken 
seriously. However, despite the benefits of the snowballing method, representativity 
has been shown to be its main limitation (Morgan, 2008). Being a convenient 
sampling strategy, selection bias and external and internal validity limitations tend to 
be prevalent with snowballing. This ultimately explains existing claim that most 
snowball samples are biased and cannot be generalized (Griffiths et al., 1993; 
Cohen and Arieli, 2011). Selection bias mainly stems from the fact that participants 
are often not sought randomly unlike other ‘pure’ random sampling strategies 
(Patton, 2002), but are rather dependent on the referrals of the respondents first 
accessed and on the willingness of the research subjects to participate. To 
overcome any possible selection bias from this method and as part of the quality 
assurance mechanism, it therefore became important to ensure that all potential 
participants met the criteria for inclusion discussed above 
3.4.2. Sample Size 
In the qualitative research community, the issue of sample size has generated much 
debate: it remains a lingering question as to what particular sample size is ideal for a 
qualitative study. For example, a wide range of studies that employed the critical 
decision method have used a varying number of sample size — ranging from 4 to 40  
(Klein 1988,; Flin 1996; O’Hare et al. 1998; Calderwood et al. 1990; Wong, 2000; 
Hutchins et al. 2004; Horberry and Cooke, 2010). Some of these authors (e.g. 
Weitzenfeld, Freeman, Riedl and Klein, 1990) believe that conducting face-face 
CDM interviews with 3-4 experts will still generate a reasonable depth of expert 
knowledge that is both reliable and transferable as would a larger sample size. 
 
Pope et al. (2000), Stake (1980) argue that, although it is quite difficult not to have a 
specific sample size in mind before commencing a study, qualitative researchers 
should be disciplined not to firmly hold onto their pre-selected sample size. These 
authors rather suggested that the most important factor to “weigh up” is whether the 
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point of data saturation has been reached, where new concepts or themes no longer 
seem to emerge from the data. Hence, in a theoretically sensitive sample i.e. a 
sample that is diverse in characteristics and experiences (as with CDM data), 
reaching the point of data saturation should be used as the criterion for determining 
whether or not to collect more data. If more themes are emerging from the analysis 
of the latest batch of data, then the chances are that more themes are still likely to 
emerge when additional data is collected.   
 
The sample size for this current study comprises 31 firefighters (made up of 15 
experts in the UK and 15 experts in Nigeria, plus 1 trainee commander in Nigeria). 
This sample size was chosen partly because it exceeds the usual range used in 
other CDM research, and partly because it has generally been suggested that data 
saturation starts to occur from a sample size of 8-10 for in-depth qualitative studies 
(Marshall, 1996). The demographic details of the participants are discussed in 
chapter 5. 
3.5. DATA COLLECTION: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING  
Data collection by interviewing is a data collection method widely used in studies that 
are concerned with exploring new concepts, or where it becomes necessary to 
understand existing concepts in detail. According to Appleton (1995), interviewing 
involves one person, the interviewer, asking questions from another person, the 
respondent, which is either done face to face or through a telephone conversation. In 
this study, all interview data were collected face-to-face due to the interactive and 
collaborative nature of the critical decision method (discussed in chapter 4).  
 
Many advantages of using interviews have been identified in the research literature. 
First, it allows important parameters of interest to be explored in depth using open-
ended questions (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Interviewees are given the opportunity 
to share their experiences with little or no interruption from the investigator, thereby 
allowing rich, natural data to be collected. In this study, a semi-structured protocol 
containing open-ended questions was used throughout (see section 4.3 for the CDM 
probes). The semi structured interview protocol attempts to strike a balance between 
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a purely unstructured approach such as a concurrent verbal protocol, and a 
completely structured approach such as close-ended survey questionnaire (Wong, 
1996; Weitzenfeld et al., 1990; Hoffman et al., 1995). One of the perceived benefits 
of using a semi-structured interview guide is that it provides interviewers with a better 
opportunity of capturing the most essential aspects of expert knowledge, rather than 
just listening to “fire stories” from experts (Klein et al., 1989). In other words, experts 
can be curtailed to the key elements of the incident which affected decision making, 
while at the same time allowing details to emerge from the narration. Also in terms of 
data analysis, it has been shown that analysing qualitative texts from semi-structured 
interview is relatively easier than it would be for unstructured interviews (Burnard, 
1996)  
 
 Second, with face to face interviews, it is much easier to critically apply a purposive 
sampling strategy i.e. participants can be more carefully assessed to ensure they 
meet the requirements of the study scope as stated above. At the commencement of 
the interview process in this study, for instance, two of the potential participants in 
the UK felt they did not possess enough incident command experience to contribute 
something meaningful to the study, and were therefore excluded from participating. 
This type of “onsite screening” is however difficult to achieve with online or postal 
questionnaires since the researcher may not be able to ascertain with full confidence 
that the interview questions were actually answered by the right candidates. 
Furthermore, face-to-face interviewing gave flexibility in ensuring that the interview 
questions were answered in line with the variables that were of interest to the study 
aim/objectives, by logically guiding the interview process to ensure that interviewees 
were not carried away while sharing their experiences regarding the fire incident 
 
Although the whole interview process (from the design of the interview guide to the 
recruitment of participants to the coding and analysis of data) often tend to be 
laborious, costly and time consuming compared to numerical data (Sandelowski, 
2000a; Patton, 2002; Charmaz, 1994; Silverman, 2000), interviewing was 
undoubtedly seen as the most appropriate data collection method in this study, 
especially if the values (axiological stance) attached to the variables and the 
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expected outcomes are to be achieved. Eliciting experts’ tacit knowledge by solely 
relying on survey questionnaires has been shown to be inappropriate (Lipshitz et al., 
2001; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2003). For example, Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005) 
reviewed different approaches used by scholars to measure intuition/tacit knowledge 
and concluded that less qualitative methods stands the risk of generating an 
incomplete description of experts’ cognitive processes.  
3.5.1. Data collection procedure 
Participants were first asked to recall and ‘walk-through’ a memorable fire incident 
that particularly challenged their expertise. Prior to the interview, the author informed 
participants about the scope of the study as well as the type of incident that will meet 
the requirements of the study i.e. non-routine incidents for which interconnected and 
interdependent decisions were made under time pressure.  
 
Participants were allowed to narrate the incident from start to finish, with minimal 
interference from the researcher. This was to allow a rich context about the incident 
to be obtained, including a detailed description of the sequence of events that 
unfolded. After narrating the incident, a timeline was sketched by the interviewer and 
participants were asked to indicate points along the timeline where key events 
occurred such that the events necessitated making some form of critical decision. 
The sketching of the timeline was to make it easier for participants to remember the 
key decisions they made from the start of the incident until when it was brought 
under control. During the timeline construction stage, decision points (DP) were also 
identified. A decision point is defined as any point on the incident timeline where 
participants admitted following a particular course of action even though other 
potential options were envisaged. The incident timeline and decision point 
identification stages were followed by probing each decision point i.e. using a set of 
cognitive probes to enhance the knowledge elicitation process. The set of cognitive 
probes used in this study covered key questions such as the cues sought by experts, 
the main goals pursued at each decision point, the information used to form each 
decision and their sources, the list of training that was helpful in making each 
decision etc. These cognitive probes allowed the researcher to gain a detailed 
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understanding of the cognitive processes which made effective performance 
possible.  
 
Finally on the CDM procedure is the “what-if” stage. Here, a hypothetical scenario 
was presented to experts in order to identify their possible courses of action. The 
hypothetical scenario posed to experts in this study read thus: 
 
Briefly explain what you would do if you arrive at the scene of a serious fire and 
discovered that you have very little information about what is happening, and 
yet you have to make decisions whether to employ an offensive or defensive 
attack? 
 
All the thirty-one interviews were tape recorded using an MP3 player and were all 
personally transcribed verbatim by the author and then readied for analysis. Each 
interview lasted between 1hr-2.30hr depending on how verbal an expert was. Notes 
were taken as the interview went on and diagrammatic representation of the timeline 
was sketched in each interview.  A total of 134 decision points were obtained from 
the whole of the interviews. The interview data were analysed using the emergent 
themes analytical method (Granheim and Lundman, 2004; Braun and Clarke, 2006)  
 
3.6. DATA ANALYSIS 
Generally, three approaches of qualitative data analysis have been identified, 
depending on the degree to which they relate to pre-determined theoretical 
constructs (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). First is the immersion/crystallization 
analytical style in which data is allowed to naturally crystallize out, following a 
thorough examination of the transcripts. The second is the editing (data based) style 
where the researcher identifies certain units in the narratives which form the basis for 
developing categories. The generated categories are then used, in turn, to re-
organize the narratives so that their meaning become clearer. This process is also 
known as re-contextualization. The last style of data analysis is the theory-based. 
Here, the narratives are organized according to pre-existing theoretical frameworks 
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with the intention of providing new descriptions of previously known phenomena 
(Sandelowski, 2000b). Although starting an analysis with some pre-conceived ideas 
has proved quite useful in establishing new insights based upon the foundation of 
what is already known, Charmaz (1994) warned that great care must be taken to 
avoid forcing raw data into these preconceived categories.   
 
The current study employed the aforementioned three different analytical 
approaches as it required the use of both the inductive (theory building) and the 
deductive (hypothesis testing) approaches in order to fulfil its set objectives. Hence, 
although this study is primarily focused on exploring the decision making processes 
of the expert firefighters as well as their problem solving strategies, it will also 
evaluate the decision points elicited from the expert firefighters using existing 
theoretical constructs from the NDM community. Hence, inductive analysis in this 
study is not expected to hinder deductive testing of existing theories neither is 
qualitative data analysis expected to affect quantitative analysis (Ryan and Bernard, 
2003). This conversion process is explained later on in this chapter. 
  
Graneheim and Lundman (2004) used the term qualitative content analysis (similar 
to the immersion and data based styles) and quantitative content analysis (similar to 
the theory based style) to describe the types of qualitative data analysis that exist. 
The authors noted that the major difference between the two methods (i.e. the 
qualitative and quantitative content analysis) is that the former is based on 
developing codes from within the data whereas the latter is based on applying pre-
existing codes to the data (Burnard, 1996).  
3.6.1. Qualitative Data Analysis 
There is a vast range of approaches to qualitative research analysis, ranging from 
the linguistic tradition that treats text as an object of the analysis to the sociological 
tradition that treats text as a window into understanding the human experience 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Scholars have relied on a number of strategies in 
analysing qualitative data such as conceptual analysis, discourse analysis, content 
analysis, repertory grid analysis, account analysis, historical analysis, narrative 
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analysis, ethno-science and structural ethnography, and ethno-methodology, 
taxonomies and mental maps, to name but a few (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Bradley et 
al. 2007; Firestone, 1987; Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003). The common theme 
binding all these methods, however, is the definite need to identify patterns, 
similarities and differences that exist and emerge from the respective data (Burnard, 
1996; Pope et al. 2000; Ryan and Bernard, 2003) 
 
However, qualitative researchers have been accused of showing a lack of 
transparency, traceability and rigour in the way they analyse qualitative data 
(Appleton, 1995; Schutt, 2011). Burnard (1996), for example, noted that qualitative 
researchers are frequently unable to defend the authenticity of their findings because 
they fail to provide evidence showing the link between their final results and the 
original data source. In other words, antagonists of qualitative research claim that 
crucial contextual details are often missing from the findings and that critical 
appraisal of such reports are not usually well audited (Hoddinott and Pill, 1997).  As 
Miles (1979) puts it:  
 
“The most serious and central difficulty in the use of qualitative data is that 
methods of analysis are not well formulated. For quantitative data, there are 
clear conventions the research can use. But the analyst faced with a bank of 
qualitative data has very few guidelines for protection against self-delusion, 
let alone the presentation of unreliable or invalid conclusions to scientific or 
policymaking audiences” (Miles, 1979, p.591) 
 
A combination of the qualitative coding process (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998; Silverman, 2000; Graneheim and Lundman, 2004) and the 
emergent themes analysis approach was utilized in this study so as to provide the 
required audit trail. Audit trails are important evidence that qualitative researchers 
provide to enhance the transparency and traceability of their findings. Simply stating 
that a qualitative analysis was carried out or that certain themes emerged from a set 
of data is no longer seen as enough justification in defending the validity of the 
findings from a study (Sandelowski, 2000b).  
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The process of data analysis in this study is discussed in detail below, starting with 
the qualitative coding process then the emergent themes analysis. 
3.6.2. From CDM data to themes: the transformation process 
 
Note: A brief explanation of some key terminologies used in the qualitative data 
analysis is presented in Table 3.5 below.  
 
The audio-taped interviews were all transcribed verbatim by the author, after which 
the transcripts were read through several times “as one would read a novel” (Hsieh 
and Shannon, 2005), so as to make sense of the whole data and to reduce the risk 
of fragmentation. Furthermore, decision to personally transcribe the whole data 
without any external assistance was to allow for immersion in the data (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Relevant concepts and patterns are often identified even from the 
early stage of data analysis, from which investigators then proceed to the next level 
of analysis known as “constant comparison” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.102). This 
early identification of patterns from interview transcripts is known as open coding 
(Burnard, 1991) 
 
The interview transcripts were exported into an excel spread sheet for the ease of 
organization, and then sorted into relevant content areas such as “Knowledge”, 
“Cues”, “Goals pursued”, “Rules followed”, “Training requirements”, “Sources of 
information” etc. The units of analysis, which relate to the particular subject under 
investigation, were determined for each content area. The text belonging to each 
content area was then divided into meaning units and each meaning unit was further 
summarized into a condensed meaning unit — in such a way that their intended 
meanings from the original narrative were not tampered with. This was to help 
catalogue the key concepts while still preserving the context through which they 
occurred within the data (Burnard, 1991; Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003; Fereday 
and Muir-Cochrane, 2008; Bradley et al. 2007). The condensed meaning units were 
then abstracted and labelled with a code. It was important to ensure the most 
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suitable meaning units were selected; using large chunks of data as meaning units 
were avoided as they may contain many meanings, thereby increasing the chance of 
missing out on important themes. Conversely, meaning units that contain very limited 
data size (e.g. single words or very short sentences) were equally avoided, as much 
as possible, since they could increase the risk of fragmentation.  
 
The creation of codes is an important procedure in qualitative research and requires 
that data are broken down into manageable segments that are subsequently labelled 
(Pidgeon and Henwood, 2004, p.635). However, as Saldana (2012) puts it: coding is 
not just labelling the data, but also involves linking data together. It leads the 
researcher from the data to an idea, and then from the idea to all the data pertaining 
to that idea. Codes are therefore not synonymous with categories, contrary to 
popular belief. Rather, codes capture the essence of the data such that when 
clustered together based on their similarities and regularities (patterns), they actively 
facilitate the development of categories. It is these categories that then help explain 
the basis of the connections between and within the codes (Saldana, 2012). 
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Particular                                                                                               General 
 
After the codes had been generated, they were compared and contrasted across all 
the incidents, and then abstracted into sub-categories using conceptual codes and 
sub-codes i.e. labels used to separate data into distinct domains. The sub-categories 
were also sorted and abstracted into categories by looking for common meanings 
and the relationships between and within the concepts in the sub-categories, across 
all the incidents. This abstraction process was also achieved by using relationship 
codes i.e. links between categories (see Fig 3.3). Finally, the underlying meaning i.e. 
the latent content of the categories were formulated into a theme by looking out for 
links between the conceptual codes and the relationship codes.  
 
 
Themes/ 
Concept
 
Model 
Code 
Code  
Code  
Category 
Code 
Code  
Code  
Category 
Sub-category 
Sub-Category 
 Figure 3.2. A framework for qualitative data analysis from narratives to themes 
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Table 3.5: Summary of the key concepts in the qualitative data analysis. 
Adapted from Graneheim and Lundman (2004, p.109) 
 
CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Unit of Analysis This refers to the segment of an interview transcript, or persons, 
characters, specific actions, organizations etc. that has been 
considered for analysis. A unit of analysis could also be parts of 
the text that are abstracted and coded, or every word or phrase 
contained in the transcript. The general rule is that the chunk size 
of a unit of analysis should neither be too large nor too small.  
Meaning Unit These are a constellation of words, sentences or paragraphs that 
relate to the same central meaning. A Meaning unit is also called a 
coding unit or an idea unit (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). 
Condensed meaning 
unit 
This is the stage where meaning units are further summarized, 
without tampering with the original meaning of the sentence or 
paragraph. Getting description close to the text as much as 
possible. 
Abstraction This is process of grouping condensed texts together into higher 
order headings. These include the creation of codes, categories 
and themes at varying levels. Abstraction occurs at different 
stages until the final stage of theory discovery. 
Content Area Content area sheds light on a specific explicit area of the transcript 
that requires further evaluation. A content area can be parts of the 
text that address a specific topic in an interview guide. 
Code This simply refers to the process of labelling a condensed meaning 
unit and allows the data to be thought about in a new way. 
According to Miles & Huberman (1994), codes are tags or labels 
assigned to whole documents or segments of documents (such as 
paragraphs, sentences, or words) to help catalogue key concepts 
while still preserving the contexts in which they occurred  
Categories This is a core component of qualitative analysis. It represents a 
group of content that shares a common meaning i.e. an observed 
thread across the codes (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). It is 
however important to note that categories should, as much as 
possible, be mutually exclusive. That is, no data is allowed to fall 
between two categories and no data should fit into more than one 
category. In some cases, sub-categories can be formed and then 
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abstracted into a category, alternatively, a category can be divided 
into sub-categories  
Themes The concept of a theme has multiple meanings. Creating a theme 
is simply linking the underlying meanings that are present in 
categories together (Thomas, 2006). However, unlike categories, 
themes can be mutually exclusive i.e. a condensed meaning unit, 
a code or a category can fit into more than one theme. To develop 
a theme, data that link categories to each other are tagged. 
 
It should be noted, however, that although the final generation of themes seems to 
have followed a linear process, this was never the case (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane, 2008). Indeed, the whole process of analysis involved a back and forth 
transition between the whole and parts of the transcripts (Taylor-Powell and Renner, 
2003). This consequently required careful reflection (contextualization, de-
contextualization and re-contextualization) all along the way (Burnard, 1991). This 
also supports the assertion of Strauss and Corbin (1990) that data analysis 
‘techniques and procedures, however necessary, are only a means to an end and 
not to be applied rigidly in a step by step fashion’ (p.14). In qualitative research 
therefore, as is the case with this study, there appears not to be clear cut stages 
between data collection and data analysis. Both stages overlapped and mutually 
shaped each other (Sandelowski, 2000b).  
3.6.3. A summary of the process of thematic analysis utilize in this 
study 
• The transcribed data were re-read and understood in their entirety. 
• The transcripts were open coded to identify the potential initial themes which 
were written down.  
• Coding manuals were developed and the inclusion and exclusion criteria for 
each was determined 
• Data was exported to an excel sheet for ease of organization and separated 
on the basis of the content area. Content areas include the cognitive probes 
from the CDM protocol (e.g. cues, goals, knowledge, rules and training etc.) 
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• Data were reduced to a number of condensed meaning units that were 
codeable 
• Codes (i.e. tags that best described the condensed meaning unit without 
altering their original context) were applied to the condensed meaning units 
across the whole data set 
• Categories (i.e. observed threads throughout the codes) were developed 
across all of the incidents 
• An intra-coding reliability check was carried out in order to verify the 
developed “codes” and “categories” structures. Intra-coder reliability was 
achieved by personally applying already developed codes and categories to 
fresh sets of data in order to check for compatibility and possible 
adjustments.  
• Categories were constantly cross-examined and necessary adjustments and 
refinement were made. New categories were also added as deemed fit  
• Relationships, links and patterns were carefully searched for across the 
whole of the data, and categories were abstracted into themes/concepts 
based on the observed patterns  
• Evidence was checked for narratives, or combination of narratives which 
explained the various concepts, categories and themes. It was important to 
ensure that a clear and transparent audit trail existed for the various themes 
developed in this study (see Appendix F for examples). All the codes, 
categories and themes are thus traceable to their respective original 
narratives. 
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3.6.4. The emergent themes analysis process  
Wong and Blandford (2002) developed the emergent themes analysis (ETA) method, 
which they used in analysing their CDM data (focused on analysing the decision 
making strategies of ambulance dispatchers). The authors explained that although 
the method is based on the grounded theory approach, its advantage lies in the fact 
that it is less expensive and less time consuming than grounded theory or 
ethnographic observation. The ETA method is able to yield more insights with the 
Information filtering 
& intuitive decision 
making model 
Visual 
Cues 
Perceptual 
Cues 
Emotional 
based Cues  
Types of cues 
Analogue 
Deliberative  
 Prototype 
Decision making 
strategy  Problem solving 
strategy 
Principal cue 
 Figure 3.3. An example of qualitative coding utilized in this study, leading to the emergence of 
the descriptive decision making model 
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same or even less effort when compared to other similar methods. Wong & 
Blandford (2002) identified three main advantages of using ETA in analysing CDM 
data:  
• Firstly, the ETA approach is tailored to take advantage of the exploratory 
nature of CDM research, thereby allowing the researcher take account and 
reflect on the way broad and specific themes emerge from the data (see Fig 2 
below).  
 
• Secondly, the ETA approach is able to provide a balance between the 
emerging themes and existing theories. In this respect, the decision making 
strategies that emerged from the distillation process can be logically and 
coherently explained using appropriate theoretical frameworks.  
 
• Finally, the approach is relatively fast, allowing themes to emerge even at the 
early stages of the data analysis. This therefore means that new discoveries 
are not left until late.  
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 Figure 3.4. The emerging themes analytical process (Wong, 2004) 
 
3.6.5. Procedure 
The ETA approach reduces and makes sense of voluminous interview data through 
an iterative distillation process. First, the analyst identifies and collates concepts that 
were found to be similar across the whole interview data. These identified concepts 
form the broad themes (broad themes could be goals, cues, training, time pressure 
etc.). Thereafter, the researcher uses the same distillation process to closely identify 
sub-themes or specific themes from within each of the broad themes earlier 
identified. These sub-themes are then categorized by using a framework that allows 
the decision making strategies used by experts to be revealed (see Fig 3.4). This 
framework includes action taken, cues sought, knowledge used and the difficulties 
encountered in making each of the decisions. The specific themes and the 
corresponding data/narratives that support them are then tailored into summary 
tables (see Fig 3.4). The narratives and summary table are then contextualized, and 
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new patterns and ideas are sought. From these observed patterns, the decision 
making strategies used by experts are identified and are described again in narrative 
form.     
 
3.7. Ethics  
 
The word “ethics” was derived from the Greek ethos, which stands for character 
(Aguinis and Henle, 2002:34). Interest in ethical issues in organizational and 
psychological research has grown since the 1970s (Aguinis and Henle, 2002), 
resulting in the implementation of ethical codes that obliges investigators to uphold 
sound ethical standards. Upholding high ethical values became necessary because 
of the need to protect the rights of participants, the reputation of researchers and that 
of their discipline. In line with this thought, therefore, it became important that these 
ethical standards permeated the design, conduct, analyses and reporting of the 
current study.  
 
The current study followed and adhered to key ethical principles concerning what is 
right/wrong, good/bad, acceptable/unacceptable, based on ethical guidelines 
provided by Middlesex University. Before going to the field for data collection, ethical 
approval was first sought from the appropriate authority in the department (see 
Appendix D letter of approval). As part of the ethics application process, a risk 
assessment form was completed and any potential risks the researcher or the 
participants could be exposed to were identified and potentially addressed. Also, a 
participant information sheet, which describes the purpose of study to the 
participants was provided to the ethics committee for scrutiny.  
 
Since the study involved travelling to Nigeria to conduct interviews, it became 
important to demonstrate access to the Nigerian firefighters. A letter of confirmation 
to this effect was received from the Lagos state fire service Headquarters (one of the 
study areas in Nigeria), duly signed by the director. This allowed access to be gained 
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to interview firefighters across various fire stations within the state (see Appendix E 
for attachment).  
 
Another principle that was adhered to throughout the research was lack of coercion. 
The recruitment process was strictly through a free-will to participate, more so, there 
were no existing ties with the fire officers that might have warranted coercion. As 
stated in section 3.4, some of the participants were recruited through a snowballing 
process either through an email (mainly the UK participants) or face-to-face, and 
were clearly asked to indicate their interest to participate. Upon any interview 
meeting, efforts were made to explain the nature of the interview to the participants 
after which they were asked again to confirm their willingness to participate. All the 
participants in the study were also encouraged to read and sign an informed consent 
form, which indicated their interest to participate in the study and to provide approval 
in using the collected data for research purposes.  
 
Furthermore, confidentiality (which refers to decisions about who will have access to 
the data, how records will be stored and maintained, and whether participants will 
remain anonymous) was another principle that was utilized in this study. Considering 
the fact that the research involved reporting complex incidents some of which 
involved the death of human beings, participants were assured of complete 
anonymity — in terms of hiding both personal and organizational identities. All the 
excerpts quoted from the interview transcripts applied pseudonyms (false names), 
and conscious efforts were made to ensure that no organizational identity was 
revealed as all fire stations remained anonymous both in the UK and Nigeria.                  
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                                        CHAPTER 4 CRITICAL DECISION METHOD: A REVIEW OF STUDIES AND JUSTIFICATION OF METHOD FOR ELICITING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE 
4.0. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores a wide range of studies and research across various 
emergency response and high risk organizations using the cognitive task analysis 
(CTA) and the critical decision method in particular. One of the major advantages of 
using the critical decision method is that it allows the actual decision making process 
used by experts in these domains to be discovered, which can then subsequently be 
used for training purposes (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006). The author is 
interested in examining how the critical decision method has been employed by 
various scholars in revealing, representing, preserving and disseminating expert 
knowledge in real world settings. Furthermore, previous CDM studies in the military, 
aviation, fire-fighting, medical, nursing and midwifery and offshore and mining 
industries, were reviewed. This chapter also discussed the issues of validity, 
reliability and generalizability of the critical decision method as a knowledge 
elicitation tool.   
 
It is important to note, for the purpose of this study, that the term "expert" is used to 
represent individuals who have been shown to possess relevant skills or a broader 
knowledge base in their domain of practice (Klein, et al, 1989, p. 462; Shanteau, 
1992; Elliot, 2005). Thus, the terms “experts” and “novices” are used as a 
convenience to refer to higher and lower levels of skills and experience throughout 
this thesis, implying therefore that the term “novice” is strictly used in a relative 
sense.  
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4.1. WHY KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION? 
Some emergency service organizations such as fire-fighting heavily rely on 
explanations from experts about the cognitive strategies they use in solving difficult 
problems, which are subsequently utilized as the basis for developing training 
instructions for junior officers (Clark et al., 2007; Hannabuss, 2000; Feldon, 2007; 
Wong, 2000). Knowledge elicitation in such domains is therefore seen a crucial 
aspect of organizational learning (Feldon, 2007; Wong, 2004). The daunting 
challenge however, from the majority of previous studies is that unless structured 
knowledge elicitation techniques are used in eliciting domain knowledge, self-reports 
that are freely recalled from experts tend to be incomplete, inaccurate or error-prone 
(Breedin, 1994; Eraut, 2004; Wei and Salvendy, 2004).  
 
According to Nisbett and Wilson (1977), explaining how and why one made certain 
decisions especially in novel situations can be quite challenging. Yet such 
explanations remain an important recipe for management in most high risk 
organizations if the decision making process is to be improved and if novices are to 
be trained to learn complex skills faster. In the light of this necessity and after an 
unimpressive progress in the development of decision aids and training methods 
derived from the self-reports and other formal knowledge elicitation methods 
available at the time, researchers in the field of naturalistic decision making 
pioneered by Gary Klein eventually made a breakthrough (Klein et al., 1989). One of 
the most significant aspects of this breakthrough was the transition from the 
conventional theoretical-based laboratory evaluations of the decision making 
processes employed by actors to investigating such processes in more precise field 
settings (Clark et al., 2006; Calderwood, Crandall & Baynes, 1990).  
 
Klein’s research began in the mid-1980s with a study of urban fire-ground 
commanders who had to make critical decisions such as whether or not to initiate 
search and rescue operations, whether to begin an offensive attack or to be more 
precautionary, what resources they needed and how such resources were to be best 
deployed (Klein et al. 1986; Klein et al., 1989). Klein and his colleagues found that 
the fireground commanders’ accounts regarding their decision making process did 
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not fit into any of the rational decision making models that was dominant at the time. 
The breakthrough began when Klein and his colleagues asked one of the fireground 
commanders (who had just returned from managing a serious fire incident) to 
describe the decisions he had just made. The officer simply replied, to the 
amazement of the authors, that he had not made any decision, but had simply 
“acted” upon what he already knew (Klein et al., 1986). The insights from this study 
subsequently inspired the development of the recognition primed decision model and 
led scholars to seek for better ways of exploring the cognitive processes of decision 
makers. One of the knowledge elicitation tools that emerged from Klein’s study is the 
critical decision method (Klein, Calderwood and McGregor, 1989; Crandall and 
Gretchell-Leiter, 1993; Hoffman et al., 1995; Schraagen et al., 2000; Hutton, Miller 
and Thordsen, 2003; Hutchins, Pirolli and Card, 2004; Clark et al. 2006).  
  
The goals of knowledge elicitation (KE) have been documented in several studies, 
and include:  
• Generation of cognitive specifications and requirements for tasks 
• Prevention of human error in domains involving high risk, time pressure and 
uncertainty, and 
• Enhancement of competence through training, skill remediation and 
technological innovation (Hoffman et al., 1995; Klein, 1993; Kaempf, 
Thordsen and Klein, 1991; Coombs, 1984).  
 
Through knowledge elicitation, investigators are able to generate insights from 
experts in a representational format which can then hopefully be transformed into 
useful products e.g. designing decision aids and training curricula (Klein and Wolf, 
1998; Hoffman et al., 1995). According to Kolodner (1983), the ultimate aim of 
knowledge elicitation is to develop systems that contain all, or almost all of experts’ 
skills and knowledge.  
  
Furthermore, knowledge elicitation has also been shown to play an important role in 
providing reasonable answers to the following critical questions:  
• What do experts normally do in their domain of practice (task analysis)?  
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• What do experts agree that they do?  
• What do experts actually do when constrained by some unusual challenges? 
(Hoffman et al., 1995).  
 
Hoffman (1987) compared five methods of knowledge elicitation: documentation 
based task analysis, unstructured interviews, structured interviews reliant on a first-
pass knowledge base, familiar tasks with think aloud processing constraints and 
tough case materials, and finally, problems that combined limited information with 
processing constraints. He observed that each of the methods differ in the relative 
efficiency with which they yield new knowledge. He suggested that knowledge 
elicitors should strive to utilize the particular method that generates the highest 
number of outputs within a given total task minute (which includes the total amount 
of time taken to prepare for the protocol, the length of time taken to carry out the 
procedure itself and the time taken to analyse interview transcripts). Similarly, other 
authors have shown that different knowledge elicitation techniques may elicit 
different types of knowledge (tacit versus explicit knowledge; procedural versus 
declarative), depending on the overall aim of the elicitation process. Documentation 
analysis, for example, seems to be best suited to eliciting knowledge concerning the 
key concepts used in a particular domain whereas sorting and scaling tasks (e.g. 
repertory grids) are most appropriate in the need to better understand how various 
elements within a domain interact and relate to each other (see Table 4.1: Hoffman 
et al., 1995). Furthermore, the authors purported that eliciting knowledge regarding 
the cognitive rule or intuitive skills used by experts would most likely employ either a 
think aloud problem solving strategy or a cue recall based interview procedure (e.g. 
the critical decision method).  
 
Table 4.1 below shows the various knowledge elicitation strategies depending on the 
procedure the investigator deemed most appropriate, as well as the materials 
available for the study in question.  The elements in bold represent the particular 
strategies adopted in this current study.  
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Table 4.1. Classification of knowledge elicitation methods (Hoffman et al., 
1995, p.140) 
Participants Experience level 
Naivette, Novice, Trainee, Journeyman, Expert, Master 
Groupings 
Individuals, small groups, working groups 
Procedure Familiar task activities 
Task analysis, unobtrusive observation, simulated 
familiar tasks 
Interviews 
Unstructured, structured (by probe questions, test 
cases) 
Contrived techniques 
Event recall, think aloud problem solving, creative 
problem solving, decision analysis, 
scaling/sorting/rating tasks, constrained processing 
tasks, limited information tasks, graph generation tasks 
Materials Familiar task materials, probe questions, limited 
information materials, archive-based test cases, test 
cases generated by experimenter, tough case 
materials, salient case materials, critical incident 
records. 
 
4.1.1. Knowledge elicitation for training purposes 
Alavi and Leidner (2001) pointed out the need to pay more attention to the methods 
and methodologies used by some of the knowledge management theorists in their 
attempts to convert tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. The authors argued that a 
large number of studies tend to deploy weak or ineffective strategies in carrying out 
such conversions; a process which other authors claim certainly requires more 
sophisticated approaches than are currently used (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Eraut, 
2004; Fessey, 2002; Maqsood, Finegan and Walker, 2004; Nonaka and Von Krogh, 
2009).  
 
One of the justifications for this current study is based on the compelling evidence 
that experts are not fully aware of about 70% of their own decisions and mental 
analysis of tasks and so are unable to explain them fully even when such insights 
are needed to support the design of training, assessment or job aids (Clark and Elen, 
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2006; Feldon and Clark, 2006). In other words, experts find it difficult to express what 
they know and do. This is either because they are not used to verbalizing much of 
the information pertaining to their task, or because the knowledge from which they 
make those critical task related decisions is tacitly held (Fessey, 2002; Eraut, 2004; 
Clark, 2014). It therefore appears evident that experts need help telling what they 
know and do (Crandall, 1989; Tsoukas, 2003). It is important to emphasize the fact 
that unconscious knowledge needs to be made conscious and tacit knowledge made 
explicit before they can be utilized for any form of learning or training (Hannabuss, 
2000; Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Billett, 2010; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012). Since 
knowledge management is therefore more about managing knowledge-absences 
rather than knowledge-assets, such missing (and usually tacit) knowledge needs to 
be carefully exhumed from experts (Spender, 2008)    
 
However, despite the importance of eliciting expert knowledge, and tacit knowledge 
in particular, the fact that expert knowledge is multi-faceted has been revealed as 
one of the challenges of knowledge elicitation (Billett, 2010; Wei and Salvendy, 
2004). Experts possess both explicit and implicit (tacit) knowledge, implying that 
knowledge elicitors are constantly faced with a huge challenge of identifying the 
default knowledge mode used by experts at any point in time. In addition, there has 
been a considerable debate as to the extent to which this tacit knowledge can be 
made explicit, and evidence gathered from the literature suggests that the ease of 
conversion between these categories of knowledge has been over exaggerated 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Fessey, 2002; Tsoukas, 2003; Eraut, 2000, 2004).  
 
The above discourse explains why Hoffman (1987) criticized the knowledge 
elicitation methods that focus on eliciting explicit and objective aspects of expert 
knowledge, at the expense of the more tacit ones. Many authors seem to agree that 
the best knowledge elicitation method is one which, in addition to identifying the 
codified (or theoretical) knowledge used by experts in performing domain tasks, is 
also able to reveal the contributions made by tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962; 
Crandall, 1989; Clark et al., 2006; Spender, 2008). Simpson, Horberry and Joy 
(2009) defined tacit knowledge as a type of knowledge that has not been previously 
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expressed or explicitly considered by professionals, even when they possess such 
knowledge. In other words, tacit knowledge is a component of expertise that is highly 
resistant to surface articulation, even by experts themselves (Klein, Calderwood and 
MacGregor, 1989; Eraut, 2004; McCaffrey, 2007). 
 
Having established the value of expert knowledge elicitation for enhancing 
organizational learning, the critical decision method was chosen in this current study 
as one of the most appropriate methods for eliciting both explicit and tacit knowledge 
(Horberry and Cooke, 2010; Wong, 1996; Watkins, 2007; Crandall, Klein and 
Hoffman, 2006; Hutchins, Pirolli and Card, 2004; Crandall, 1989) for reasons 
discussed below 
 
4.2. THE CRITICAL DECISION METHOD 
It was reported that only a few methods were available for eliciting expert knowledge 
in the early 80’s (Klein et al., 1989; van Merrienboer et al., 2007). However, the 
reason for the dearth in the availability of such methods was not necessarily a result 
of a lack of research progress, but mainly because most researchers were, at the 
time, more focused on capturing the decision making process from a broad sense, 
with little emphasis on the content of the knowledge itself (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
Most of the studies on judgment and decision making at that time were carried out in 
context-restricted laboratory settings using methods such as multi-dimensional 
scaling and network analysis, repertory grid analysis etc. (Klein, Calderwood and 
MacGregor, 1989; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Bazerman and Watkins, 2006; 
Riabake, 2006).  
 
Fortunately, with the emergence of expert systems and the growing interest in 
naturalistic/real world decision making, researchers became more interested in the 
content knowledge of experts (Barnet et al., 2010; Klein, 1989; Rasmussen, 1993; 
Flin, 1996; Shanteau, 1992; Gore, 2006; Hoffman et al., 1995; Zsambok and Klein, 
1995). One approach that has been widely used to improve the overall level of 
human performance in a task is by seeking understanding of how proficient 
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individuals actually perform such tasks in real-life (Coombs, 1984; Okoli et al., 2014). 
The principle behind this approach is that by carrying out a detailed study that covers 
the general knowledge, specific information, and experts’ decision making strategies, 
a “model” which exhibits some of the properties of experts can then be developed 
(Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor, 1989; Hoffman et al., 1995; Fischhoff, 1989). 
Such model(s) can be used to identify opportunities for improved training for non-
experts, and/or to develop expert-based decision support systems (Wong, Sallis and 
O’Hare, 1997).    
 
The critical decision method has its root in the work of Flanagan (1954) who initially 
developed a case-based knowledge elicitation strategy, which he termed the critical 
incident technique (Flanagan originally developed the critical incident technique for 
the purpose of job analysis, with the aim of identifying the critical requirements for 
good performance in high-risk work domains). However, it was Gary Klein and his 
colleagues in their study with urban firefighters that perhaps made the most 
successful conceptual adaptation of the early work of Flanagan (Klein, Calderwood 
and Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). In their first study in 1986, they were able to refine and 
adapt the CIT to suit their own purpose of investigation, focusing more on the 
cognitive requirements of job performance rather than on just the job analysis. The 
researchers consequently rebranded their newly developed “bespoke” version of the 
method from what Flanagan initially labelled critical incident technique (CIT) to what 
they preferred to call the critical decision method. 
 
Klein et al. (1989) defined the critical decision method as:  
 
“a retrospective interview strategy that applies a set of cognitive probes to 
actual non-routine incidents that required expert judgment or decision 
making” (Klein et al., 1989, p.464) 
 
The strength of the CDM is that it is designed to go beyond identifying unsafe 
acts and conditions that led to a crisis (i.e. what happened?) or analysing the 
causal relationship between a crisis and the breakdown of the system (i.e. what 
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led to the crisis?). Rather, the method is designed, more importantly, to allow for 
a better understanding of an incident, including the underlying decisions made 
by the operational commander(s). The CDM therefore provides a much better 
description of an incident, not only regarding why and how the incident occurred, 
but also how it was resolved (Horberry and Cooke 2010). In order to 
substantiate this claim, Horberry and Cooke (2010) used the CDM as a follow-up 
to elicit information about the root cause of mining accidents after they had 
initially utilized the incident cause analysis method (ICAM). Analysis of the data 
elicited from both methods showed that the CDM provided significantly more 
insights into the hidden cues and the tacit knowledge utilized by the experienced 
mine operators they interviewed. A wide range of empirical studies have shown 
a similar outcome, suggesting that the CDM is more robust and superior in 
eliciting expert knowledge than other “think-aloud” methods (Cooke, 1994; 
Crandall and Calderwood, 1989; Dickson, McLennan and Omodei, 2000; Wong, 
2004). Techniques such as task analysis were deemed to be unsatisfactory for 
the current study because they are not able to differentiate the cognitive 
performance of an expert from that of a novice (which is the most important 
aspect of this study). Also, methods such as the concurrent verbal protocol —
where decision makers are asked to explain the basis of their actions while 
performing real-life incidents (Lipschitz et al., 2007) would have been detrimental 
to this study. Asking actors to justify their choice options could easily be 
distracting at a critical time, as well as hamper their performance. Also, there is 
only a remote possibility that the researcher would be present during major fire 
incidents to observe and record how incidents are being managed in real-life.  
 
Thankfully, the critical decision method, being a retrospective interview, does not 
suffer from these limitations (Fischhoff, 1989; Klein et al., 1989; Weitzenfeld et 
al., 1990; Hoffman et al. 1998; Dickson et al., 2000; Horberry and Cooke, 2010). 
The method was originally designed to meet three criteria:  
 
• To address the basis of experts’ competence in making critical and task-
related decisions  
154 
 
 
 
• To be applicable under field and naturalistic conditions, and 
• To provide useful data that can potentially be used to enhance the design of 
instructional guidelines for training novices (Klein et al. 1989: 464; Klein, 
Calderwood and MacGregor, 1989; Wong 2004).  
 
Klein et al. (1986) in their original research using the CDM developed a set of 
opening queries to stimulate the recall of salient fire cases i.e. cases where the 
firefighters made some level of critical decisions and for which their knowledge and 
skills were stretched beyond their “comfort zone”. They also developed a set of 
probe questions (see Table 4.2) that guided the knowledge elicitation process, 
covering important aspects of decision making, which include cues, choice points, 
options, goals, action plans as well as the role of experience in the overall decision 
making process. 
 
The CDM has been used across a wide range of disciplines to discover some salient 
facts surrounding effective performances in the various work domains. For example, 
it has been used to elicit knowledge about perceptual cues in neonatal sepsis, some 
of which had never been mentioned in any textbook or training manual (Crandall and 
Calderwood, 1989; Crandall and Gambalian, 1991; Crandall and Getchell-Reiter, 
1993); to improve existing decision support systems (Kaempf et al. 1992; Klinger and 
Gomes, 1993); to prove that the experience of the best programmers could be 
adequately preserved and disseminated (Sonnentag, 2001); to capture and analyse 
the root causes of major incidents in the mining industries (Horberry and Cooke, 
2010);  and to show that designing a computer-based decision support system would 
be more effective than making changes in existing training methods (Miller et al., 
1994). In terms of knowledge preservation, the CDM has been used to capture the 
tasks performed by experts in knowledge intensive organizations to avoid the woeful 
tales of loss of knowledge due to retirement (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
 
155 
 
 
 
4.2.2. The choice of the CDM as a method within the cognitive task 
analysis family 
Breaking the acronym CTA into its component parts Hoffman and Millitello (2008) 
explained that the first word, “cognitive” signifies that CTA is mainly concerned with 
the mental and thought processes of the decision makers. “Task” relates to the 
actual work that people are required to perform in achieving some response goals. 
Finally, the term “Analysis” implies that CTA permits systematic description, 
organization and categorization of the collected data. 
 
About 100 different types of cognitive task analysis methods that are in current use 
have been identified, which makes it quite challenging for a novice researcher to be 
able to choose the most appropriate method from amongst the available options (see 
Clark et al., 2007 for a review). Since each method has its own demands, uses and 
application, CTA experts have advised investigators on the need to evaluate their 
chosen methods to ensure they sufficiently suit the intention of the research 
(Schraagen, Chipman and Shute, 2000). The main purpose of a cognitive task 
analysis is to define the decision making requirements and the psychological 
processes of experts which enables them perform complex tasks and accomplish 
unusual results (Watkins, 2007; Hutchins et al., 2004).  
 
As stated earlier, this current study adopted the critical decision method (CDM) 
amongst the other numerous methods within the CTA. Below is a list of some of the 
key features of the critical decision method, which justify the selection for the current 
study: 
 
• Focus on non-routine cases: Incidents that are non-routine or those that 
challenged the skills of experts are usually the richest source of data for the 
CDM. Such incidents increase the usefulness of the elicited knowledge and 
allow the emergence of certain aspects of expertise that would normally not 
be apparent in routine incidents (Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor, 1989; 
Fischhoff, 1989). Data from non-routine incidents pertaining to times when 
work is most challenging and decisions most critical is more likely to provide 
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useful insights for developing training packages for potential learners or 
novices (Wong and Blandford, 2002) 
 
• Case-Based Approach: During the cognitive interview process, questions 
always refer to a specifically recalled incident rather than asking participants 
about the general procedures and rules they broadly employ — as is the case 
with task analysis (Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, 1987).  The critical 
decision method uses the semi structured interview to shift the perception of 
the experts from providing operational and generic accounts of an incident 
into more descriptive detail on how the specific incident was managed 
(Horberry and Cooke, 2010). 
 
• Cognitive probes: Cognitive probing, also known as progressive deepening 
(Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Hoffman, Crandall and Shadbolt, 1998; Clarke et 
al. 2006), is one of the greatest strengths of the CDM. The responses which 
decision makers give to probe questions are not just taken at surface level, 
rather the probe questions are specifically designed to cause the decision 
makers to retrospectively reflect on their own thought processes during the 
incident. The CDM cognitive probes give extra vigour to the approach when 
compared to other methods such as verbal protocols (Shanteau, 1992; 
Hoffman et al., 1987). Table 3.2 shows a summary of the cognitive probes 
that were adopted specifically for this study.  
 
• Semi-structured interview:  The CDM also uses a semi structured interview 
protocol, and with this it attempts to strike a balance between a purely 
unstructured approach, such as an ongoing verbal protocol, and a completely 
structured approach such as a close-ended survey questionnaire. The CDM 
allows a significant amount of interview time to be allocated to eliciting 
experts’ tacit knowledge, perceptual cues and decision making strategies 
(Wong, 1996; Weitzenfeld et al., 1990). Structured interviews are generally 
more organized, making data analysis and coding processes relatively easier 
compared to unstructured interviews (Silverman, 2000). 
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• Focus on research goals: Another benefit of using this semi-structured 
approach of data gathering is that it gives the interviewer the opportunity to 
capture the most essential aspect of expert knowledge and decision making 
procedures rather than just listening to “fire stories” (Klein et al., 1989). That 
is, the focus of expert participants can be curtailed to those elements of an 
incident that most affected decision making, ensuring responses are 
structured in a way that can be summarized along a specified set of 
dimensions while still allowing details to emerge from the narration. The CDM 
focuses specifically on the decision making process (rather than on the 
entirety of complex tasks), which fits perfectly with the overall scope of the 
current research.   
 
• Combination of knowledge elicitation methods:  One of the reasons the CDM 
has been widely accepted by scholars as a credible knowledge elicitation tool 
is due to its high level of internal triangulation or internal validity (Hoffman et 
al, 1995; Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Schrageen, Chipman and Shute, 2000; 
Watkins, 2007) 
 
The method typically combines four basic techniques:  
 
• (i) a form of protocol analysis  
• (ii) case-based reasoning  
• (iii) structured interviewing 
• (iv) a form of retrospection  
4.3. THE FULL CDM PROCEDURE 
 
The critical decision method as a logical and systematic knowledge elicitation tool 
involves a series of steps that must be followed in order to boost the outcome of the 
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procedure. The steps described below formed the basic foundation upon which the 
interviews were carried out in this study  
 
Step 1: Preparation 
It has been agreed that preparation provides knowledge elicitors with the opportunity 
of familiarizing themselves with the tasks, contents and procedures of the domain 
they intend to study before going into the field (Clark et al., 2006; Hoffman et al., 
1995). Investigators that know very little about the particular domain they intend 
studying have been generally shown to be more likely to probe experts on trivial 
issues, with the possibility of losing out on the core cognitive details (Cooke, 1994; 
Clark et al. 2006; Shcraagen, Chipman and Shute, 2000). Hence, the quality of 
information that can be elicited from participants tends to be richer if investigators 
have taken time to prepare and familiarize themselves with the key terminologies 
and jargons used by experts in their domain of interest (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 
2006) 
 
Preparation for the CDM interviews for the current study started by ensuring that the 
goals for knowledge elicitation were specified and defined, and that efforts have 
been made to ensure that the expert firefighters were sufficiently available and 
accessible both in the UK and Nigeria (Jonnasen, Tessmer and Hannum, 1999). As 
part of the preparation process, the following materials also proved quite useful in 
obtaining preliminary knowledge about the firefighting domain: incident command 
and control fire reports, literatures, fire training manuals and personal observation 
and visits to fire stations. Furthermore, due to the nature of the critical decision 
method protocol (which requires intensive probing and attention to details), it was 
important to be sure that adequate knowledge can be demonstrated in the 
preparation of the interview guide and in the interviewing process itself. This was 
possible through two pre-study sessions where the author rehearsed the interview 
protocol with two firefighters, paying attention to any potential ambiguity in the 
interview questions in the process.  
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Step 2: Incident selection 
The incident selection phase is particularly important in the CDM protocol because it 
helps interviewers identify cases in which they might expect differences between the 
decisions and actions of an expert and those of someone with less experience 
(Wong, Sallis and O’Hare, 1997; Weitzenfeld et al., 1990). The most appropriate 
incidents are therefore those where the decisions of an expert altered the outcome of 
the incident, or incidents that particularly challenged the skills and expertise of the 
participants (Horberry and Cooke, 2010).  
 
It was important that the incidents used for the CDM interviews in this study were 
carefully selected, and that participants were guided through the selection process. It 
was made known in advance of any interview that routine or typical incidents were of 
no interest in the study. Participants were also advised to share only incidents that 
emerged from their own lived experience as decision makers or ‘doers’ (see 
selection criteria in section 3.4)  
 
Step 3: Incident recall 
One of the advantages of the incident recall phase has been linked to its role in 
establishing mutual interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, such 
that the latter is seen as a listener rather than an interrogator (Klein, Calderwood and 
MacGregor, 1989). In fact, the ‘story-telling’ aspect of the critical decision method 
has been regarded as one of the most remarkable features of the method over other 
knowledge elicitation methods (Weitzenfeld et al., 1990). Studies show that experts 
are often flattered to tell their own stories and to share their experiences with others 
(Hoffman, Crandall and Shadbolt, 1998; Hannabuss, 2000; Fessey, 2002). It is 
however important, as suggested by Klein et al. (1989), to take interviews beyond 
mere story-telling to actually identifying the key cognitive elements. This ultimately 
means that investigators must be able to probe the “story behind experts’ stories”.   
 
Once the appropriate incident has been selected in this study, participants were 
asked to recount and ‘walk through’ the incident, describing it from beginning to end. 
This spanned across the moment the fire call was received to the time the fire was 
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eventually brought under control. Participants were allowed to give as many details 
as possible about the incident at this stage, with very minimal interference.  
 
Once an expert has finished narrating an incident, the story was told back to them, 
matching as closely as possible the expert’s own phrasing and terminology to the 
original incident account. Participants were then asked to assess the accuracy of the 
story and to offer additional details, clarifications and corrections where possible. 
This stage allowed the elicitor and the participant to arrive at a common 
understanding of the incident in the end. 
 
Step 4: Time line verification and decision point identification 
The main goal of an investigator at this stage is to specify and verify decision points, 
which Klein et al. (2010) defined as points where different possible ways to 
understanding a situation existed, or where different possible courses of action could 
have been used to solve a problem. To avoid treating every single action as a 
decision point, participants were encouraged to concentrate on key decisions that 
the less experienced officers would perhaps not have considered if they were in the 
same position. The incident timeline was carefully verified with the participants until 
an agreement was reached on what constituted a decision point. Events within an 
incident included both objectively verifiable occurrences (e.g. the time a third fire 
appliance arrived at the scene) or the thoughts and perceptions reported by an 
officer (e.g. colour of smoke indicating the presence of a toxic substance). In other 
instances, experts’ assertions could also suggest feasible alternative courses of 
action that were considered and discarded (e.g. “I thought I might have to call a 
second engine if the intensity of the fire increases”).  
 
As an incident was being reported, the elicitor asked for the approximate time of key 
events. The elicitor’s goal at this point was to capture the salient events within the 
incident, ordered by time and expressed in terms of the points at which important 
input information was received or acquired, points at which decisions were made, 
and points at which some level of key actions were taken (Calderwood, Crandall and 
Klein, 1987). 
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Step 5: Application of cognitive probes (progressive deepening)  
Following the timeline and decision point verification phase, the elicitor led the 
participant back over the incident account yet again. But this time, efforts were 
concentrated on applying cognitive probe questions, emphasizing the various 
aspects of decision making that concerns the study e.g. cues, experience, pattern 
recognition, training etc. (see Table 4.2). The cognitive probe phase was the most 
intensive of all the phases in the CDM procedure as it was the point where specific 
information and knowledge relating to the purpose of the study mainly derived from. 
With appropriate and adequate probing of experts’ decision making process, key 
insights (including tacit knowledge) were deciphered (Weitzenfeld et al., 1990).  
 
The cognitive probing began with questions about the informational cues that experts 
relied upon in making the initial assessment of the incident, including the source of 
the knowledge that formed the basis of such assessment. The cognitive probe 
questions also attempted to elicit the meanings that the informational cues held for 
the decision makers, the expectations, goals and actions they engendered, as well 
as the options they might have considered (Wong, Sallis and O’Hare, 1997). The 
elicitor examined each segment of the story and asked for additional details if 
needed. As advised by CDM experts, participants were encouraged to make more 
specific as opposed to generic statements while describing their action points 
(Hoffman et al., 1995), e.g. it was better to say “my goal was to attack the seat of the 
fire” than saying “my goal was to put out the fire”. 
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Table 4.2: Sample of CDM probe questions used in this study (Adapted from Hoffman 
et al., 1998, p.273) 
Probe Type Probe Content 
Cues What were you seeing, hearing or smelling that helped in 
formulating your action plans? 
Knowledge What information did you use in making these decisions and how 
was it obtained? 
Analogues/Prototypes Were you reminded of any previous incident(s) while managing this 
particular incident 
Level of Novelty Does this case fit a standard or typical scenario? Does it fit a 
scenario you were trained to deal with? 
Goals What were your specific goals and objectives at each decision 
point? 
Options What other courses of action were considered or were available? 
Why were these options not considered? 
Rules based 
/Adaptive/Creative 
decisions 
What rules were you following at each decision point? At what 
point did you go beyond following SOPs or firefighting rules? Were 
you being creative with any of your decisions?  
Most important 
information 
What was the single most important information that you used in 
formulating your action plans? 
Experience and 
prerequisite 
knowledge 
What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in 
making these decisions? What training, knowledge, or information 
might have helped? 
Time pressure How much time pressure was involved in making each of these 
decisions? How long did it actually take you to make these 
decisions? 
Errors What mistakes are likely at each decision point? Did you 
acknowledge if your situation assessment or option selection were 
incorrect? How might a novice have behaved differently? 
Hypotheticals Briefly explain what you would do if you arrived at the scene of a 
serious fire and discovered that you have very little information 
about what was happening and yet have to make decisions 
whether to employ an offensive or a defensive attack? 
 
 
Step 6: Hypothetical Scenario 
This is the final step of the CDM procedure and involves shifting the perspective from 
participants’ actual experience of an event to obtaining information about their depth 
of knowledge regarding the domain of practice. The hypothetical scenario posed to 
experts in this study read thus: 
 
Briefly explain what you would do if you arrive at the scene of a serious fire 
and discovered that you have very little information about what is happening, 
and yet you have to make decisions whether to employ an offensive or 
defensive attack? 
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4.4. METHODOLOGICAL RIGOUR IN CONDUCTING AN INQUIRY USING 
THE CRITICAL DECISION METHOD 
One of the most effective ways of measuring the trustworthiness of the findings of a 
particular study is by evaluating them in relation to the procedures and methods 
used in generating them (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004; Sandelowski, 2000a; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Patton, 2002; Bryman, 2006; Creswell, 2003). In a recent 
review of the existing knowledge elicitation methodologies, Cooke (1994) noted that 
though there is no shortage of methods, the lack of compelling evidence on the 
modes of evaluation remains a challenge. As a result, the issue of reliability, validity 
and generalizability of the CDM has therefore received more methodological 
attention in recent years than it has in the past.  
4.4.1. Reliability of the CDM method 
According to Gordon and Gill (1997), some of the questions commonly used to 
challenge the reliability of the critical decision method are: can participants be 
expected to report the same details when asked about the same incident at a later 
time? Can participants be expected to identify the same proceedings in the timeline 
(decision points, critical cues, action etc.)? Furthermore, issues have also been 
raised about the reliability of the procedures used to analyse the CDM data and 
decision points in particular (Hoffman, Crandell and Shadbolt, 1998). In this regard, 
sceptics have asked whether independent data analysts would generate the same 
results from the coding of raw CDM data. Finally, the reliability of the identified 
decision points has also been questioned.  
 
Some authors have also questioned the retrospective nature of the critical decision 
method (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Ericsson and Simon, 1993), arguing that 
individuals do not always accurately report information that has to do with the 
recollection of past events due to the inherent limitations of the human memory. In 
line with this argument, it is believe that the exact circumstances surrounding an 
incident can never be recreated, and that once interviewed, the interviewee’s 
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memory about the event will alter to some unknown degree (Maqsood, Finegan and 
Walker, 2004). In addition, sceptics have often laid emphasis on the effect of 
hindsight bias i.e. the tendency to view events as more predictable than they really 
were (Turner, 1976; Messick and Bazerman, 1996; Kahneman, 2011). Hindsight bias 
has been attributed to the main reason why people will attempt to cover up their 
mistakes and report only the aspects of an incident that favour them (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1980; Kahneman, 2003; Weitzenfeld et al., 1990; Dickson, McLennan and 
Omodei, 2000). 
 
Despite all the questions and concerns regarding the validity and reliability of the 
critical decision method, most empirical studies, particularly those that utilized real 
experts, have persistently shown that the critical decision method has proved to be 
effective and reliable in eliciting expert knowledge. (Klein et al. 1988; McLennan et 
al. 2006; Burke and Hendry, 1995; Wong, 2004; Lipshitz et al., 2007). Although it 
should be noted that CDM experts do not deny the possible limitations associated 
with the use of retrospective verbal protocol in knowledge elicitation, they simply 
suggest that some of the criticisms tagged with the method are slightly exaggerated 
(see Flanagan, 1954; Klein et al., 1989; Hoffman et al. 1998 for a review of the CDM 
protocol). For instance, in their research with fire fighters, Klein, Calderwood and 
Clinton-Cirocco (1988) observed that most of the very challenging incidents in the 
career track of the officers were vividly remembered and that many of the non-
routine events were reported more accurately and completely than the routine ones 
(Eraut, 2004; Calderwood, Crandall and Baynes, 1990). This holds true even for 
incidents dated as far back as 10 years or more (Crandall, Klein and Hoffman, 2006). 
  
In their review of the critical decision method, Klein et al. (1989) suggested that the 
CDM minimizes hindsight bias and other cognitive biases through the same 
strategies with which it enhances incident recall. These include allowing the same 
story to be narrated at least twice throughout the duration of the interview (see step 
2, 3 and 4 above). The “rule of thumb” is that the more participants are committed to 
going over an incident, the less likely are there to be discrepancies or variations in 
the generated CDM data. The incident timeline phase (which allows a timeline of the 
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various events that happened throughout the incident to be sketched), in addition to 
the fact that participants are allowed to refer back to their log books and registers (in 
the event they could not remember certain things about the incident) — have both 
played important roles in enhancing memory recall. Furthermore, the CDM probe 
questions, regarded as one of the greatest strengths of the method, have also 
proved useful in reducing any form of inconsistency between what was initially 
narrated and the subsequent answers provided by participants to each of the probe 
questions (O’Hare et al, 1998).  
 
One of the ways in which the issue of reliability has been mostly addressed is 
through the use of inter-coder agreement (i.e. the level of agreement between two or 
more independent judges regarding the coding result of interview data). Inter-coding 
reliability checks have been used to show a high level of coding agreement across a 
range of CDM studies (Hoffman, Crandall and Shadbolt, 1998; Klein et al., 1989; 
Hoffman et al., 1995). For example, in a study involving wild-land fire ground 
commanders, Taynor et al. (1987) utilized two independent judges to code for 
“decision strategy” across 29 decision points; the corresponding calculation of 
agreement yielded a rate of 87%. In another study by Calderwood, Crandall and 
Klein (1987), two independent judges also attempted the classification of the 
decision strategies from 18 decision points and found their rate of coding agreement 
to be about 89%.  
  
4.4.2. Content validity 
In addition to the issue of reliability, the internal or content validity of the critical 
decision method has also been addressed in the cognitive task analysis literature (c/f 
Hoffman and Militello, 2008). The questions posed under this theme can be framed 
in terms of the quality of data generated from a CDM procedure i.e. examining how 
comprehensive, accurate, inclusive, and precise such data are. The question can 
also be framed in terms of the informational content of the data e.g. does the method 
yield true information about the concepts, principles, decision making styles etc. of 
the particular domain which was investigated?  
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In their assessment of the content validity of some CDM studies, Hoffman et al. 
(1998) reported the relevance and value of the products developed from these 
studies.  For instance in a study conducted in the domain of neonatal intensive care 
unit, Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) interviewed 22 experienced nurses (mean 
length of experience, 13years) using the CDM protocol. Findings from the study 
revealed certain diagnostic cues such as muscle tone, sick eyes, edema, clotting 
problems, a few of which were found to be opposite of what the existing cues (i.e. 
indicators of infection in adults) were known to be. Also, interestingly, more than one-
third of the cues that were discovered in the study appeared to be novel in the 
medical literature at the time. Following the outcome of the study, Crandall and 
Getchell-Reiter (1993) went further to conduct a validity check on the identified 
diagnostic cues, based on independent assessments made by a group of experts. 
The experts who comprised independent NICU nurses, clinical and specialist nurses 
and research based nurses were all found to favour the findings from the study, 
giving credence to the theoretical and practical relevance of such findings.  
 
In another CDM study, Wong et al. (1996) interviewed ambulance dispatch officers 
at the Sydney ambulance coordination centre and used the knowledge elicited from 
the officers as the basis for the design of a more efficient decision aid. The content 
validity of the CDM output was attributed to the ability of the authors in transforming 
the manual system used for collecting and processing information at the ambulance 
call centre to a more efficient computer based system.  
 
The content validity of the findings from the current study was mainly assessed 
through discussion with the author’s supervisors and from expert scrutiny.  As stated 
earlier, findings from the study have been published in two different peer-reviewed 
journals (Okoli et al., 2014; Okoli et al., 2015) and in a conference proceeding (Okoli 
et al., 2013) 
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4.4.3. Generalizability of the CDM outputs 
As stated earlier, a common criticism of qualitative inquiry relates to its methodical 
dependence on small samples, which critics believe renders conclusions from such 
studies incapable of generalization (see Myers, 2000 for example). The term 
'generalizability' means the degree to which the findings from a study sample can be 
generalized to the wider population (Marshall, 1996). In other words, can the 
conclusions reached in a single study be successfully applied beyond the scope of 
the instances investigated? 
 
It should be emphasized at this juncture that qualitative studies, and CDM studies in 
particular, are not generalizable in the literary use of the word, neither do they claim 
to be (Stake, 1980; Myers, 2000; Wong and Blandford, 2002). Rather they seem to 
be imbued with other redeeming features which make them highly valuable for 
transferability to other domains. Every single incident reported in a CDM study is 
treated as a unique source of data and analyzed for the purpose of theme 
development, thereby making the issue of generalizability less significant. Studies in 
the CDM literature have shown substantial records of making significant 
contributions from and to a wide range of disciplines such as psychology, education, 
nursing, aviation etc. in diverse ways (Klein, Calderwood and McGregor, 1989; 
Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993; Hoffman et al., 1995; Schraagen et al., 2000; 
Hutton, Miller and Thordsen, 2003; Hutchins, Pirolli and Card, 2004; Clark et al. 
2006). Most of the frameworks, theories, models, training needs and conceptual 
graphs generated from these studies have continued to help in bridging the gap 
between theory and practice, especially in the aspect of developing instructional 
designs (see Hoffman et al., 1995; O’Hare et al., 1998 for a review)  
4.5. APPLICATIONS OF THE CRITICAL DECISION METHOD 
CDM has certainly proved useful in a variety of ways. Below is a summary of how 
the outputs and products of the critical decision method can be applied or utilized in 
practice, particularly in the firefighting domain as with this current study: 
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4.5.1. Training and developing decision aids 
The various incident accounts from the CDM interviews can be written up and used 
as training materials to assist trainees in developing the relevant firefighting skills 
such as situation awareness, pattern recognition or prioritization skills. These 
reported incident cases can be used to develop table-top exercises or role playing 
scenarios that would help prepare novices for dealing with similar non-routine 
incidents in the real-life (Wong, Sallis and O’Hare, 1997).  
 
Products from the CDM procedure which can serve as decision aids include: (i) a 
taxonomy of domain concepts and categories along with their definitions (ii) a 
taxonomy of the changing conditions (situation assessment record) (iii) a taxonomy 
of principles and causal relations (IF-THEN or CUE-ACTION relationships) (iv) a 
taxonomy of goals and associated options (v) a taxonomy of skills and sub-skills that 
are used by experts. On this note, the CDM data generated from this current study 
were packaged in three major ways as shown below. Each of these outputs are 
presented and discussed in the next three chapters of this thesis.  
 
1. Descriptive Decision Model: the decision points identified from the CDM 
procedure can be coded and categorized, and then utilized as the basis for 
developing a decision model. Such a model is made possible following the patterns 
and common themes identified across all the incidents. The developed decision 
model can be used to support, refine or modify previously established models in the 
field e.g. the RPD model (Klein, 1997), the R/M model (Cohen et al., 1996); decision 
ladder (Rasmussen, 1997) and image theory (Beach, 1978).  
 
In their CDM review article, Hoffman et al. (1995) explained that a decision model is 
also referred to as a “conceptual graph”, which they defined as a graphical 
representation of a domain in terms of the relationships or links between the various 
elements, concepts and nodes which domain experts use in conveying relevant 
information. The authors also made a strong case for the use of cognitive graphs, 
stating that they tend to represent a domain better than would explanatory texts.   
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A model that describes how experts make intuitive decisions amidst multiple sources 
of information on the fireground was developed and discussed in this study (see 
section 5.8), and has also been published elsewhere (Okoli et al., 2015) 
 
2. Critical Cue Inventory:  Another way the CDM products can be utilized for the 
development of training materials is by generating taxonomies of informational and 
environmental cues (e.g. smoke colour, smoke direction, type of building, climatic 
conditions etc.). The critical cue inventory (CCI) therefore refers to the informational 
and perceptual cues that have been collected and compiled from the coded incident 
accounts. Since some of the cues experts use in making critical decisions are mostly 
tacitly held and thus potentially unknown to them, the critical decision method 
becomes a very useful tool for eliciting knowledge about such cues. The CCI mostly 
serve the purpose for developing training protocols particularly for cue-based 
learning.  
 
A critical cue inventory record was developed from this study, which includes 42 
cues used by the expert firefighters who were interviewed in both the UK and 
Nigeria. The critical cue inventory is presented and discussed in section 5.7 and has 
also been published elsewhere (See Okoli et al., 2014) 
 
3. Competence Assessment Framework: A framework that revealed the relevant 
skills and knowledge dimensions used by experts across the entire incidents was 
presented and discussed in section 5.10. The framework is envisaged as a useful 
tool against which the competence of novice firefighters can be assessed. 
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CHAPTER 5 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
This chapter presents and discusses the main findings from the study, and compares 
the insights generated from the UK and the Nigeria experts where possible. The 
chapter starts by presenting the demographic characteristics of both groups of 
firefighters, which include their length of experience in the service, educational 
qualifications, number of stations previously served and their positions/rank in the 
fire service. Thereafter, the characteristics of the incidents narrated by each 
participant, the decision points from each incident, the decision making and problem 
solving strategies used by each participant, the goals pursued at each decision point, 
the pattern recognition mechanisms, the cues that informed decision making were all 
presented and discussed. Furthermore, a model that attempts to describe the 
decision making strategy of the expert firefighters across both countries is presented 
and discussed. Finally the chapter concludes with a competence assessment 
framework which was developed from the knowledge elicitation process across the 
entire incident reports. The framework attempts to outline the key tacit skills that 
were gathered from the expert firefighters following the critical decision method 
cognitive probe process.    
5.1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
As part of the interviewing process, demographic and personal information regarding 
respondents’ fire-fighting career was collected (See Table 5.1), which provided a 
robust background that relates to the participants’ firefighting career across the two 
groups. One of the demographic questions that was asked in this study, which was 
found to be rarely included in other related CDM studies, was for participants to 
briefly share their experiences across the various fire stations in which they had 
previously served. This question was found to be useful as it allowed insights to be 
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gained about how different station-specific features are likely to affect the process of 
skill acquisition amongst firefighters.   
 
Table 5.1: Demographic characteristics of respondents 
PSEUDONYMN/ 
GENDER 
YRS OF 
EXPERIENCE  
POSITION/RANK EDUCATION 
QUALIFICATION 
NO OF 
STATIONS 
PREVIOUSLY 
SERVED 
                                                UK FIRE-FIGHTERS 
NATH [M] 5*  
Station manager 
MSc 3 
ADRIAN [M] 17 
Watch commander 
CCSE/O 
Levels 
5 
PATRICK [M] 32 Asst. Fire chief MSc 20 
DICKSON [M] 23 
Crew commander 
College: TEC 
Certificate 
7 
BROWN [M] 27 Crew commander Nothing 4 
LILIAN [F] 15 Director in command MSc 3 
ISAAC [M] 13.5 Crew Commander A levels 3 
DUNHAM [M] 13.5 Station Manager/flexi 
duty officer 
O Levels 9 
MARTINS [M] 31 Crew Commander A levels 5 
DAKE [M] 17 Watch Commander Diploma 5 
WILLY [M] 28 Watch Commander A Levels 8 
LAMBERT [M] 26 
Watch Commander 
Secondary 
school 
11 
JADE [M] 15 Crew Commander A levels 4 
DARREN [M]  17 Station 
Manager/District 
Commander 
MSc 10 
TROY [M] 27 Group 
Commander/Flexi 
MSc 13 
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duty officer 
                                        NIGERIAN FIRE-FIGHTERS 
YOUNG [M] 8 Fire Supt officer HND 2 
KEVIN [M] 8 Watch commander NCE 2 
SAMMY [M] 8 Fire supt. officer NCE 2 
KNIGHT [M] 8 Watch commander NCE 2 
ADAMS [M] 30 Chief fire supt. DIPLOMA 2 
RYAN [M] 8 Fire supt. officer NCE 1 
MARVIN [M] 30 Commandant 
trainer/Station 
Manager 
DIPLOMA 3 
ATKINSON 
[M] 
8 Watch commander NCE 2 
JACK [M] 30 Chief fire supt. SSCE 4 
SUNNY [M] 29 Asst. Chief fire supt. OND 4 
STEVE [M] 9 Fire Supt Officer BSc 2 
FRANCIS [M] 28 Chief Fire Supt HND 4 
BILLY [M] 25 Principal Fire Officer 
1/Asst. Station 
Manager 
ND 3 
MARGARETH 
[F] 
11 Fire Supt Officer 1 BSc 2 
 MIKE [M] 28 Asst. Chief Fire Supt DIPLOMA 3 
*NB: The first participant attended his training in a fire station in Taipei and not in the UK 
 
5.1.2 The length of experience in the fire service (measured in 
years)     
The length of years professionals have collectively served in their work domains has 
been used as an important variable in most studies on expertise (Hoffman et al., 
1995). The rule of thumb is usually that the longer the time people have served in a 
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particular work domain the greater the knowledge they are expected to have 
acquired in such a domain, although some scholars have challenged this notion 
claiming that a high number of years of experience does not necessarily signify more 
domain knowledge (c/f Shanteau et al., 2002). These authors argue that other 
factors such as the type of problems solved, the quality of team composition and the 
quality of training received are all possible factors that could also influence task 
performance. It is important to note that although this study initially aimed to maintain 
the “conventional” minimum of 10 years of working experience (Chase and Simon, 
1973; Gobet, 2005) for all the participants as part of the recruitment criteria, it was 
somewhat difficult to achieve with the Nigerian firefighters. Four of the participants in 
the Nigerian group had been in the service for less than 10 years; however they are 
still categorized as experts judging by other variables such as position/rank as well 
as peer recognition (Shanteau, 1992; Shanteau et al., 2002). The years of 
experience varied across respondents in Nigeria and the UK as shown in Table 5.2. 
Overall, the mean year of experience across the two groups of firefighters was seen 
to be significantly higher than the conventional ten years recommended by most 
scholars (the term “conventional” was used because most of the aforementioned 
scholars seem to agree that a professional must have served in a work domain for a 
minimum of 10 years before s/he can be regarded as an expert). Table 5.2 also 
shows that the Nigerian firefighters had a higher variance in their years of experience 
compared to their UK counterparts, and this was mainly because of the higher rate of 
staff turnover in the Nigerian fire service. Officers in the Nigerian fire service are 
more prone to leave the fire brigade once they find a better opportunity elsewhere, 
especially the relatively junior officers.      
 
 
Table 5.2: The distribution of experts’ Length of service (years) in the UK and Nigeria 
GROUPEXPERTS N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
UK YREXPR *14 13.50 32.00 21.5714 6.78759 
      
NIGERIA YREXPR 15 8.00 30.00 17.8667 10.45990 
      
*NB: Number of participants in the UK was 14 because one of the participants was exempted who was 
currently not based in any UK fire station, though a firefighter  
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 Figure 5.1: The distribution of the length of service for experts across both groups 
 
 
It was also observed that years of experience do not necessarily correlate with 
people’s position/rank, especially in the UK. From Table 5.1, it can be seen that 
some of the high ranked officers such as station managers and flexi-duty 
commanders (e.g. Darren, 17, Dunham, 13.5) have a lower length of service year 
than most of the crew commanders (e.g. Dickson, 23; Brown, 27; Martins, 31). This 
seems to suggest that factors other than simply years of experience possibly 
contribute to people’s career progression in the fire service.  
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5.1.3 Rank/Position 
The position/rank of each of the participants served as an important and 
unnegotiable selection criterion in the study, meaning that all participants were at 
least required to be in a supervisory management position before they can 
participate in the study. The fire service in both countries operates a hierarchical 
organizational structure whereby an officer progressively climbs the scale of 
authority based on merit. The first point of promotion in the fire service, across both 
countries, is that of moving from an ordinary fireman to a crew commander. This 
promotion is heralded by attending and writing a series of courses, after which 
officers are made to acquire the “all-important” incident command training. It is this 
incident command training that actually differentiates ordinary firefighters from 
supervisory managers and beyond.  
Participants’ position/rank were categorized into three groups: supervisory 
managers, middle managers and senior managers (see Fig 5.2) Supervisory 
managers, which mainly include crew commanders and watch commanders, are 
group of officers that are qualified to lead at least one fire crew to the scene of an 
incident, acting as incident commanders. These officers ride on fire engines to the 
scene of an incident with their crew(s) and take a leadership position pending the 
time a superior officer arrives on the scene. The middle managers are the more 
senior officers who are tasked with higher levels of command and control and only 
attend more “serious” incidents; these include station managers and flexi-duty 
officers (group commanders). Officers in the middle management position are not 
confined to a particular station; they can also operate within a borough or a district 
and have management responsibility for people and other resources, beyond just the 
watch. The last category, senior managers, is the most senior set of officers who 
make strategic and policy decisions that guide the fire service. Officers in this group 
include assistant chief fire officers, deputy chief fire officers, area commanders who 
mainly attend to “catastrophic” incidents e.g. incidents that involve media attention. 
For large incidents, the most highly ranked officer that is present at the scene usually 
takes the overall incident command responsibility, but might need to appoint other 
experienced officers to manage other sectors. Hence, sector commanders take 
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charge of particular sections of the incident/building, giving instructions to the crew(s) 
working directly under them, communicating with other sector commanders and 
ultimately reporting to the overall incident commander.  
 
Although a lot of similarities exist in the hierarchical structure between the UK and 
Nigerian firefighters, a little difference was also found in the way the officer that takes 
over the overall incident command position is decided. Whilst the Nigerian fire 
service tend to be hierarchical in this regard and allows only the highest ranking 
officer  present at the scene to take over, in the UK the decision is mainly based on 
the circumstances surrounding the incident. Although the most experienced of the 
officers (in terms of length of service) also usually takes over the leadership role in 
the UK, yet in some other instances the officer who got to the scene of the incident 
first and has gained the best situation awareness is allowed to assume the overall 
command position, regardless of their rank — provided they are making the right 
decisions. 
 
Also, while the senior (strategic) managers in the UK fire service are rarely 
positioned at a particular station (at least not one that is used for operational 
service), this was not found to be the case for their Nigerian counterparts. The senior 
managers in the Nigeria fire service were often based in fire stations, but mostly at 
the headquarters (which is also used for operational services in Nigeria). This 
explains why the author was able to recruit four senior managers in Nigeria as 
opposed to just one in the UK (Fig 5.2)     
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 Figure 5.2: Distribution of participants based on management position (n=30) 
 
5.2. Peculiarity of incidents to the participants  
As part of the interviewing process, respondents were probed as to why they 
selected the particular incident they chose to narrate, out of the other numerous 
incidents they have attended. The main rationale behind this question was to 
ascertain what actually makes an incident both complex and unique from the point of 
view of the participants. At the start of the interview, the interviewer ensured that the 
participants understood the type of incidents that met the requirements of the study 
i.e. incidents that are memorable and remarkable and those that sufficiently 
challenged the expertise of the participants. It was important that the incident chosen 
by each participant was non-routine, and for which some sets of interconnected 
178 
 
 
 
decisions were made under time pressure, and this is because experts are more 
likely to reflect their tacit knowledge when managing unusual incidents as opposed 
to routine ones (Polanyi, 1962). Some of the non-routine incidents reported in the 
study include incidents:  
 
i. In which combustible and hazardous substances were present (e.g. acetylene 
and LPG cylinders) 
 
ii. Where getting access routes to the fire-ground was quite difficult or 
problematic  
iii. (iii) where access to the seat of fire was extremely dangerous and/or involved 
breaking of walls/roofs  
 
iv. Where water was not readily available either because there were no hydrants 
available or because the available hydrants were not flowing with the right 
amount of pressure  
 
v. For which members of the public had to be evacuated from their homes to 
safe shelters  
 
vi.  Where information regarding the cause of fire was not readily available.  
 
A content analysis of the CDM data revealed seven different criteria that defined 
experts’ perception on what a “challenging” and/or a “memorable” incident was 
(Table 5.3). It was interesting to know that participants did not necessarily define a 
memorable incident on the basis of how recent or how fresh such an incident was in 
their memory, rather, other variables were seen to influence the decision of each 
participant to narrate the particular incident they chose to report. These are 
discussed below:     
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Table 5.3: Participants’ rationale for incident selection 
Rationale for selection No of incidents (UK) No of incidents (Nigeria) 
Unusual incident   5  1 
Severity of incident   5  6 
Casualties involved   1  3 
Requiring complex and 
multiple decisions 
  5  1 
Recency of incident   2  4 
Effective performance   3  2 
First incident in charge   1  - 
 
 
i) Casualties involved: Experts categorized incidents as remarkable or memorable 
if such incidents involved the loss of human live(s). They also admitted that such 
incidents are very difficult to forget. As shown in Table 5.3, four of the incidents 
reported in this study involved the loss of human lives (3 Nigeria, 1 UK). One of the 
Nigerian incidents was a serious road traffic collision that eventually led to a severe 
fire outbreak, resulting to the death of eight people. Each of the other two incidents 
(Nigeria) involved the death of an elderly person that was trapped in the building and 
unable to escape. The UK one on the other hand was a workshop fire in which the 
owner of the workshop suffered 30% burns from an acetylene explosion and 
eventually died three days after the incident.   
 
(ii) Severity of the incident: Experts described an incident as “critical” or “very 
serious” if a great deal of property was lost or seriously damaged, or if the stress 
involved in managing the incident was so out of proportion that experts were 
stretched beyond their comfort zones, or if a number of task constraints were 
associated with managing the incident. Task constraints refer to the elements of a 
task that inhibits good performance. Some of the task constraints identified in this 
study include, for example: ensuring a constant supply of water in rural areas where 
hydrants sometimes flow with low pressure or where hydrants do not even exist at 
all; breaking through building walls in order to gain access to the seat of fire; fighting 
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a fire against harsh climatic conditions (such as excessive heat, high wind intensity, 
negative wind direction);  gaining access to fire scenes in tight spaced locations that 
pose difficulties in setting up fire appliances; and  concurrently carrying out 
firefighting and rescue operations particularly with limited resources.  
 
Experts also seemed to define a severe or a serious incident on the basis of the time 
it took the firecrew(s) to bring the incident under control. Two massive factory fires 
(1UK, 1 Nigeria) were particularly memorable to the participants because both 
incidents lasted for about three days (72 hours), even with continuous firefighting.  
 
 
iii) The level of risk involved: Experts also defined a “remarkable” or a 
“memorable” incident on the basis of the amount of risky or life-threatening decisions 
they were forced to make while managing the incident. Although it is true that 
firefighting is a type of domain where experts are required to make important 
decisions with pre-defined standard fire service risk philosophies underpinning task 
performance as a guide, yet these experts explained that some level of risks are still 
required to be accepted by the incident commander, beyond what is stipulated in the 
books. For example, Sunny (ACFS, 29, Nigeria) reported how he entered a building 
that was well-alight without wearing breathing apparatus as none was available. 
Though the commander admitted that such level of risk was somewhat intolerable 
from the point of view of the standard operational procedures in the fire service, it 
was still the best option that was available to him. The other option was to admit to 
defeat and allow the building to burn itself out. Similarly, Dickson (23, Crew 
commander, UK) reported how he and his crew were almost caught up in a 
warehouse explosion involving acetylene cylinders. Similar to the Nigerian officer, 
Dickson admitted taking a high level of risk by going offensive (direct firefighting) 
instead of defensive, which was, in that circumstance against the standard 
operational procedures of the UK fire service.  
 
iv) Effective performance: It has been shown that experts are naturally motivated 
by their performance records and therefore strive to maintain good records as much 
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as possible (Zimmerman, 2006). As shown in Table 5.3, it was interesting to note 
that five of the participants in this study preferred to narrate the particular incident 
they chose mainly because they were personally satisfied with their performances (3 
UK, 2 Nigeria). These experts were therefore excited to share their experiences, 
stressing the fact that they did everything needful, timely and professionally. The 
excerpts below shed more light to this: 
 
I’m very good at reflecting, I’m very good at saying where I can learn, but I 
guess one of the reasons I’m using this particular incident to discuss with you 
is because it is an incident that I was very pleased with and at the end of it I 
was happy with the decisions that were made and the consequences of those 
decisions (Jade, crew commander, 15.5, UK)  
 
“I decided to share this incident because if we had not used the tactics we 
used, the whole town could have been burnt down” (Mike, Assistant chief 
fire superintendent, 28, Nigeria)  
 
vi) Novelty of the incident: Six of the participants admitted that the incidents they 
narrated were quite “strange” and unusual, and thus required making decisions that 
were beyond normal routine practices, or that exceeded what was covered during 
training. These incidents were therefore chosen by the participants either because of 
their rarity or because of the “twists” that evolved along the line. Novel or atypical 
incidents, unlike routine ones, often place more pressure on decision makers, who 
are expected to resolve complex problems mainly by relying on creative knowledge. 
For example, Marvin (Station Manager, 30, Nigeria) reported a fire incident on a 
moving train and admitted it was his first time of experiencing such in his career in 
Kwara state (one of the study areas in Nigeria). Darren (Group commander, 17, UK) 
also reported a school fire incident which had a number of unexpected turns which 
he had never witnessed in his career as a firefighter. The fire started as a roof fire 
and suddenly turned into a catastrophic incident, rapidly spreading across two other 
buildings in ways the officers could not explain.     
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5.2.1. Why is firefighting a complex domain? 
In their research on cognitive task analysis, Clark et al (2006) argued that for a task 
to be classified as complex it must be performed using both automated (tacit) and 
explicit knowledge and must, in addition, usually extend over many hours or days. 
The data in Table 5.3, in addition to excerpts from the interview transcripts (see 
below), provided additional insights into what makes firefighting a complex task. 
Expert participants in this study reported that the main task difficulties they 
encountered when managing complex fire incidents included:  
 
• working over a long duration of hours usually without any break or 
refreshment 
• managing and coordinating resources effectively (crew members, fire engines 
and appliances, multi-agencies) 
• the need to continuously monitor a complex situation and develop plans 
amidst constantly changing conditions 
• the possibility of encountering novel situations 
• managing the emotions of members of the public and ensuring their safety 
• managing the media and public perception 
• battling with harsh weather conditions such as wind.  
• ensuring the safety of fire crews against physical and verbal attacks from 
members of the public (peculiar to the Nigerian environment) 
• getting adequate water to fight a serious fire without having to go back to the 
station for replenishing (peculiar to the Nigerian environment) 
 
The following excerpts below show the expressions of some of the participants with 
regards to the complexities associated with managing fire incidents:  
  
“This incident was very challenging for me because we were working against 
very difficult atmospheric conditions; very dry, severe drought and windy 
conditions in a densely populated area with houses all over” (Lilian, 15, Watch 
commander, UK)   
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“It was very unusual for me because the woman involved was psychiatric and 
threatened to burn down the building if we left….so the incident turned out to 
be a welfare issue” (Adrian, 27, Crew commander, UK).  
 
There are two dangers which you can meet when you enter into an engulfed 
building: the livewire might drop on the ground which you don’t know because it 
has affected all the roof, so things up would come down which would involve a 
livewire, then toxic gas might have engulfed all the building – you can’t inhale a 
toxic gas for 2 mins, that officer would suffocate (Young, 28, CFS, Nigeria) 
 
“……the wind factor itself was something I had never experienced before. The 
wind was like swirling, and the fire was actually drawing the wind in. So even on 
the opposite side of the fire you might have had a wind say 5, 6, 7 10 miles/hr, it’s 
probably 40-50miles/hr on the opposite” (Dunham, 13.5, station commander, UK)    
 
“There was no wind so the smoke didn’t blow away, which made it difficult for 
communication because you couldn’t see the person you were talking to because 
of the smoke, but these can be overcome by tactics” (Lambert, 26.5, Watch 
commander, UK)  
 
“Because it is a dynamic situation, you had all the factors, the wind, the smoke, 
the heat, the water, all the different factors that you have to take into account, 
crews welfare, you have to take that into account, keeping their adrenaline levels 
up, fatigue was a big one. I was there in charge of that area for 11hrs without 
being relieved so you think of the mental strain, the mental pressures and 
tiredness as well as the physical” (Dunham, Station Commander, 13.5, UK)                   
 
The above excerpts provide ample evidence that supports existing claims regarding 
the complexities and ambiguities associated with a fireground environment. Officers 
noted that the need to attend to a range of external factors is what mostly contributes 
to the task difficulties they face on the fireground, particularly with the factors they 
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have little or no control over. The influence of atmospheric conditions in relation to 
task performance was found to be a popular theme amongst the UK firefighters as 
shown in the above excerpts. This is because fighting a fire under unfavourable 
conditions (such as excessive heat, high wind, and low humidity) often tends to 
increase one’s mental effort and the amount of resources needed to fight the fire. 
One of the Nigerian officers, on the other hand, mentioned that firefighting job seems 
to be complicated for him mainly because officers have to identify and make sense 
of the various possible risks in their surrounding environment. Based on the excerpt 
from the Nigerian officer, it appears that ensuring the safety of one’s self and that of 
others amidst unfavourable conditions, while at the same time carrying firefighting 
operations, explain why the job of firefighting seems complicated.    
 
Furthermore, one of the incidents reported by one of the participants (Dunham, 13.5, 
Station manager, UK) gave a clearer picture of how complex or messy managing 
complex fire incidents could be. Important statistics across the timeline of this 
incident are shown on Table 5.4: 
 
Table 5.4: Statistics of the Smethwick fire incident 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Smethwick Fire report 2013)  
• 429 “999” calls were made (this was 3 times the daily average) 
• A total of 35 fire engines were deployed to the scene of fire.  
• 2 high volume pumping (HVP) units were used 
• 3 Aerial appliances were used 
• Multi-agency involvement, which include incident command unit, environmental unit, incident 
support unit and welfare unit. 
• Over 14million litres of water was used within the first 12 hours (this is equivalent to six 
Olympic swimming pools, 300,000 baths or the lifetime water consumption of 24 UK residents)  
• 19,000 tonnes of C02 was produced from the fire (this is equivalent to flying from London to 
New York and back every weekend for 339 years) 
•  Smoke plume from the incident was visible from a distance of 40 miles 
• Approximately 200 fire fighters were present at the scene of the incident at the same time (a 
record breaking number). 
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5.3. DECISION POINT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
A decision point, which is the basic unit of analysis in this study, is defined as the 
point where participants admitted choosing a specific course of action from amongst 
several other potentially available alternatives. Examples of decision points from this 
study are: ‘I committed my crews with breathing apparatus into the building’, ‘I 
withdrew my crews from the building because it was too risky’, ‘I requested more 
appliances because I thought we didn’t have enough at that moment’ and so on.  A 
total of 134 decision points were identified from the 30 incidents that were covered in 
this study (see Appendices A & B for an outline of decision points for the UK and 
Nigerian experts respectively).   
5.3.1 Decision Time 
Participants were carefully “walked through” each of the decision points and asked to 
quantify the time it took to make each decision — either in seconds, minutes or 
hours. The main rationale behind this question was to ascertain the extent to which 
these fireground decisions allowed for deliberation. It was made clear to the 
participants that the decision time in this context refers to the time that elapsed from 
when the need to decide came into their minds until the decision was made, as 
opposed to when a course of action was eventually implemented. It was important to 
clarify this since the latter often depends on other factors that are most times 
external to the decision maker (e.g. weather conditions, adequate manpower, nature 
of incident)   
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 Figure 5.3: A breakdown of decision time across the entire decision points between 
the UK and the Nigeria participants (N=69 decision points UK, N=65 Decision points 
Nigeria) 
 
Participants used words such as “instantly”, “straightaway”, “immediately”, “as soon 
as possible”, “almost immediately” to describe the urgency required in making most 
fireground decisions. Findings from Figure 5.3 reveal that 80% and 72% of the total 
decisions made by the Nigerian and UK officers respectively were within 1 min — 
which, on the basis of the time dimension, can be classified as intuitive decisions 
(Klein et al., 2010; Dorfler and Ackermann, 2012).  It is worth mentioning that 
decisions reportedly made within 2mins were not considered as intuitive, judging by 
what constitutes an intuitive decision, as discussed in section 2.7 (pp. 51-52). At the 
extreme end of the analytical or deliberative decision making, only one decision point 
187 
 
 
 
was found where there was a need to deliberate for up to an hour.  In this case (a 
massive petrol storage fire, UK) the officer in charge (Patrick, Assistant Fire Chief, 
32) was forced to change his initial proposed action plan to an alternative one, after 
the plan was found to be flawed . 
Overall, a significant similarity was found in the decision time between the UK and 
the Nigerian groups.  
5.3.2 Time Pressure 
Time pressure is a term widely used in the naturalistic decision making domain to 
depict the psychological state of decision makers upon their awareness of the 
urgency to implement a course of action and/or the implications of not doing so. 
Participants were probed at each decision point and asked to verify whether they 
were under any form of time pressure. From the point of view of the reported 
incidents, all the participants (except one) agreed that firefighting places significant 
pressures on incident commanders. A content analysis of the CDM reports revealed 
five sources of time pressure associated with firefighting, as shown below: 
 
• Pressure to prove worth as overall commander: Pressure to prove self-
worth and to display a high level of professionalism as an officer in charge 
sometimes puts incident commanders under time pressure. 
• Pressure to return to business as usual: During fire incidents incident 
commanders always strive to restore things back to normal and minimize 
disruption as low as possible. This generates more time pressured reactions  
• Pressure from task constraints: As shown earlier, the task of firefighting is 
a complex one that requires incident commanders to make good and yet 
quick decisions. The need to make complex and high-staked decisions in a 
timely manner is therefore arguably the most important cause of time 
pressure     
• Pressure to prevent incurring further losses: Envisaging that something 
more critical is likely to happen (e.g. fire affecting other nearby properties, 
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injury to crews, loss of lives etc.) places incident commanders under 
significant time pressure since they are then primed to act more urgently 
• Pressure to manage public behaviour: Members of the public sometimes 
mount extra pressure on the fire crew(s), in the form of verbal abuse or 
physical attack. Such aggressive acts consequently distract firefighters from 
their main firefighting tasks, putting them under more intense pressure 
instead, which include: first, pressure from managing task constraints and 
second, pressure from coping with the aggressive behaviour of passersby. 
However, it is important to note that this issue was more prevalent in Nigeria 
because members of the public are usually not “cordoned” away from the 
scene of an incident unlike in the UK.  
 
In order to quantitatively analyse the decision points, the current study employed the 
4-point time-pressure scale that was utilized by Klein et al. (1988) in their initial study 
with firefighters as shown below:  
 
Scale 1 (Low):  Time pressure was coded “low” when a decision point does not 
directly impact the outcome of an incident, and most times include decisions made 
when an incident is still very much within control.  For example, the decision to 
reassure members of the public on their safety (Brown, 27, Crew commander, UK)       
 
Scale 2 (Medium): Time-pressure is rated “medium” in situations where officers had 
foreseen the potential of an incident escalating and acting to contain the fire or to 
prevent further spread. For example, the decision to first switch off the electrical 
supply from the main source after discovering that the incident was caused by an 
electric fault (Kevin, 8, Watch commander, Nigeria).  
 
Scale 3 (High): Time pressure is high when loss of control over the incident is 
imminent i.e. when the situation is becoming increasingly complex and difficult to 
manage. A common example of decision that belongs to the high time-pressure 
category in this study is the decision to request additional resources (since the extra 
resources are meant to empower the crews with the hope that they can gain control 
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over the incident). There is also the decision to commit firefighters into a building to 
initiate rescue operations (Young, 29, CFS, Nigeria; Martins, 31, Crew commander, 
UK)  
 
Scale 4 (Extremely high): This is the highest level of time-pressure that can be 
exerted on expert incident commanders, and mostly occur in situations which 
threaten the loss of human lives. Examples of decisions that fell within this category 
are safety related decisions such as the decision to resuscitate trapped victims, 
decision to evacuate the victims to a safe place, decision to switch to a more 
defensive firefighting strategy for safety purposes.           
 
 
 
 Figure 5.4: Distribution of time-pressure on a 4-point scale (UK Firefighters) 
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 Figure 5.5: Distribution of time-pressure on a 4-point scale (Nigerian Firefighters) 
 
Consistent with the previous studies that have investigated how human beings make 
decisions under varying levels of time-pressure (e.g. Freeman, Cohen and 
Thompson, 1998; Holgate, 2003; Reimer and Katsikopoulos, 2004; Hilbig, Scholl and 
Pohl, 2010), the above findings provide additional evidence to demonstrate that high 
staked tasks are mostly performed under time-pressure. Figures 5.4 & 5.5 above 
indicate that 71% and 63% of the decision points amongst the UK and the Nigerian 
firefighters respectively were made under conditions of high or extremely high 
pressures.    
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5.4. DECISION MAKING STRATEGIES 
 
One of the most important objectives this research set out to achieve was to identify 
the dominant decision making strategy often employed by fireground commanders in 
solving complex tasks. In addressing the issue and meeting this important objective, 
a categorization construct was adopted that was similar to that used by O’Hare et al., 
(1998) in their study with expert water rafting guides, aviation pilots and emergency 
ambulance dispatchers. Each decision point was coded as “option comparison”, 
“deliberated”, “analog” or “prototype”, depending on the source of knowledge 
applicable to experts at each decision point:  
 
 
 Figure 5.6: The percentage distribution of the decision making strategy between 
the UK and Nigerian officers  
(N=69 decision points UK, N=65 Decision points Nigeria). N.B: Data for option 
comparison is not visible on the chart as it has zero frequency 
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Option comparison: Experts are said to be comparing options when they have to 
rely on pre-determined criteria (usually from external sources) to select their course 
of action. This approach to decision making involves consciously comparing and 
contrasting a particular option against other available options, similar to how people 
choose their holiday sites or the type of car to buy. As part of the interviewing 
process, participants were asked to explain if other options were available to them at 
each decision point. They were also asked to explain why they preferred certain 
options to another if they answered yes to the first question. The main rationale for 
asking this question was to better understand how experts generate and manage 
possible decision alternatives on the fireground. Fig 5.6 indicates that in no case was 
an option comparison strategy utilized    
 
To explore further whether options actually existed, another probe question was 
applied as shown in Table 5.5. A total of ten participants (6 UK, 4 Nigeria) reported 
that no other option was available to them at each decision point, meaning they were 
not considering any other option at all. Twelve participants (8 UK, 4 Nigeria) 
acknowledged the existence of other options but explained, however, that the option 
they eventually chose was the best that was available to them at the decision point. 
Some of these officers emphasized they would still choose the same option if the 
incident were to repeat itself exactly the same way in the future. Six participants 
(Nigerian participants only), on the other hand, reported that they could have chosen 
another option if they had the luxury of choice. This group of experts explained that 
even though they could identify a few limitations in one or more of their selected 
options, they had no other option than to improvise with the resources and personnel 
available to them. Overall, only in one of the incidents was the first option chosen by 
a commander eventually found to be “unworkable”. The officer in charge (Atkinson, 
8, Watch commander, Nigeria) claimed he was eventually forced to change his 
tactics from “offensive” to “defensive” firefighting.  
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Table 5.5: Respondents’ reaction to the availability of options  
Categories No of Participants Supporting hypotheses in the 
NDM literature UK NIG 
No other option exists    6    4 It has been reported in a number of NDM 
studies that the first option generated by 
experts is usually satisfactory, even for 
moderate experts (Johnson and Raab, 
2003; Ross et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2011; 
Kermarrec and Bossard, 2014) 
Other options exist but the option 
chosen was the best in managing 
the incident 
    
 
   8 
   
 
   4 
Simon (1956) used the term “satisficing” to 
explain the notion that making decisions in 
time-pressured and high staked 
environments do not necessarily entail 
making the best decisions. Officers only 
need to make decisions that are good 
enough to get the tasks done in the safest 
manner.    
Option chosen was not necessarily 
the best, but was the best available 
to the officers at the time 
 
    - 
 
   6 
Fredholm (1997) developed a model, which 
he termed tactical problem situations. The 
model identified four resource levels and 
their corresponding problem states, and 
argued that it is the amount of resources 
available to officers and how they manage 
them that mostly determine the quality of 
their performance.  
 
 
First option was found problematic 
and an alternative option was 
subsequently  generated  
  
    
 
 
   - 
    
    
 
 
    1 
Klein (1998) in his book entitled “how 
experts make decisions” argued that 
experts often employ a serial option 
selection strategy as opposed to concurrent 
comparism of options. This means that 
experts mostly use their experience to 
determine a most plausible option and then 
channel their mental energy towards that 
option.  
 
 
 
    
 
 
     
 
 
A number of authors have identified a 
relationship between what people know at 
any point in time and how what they know 
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Something would have been done 
completely differently if the incident 
happened now  
   1   - shapes their understanding of the world 
(Turner, 1976; Ackoff, 1989; Pollock et al., 
2002; Spender, 2008). It is therefore logical 
to infer that the accuracy of people’s 
judgment at any point in time will be largely 
dependent on the quality of their mental 
model (Salas et al., 2010) 
          
Again, as shown in Table 5.5, in no circumstance were any of the incident 
commanders concurrently comparing different alternatives against each other in 
order to determine the most appropriate course of action; they either reported that no 
other options were available to them or that other options existed but were not worth 
pursuing. Even for the incident where the first option did not eventually work, the 
incident commander was not found to be concurrently comparing options against 
each other. Rather he started with an option and then moved to the next available 
option only after it became obvious that the first option will not work. No evidence 
was therefore found from the above findings and across the entire decision points 
where incident commanders compared options in a concurrent manner.  
 
All the participants agreed that the particular decision making strategy eventually 
adopted in managing complex incidents is usually not pre-determined, but contingent 
upon the proceedings of an event. Previous studies, including the prototypical 
recognition primed decision making model, have similarly shown that experts do not 
compare alternatives concurrently against each other; rather they choose one option 
at a time in a serial manner, which eventually turns out to be an adequate option 
even for moderate experts (Calderwood, Crandall and Klein, 1987; Wong and 
Blandford, 2002; Johnson and Raab, 2003; Klein, 2003; Azuma, Daily and 
Furmanski, 2006; Ward et al., 2011).  
 
Deliberated: Deliberative or analytical decision making involves carrying out a more 
conscious or detailed analysis on a potential course of action before implementing it. 
Two parameters were considered while coding decision points in this category: (i) 
decision time – decisions that took experts more than one minute to make were 
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considered analytical. It has been well-established that individuals will only require 
additional thinking time if they needed to deliberate on a potential action plan, 
otherwise they simply go ahead with their first impression (see the intuitive-analytical 
continuum model, Hammond et al., 1987; the unconscious thought theory, 
Dijksterhuis, 2004) (ii) Team collaboration – decision points that entailed an 
exchange of ideas between the incident commander and other team members in the 
form of a group discussion.  
 
Figure 5.6 above shows that only 7.2% and 7.7% of the entire decision points in the 
UK and Nigerian groups respectively were made deliberatively.    
 
Prototypes: Prototypical decisions are decisions that allow actors to draw from their 
pool of knowledge and skills. It is the culmination of experience(s) obtained from the 
numerous incidents which officers have attended in the course of their firefighting 
career. One of the attributes of a prototypical decision is that it therefore becomes 
quite difficult to specifically attribute development of a prototype to any one incident 
in particular. Hence, experts were probed at each decision point whether or not the 
decisions they made brought to their memory how previous incidents were managed. 
If experts were thus able to demonstrate at each decision point how they used 
knowledge of previous incidents to manage a current one (i.e. based on their ability 
to remember the cues sought, goals pursued and actions taken from the previous 
incidents) it then becomes categorized as a prototypical decision. The concepts of 
templates, prototyping and pattern recognition are discussed in more details in 
section 5.8 of the current chapter.   
 
The following excerpts show how the expert participants perceived this experience-
based prototypical approach to decision making: 
 
“The only way I can describe it is that those incidents contribute to a template, 
and that’s in your head; just a framework for thinking that you call upon 
instinctively. You may only have 5 or 6 templates perhaps, but most of the 
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incidents you go to will fit into one of those templates” (Patrick, Assistant Fire 
Chief, 32 UK) 
 
“…..at the time, nothing specific, but it’s a generic experience. I didn’t look at 
that incident and think this is like any other incident that I went to. I take 
learning points from all the incidents I go to and that, I believe, produces an 
ability to then make decisions”.  (Jade, Crew Commander, 15, UK) 
 
“Yes, [you are reminded of previous incidents] but I think it is more of a 
collection of experiences as opposed to a particular incident” (Sunny, 29. 
ACFS, Nigeria) 
 
There are some [incidents] that are similar, and some that are not similar, 
but you must remember. Like today, if we attended the same scene and we 
noticed the same building, about 5-7 rooms, and two rooms were not 
affected, we can apply the same method we used there (Adams, 30, CFS, 
Nigeria) 
 
The majority of the decisions points across the entire set of incidents fell under this 
decision making strategy across both groups of experts (UK= 88.4%, 
Nigeria=84.6%). This therefore suggests that the officers were mainly assessing the 
current situation against the prototypes they had stored in their memory. It is evident 
from the above excerpts that experts actually regard this pattern recognition ability 
as one of the greatest hallmarks of expertise, which they claim is largely based on 
the amount of chunks or patterns that is available in the long term memory.  
 
Despite the consensus reached by many scholars regarding the possibility of 
employing the intuitive and analytical thinking modes simultaneously, the challenge 
has often been that of determining the dominant thinking mode. Furthermore, 
although there is evidence in the literature indicating that about 80-90% of difficult 
decisions are made through the pattern recognition strategy, only a relatively few 
such studies have been reported in the firefighting domain. For example, in their 
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study involving Naval officers, Kaempf et al. (1993) showed that 95% of the 
decisions made by the officers relied on situational and pattern recognition, with only 
less than 5% being deliberative. Furthermore, in their study with design engineers 
who were relatively under less time pressure, Klein and Brezovic (1986) found that 
the experts relied reasonably well on pattern recognition (60% of total decisions) in 
solving difficult problems. On this note, therefore, it is believed that findings from this 
current study have contributed to existing evidence suggesting the majority of 
experts’ decisions, and those of firefighters in particular, are based on the 
prototypical or pattern recognition strategy.  
 
Analog: Analogs were used in this study to describe a situation where incident 
commanders made particular reference to a specific incident or to a specific event 
within an incident which they had previously managed. Again, as part of the CDM 
probe questions and in order to avoid confusing analogs with prototypes (since it is a 
bit difficult to separate a particular event from the multiple events that have been 
merged into their memory), officers were asked at each decision point to differentiate 
between decisions made with reference to a specific incident (analogue) and those 
made using combined knowledge of multiple incidents (prototype). If the officers 
could specifically attach any of decisions made to any single previous incident or 
event in particular, then such a decision point was classified as analog.  
 
For example, Jack (CFS, 30, Nigeria) reported how he was able to work out the best 
way of positioning fire appliances at the scene of what appeared to be a difficult 
incident — a massive fire in a plank factory during harmattan season (a season 
characterized by high wind in Nigeria). The commander explained he was able to 
remember specifically from an incident he attended back in his days as ordinary 
firefighter how one of his superior officers positioned the firefighting appliances 
downwind of the fire, so as to avoid further spread. In another incident in the UK, 
Troy (27, Group commander) reported how he stood firm on his decision to directly 
attack a massive fire involving acetylene and LPG cylinders in a workshop factory, 
which eventually proved to be the best judgment call. This course of action was 
chosen by the expert, as opposed to evacuating the fire crew (which was technically 
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the right thing to do in such circumstances), when he remembered and decided to 
replicate the action plan he employed in one of the previous incidents.   
 
Analyses of the decision points show that only 4.3% and 7.7% of the entire decision 
points in the UK and Nigerian incidents respectively could be classified as analogs.  
 
5.5. PROBLEM SOLVING STRATEGIES 
Problem solving strategy defines the type of behavior displayed by a decision maker 
while responding to complex tasks. In one of his early works, Rasmussen (1983) 
identified three main types of behaviour operators are likely to display at each 
decision point: rule based, skill based and knowledge based behaviour. Thankfully, a 
number of authors have subsequently built upon this idea and have developed a 
similar problem solving construct that has now been widely utilized in a number of 
naturalistic studies. For example, in the following studies involving firefighters 
(Calderwood et al. 1987; Burke and Hendry; 1995; Klein et al., 2010), each decision 
point was classified as any of standard, typical or creative. The same coding criteria 
were employed in this study as discussed below:  
 
• Standard: decisions made simply by applying existing knowledge which has 
been taught explicitly as “the standard way of doing things” in the fire service 
 
•  Typical: decisions made through modifications to the standard operating 
procedures of the fire service in order to meet the requirements of a current 
situation  
 
• Constructed or creative: decisions made under novel conditions i.e. where 
no standard solution exists  
 
Figure 5.7 below shows the distribution of the problem solving strategies utilized by 
expert firefighters across both countries, followed by a discussion of the strategies.   
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 Figure 5.7: Frequency distribution of the problem solving strategies used by 
respondents     
(N=69 decision points UK, N=65 Decision points Nigeria) 
 
Standard: These are basic firefighting decisions for which an average officer, at the 
least, would have also been expected to act similarly i.e. the “bog standard” way of 
doing things in the fire service. The fire-fighting domain, being a high risk profession 
by its very nature, often requires that officers follow some of the rules and 
procedures binding the service as closely as possible, without which safety could 
easily become jeopardized. Hence, all the decisions that were arrived at by following 
firefighting rules, standard operating procedures or fire manuals fell within this 
category (see table 5.6 below). These include, for example, the rules of 
communication between the operational team and the control room, entry control 
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rules (committing firemen into a well-alight building with their breathing apparatus), 
rules for evacuation (withdrawing victims within a certain distance from the scene of 
an incident).  
 
The participants were carefully probed at each decision point whether or not they 
were following any standard rule, and their responses were then matched against 
the incident accounts. Care was taken to note at each decision point where the 
experts were strictly adhering to standard firefighting rules and where they were 
making adaptations to the rules in order to suit the current task (typical rules). For 
example, spotting the need to request additional resources or knowing that a size up 
(i.e. a 3600 situation assessment) is needed upon arriving at the scene of an incident 
— was coded as standard rule. On the other hand, knowing the actual time to 
request for resources and also providing an estimate of the amount of resources 
required — was classified as typical (since some modifications have taken place to 
the standard operational procedures).  
 
Figure 5.7 above shows that 23.2% and 26.2% of the decision points in the UK and 
Nigerian reports respectively fell under the standard category. This implies that only 
approximately one-fifth of all the decisions made by both groups of experts followed 
basic firefighting rules, in these exceptional incidents.  
 
Typical or Adaptive decisions: Unlike standard decisions, typical or adaptive 
decisions force experts to approach things differently from the way novices would 
have probably approached them. These decisions are therefore often arrived at by 
making “calculated” modifications and adjustments to the standard way of doing 
things, which is possible through the application of extensive domain knowledge and 
the continuous process of dynamic risk assessment on the fireground. It therefore 
becomes difficult to mention decisions of these sorts without acknowledging the role 
of experiential knowledge (which has been accumulated over years of active service) 
and deliberate practice. The ability to tweak action plans to suit the requirements of a 
current situation undoubtedly requires experience. Hence, whilst the rule based 
decisions can easily be implemented by drawing upon factual knowledge or “strict 
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regulations” binding work performance in the fire service, a deeper knowledge of the 
task as well as relying on experiences drawn from previous incidents appears crucial 
for adaptive decisions. This also explains why adaptive decisions are sometimes 
called skill-based decisions, since the knowledge required for making such decisions 
is expected to have become fully processed, internalized and transformed into skills. 
This transformation of knowledge into skills is one of the reasons why experts will not 
have to deliberate so long before implementing a desired action plan.  
 
Using the problem solving criteria outlined earlier, each decision point was carefully 
matched against the incident report. For example, Patrick (32, Assistant Fire Chief, 
UK) reported how he over-ruled a less experienced officer’s decision, who was about 
to make a call for 12 additional pumps. Patrick explained that upon seeing the 
magnitude of the fire and its huge potential to spread, he became convinced that 12 
pumps would not be enough and therefore asked the junior officer to increase the 
pumps to 15. Another experienced officer, Adam (Chief Fire Superintendent, 30, 
Nigeria) reported how he instructed his crew to utilize a hose reel (a type of hose that 
produces small quantity of water but with very high pressure) instead of a main jet (a 
very big hose that produces large quantity of water but with less pressure) for safety 
reasons. Adam explained that although judging solely by the size of the fire, a main 
jet would have been the most appropriate firefighting medium to extinguish the fire. 
But after spotting some cracks on the wall, the officer immediately knew that using a 
mainjet would significantly increase the chance of the building collapsing, hence his 
decision to adopt a more defensive strategy.   
 
It therefore seems clearer from the foregoing that expertise largely lies in recognizing 
the points where following a standard rule is likely to be flawed and where it is simply 
safer to follow one. For instance, although it is a recognized rule (both formal and 
written) in both the UK and Nigeria fire services that a superior officer will usually 
take over from a less ranked officer e.g. when the number of fire engines at the 
scene of the incident increases to five, instances were found from the CDM reports 
where this rule was not followed by experts. In some of the incidents the higher 
ranked officers took over as overall commander immediately they arrived at the 
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scene of incident, regardless of the number of fire engines in attendance, whereas in 
other instances (mostly in the UK) the less ranked officers were allowed to continue 
as overall commander.  
 
Figure 5.7 above shows that the vast majority of decision points across the entire 
incidents were “adapted to suit”, accounting for 62.3% and 64.6% of the UK and the 
Nigerian incidents respectively. 
 
Creative or constructed: Unlike the first two problem solving strategies, creative 
decisions usually occur in unfamiliar situations where rules are unavailable and 
where patterns cannot be matched with any of the pre-stored prototypes from 
memory. These decisions typically require creative problem solving strategies as no 
direct rule exists on how things should be done. Experts therefore develop their own 
solution to a problem, mostly through improvisation, story building (combining bits of 
elements together to create an action plan). It is also common to find some of the 
creative decisions being at odds with the standard operating procedures of the fire 
service (see Table 5.6).  
 
As part of the interviewing process, participants were probed and asked to identify 
the decision points where they were being creative. Following the coding criteria 
mentioned earlier, a decision point was then coded as creative if participants were 
able to demonstrate that their course of action did not fit any of the existing rules or 
pre-stored knowledge (i.e. they were thinking outside the box). To therefore confirm 
that the officers were actually being creative as claimed, each of the creative 
decisions were tested against the task constraints reported in the incident account.  
 
Although the perception and interpretation of what makes up a creative decision 
differed across the incidents and also within experts, three parameters were 
generally used by experts to define what a creative decision is: 
 
(i) Decisions that entailed making significant changes to an action plan i.e. moving 
from doing what is typical to expressing acts of “heroism” (in the words of one of the 
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officers, Brown, 27, Crew commander, UK).  He explained heroic acts as the 
willingness to go the extra mile in finding alternative ways of doing things — even if it 
meant exceeding the boundaries of one’s comfort zones. Below are examples of 
creative decisions as reported by the expert participants: 
 
• Manually breaking of walls, doors and glasses so as to gain access to the 
seat of fire (Sammy, Fire Superintendent Officer, 8, Nigeria; Sunny, Assistant 
Chief Fire Superintendent, 29, Nigeria) 
• Completely removing the roof of a building in order to gain access to the seat 
of a massive petrol fire (Patrick, Assistant Fire Chief, 32, UK) 
 
The above two incidents were instances where the officers in charge could have 
easily admitted defeat and withdrawn their crews (which would have also been 
justifiable from an incident command point of view). But instead they chose to 
increase their level of risk by going more offensive, which eventually proved more 
rewarding.     
 
(ii) Decisions that were almost completely opposite to some of the stipulations in the 
standard operational procedures of the fire service (albeit for a just cause). 
• decision not to withdraw the fire crews to a distance of 200m in an incident 
involving LPG and acetylene cylinders against what was stipulated in 
firefighting manuals (Troy, Group commander, 27, UK) 
 
(iii) Decisions that required creating new ideas through improvisation, especially in 
novel circumstances  
• Creatively fastening a mainjet water supply to a wall to keep attacking the fire 
while fire crews were safely withdrawn from the immediate environment 
(Brown, 23, Crew commander, UK) 
• Digging a temporary dam where water was stored and also liaising with water 
carriers to ensure steady supply of water in a rural area with extremely low 
pressured hydrants (Darren, station manager, 17, UK)  
 
204 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 above shows that only 14.5% and 9.2% of all decisions made respectively 
by the UK and Nigerian experts were creative.  As expected, creative decisions 
appeared to be the least utilized among the problem solving strategies, overall.  
 
Table 5.6: Analysis of rule-based, typical and creative decisions 
Actions (Decision points)  Is this a Standard 
operational 
procedure in the 
fire service? (Y/N) 
How participants approached the decisions 
across the entire incidents 
Standard  
(Knowing 
that) 
Typical  
(Knowing 
when & 
Knowing  
how) 
Creative 
 
(combining 
knowledge) 
Situation assessment  (Nigeria experts)  
Y 
 
  
    √ 
 
    √ 
 
Ensuring that the BA sets are well monitored 
upon committing crews into a building (UK 
experts) 
 
Y 
 
 
    √ 
  
Rules of communication with the control 
room every 10mins at the start of an 
incident, and then every 20 mins as the 
incident winds down (UK experts) 
 
 
Y 
 
 
  
 
  √ 
 
Rules of evacuation within a radius of 200m 
in the event of acetylene (UK experts) 
 
Y 
 
 
  √ 
 
   
 
     √ 
Requesting extra resources (UK & Nigerian 
experts) 
 
Y 
 
  √ 
 
  √ 
 
 
Using the appropriate fire-fighting medium 
e.g. Hose reel or Main jet (UK & Nigerian 
experts) 
 
Y 
 
 
  √ 
 
  √ 
 
Requesting assistance from other 
emergency response organizations e.g. 
Police, Ambulance, Road safety, civil 
defense (UK & Nigerian experts) 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
   √ 
  
Getting to the scene of an incident through 
the nearest route (Nigerian experts)  
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Y 
 
   √ 
Ensuring firemen are committed in pairs into 
a well-alight building (UK & Nigerian experts) 
Y 
 
 
 
   √ 
  
Climbing the ladder to the roof of the 
building or breaking the wall to be able to 
gain access to the seat of fire (UK & 
Nigerian experts) 
 
 
N 
 
 
  
 
   √ 
 
 
  √ 
Notifying control room when switching from 
defensive to offensive strategy (UK experts) 
 
Y 
 
 
 
   
 
 √ 
 
Crawling into a building to fight the fire 
(Nigerian experts) 
 
Y 
 
 
 
  √ 
  
Taking over from a less ranked commander 
at the scene of an incident (UK & Nigerian 
experts).  
 
Y 
  
   √ 
 
Sourcing for water in an area without 
hydrant (predominantly Nigerian experts,  
only 1 UK expert)  
 
Y 
   
   √ 
N.B: The ticked boxes√ represent the decision points that fit into a particular problem 
solving strategy.      
 
Table 5.6 provides evidence which suggests that experts are not predominantly 
bounded by rules; they either adapt rules to suit a current circumstance or create 
new ways of solving a problem if necessary. As shown in the table, adaptive or 
creative decisions were still utilized by experts regardless of whether or not a 
decision was regarded as standard rule. Experts therefore seemed to be very much 
inclined to overrule the “standard way of doing things” if they envisage any potential 
problem in their action plans. For example, whilst notifying the control room on the 
proceedings and developments taking place at the scene of an incident every 20 
minutes is regarded as a standard rule in the fire service (in both countries), the 
interview transcripts showed that experts sometimes ignore this rule, especially at 
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the start of the firefighting operation. This is to allow them gain a better awareness of 
the incident. Hence, a rule that was meant to be a standard way of doing things has 
now been adapted to suit the current proceedings of the incident in this instance.     
 
Findings from table 5.6 also seem to align perfectly well with Karlqvist’s (1997) 
view regarding the sequence of knowledge types in practice:  
 
The application of standard rules does not mean that incident commanders 
are not creative. Working without rules is uninteresting, and absolute liberty 
is boring. “The creation of innovative approaches does not happen in a 
vacuum; rather it is the result of playing with the rules, stretching them, 
moving and testing them”. It is therefore essential to maintain common 
operating guidelines, or rules, because they form a stock body of common 
knowledge, but it is also essential to break the rules and play around with 
them. “Mastery reveals itself as breaking rules”. The secret of creativity 
hinges on this insight: to know the right moment when one can go too far 
(Karlqvist, 1997, p.111-112, paraphrased) 
 
Evidence from this study shows that experts utilized each of the three problem 
solving strategies (i.e. standard, typical and creative decisions) when resolving 
complex tasks, depending on the nature of the incident. This assertion gives 
credence to existing beliefs that experts know the boundaries of their skills and when 
to apply or switch between the three strategies as events unfold (Rijpma, 1997; 
Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Chrichton and Flin, 2004). Analysis of the various 
decision points as shown above also provided further understanding regarding the 
sequence of conversion that exists between the application of rule, skill and 
knowledge based decisions. The table shows, for example, that rules and 
procedures are often invoked when performing recurrent (routine) aspects of tasks, 
since expected outcomes are basically similar from problem to problem. But in 
situations where expected outcomes vary from problem to problem (non-routine 
tasks), decision-makers tend to depend less on rules/procedures and to rely more on 
their prototypical and creative ability.  
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Does it then imply that strict adherence to SOPs is a feature of novices? The answer 
is believed to be No. Without much doubt, procedures are quite essential as they 
provide established safety guidelines for operators in a domain of practice (Klein, 
2003). However, the major challenge for novices remains knowing when adhering to 
a standard procedure is likely to be flawed. In the statement of one of the 
participants: 
 
“People sometimes misinterpret fire guidance notes and try to follow them to 
the letter where as it is only meant to be a guide” (Troy, 27, Group 
commander, UK) 
 
Acknowledging that relationships exist between rule based, skill based and 
knowledge based behaviours is therefore perceived to be an important factor when 
developing training protocols for novices. In as much as it is recommended to 
commence complex skills learning by teaching learners the cognitive rules 
underpinning a particular skill, it is also important to avoid constraining them within 
the remit of such rules/procedures. This will undoubtedly reduce the risk of slowing 
down the learning curve of novices or hampering their creative power (Skriver and 
Flin, 1996).  
    
Although some of the courses of action reported by both groups of officers appeared 
to be similar e.g. commanders in both groups seemed to understand the importance 
of committing firefighters into a well-alight building in pairs for safety reasons, a 
number of differences still exist between both groups. These differences can be 
explained in terms of (i) the “weight” of the reported courses of action at each 
decision point (ii) what constitutes the standard, typical and creative decisions. For 
example, analyses of the decision points showed that the majority of the Nigerian 
firefighters reported “conducting a situation assessment upon arriving at the scene of 
an incident” as part of the important decisions they made, while none of the UK 
experts considered this as an important decision.  
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5.6. GOALS PURSUED BY THE EXPERT FIREFIGHTERS ON THE FIRE-
GROUND 
    
One of the benefits of using the critical decision method in knowledge elicitation is its 
ability to capture, inter alia, the main goals and sub-goals pursued by experts at each 
decision point. Rasmussen (1983) has previously shown that humans are not simply 
deterministic input-output devices but teleological (or goal-oriented) beings that have 
expectations in mind. This means human beings are able to choose their goals, 
search out relevant information to pursue their chosen goals and then modify their 
goals through the cues displayed from the task being performed (Ordonez et al., 
2009).  
 
 As part of the interviewing process, participants were asked to explain the goals 
they were pursuing at each decision point. Also, since the incident commanders will 
normally pursue different goals depending on the circumstances surrounding a 
particular incident, participants were further asked to explain the rationale behind 
their goals and sub-goals. The goals pursued by expert commanders were analyzed 
across all the incidents and sub-categorized as shown in table 5.7 below: 
 
Table 5.7: Analysis of goals pursued by experts and the number of decision points 
associated with each goal. 
 
  
 
             Goals pursued 
No of Decision points 
UK Nigeria 
Safety related goals 17 13 
Resource reinforcement and support  15  4 
Timely completion of task  2  6 
Crew-task management  4  - 
Situation assessment   -  6 
Prevention & Containment  14  21 
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Rescue & Salvage   5  2 
Water sourcing and conservation   4  1 
Gaining access to seat of fire   2  8 
Professionalism & work ethics    6  4 
                                                  Total   69  65 
 
 
Table 5.7 shows that all the expert participants across both countries were pursuing 
at least one goal at each decision point. But as expected, these goals varied due to 
certain factors such as the type of incident involved, the environmental and locational 
structure, the make-up of the response team as well as the intensity and size of the 
fire. The table also confirms that firefighters are not simply tied to the goal of 
extinguishing the fire, contrary to common belief. Members of the public mostly try to 
relegate the task of firefighting to solely mean “using the white stuff to put out the red 
stuff”, an assumption that often tends to oversimplify the complexity associated with 
fireground decision making in real life (Okoli et al., 2014). Hence understanding the 
dynamic nature of fireground goals and how informational and environmental cues 
are likely to affect them is judged to be vital in designing any training curricula for 
novices (this is exemplified in the situation awareness record shown in Table 5.8). 
For instance, in riskier incidents such as those involving highly combustible 
substances, incident commanders seemed to be mainly concerned with safety 
related goals (UK=17DPs, Nigeria=13DPs). Similarly, for incidents that involved well-
alight and rapidly blazing fires, incident commanders were found to be more focused 
on containing and preventing the spread of fire to other surrounding buildings or 
properties i.e. the goals of prevention & containment (UK= 14DPs, Nigeria=21DPs).  
 
A closer investigation of the entire decision points across the CDM reports revealed 
some differences across the two countries based on goal frequencies:  
 
• The goal of reinforcement and support, although reported by all the 
participants as important and irreplaceable, was found to be significantly lower 
in Nigeria (Nigeria=4DPs vs UK=15DPs). In periods of utmost duress, incident 
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commanders usually seek support from other fire stations through the fire 
control department. This support could either be in terms of requesting 
specialist appliances such as foam compact, high volume pumps, and aerial 
appliances (e.g. turn table ladders or helicopters), as well as from other 
emergency response organizations e.g. police, ambulance or fire investigation 
departments. The nature of firefighting is such that if fireground commanders 
run out of vital resources such as water, all previous effort automatically 
becomes futile due to the volatility of fire. But as important as the goal of 
reinforcement and support appeared in the UK, it was not common in the 
decision points of the Nigerian firefighters. The most obvious reason being 
that there are hardly any resources available to call upon even when they are 
needed (this issue is discussed further in chapter six)   
 
• The goal of finding, or creating access to find the seat of the fire was 
emphasized more by the Nigerian firefighters (Nigeria=8DPs vs UK=2DPs). 
The seat of fire is the exact point from which the energy of the fire is being 
released. Participants explained that fighting a fire without an attempt to see 
the actual seat of fire is tantamount to “fighting the air”, which is essentially a 
futile exercise. One of the reasons great emphasis was placed on this 
particular goal by the Nigerian firefighters was probably because of the need 
to prudently manage water (which is a scare commodity in the Nigerian fire 
service). As a result, they can therefore not afford to waste water on the 
smoke rather than on the actual fire.  
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•  The goal of situation assessment was only mentioned by the Nigerian 
firefighters (DP=6) and was completely ignored by their UK counterparts. This 
evaluation is seen more as a priority issue more than anything else i.e. it is 
assumed that the UK firefighters regard this particular goal as something 
trivial to report since it is a mandatory requirement for every incident 
commander    
 
Table 5.8: An example of a situation assessment record showing how an expert in the study 
responded to changing goals    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Situation assessment 1 
Cues 
 
Very large fire involving oil storage; collapsed roof; site of incident very close 
to residential houses 
 
Expectations 
 
Very intense fire with high potential of spreading further 
Goals 
 
Getting access to the building; getting enough water to attack the fire; 
containing the fire 
Decision-Point 1 Asking for reinforcement (Requested 15 additional pumps) 
 
Decision-Point 2 
 
Exterior attack- it is too dangerous to commit crew 
  
Situation assessment 2 
Cues 
 
 
Fire growing bigger; arrival of 15 additional pumps 
Expectations 
 
Presence of additional workforce will result into better control  
 
Goals 
 
Getting access to the seat of the fire; resorting to another option since the 
initial option of water attack is not working; safety of crew members 
 
Decision-Point 3 
 
Getting specialist appliance to climb higher in order to see the actual seat of 
fire  
  
Situation Assessment 3 
Cues 
 
Fire still burning because petrol is involved; water unable to put out the fire; 
pollution of water courses.  
 
Expectancies 
 
 
Fire may remain uncontained and burn out itself unless a more rigorous 
strategy is employed 
Goals 
 
Reducing environmental pollution from the flames as much as possible; 
clearing the road for road users to get to work as soon as possible 
 
Decision-Point 4 
 
Decision to request specialist appliance (foam attack) 
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A direct relationship was found to exist between the cues identified by an expert, the 
goals they pursued and their subsequent actions (see Table 5.8 for an example of a 
situation assessment record). As soon as experts identified certain cues, they used 
their experience and wide domain knowledge to interpret the implications of such 
cues and then prioritized response goals. This thus implies that goals are mostly 
context-specific and rarely set a priori. This assertion gives credence to one of the 
most popular decision making theories: the image theory (Beach, 1978; 1993). The 
theory postulates that decision makers often represent information in the form of four 
images — a set of values and beliefs, the specific goals to which the decision maker 
is striving, the defined operational plans for reaching the goals, and the anticipated 
results from implementing the plans. To be able to carry out a task effectively, Beach 
(1993) argued that these four images must be properly harnessed by the decision 
maker so as to avoid any form of conflict between or within them. He stressed that 
“each plan is an abstract sequence of potential activities beginning with goal 
adoption and ending with goal attainment” (Beach, 1993, p.236). The above 
assertion also seemed to be consistent with existing belief that expertise is largely 
attached to one’s ability to manage shifting goals under time pressure (Shanteau, 
1992; Klein, 1997; Wong, 2000; Zsambok and Klein, 1997; Shanteau et al, 2002; 
Salas, 2003). 
5.7.    CUES 
 
According to Wong (2004), a cue is defined as any stimulus with implications for 
action e.g. smoke colour, cracks on the wall, odour of flames etc. But it is worthy of 
note that the cues present in an environment must first be able to generate useful 
information to the decision maker, who then interprets, processes and translates the 
implied knowledge into a workable course of action. Hence, even when an incident 
presents some visible cues, the onus still lies on the decision maker to make sense 
of them. Attaining effective performance can therefore be jeopardized if the relevant 
cues are not recognized by the actor in a timely manner. For instance, it is almost 
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useless for a decision maker to spot a cracked wall or a collapsed roof if s/he is then 
unable to infer the implications of such cues and act accordingly. 
 
Against the above background, this section presents and discusses the critical cues 
used by expert firefighters across the thirty incidents. It also elucidates the 
importance of cues and the role they play in making fireground decisions as shown 
in the excerpts below:    
 
For example, if there are lots and lots of smoke coming out of those doors up 
on the first floor and it was coming out under pressure, I wouldn’t put a ladder 
there and I wouldn’t put two people in through there because it’s just too 
dangerous (Jade, 15, Crew Commander UK) 
 
Also because the sympathizers have been trying before our arrival, so far 
they have not been able to conquer the fire, it means that the fire is not easy 
(Sammy, 8, FSO, Nigeria). 
 
A positive relationship therefore seemed to exist between the informational and 
environmental cues on the fireground and experts’ subsequent response actions. 
Cues guide experts in developing useful action plans, in recollecting similar 
prototypes from memory and in refining action plans as events unfold.  
 
From the knowledge elicitation process and analyses of the thirty incident reports, 
the author identified 42 different cues commonly sought by these expert firefighters. 
These cues were then categorized into five classes depending on the type of 
information they conveyed to incident commanders (Table 5.9). While some cues 
presented themselves to officers in clearly visible ways e.g. smoke colour, intensity 
of fire, crack on the wall, collapsed roof, thickness of the smoke, others were found 
to be less visible and thus required experts to make use of their senses, previous 
experience and rich domain knowledge in gaining a deeper understanding. These 
less visible cues sometimes required good use of somatic awareness on the part of 
the officers i.e. seeing, hearing, smelling or feeling.  
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These processes are explained in details in the model developed in the next section.         
5.7.1. Classification of cues 
 
(i) Search and rescue or safety related cues: these cues influence the risk 
taking behaviour of officers in carrying out their search and rescue tasks of saving 
lives and properties. This category of cues guide subsequent safety actions and 
determine if firefighters are still able to accept some level of risk or not. This 
category of cue raises safety awareness, which is critical for safe performance 
and ensures that incident commanders carry out safety precautions proactively 
rather than reactively. Examples of safety related cues include cracks on the wall, 
potential of roof collapsing, presence of acetylene or LPG cylinders etc. 
Furthermore, safety related cues help answer the question: how safe is safe 
enough, allowing officers to decide whether adopting a precautionary approach 
(i.e. erring towards the side of safety in conditions of high uncertainty) is the safer 
thing to do.  
(ii) Cues that indicate the “nature of the problem”: this class of cue comprises 
both the visible and perceptual cues from which experts are able to make informed 
decisions regarding the state of things on the fireground. For instance, the size of a 
fire or intensity of the blaze (both visible cues) can be used to judge how severe an 
incident is, while the room temperature (a perceptual cue) can be used to predict the 
exact time a fire started to burn in a room.  
 
(iii) Environmental based cues: these are cues generated from the immediate 
climatic conditions around the fire scene. The cues in this class help to reveal how 
environmental factors such as wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric temperature 
could possibly affect task performance — positively or negatively  
 
(iv)Affective or emotive cues: this category of cues emanate from the 
psychological and emotional states of members of the public, or victims. In order to 
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make sense of the potentially important information that needs deciphering from the 
people around the fire scene, this class of cue requires that incident commanders 
possess good emotional intelligence and metacognitive skills. For instance, the 
amount of outburst (crying and shouting) displayed by members of the public can be 
a good predictor of the severity of an incident or the potential for disruptive behaviour 
that could hinder operations.    
 
v) Incident command and control cues: these are cues that signal if/when a more 
senior officer should take over command responsibility on the fireground. It must be 
noted that the most experienced or highest ranking commander on the scene does 
not necessarily need to take over the command and control of the incident upon their 
arrival, unless such a commander appears unsatisfied with any of the tactics used by 
the incumbent incident commander. This group of cues therefore helps in 
determining whether or not to make such a “take-over” decision, and by so doing, 
ensure that there is effective leadership and coordination at the incident scene.  
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Table 5.9: Critical cue inventor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRITICAL CUE INVENTORY (CCI) 
1. Search and rescue cues: safety related cues 
• Cracked wall (Implication: building is not safe anymore; the chances of collapsing is higher) 
• Walls falling down (Implication: Building is becoming weaker and collapse is imminent) 
• Roof condition (possibility of collapse) 
• Substances present/perceived to be present in a building e.g. combustible materials such as petrol, 
acetylene cylinders, LPG cylinders 
• Potential of fire spreading 
• Smoke behaviour (flashovers, backdrafts) 
• Location of the seat of fire 
• Location of unaffected properties  
• Type of building (terraced, block of flats, single-story, multi-storied) 
• Entry point (accessible, obstructive) 
• Category of victims trapped (elderly, disabled, mentally challenged) 
2. Cues that indicate the “Nature of Problem” 
• Size of Fire (The area and distance covered by the fire indicates how serious it is)  
• Intensity of fire (The amount of energy in the fire indicates how serious the fire is) 
• Pattern of flame movement 
• Egress of the flames (through the windows, attics of the house, doors)  
• Smoke color (yellowish rainbow, blue, thick black) 
• Smell/odour of smoke and burning substances 
• Texture of smoke (thick, light, cloudy) 
• Severity of physical damage 
• The nature and extent of injury on victims  
• Room temperature (A room on fire can sometimes be as hot as 1000oC) 
• Type of materials burning or class of fire (metal fire, gas fire, batteries, acetylene) 
• Noise of vibration on the ground (gas fires involving filling tanks) 
• The intensity of heat emitted from the blazing fire to the environment 
• The quantity of water that has been used up in the process (10,000 liters show how serious a fire is)  
3. Environmental-based Cues 
• Wind direction (is the wind blowing towards or away from the fire?) 
• Wind speed/intensity 
• External temperature/climatic condition (Hot, warm, harmattan, cold) 
• Catchment area (Residential, Factory, Industrial, Rural, City) 
• Location of incident (Rural or Urban area) 
• Distance to water supply (availability and proximity of hydrants) 
• Topography of the street e.g. steep slope, high slope 
4. Affective or emotive cues 
• Verbal threat from victims (abusive words to firefighters, arson) 
• The shouts for “help” from crowd 
• Level of panic observed in the crowd 
• Cry and wailings from trapped victims upon arrival 
• The number of passersby at the scene of the incident 
5. Cues that inform incident command and control decision  
• The rank/level of experience of the officer currently in charge 
• The number of pumps deployed (a more superior officer (e.g. a station manager) takes over when the 
number of on-scene pumps gets to five) 
• The size of the building (building size determines whether sectorization is needed and also determines 
who is going to be in charge of each sector) 
• Height of the building (e.g. if building is too high beyond the reach of a ladder, then the use of an aerial 
appliance becomes necessary) 
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It is important to clarify that the list of cues outlined in table 5.9 is not claimed to be 
exhaustive, it could still have perhaps been possible to elicit more cues used by 
experts in the firefighting domain if, for example, other varieties of incidents were 
reported. But having said this, the number of cues reported in this study appears 
quite encouraging when compared to what is currently available in the literature, 
outnumbering even those identified by Klein and his colleague in their seminal work 
with urban firefighters (Klein et al., 1986). The importance of cue elicitation cannot be 
overemphasized in a complex domain such as firefighting, as demystifying the cues 
experts rely upon in making their judgments has been shown to play a crucial part in 
designing efficient decision support systems. These decision support systems, as 
the name implies, are evidence based tools designed to aid the decision making 
processes of individuals who operate in complex work environments (Rasmussen, 
2005). Thankfully, a number of studies have reported how this cue-based learning 
approach has successfully been employed in various domains of practice in training 
less experienced operators (Spence and Brucks, 1997; O’Hare et al., 1998; Wong, 
2000; Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003; Perry and Wiggins, 2008). For instance Wiggins 
and O’Hare (2003) developed and then tested the effectiveness of a cue-based 
training programme which was designed to guide the decision making process of 
operators in determining whether or not to fly a plane, considering various weather 
conditions. The aftermath of the cue-based training showed a statistically significant 
improvement in the performance of operators who participated in the training and 
those who did not.  
 
The way experts sought and utilized cues in this study was found to contradict the 
cue-utilization theory (Easterbrook, 1959). The theory suggests that consistently 
arousing the emotions of task performing individuals using an external stimulus will 
end up reducing the number of cues such individuals will be able to identify, which 
will in turn affect task performance. The theory further argues that the more people 
are exposed to the cues that arouse their emotions, the more likely they are to be 
distracted away from the main tasks. Unfortunately, there was little or no evidence 
from this study to support Easterbrook’s theory as none of the interview transcripts 
were found to suggest that experts got distracted through identifying other cues. This 
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includes twelve of the reported incidents (UK= 5, Nigeria=7) which involved low to 
high level of emotional outbursts, either from members of the public or victims. The 
current study instead supports the existing notion that the amount of cues identified 
and processed by experts does not necessarily result to a better or poorer 
performance; the decision makers must in the end be able to understand the specific 
cues that will maximize task performance (Wong, 1996; Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003; 
Hanoch and Vitouch, 2004; Perry and Wiggins, 2008). 
 
The critical cue inventory shown in Table 5.9 seems to suggest that experts across 
both countries seek more of the cues that define the “nature of the problem” (13/42) 
as well as the “safety related cues” (11/42), than other cue categories. It might be 
logical to infer that these two cue categories, regardless of the type of incident, play 
the most significant role on the fireground in developing and implementing action 
plans. For example, it is expected that once the nature of the problem is identified 
(e.g. the size or class of fire) it then becomes relatively easier to develop response 
plans that would best suit the identified problem (e.g. whether or not to deploy a 
specialist appliance). Similarly, on the aspect of the safety related cues, it was found 
that once a cracked or falling wall is spotted by an incident commander, the safety of 
fire crews automatically becomes of utmost priority, causing the commander to 
become less and less tolerant of risk-taking in such circumstances. This therefore 
suggests that experts do not just spend time identifying cues on the fireground, but 
also understand the implications of the various cues and how each cue is likely to 
affect the problem at hand (this is discussed in more details in the next section). The 
work of Perry and Wiggins (2008) illustrates this further. Their study with firefighters 
compared the type as well as the number of cues generated by two groups of 
firefighters: experienced station officers (mean years of experience = 22.3) and 
competent firefighters (mean years of experience = 5.04). The task presented to the 
participants involved three different scenarios (a single storey house, a single storey 
office and a furniture warehouse) after which participants were given a cue 
generating questionnaire that contained all possible cues they are likely to consider. 
Findings from the study showed that station officers (experts) significantly reported 
more cues utilized (mean number of cues = 10.10) than the firefighters (mean 
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number of cues = 6.00) as expected. But more interestingly, when the authors 
classified the types of cues reported by the participants into three different categories 
i.e. cues related to difficulty of using an entry point, cues related to rescue, and cues 
related to the safety of crew members — results showed a significant difference 
between the two groups of firefighters only for safety related cues. The station 
officers reported more safety-related cues than the competent firefighters in all the 
three scenarios, but no significant difference was observed for the other two 
categories (cues related to difficulty of using an entry point and cues related to 
rescue).  
5.8. INFORMATION-FILTERING INTUITIVE DECISION (IFID) MODEL 
                                                               
Following a thematic analysis of the critical decision method incident reports based 
on the patterns identified across all the incidents (see worked example in Appendix 
F), it was evident that fire ground commanders in an attempt to manage the 
complexities generated by an incident concurrently go through stages of information 
scanning and filtering process, sifting out irrelevant information (noise and 
distractions) and retaining the useful ones. Although each participant was asked 
about 22 different questions as part of the CDM protocol, the following questions 
were particularly important in designing the above model: How did you know that the 
decisions you made were the most appropriate ones? Where did you get the 
knowledge for making each of the decisions from? How did you source your 
information? How long did it take you to make each of these decisions? What cues 
were you following in making these decisions? What was the most important piece of 
information that guided your decision making? The last question (i.e. what was the 
most important piece of information you used in formulating your decisions) was 
specifically helpful in designing the model as it allowed the researcher to better 
understand what information mattered most to each participant.   
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 Figure 5.8: Information filtering and intuitive decision model 
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The model explained: 
 
The model begins with a constantly evolving incident in a dynamic and low validity 
environment (such as fire-fighting), as opposed to a static environment. This type of 
environment is characterized with either the presence (or absence) of a range of 
environmental and informational cues in no particular format, with some cues 
appearing more obvious than others. Each commander is therefore faced with an 
important task of making sense of both the visible and the less visible cues and, 
more importantly, understand their implications for task performance. In addition, the 
model argues that some of the goals incident commanders pursue on the fireground 
are not only ill-structured, but also confusing and conflicting (see section 5.6). For 
instance, participants reported that they are immediately faced with a huge challenge 
of making sense of the various proceedings upon their arrival at the scene of an 
incident, which in turn leads to a number of questions being generated: what is 
burning? Are there people trapped inside? Are there combustible materials in the 
building? Do we have enough resources to combat this fire? Why are the victims 
reacting this way? Is the fire going to escalate beyond this level in the next couple of 
minutes? Are there other hazards around the environment that need to be taken into 
account? What is the safest way of tackling the fire? How may the topography of the 
environment affect task performance and what could be done about it? Should an 
offensive strategy be employed or is it best to go defensive? It is therefore in the 
quest to search for answers to the above questions that fireground commanders 
begin to conduct a thorough situation assessment (or what is also called a 3600 size-
up, in the language of firefighters). The model attempts to describe how the expert 
firefighters were able to cope with at least two difficult cognitive task demands on the 
fireground: (i) the task of thinking and acting concurrently, making critical decisions 
amidst incomplete, confusing and conflicting information e.g. investigating the major 
cause of a fire while at the same time committing the fire crew into the building (ii) 
the task of identifying the relevant cues, amongst other various available cues on the 
fireground, that will aid developing workable action plans  
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The main focus of the model, therefore, is to describe how expert firefighters gather 
the wide range of informational cues at the fire scene and how such information is 
subsequently filtered to the point that decision makers are confident of carrying out 
their proposed action plans without the need for further deliberation. But before 
proceeding, it seems important to first clarify how some of the terminologies 
described in the model were used. As earlier stated, a cue in this model is defined 
similarly to Wong’s (2004) definition as any stimulus with implications for action. 
These include, for example, smoke colour, smoke texture, visibility of flames, 
proximity of buildings, size of fire, type of building etc. Also, the term “information”, as 
used in the model, represents any potential source of knowledge e.g. from external 
cues, from previous experiences, or from other crew members. The stages involved 
in the information filtering and intuitive decision model are now discussed below: 
5.8.1 Information scanning stage 
 
“Even when you don’t have the information, you can gain it from experience. 
You could ask people around for information about a particular location if you 
are unsure. You could look around for signs, telephone numbers, landmarks 
upon which you can base your judgments. What color is the smoke? Is it a 
compartment fire or factory fire? What is the building made of (brick, wood)” 
(Adrian, Watch commander, 17, UK) 
 
As part of the CDM probes, participants were asked to explain the various sources of 
the information they used in making each of the task-related decisions. A thematic 
analysis of the CDM report revealed five different information sources, including a 
description of the type of information that was generated from each of these sources. 
These are discussed later.  
 
The information filtering and intuitive decision model shows that expert firefighters 
usually generate task related information in two major ways: internal (through pattern 
recognition) and external (through situation awareness). Information from internal 
sources relates to the set of information that can only be sourced internally, by the 
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decision makers themselves. This includes information generated from the internal 
memory systems e.g. through pattern recognition, previous training exercises, or 
from a particularly similar incident that has been previously encountered by the 
officer. Sourcing information internally entails scanning one’s memory in search of 
previously stored patterns and repertoires — in the form of cues, goals, expectancies 
and actions — with the hope that any of the pre-stored knowledge will match the 
current problem. Information from external sources, on the other hand, includes 
information directly gathered from the incident, mainly from the events in the task 
environment. These include, for example, information collected verbally from victims 
or passers-by, information gathered from observing the behavior of the members of 
public or victims — in the form of emotional outbursts (e.g. people wailing and 
shouting for help). Commanders also generate information by making sense of some 
of the external cues at the fire scene (e.g. smoke colour, fire intensity, cracked walls, 
smoke texture etc.).   
 
The five informational sources are discussed in detail below: 
 
Source 1 — Experience: Experts often rely heavily on their experience (which is an 
internal source of information) both for making judgments concerning routine 
problems and for making creative decisions regarding non-routine tasks. Experience 
therefore contributes to the pool of information that is stored in experts’ memory 
which they often retrieve with the aid of a powerful tool known as a schema (Sweller, 
1994; Pollock et al., 2002; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004). Experience as an 
internal source of information is thus similar to the prototypical decision making 
strategy discussed in section 5.3 above. The interview transcripts show the 
importance of experience in the attainment of effective performance. Unless less 
experienced officers are sufficiently exposed to managing real-life fires, the expert 
participants in this study claimed it is almost certain that these junior officers will 
struggle when confronted with some of the adverse task constraints that come with 
managing complex fires. The participants (both the UK and the Nigerian ones) 
emphasized the need to validate the training and simulation exercises often 
conducted in the fire service by exposing officers to real-life incidents. The following 
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excerpts illustrate how experts perceive “experience” in the firefighting domain, and 
why it is regarded as an important source of fireground information:   
 
“The technical experience I’m talking about is that as a fireman you would 
have attended series of fires, and every fire you attend…… there is a saying 
in the fire service that no two fires are alike ― the fire in room A will definitely 
be different from the fire in room B, though they are within the same 
premises. So the number of fire outbreaks you attend expands your horizon 
and technical knowledge about fighting fire” (Sunny, ACFS, 29, Nigeria) 
 
A lot of it is on the job isn’t it?  I have gone from really busy stations where 
we were probably having 4,500, - 5,000 incidents a year to where we are 
probably about a thousand. So lots of experience, lots of different incidents 
we would go out to when I was younger (Willy, 28.5, Watch commander, UK) 
 
…but the other side is; its ok being in the training, it's then getting on the 
ground and doing it ― and that is where you get your experience from 
(Brown, crew commander, 27, UK) 
 
…but with 8 years’ experience that I have, following tankers, fighting fires 
everywhere, entering well, entering rivers to rescue, fighting fire, gas fire, 
petrol fire, free burning fire, oil fire. I have attended all. So with those 
experiences not once, not twice, not thrice (Kevin, Watch commander, 8, 
Nigeria) 
 
“Nobody sits you down and say when you have this incident you need this, 
when you have this incident you need that. That is an experience, and you 
make decisions based on what you think you need for the incident” (Dickson, 
23, crew commander, UK) 
 
The above excerpts, more than anything else, consistently demonstrate the value of 
gaining real-life firefighting experience, which the participants believe cannot be 
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successfully surrogated with any other form of learning or training procedure. It is 
perceived that the manner through which experts accumulate and utilize the lessons 
that were learnt from previous incidents can be explained through the concept of 
implicit learning i.e. the notion that people learn all through their lifetime, from good 
and bad experiences, and sometimes without even knowing how and when such 
learning took place (Fessey, 2002; Eraut, 2004; Billet, 2010).  
    
 
Source 2 —Training: In solving complex fireground tasks, the participants also 
reported that they often rely on some of the knowledge they had acquired from 
previous training exercises, particularly the incident command training. The incident 
command and control training arguably accounts for one of the major differences in 
the level of competence displayed by a supervisory manager (i.e. crew commanders 
or watch commanders) and that displayed by an ordinary firefighter (both in the UK 
and Nigeria). This is due to the fact that such training is usually not applicable to 
ordinary firefighters since they are rarely involved with management responsibilities 
on the fire scene. The training, which the majority of the participants claimed to serve 
as the foundation upon which subsequent knowledge is built, covers more advanced 
learning themes such as decision making, leadership, breathing apparatus (BA) 
entry procedures, fire investigation, sectorization, team management, situation 
assessment, emotional intelligence etc. The following excerpts describe the 
relevance of effective training in the fire service and how the knowledge derived from 
such training exercises is often transformed into a useful source of “just-in-time” 
information at the fire scene:     
 
“….. you would have command training, particularly how we set up the 
command functions. You know from the training you’ve had that if you have 20 
pumps there, your command structure would look like this e.g. operational 
commanders then sectorized and each part of the fire is controlled by one 
person, and that person is supported by a safety commander” (Patrick, 
Assistant chief fire superintendent, 32, Nigeria) . 
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 …..the basis of my decisions was…. “Initially it is training; what I have been 
taught and told” (Dickson, 23, Crew commander, UK) 
 
“…….[I gained knowledge] in the course of my training, because we were 
taught many other subjects apart from fighting fire, we were taught the 
chemistry of combustion, building construction and how the materials used in 
building behave when they are affected by fire” (Jack, 30, Chief Fire 
Superintendent, Nigeria) 
 
“Yes, I received this training to head the watch, because without these training I 
won’t even know what to do. Management wants to know whether you are 
capable of heading a watch before giving you the responsibility” (Kevin, 8, 
Watch commander, Nigeria) 
 
I went for a course in Lancashire, and I think it is one of the most important 
courses I have ever had. We were taught stuffs different from the normal 
house or car fire. We were given scenario that requires complex thinking and 
unusual scenarios as well. It was incident command training, a really 
advanced training. Ordinary firefighters are not qualified for such training 
because they do not get involved in command and control things (Isaac, 13.5, 
crew commander, UK) 
 
Nonetheless, despite acknowledging training as an important source of information, 
participants also went further to identify some limitations associated with this 
informational source, which they claimed appears “generic” most of the times.  
 
So command training is very important. In terms of actually putting out a large 
fire you get some training on that, but only theory training…..you can’t set fire 
to build buildings for training (Patrick, Assistant chief fire superintendent, 32, 
Nigeria) 
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But we have done training for small industrial unit, things like that, how to deal 
with them, what to expect to find in them; so we have done training to suit that, 
but as every incident is different, training is like a generic training that gives 
you a basic knowledge to then adapt to suit what you are doing, which is basic 
for fire services- You are given training, then you adapt to suit (Dickson, 23, 
crew commander, UK) 
 
The above excerpts therefore suggests that regardless of the length or quality of 
training experts have acquired, they must be able to adapt what they have previously 
learnt to suit a current problem, using their experience. It therefore looks like training 
still remains largely insufficient in the absence of experience.  
 
Source 3 —Team Collaboration: Another important source of information which 
incident commanders reported was through team interaction, where ideas are 
exchanged and communicated amongst the various officers at the fireground, 
particularly the more experienced members of the team. The firefighting job, being 
multi-faceted in nature, requires a wide range of knowledge, skills and technical 
know-how, therefore suggesting why it is almost impossible for officers to work in 
isolation. The participants identified various aspects of firefighting that requires the 
application of specific type of skills and expertise which no single officer can claim to 
totally possess. For example, managing a complex fire requires technical knowledge 
e.g. operating fire engines and other fire appliances; knowledge on health and safety 
e.g.  understanding safe approaches to rescue and evacuation; knowledge on entry 
control procedures and the scientific functioning of breathing apparatus; knowledge 
on managing chemical substances e.g. managing incidents involving hazardous 
materials (HAZMAT); knowledge on the use of current fire equipment e.g. 
recognizing when and how to use a wide range of specialist appliances at the fire 
scene (helicopter, foam tender, aerial appliances, high volume pumps, ground 
monitors, cold cut cobra equipment etc.), knowledge of carrying out fire 
investigations and managing crime scenes, sometimes in collaboration with other 
emergency responders.  
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Even though fireground commanders are required to possess some of the 
knowledge mentioned above (albeit on a broader scale) while undertaking the 
incident command training, they still often rely on the frontline officers in carrying out 
the “hands-on” fireground tasks. Also, in some circumstances, the incident 
commanders rely on information provided by the frontline firefighters as the basis for 
making other informed decisions (especially when fire crews have been committed 
into a building with their breathing apparatus). Hence, either way, fireground 
operations call for effective team interaction and teamwork. In illustrating this, one of 
the participants (Anderson, 28.5, Watch commander) claimed it is simply an “act of 
foolishness” for him (as a senior officer) to neglect the pool of knowledge he is 
surrounded with and try doing everything on his own. The excerpts below also 
reiterate the importance of team interaction and group communication:  
 
…… fireman is a very practical down to work lesson and we spark ideas off 
each other. So If I was to say I’m the best man, it’s only my decision because I 
tended to ignore the other 13 people that are there. If the 13 people have got 
20 years of experience each that’s 260 years of experience that your…….so if 
you stand up to say I need help here….. You’ve got another 200 to 300 years 
of experience around you, so you will be very foolish not to tap into that 
knowledge (Willy, 28.5, Watch commander, UK)     
 
Since I’m part of a team……. I was able to test my ‘theory’ against other 
experienced people; and as a consensus we agreed that it would work. It was 
my judgment and mine alone, but you always test the theory if you had the 
time, and I did, and it worked (Patrick, ACF, 32, UK) 
 
Source 4 — Situation assessment/Situation awareness: One of the first things 
incident commanders do upon arriving at the scene of an incident is to assess the 
situation, something called “sizing up” or “look see” in the firefighting language. All 
the participants admitted that they heavily rely on cues and information generated 
directly from observation as the basis for making critical decisions on the fireground. 
Since the assessment is usually carried out personally by the incident commander, 
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the information accruing from such assessment is often trusted more than that from 
other sources as it deals more with “personal knowledge” (knowledge by 
acquaintance). Although the terms “situation assessment” and “situation awareness” 
are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, they are treated as separate 
but inter-related concepts in this study. Whilst situation assessment deals with the 
aspects of “looking” or “sizing up” (in the words of the participants), situation 
awareness is more concerned with making sense of the cues that were identified 
from carrying out the former. In other words, identifying cues on the fireground 
through situation assessment can be said to be a relatively easier task, but 
understanding the implications of such cues for task performance is what remains 
challenging and hence a feature of expertise. In line with the above, therefore, 
situation awareness can be regarded as the by-product of situation assessment 
since it is by looking that an awareness of a situation can eventually be generated. 
The following excerpts illustrate the role of situation awareness in the search for 
information on the fireground: 
 
   
 When I went in to my initial…..we call it 3600 size up, I need to see myself. We 
call it ‘look-see’. In this case, what I was looking out for was: one, what is the 
actual emergency, what is going on? Two, are there any other hazards around 
that person that I have to take into account prior to me deploying any crews 
(Brown, 27, crew commander, UK) 
 
“……just observation. You know one of the qualities of a good fireman is to be 
observant. Through observation I noticed how the whole situation was” (Adam, 
30, ACFS, Nigeria)    
 
When I arrived I met my colleague, he was running in the other direction. I 
said to him: what are you doing? He said I’m going to ask for 12 pumps, and I 
said what for, and he said we need water, and I said make it 15 (Patrick, 
ACF, 32, UK) 
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“Immediately we got to the place, I surveyed with these eyes to see the 
surrounding, it is the eyes that tell the brain what to do, and the brain acts 
accordingly” (Mike, ACFS, 28, Nigeria) 
 
The above excerpts show that experts first strive to become aware of a situation 
before attempting to implement any action plan. Situation awareness therefore 
provides experts with the ability to differentiate between the cues that are transient 
signals and those that are false signals. In order to be situationally aware, scholars 
have previously suggested that actors must be able to see what they are trained to 
see; they must be able to see the right things, look out for signs and have a good 
perception of signs e.g. smoke escaping from under the eaves, melting rubber 
between clip-lock walls, cracks in concrete walls and the colour, texture and density 
of the smoke (Ingham, 2007; Endsley and Garland, 2000; Klein, 1993; Hoffman et 
al., 1998).  
 
Analysis of the above excerpts further suggest that situation assessment is only 
likely to answer the question of what resources are needed, whereas situation 
awareness answers the more important question of how much is needed. According 
to the expert participants, although most ordinary firefighters can also easily 
recognize the need to request additional resources at the scene of an incident, the 
more challenging task lies in knowing the exact amount of resources that are 
required. The ability to do the latter is part of what differentiates the ordinary 
firefighters from the incident commanders as it requires a higher level of situation 
awareness and resource management. In the fire service (both in the UK and 
Nigeria), over-estimating or under-estimating the amount of support needed is often 
seen as bad incident command practice, assumed to be predicated upon a poor 
sense of awareness on the part of the incident commander.  
 
Source 5 — Information from victims and passersby: This is another important 
source of information for incident commanders. Information gathered from members 
of the public could potentially serve as a rich source of information to firefighters, 
especially when such information is coming from more reliable sources e.g. house 
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owners or first witnesses. There were instances from the incident accounts where 
the firefighters reported that the vital information they needed to make important 
decisions was eventually supplied by the victims or passersby. Also, in addition to 
providing firefighters with important information, members of the public can also 
provide useful assistance to fire crews in handling some of the manual tasks e.g. 
carrying charged hose or lifting heavy equipment (this is common in Nigeria). The 
following excerpts aim to shed more light on the above discourse:  
 
“You know when you listen to comments, you will be able to know whether the 
fire is being caused by an arsonist, or by carelessness, or through ignorance, 
you know all these things. We depend on people’s comment” (Marvin, 30, 
Station commander, Nigeria) 
 
“I also got information from people, onlookers and those living around there, 
the information I got from them helped” (Jack, 30, CFS, Nigeria) 
 
Also the owner of the building, in a very short space of time, he gave me a 
really clear…..this is how big it is, this is a pit there, there is an inspection pit, 
we’ve got a can of waste oil and some other oils, fuels and lubricants and 
small cans of…..there might be a few cans of diesel in there, lots of tools, 
there’s three phase electrics in there and at the back there’s got two cylinders 
the little one and the big one and upstairs there’s got this one big cylinder 
LPG, so in a very very short space of time he gave me lots of information 
(Terry, 27, Group commander, UK) 
  
Nonetheless, some of the participants emphasized the importance of verifying the 
authenticity of the information generated from this source by ensuring it is mapped 
against one’s previous experiences and with the current proceedings. One of the 
explanations provided by participants regarding the need to treat information from 
passers-by with care is due to the fact that members of the public (non- firefighters) 
are most times emotional at the sight of a fire, and therefore subjective in the way 
they report their evidence.  
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Although it is true that both the UK and the Nigerian firefighters rely on information 
from members of the public, differences were found to exist in the manner in which 
both groups of experts collect and manage information from the “non-firefighters” 
(members of the public). In Nigeria, for instance, firefighters sometimes get to the 
scene of incidents quite late, most times for reasons beyond their control (e.g. being 
held up in traffic or delays encountered in the attempt to fill up fire engines with 
sufficient water). As a result of such delays, members of the public are therefore 
necessitated to commence response efforts even before the arrival of the firefighters. 
This practice of “public intrusion”, sadly, was reported by the Nigerian firefighters as 
one of the most difficult aspects of task performance as it often slows down the 
subsequent response effort. Firstly, attempts to extinguish the fire by unauthorized 
members of the public sometimes escalate the fire, making it more challenging for 
the fire crews to eventually manage upon their arrival. Secondly, members of the 
public may react emotionally to firefighters, hurling abusive words at them, 
sometimes attacking them physically. Thirdly, members of the public sometimes try 
to take advantage of the chaotic environment in order to steal or loot valuable 
assets. This sometimes leads to a situation in which a fire scene eventually turns out 
to become a crime scene. The following excerpts illustrate the experience of some of 
the Nigerian firefighters in dealing with members of the public at the scene of an 
incident:  
 
Yes, pressure from the sympathizers. In fact if not for the presence of the 
policemen, they will not allow you to do what you want to do. Some will even 
try to steal (Sammy, 8, FSO, Nigeria). 
 
We asked police officers that were around to help us control the crowd that 
were present at the place and to send them far away to avoid explosion from 
their use of the GSMs. I have been telling them and they were not 
cooperating, and we were few (four in number) and we cannot control the 
crowd. When we are working they are used to watching us, not until we call 
on the police to drive them out (Mike, 28.5, ACFS, Nigeria) 
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The UK firefighters, in contrast, do not seem to be facing this challenge of “public 
intrusion” at the scene of incidents. The reason for this cultural difference is both 
societal and organizational. In terms of society, it is usually seen as a normal 
practice as well as a legal obligation in the UK that people exit a building once a fire 
alarm goes off. In terms of organizational, firefighters in the UK make use of cordons 
(one or more, depending on the nature of the incident) to keep passersby at bay 
from the actual scene of the incident. Once the hazard zones have been cordoned 
off, firefighters are then able to carry out their tasks more effectively without any form 
of disturbance or intimidation from members of the public or any further need to 
worry about their safety.   
 
5.8.2 Information filtering and identification of the principal cues 
 
The process of information search described above results in the generation of 
multiple cues from the multiple sources listed above. This implies that elements in 
the working memory are also increased automatically, mainly to the detriment of the 
decision maker. It is at this point that information filtering becomes essential in the 
attempt to reduce the number of elements (or cognitive load) in the short term 
memory of the decision maker. For the purpose of clarity, information filtering is 
defined as the cognitive ability of discriminating between relevant and irrelevant 
information in ways that give room for further intuitive decisions to be made under 
time pressure. 
   
After experts explained their various sources of informational cues on the fireground, 
another CDM probe involved asking them to identify a single cue which they 
considered most crucial for each of the decisions made. The aim of the question was 
to identify the most important informational cue that aided expert judgment. The 
initial assumption was that certain cues are more likely to better explain what is 
happening than others. Findings confirmed this to be true: out of the 42 cues 
reportedly used by experts across the thirty incidents, only 9 were considered as the 
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most important. The author referred to these sets of cues as the principal cues. All 
the participants shared at least one strategy they use in knowing which of the cues 
were more relevant; with the most dominant strategy being that of identifying the 
particular class of fire or the type of material burning. The list of the 9 principal cues 
is:  
 
• The class of fire involved (whether Class A, B, C, D, E, and F etc.), and the 
colour of smoke generated 
• The type of materials present in the building and around (e.g. acetylene, 
carbonaceous substances, electronics)  
• The intensity of the fire 
• The work the building is used for (e.g. garage or mechanic workshop) and  
• The cause of the fire (Arson, electric spark, lightening) 
• The psychological states of victims 
• Cracks spotted on the wall of a building 
• The layout of the building (this is to aid in identifying access routes) 
• Presence or absence of individuals in a burning building (e.g. trapped victims, 
disabled individuals, elderly persons) 
 
For instance, once the class of fire involved is recognized, experts are then able to 
intuitively determine the next course of action such as to decide on the most 
appropriate fire-fighting medium that would best tackle the fire e.g. hose reel or main 
jets, the amount/type of resources to request, the most appropriate firefighting 
strategy to employ (i.e. offensive or defensive) etc. Also, identifying the particular 
class of fire that is burning allows experts to engage and occupy their present 
thoughts mainly with information regarding that class of fire (Table 5.10). Information 
relating to other classes of fire is thereby screened out and pushed to the sub-
conscious “window” in order to keep working memory load reasonably low. This 
finding is seen to support existing belief that experts are used to selecting one option 
at a time rather than concurrently comparing amongst various alternatives — a 
process Klein (2008) termed serial selection of options.     
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Table 5.10: Classes of fire and their description 
Class     Description 
A Fires in ordinary solid combustible materials such as paper, 
wood, clothes etc. 
B Fires involving flammable liquids such as petrol, kerosene, oil, 
paint 
C Fires involving volatile gases such as natural gas, propane, 
butane 
D Fires involving combustible metals and Alloys such as 
Aluminium, Lithium, Zinc etc. 
E Fires originating from electric sparks, short circuits, naked and 
transparent wires etc. 
F Fires involving molten fats or tars. 
 
Below are data from the CDM reports showing that incident commanders do not only 
source for relevant information but also allow such information go through a filtering 
process before developing an action plan: 
 
“Essentially, when I went in, I was confused at first as to why the woman set 
a fire and put it on the floor. Is it because she is on drugs, is it because she’s 
got psychiatric problems, is it because she’s angry with somebody, has she 
been drinking, is she going to harm my crew. She might have a knife; she 
might have a weapon….. all these things were the things going through my 
mind in making judgment…………… the most important piece of information 
from my point of view is the threat of burning the building down” (Adrian, 
Watch commander, 17, UK) 
 
“The thing is, you are looking at the fact that there is a lot of smoke coming 
out and you can tell what the colour of the smoke. [I know you might think it’s 
funny] but you can tell if it’s a car fire, you can tell if it’s a house fire, you can 
tell if it’s paper or wood……so you know from that grey yellow smoke that it’s 
a house fire” (Willy, 28.5, Watch commander, UK) 
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Members of the public; when you arrive at an incident members of the public 
would tell you lots of information very very quickly, and it’s up to you as the 
incident commander to take the useful pieces of that information and discard 
the bits that may not be……. (Jade, 15, crew commander, UK) 
 
“On getting there, people around will give you information; you will be hearing 
them say this is what caused it....... through that we now gather our 
information.……….. the smoke/flame is also an important source of 
information. When the smoke is white/light then the fire is not dangerous. But 
when you see the smoke deep and dark, it means the fire is too dangerous” 
(Kevin, Watch commander, 8, Nigeria) 
 
Arguably, one of the greatest strengths of the information filtering stage as described 
in the model is that it allows the level of uncertainty associated with a particular 
incident to be reasonably reduced. Lipshitz & Strauss (1997) defined uncertainty as 
a sense of doubt that delays action. The authors also identified five sources of 
uncertainty incident commanders often need to combat at the scene of an incident: 
missing information, conflicting information, confusing information, noisy information 
and unreliable information. Through information filtering, therefore, the decision 
maker is left with less and less options to choose from thereby making the working 
memory space freer in performing other non-routine tasks. However it is important to 
emphasize at this juncture that “irrelevant” cues do not necessarily mean “useless”. 
They are only termed irrelevant because they do not fit the purpose of the current 
task at the time. As suggested by other scholars, extra care must be taken during the 
information filtering process so as to avoid screening away important cues 
(Oppenheimer, 2003; Klein, 2003; Spender, 2008). It is suspected that experts may 
place “irrelevant information” into the sub-conscious realm as potentially useful 
possible options they could subsequently consider, if need be. This then allows them 
to focus on the relevant information at the conscious level.  
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5.8.3. The decision making phase (Validation and/or implementation 
of proposed action plans) 
 
 As shown in the model (Fig. 5.8), once the information filtering process is deemed 
complete and the relevant information obtained, incident commanders then proceed 
to determine whether or not there is a need to validate the information regarding the 
proposed action plan. Validating the potential action plan before implementing it 
strives to ensure that all missing gaps are filled and that all potential causes of post-
decision regrets are envisaged and prevented. The decision to validate, the rigour 
and the time spent in the validation process were all found to depend on certain 
factors, such as the amount of time pressure commanders are faced with, the stakes 
involved in the incident, the composition of the team and the quality and authenticity 
of the information at the disposal of the commander. For example, the validation 
process is not likely to be too rigorous if the information at the incident commander’s 
disposal is from sources judged to be highly reliable (e.g. information coming directly 
from first witnesses) or if the team is made up of more experienced officers who do 
not need much detailed explanation to understand their tasks 
 
It is suggested in the information filtering and intuitive decision making model that the 
overall validation process usually takes one of two major forms: (i) mental simulation 
― where the commander projects the status of the current environment into the 
future, spotting potential pitfalls as well as opportunities (ii) quick consultation with 
peers ― which occurs when a commander needs to “pick the brain” of other team 
members before implementing an action plan. Two of the participants specifically 
reported that they are sometimes forced to test their ideas against the ideas of other 
experienced team members, mostly under conditions of high uncertainty or 
conflicting goals. These two validation processes as shown in the model are termed 
“intuition guided by analysis”, which appeared at decision points where experts 
indicated they did not follow their first impression at the exact time it came to their 
mind. However, it is important to clarify that the validation stage in this model should 
not be confused with the extreme analytical thinking mode described in the intuitive-
analytical continuum model (see Hammond et al. 1987). Instead, the validation 
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process described here is similar to what Hogarth (2003) termed imposing “circuit 
breakers” and what Cohen et al (1996) called conducting a “quick test”. 
 
The decision makers on the other hand reported that they proceed to implement their 
proposed action plans once they are satisfied with the quantity and quality of 
information they have at their disposal i.e. when there is no need to validate. One of 
the cues that triggers the decision to act instantly is when officers experience some 
level of congruity between information retrieved from memory (internal sources) and 
that obtained from current proceedings (external sources). Thus, in the absence of 
conflicting or confusing information in working memory, commanders begin to 
experience what Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) called “a sense of confidence that 
precedes intuitive judgement” 
5.8.4. THE IFID MODEL DISCUSSED 
The model presented above, the information filtering and intuitive decision model 
(IFID), attempts to describe how the experienced firefighters who were interviewed in 
the study reported managing a critical fire incident. Since most of the cues on the 
fireground rarely appear in forms that are clearly defined, especially at the initial 
phase of an incident, incident commanders were often found to be faced with the 
important task of collecting, filtering and processing multiple informational cues from 
various sources within a limited timeframe. In carrying out these tasks, the 
participants explained that they try to initiate a problem solving process using certain 
amount of information as a starting point, and then subsequently rely on additional 
information to refine and clarify their understanding of the problem along the line. For 
example, using the “class of fire”, which is one of the principal cues identified above, 
experts usually try to focus on the cues that are directly related to the particular class 
of fire currently burning (since each class of fire will require applying different 
tactics). For instance, while class A fire can easily be extinguished using ordinary 
water, class B & class C fires would normally require more advanced chemical 
substances such as foam compacts. This information filtering process i.e. the ability 
to differentiate between the cues that trigger actions and those that are not very 
relevant is therefore seen as an important contribution of the IFID model. It is logical 
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to infer that most of the irrelevant cues (distractions or noise) that compete with the 
relevant ones mostly appear from the effort of the memory to remember everything 
that happened from previous incidents all at the same time. The basic maxim 
emphasized in the IFID model therefore appears thus: whilst having too little 
information about an incident could be quite risky, having too much information, on 
the other hand, could prove counter-productive. This implies that a point is reached 
when acquiring and computing more information becomes detrimental to the 
outcome of a decision.  
 
Interestingly, the concept of “less is more” which is regarded as one of the most 
interesting discoveries in the last 100 years of research in the field of judgment and 
decision making was found to support the underpinning philosophies of the IFID 
model (Hertwig and Todd 2003; Hogarth and Karelaia 2007; Hilbig et al. 2010; 
Marewski et al. 2010; Katsikopolous 2010). The proponents of the concept use the 
phrase “less is more” to suggest that making accurate intuitive decisions is very 
possible under conditions of less information processing, computation or time. The 
extra unnecessary information (which includes, for example, other classes of fire not 
related to the class of fire currently burning) has been termed “noise” as they tend to 
add to the pile of uncertainty if not screened out of the working memory. Klein (2003) 
defined noise as irrelevant data that competes with, or strives to overlap the 
important data or cues. According to him, noise contains its own cues and patterns 
that tend to intersect and sometimes even override the real cues and patterns. 
These intersections eventually result into more complications, as more and more 
possible ways of interpreting the problem start to emerge. Similarly, Weick (1993) 
identified noise as a real threat to accurate sense-making as it may prompt 
erroneous signals or irrelevant data, thereby increasing the possibility of explaining 
away the relevant and important cues. From the point of view of developing training 
curricula, the main challenge here for less experienced officers lies in knowing which 
information is relevant and which is noise.  
 
In addition to the “less is more” principle, the IFID model also fits well with the 
cognitive load theory, which suggests that the inability of the human memory to store 
240 
 
 
 
a large amount of information is not necessarily a disadvantage since it can then 
facilitate remembering the more important and up-to-date information, sorting out the 
irrelevant and outdated ones by forgetting them (Ackoff, 1989; Sweller 1994; Pollock, 
Chandler and Sweller, 2002; Paas et al. 2004). This way, decision makers are able 
to maximize their short-term memory — which by definition has a very limited 
capacity. In essence, eliminating irrelevant information (or possible sources of 
distraction) from working memory will allow experts to focus on the more relevant 
information, thereby freeing more mental energy for other aspects of task 
performance.  
   
A number of models have been developed in the field of cognitive psychology to 
describe how actors make decisions, with each model focused on one or more 
macro-cognitive elements e.g. situation awareness, sense making, teamwork, pre-
planning etc. (Klein 2003; Endsley, 1995; Lipschitz and Strauss, 1997; Cohen et al. 
1996). For instance, the recognition primed decision (RPD) model, a prototypical 
decision making model in the naturalistic decision making community, holds that 
proficient decision makers are mainly “recognitionally skilled” i.e. are able to 
recognize familiar situations from the repertoire of patterns stored in their memory —
which were accumulated over years of deliberate practice (Burke and Henry, 1997; 
Hatano and Inagaki, 2000; Charness et al., 2005). According to Klein (2008), these 
patterns are what eventually help decision makers to recognize the most relevant 
cues, provide expectancies, identify the main goals to be pursued, and then suggest 
the most plausible action plan. Simply put, the RPD model suggests that 
experienced officers mostly rely on patterns recalled from previous experiences (in 
the form of cues, expectancies, goals and actions) in solving current problems. 
However, in their study aimed at investigating how actors make decisions in novel 
and time pressured environments, Cohen et al (1996) identified one of the limitations 
of the recognition primed decision model. The authors drew attention to the 
possibility of rare or novel situations occurring that could altogether defy existing 
knowledge — an insight that eventually propelled them to develop another useful 
cognitive model, which they termed the recognition/metacognition (RM) model. Thus, 
in contrast to the RPD model which suggests that proficient decision makers often 
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rely on recognized patterns in solving current tasks, the R/M model argues that 
decision makers must, in addition to being recognitionally skilled also be 
metacognitionally skilled. 
 
Whilst it is important to emphasize the role of experience in making intuitive 
decisions as with the RPD (see Fig 2.3) and the RM models (Fig 2.4), it is equally 
important to describe how experts are able to manage the multiple sources of 
informational cues on the fireground. It appears from the current study that the 
incident commanders, regardless of their ability to recognize previous incidents, are 
often faced with the crucial task of identifying the most relevant informational cues as 
well as discriminating between the relevant and irrelevant (noisy).  On this note, the 
IFID model purports that the human memory not only serves as an organ for storing 
all forms of information that individuals have encountered in the past, rather it also 
serves the crucial purpose of providing them with more relevant and up-to-date 
information exactly when needed. Hence, in contrast to the recognition primed 
decision making model (Klein et al. 1988) and the recognition/metacognition model 
(Cohen et al. 1996), the IFID model goes further to highlight the principal cues used 
by experienced officers in filtering the multiple information they are often bombarded 
with at the scene of an incident (see section 5.8.2).  
 
Another important contribution from the IFID model lies in its attempt to clarify the 
role of intuition in analytical thinking. Although it is believed that analysis/deliberation 
is conceptually different from intuition, the model suggests that intuition still plays a 
key part in making decisions leading to whether or not to deliberate on a proposed 
action plan. For example, in two of the reported incidents that required some 
deliberation, the expert participants agreed they had already developed an action 
plan in mind, but only needed a little bit of more thinking time before acting. Further 
analyses of the two incidents showed that the additional thinking time was required 
(in retrospect) either because higher stakes were involved or because certain 
information remained unclear to the officers. The key thing to note here, therefore, is 
that experts seem to know when to reflect on a particular action plan and when to 
implement instantly. This finding supports existing claims that intuition complements 
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analysis in certain circumstances and also that experts, in contrast to novices, seem 
to understand the boundaries of their skills and know when their intuition is likely to 
betray them (Dunning et al., 2003; Shynkaruk and Thompson, 2006). Kahneman & 
Klein (2009) put it this way:  
 
“True experts, it is said, know when they don’t know, and non-experts 
(whether or not they think they know) certainly do not know when they don’t 
know” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p.524)  
 
The model also aligns with the overwhelming evidence in the literature suggesting 
that effective managers frequently draw on intuition and analysis as separate ‘inputs’ 
when making critical decisions, switching decision styles as conditions warrant 
(Hammond et al., 1987; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Klein, 
2003; Tanner, 2006; Evans, 2008; Epstein, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the IFID model aims to provide additional insight regarding the role of 
intuition in creative decision making. Notwithstanding the remarkable progress that 
has been experienced in recent years in studies involving intuition, Dorfler and 
Ackerman (2012) who built on the initial work of Polanyi (1962) remained quite 
critical on the extent to which most scholars emphasize the use of intuition in 
judgment making at the expense of its use in creative thinking. Dorfler and Ackerman 
(2012) challenged this notion of a one-sided application of intuition, calling for more 
empirical evidence in investigating the creative role of intuition.  Analysis of the 134 
decision points between the two groups of experts (as shown in Fig. 5.7, section 5.5) 
provided additional evidence to suggest that intuitive insight and intuitive judgment 
represent two different but related routes to intuitive decision making. The former 
relates to decisions made during unusual circumstances that require improvisation 
(creative decisions), which is only possible through insight (Polanyi, 1962) whereas 
the latter, intuitive judgment, relates to decisions made through pattern recognition 
― in which case a decision maker will assess an ongoing situation and then match 
the cues, goals and actions against the repertoire of patterns stored in the memory 
(Perry and Wiggins 2008; Keller et al., 2010). Hence, although the creative use of 
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intuition appeared to be significantly less prominent than its use in judgment making, 
there are reasons to believe that problem solving on the fireground involves both 
intuitive insight and intuitive judgment.   
 
Finally, since the IFID model describes how experts cope with one of the greatest 
challenges of managing complex incidents i.e. the ability to overcome the snare of 
diverting cognitive resources away from the main task amidst multiple task demands, 
a link seems to exist between the model and some of the psychological errors actors 
are likely to face in a task environment. Previous findings have shown that many of 
the psychological anomalies that result in poor judgment often emanate from 
people’s inability to effectively process the amount of information in working memory. 
For example, Kahneman (2011, p.95) used the term mental shot gun to describe a 
situation in which people’s intention to solve a particular problem evokes another 
task which is not only irrelevant but also detrimental to the main task. Mental shot 
gun hence results in slowing down the decision making process as it tends to 
generate some form of decision-conflicts, or what Festinger (1957) termed cognitive 
dissonance.  
 
Furthermore, Gasaway (2013) identified another potential error decision makers 
often suffer while making decisions under time pressure ― the normalcy bias. 
Normalcy bias is mostly invoked when the brain encounters something far beyond its 
bounds of understanding, reasoning and comprehension. In such circumstances the 
brain begins to fabricate new realities by blocking out the true ones and replacing 
them with vividly imagined ones. Therefore modelling what experts do as described 
in the IFID model and teaching such to novices, is envisaged to be an effective way 
of improving the intuitive decision making skills of novices. It is thus hoped that the 
IFID model, through training, will serve the purpose of mitigating occurrence of 
psychological anomalies in the less experienced officers while making time-
pressured decisions.   
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5.9. PATTERN RECOGNITION AND INTUITION  
As discussed in section 2.7, seven characteristics of intuition have been identified in 
the extant literature i.e. intuition:  
• is spontaneous  
• involves holistic processing of thoughts  
• is rooted in tacit knowledge  
•  neither follows nor breaks the rules of logic 
•  involves unconscious and effortless processing of information 
•  frequently accompanied by emotions, and that  
•  intuitors often show a sign of relief after making an intuitive judgment.  
 
However studies have also shown that the aforementioned characteristics can be 
summarized into two major schools of thought (Shirley and Langan-Fox, 1996; 
Sadler-smith and Shefy, 2004; Hodgkinson et al., 2009). The first consists of a body 
of knowledge that maps intuition to experiential knowledge and expertise, gained 
through accumulated years of experience and then retrieved through pattern 
recognition (Baylor, 2001; Liptshitz et al., 2001; Charness et al., 2005; Plessner and 
Czenna, 2008; Ericsson et al., 2007; Salas et al, 2010), while the second category 
consists of scholars who believe that sensory, emotional and affective elements are 
a crucial aspect of intuition (Epstein, 1994; Shapiro and Spence, 1997; Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy, 2005).  
 
While ample evidence was found in the current study to support intuitive 
characteristics that correspond to the first school of thought (see Table 5.12), little or 
no evidence was found to support the notion of intuition that fits into the second 
category. The table below shows a compilation of excerpts that define intuition from 
the point of view of the participants. Participants used various terminologies and 
phrases to describe an intuitive decision making process, none of which was found 
to be associated with emotions or mood.   
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Table 5.12: A content analysis of participants’ view of intuition 
PSEUDONYMN TERMS USED TO DESCRIBE INTUITION LINK TO EXISTING 
DEFINITION IN THE 
LITERATURE 
UK FIREFIGHTERS 
NATH As soon as possible, ……decisions made in 
seconds (p9,Q31) 
 spontaneous 
PATRICK It is a product of looking, feeling and seeing (p28, 
Q27)……..you consider and assess options at the 
same time as opposed to doing it in a stepped way 
(p25, Q14) 
Holistic processing of 
information 
DICKSON …….. doing something instantly and adapt that to 
suit [the situation] as you get more information 
(p49, Q26) 
spontaneous 
TROY Once you’ve made that decision it’s not to say that 
you haven’t instantaneously looked at the options, 
in split seconds the options are there and  you 
know that that’s the right way to do it, don’t ask me 
how, you just do (Q18, p221) 
spontaneous, tacit 
knowing 
WILLY Subliminally, you are doing it without realizing 
you’re doing it, and you do the kind of 
things….when I had the last fire that was like this, 
this went better or that went better (Q10, p232) 
Unconsious processing, 
tacit knowing, experiential 
JADE ….again that’s experience gained through 15 years 
of firefighting, through seeing lots of different fires 
and seeing how fire behaves (Q10, p256) 
Experiential  
DARREN …..So how you actually make those decisions is 
through primary experience and secondary 
experience; so stuff that you have actually 
experienced yourself and stuffs you’ve learnt from 
other people, you’ve learnt from manuals, from 
training exercises (q12, p196) 
Experiential 
NIGERIAN FIREFIGHTERS 
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KNIGHT ……on getting there, when I saw the sign it did not 
take me 10-20secs because before dropping down 
from the vehicle I had already known what to do 
(p105, Q19) 
Unconscious processing, 
spontaneous 
ADAM …..when you get there, your brain will just tell you 
let’s do it this way……you don’t have to waste time 
(p114, Q18) 
Unconscious processing, 
spontaneous  
MARVIN …..as you are approaching your brain will be 
working….you make decisions in 5secs, it shouldn’t 
be more than that….even before your vehicle 
stops, as a good officer you might have assessed 
the type of fire you are facing (p133, Q19) 
spontaneous, 
Unconscious processing 
JACK ….it did not take long to make any decision 
because the decisions come freely; because I have 
got the training and the experience is there (p152, 
Q24) 
spontaneous, unconscious 
processing, Experiential 
SUNNY …….it easily brings to my mind what I did before, 
and what didn’t work……you gain more knowledge 
from your past experiences (p160, Q16) 
Experiential 
MARGARETH Experience! These are the things you do every day, 
you have these issues every time and you discover 
that without doing it in a particular way, you will get 
injured (Q9, P290) 
Experiential 
 
The excerpts in table 5.12 seem to provide additional evidence to strengthen existing 
beliefs that intuition used a valid form of knowledge. The table also shows that 
intuitive knowledge represents the type of knowledge that guides professionals 
through what needs be done, without necessarily knowing how they knew. The 
evidence provided here is therefore seen to contradict the assumptions of the 
cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1998) as well as the conclusions reached 
by Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005). These authors’ main argument has been that 
intuitive knowledge often “uses emotions as a conduit”, yet none of the experts in 
this study were found to attribute intuition to “feeling” but rather to “knowing”. This 
opposing view of intuition (emotional vs non-emotional) is unsurprising considering 
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the different epistemological positions from which the various studies derive. The 
current study adopted a naturalistic approach to the assessment of intuition, whereas 
the above two studies attempted to capture intuition from an experimental and 
theoretical approach respectively.  
 
Since all the expert participants agreed that dealing with a current problem requires 
making use of previous knowledge and experiences, the concept of pattern 
recognition thus appears to be a logical way of explaining where intuitive knowledge 
comes from. Findings in Table 5.12 show that intuitive knowledge is the type of 
knowledge developed through consistent and repeated experiences that have been 
unconsciously linked together. Hogarth (2003) has previously used the term mere 
exposure effect to explain how people store past experiences in their memory as 
they respond and adapt to multiple stimuli from their environments over time. A 
number of cognitive psychologists have also used the term “pattern” — which they 
defined as a set of cues that is often “chunked” together — to describe the repertoire 
of knowledge experts often build over time (Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993; 
Klein, 2003; Perry and Wiggins, 2008).  
 
However, it is important to emphasize that developing a reservoir of meaningful 
patterns in the memory do not just occur circumstantially, it takes years of dedication 
and hard work (Driskell et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1987; Wong, 2000; Hayashi, 2001; 
Feldon, 2008; Ericsson et al., 2007; Kahneman 2011, p.238). For example, studies 
of chess masters (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973) have shown that at least 10,000 
hours of dedicated practice is required in attaining the highest level of performance 
(which is equivalent to playing chess five hours a day for about 6 years). The more 
patterns people acquire over their years of active practice the more likely they are 
able to match a new situation to one of the pre-stored patterns. This is the principle 
that helps expert fire officers, for instance, to see a smoke colour and intuitively 
predict that toxic chemicals are burning (Okoli et al., 2015).  
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 5.9.1 Principles of pattern recognition 
 
Although the term “pattern recognition” is not new in the field of cognitive psychology 
and expertise studies, it was still deemed necessary in the current study to 
investigate how the concept is utilized in the firefighting domain. The research was 
particularly interested in understanding the underpinning “principles of pattern 
recognition” from the point of view of the experts themselves, and to evaluate such 
understanding against the current application of the term in the literature. As part of 
the CDM interview protocol, participants were therefore probed in-depth as to 
whether or not managing the incident they narrated reminded them of previous 
incidents. In addition, each of the participants was asked to explain exactly how their 
knowledge of past incidents was remembered and then replicated in solving the 
current tasks. A thematic analysis of the CDM data across the thirty incidents 
subsequently generated five main themes that were found to be closely associated 
with how pattern recognition works for expert firefighters.  
 
1. The number of templates chunked in experts’ memory is a function of the 
number of incidents they have attended and the level of experience they have 
gained from solving both routine and non-routine tasks  
 
As earlier stated, the more experienced officers are often called upon to take over 
incident command responsibility as an incident escalates, which is the norm in both 
countries. This ultimately implies that competence in firefighting is mainly defined by 
the number of non-routine tasks a particular firefighter has managed throughout their 
career, as opposed to routine tasks. It is therefore not surprising that Shanteau et al. 
(2002) in their important paper entitled “Performance based assessment of 
expertise” made a strong case for the inclusion of “problem-type” as an important 
variable in discriminating between routine and adaptive experts.  
 
All the participants in this current study agreed that their ability to recognize previous 
incidents and recall them correctly is explained by the fact that they have attended 
many “serious” fires in the course of their career as firefighters. Hence, this study 
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agrees with existing claims that both the length of active service and the quality of 
experience people gather in the process are crucial to building what Chase and 
Simon (1973) called chunks, or templates by Gobet and Simon (1996), or patterns 
according to Klein (2003)  
 
Across a wide range of domains in the naturalistic decision making literature such as 
sports, medicine and midwifery, education, aviation, military, ambulance and 
firefighting, studies have confirmed a positive relationship between actors’ years of 
experience and their level of competence (Benner and Tanner, 1987; Klein and 
Thordsen, 1988; Crandall and Gamblian, 1991; Orasanu and Connolly, 1993; Flin, 
Slaven and Stewart, 1996; Wong, 2000; Johnson and Raab, 2003; Ross et al., 2004; 
Tissington and Flin, 2005; Kermarrec and Bossard, 2014). Specifically these studies 
have shown that experts tend to outperform novices mainly because they possess a 
wider range of domain knowledge which they leverage upon in making creative or 
knowledge based decisions  
 
For example, Chase and Simon (1973) in their early study on chess hypothesized 
that experts can rapidly recognize key features of a problem using their perceptual 
and cue discrimination skills. The authors tested this hypothesis in an experimental 
study involving expert and novice chess players and eventually developed a well-
established theory known as the chunking theory (Chase and Simon, 1973). The 
chunking theory purports that experts store a large amount of information in their 
long term memory, usually as a single entity which they then rely upon to direct their 
plans and moves (Gobet, 2005). In two different tasks presented to the two groups of 
chess players (chess masters and novices), the authors found that the former were 
able to memorize and reconstruct a chess position better than the weaker novice 
players. Simon and Chase (1973) linked such exceptional performances to the fact 
that the chess masters had acquired a larger amount of chunks than their novice 
counterparts, leading therefore to the conclusion that about 50,000 long term 
memory chunks are required to reach the level of performance of chess masters.   
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2. The Templates in experts’ memory form a framework for thinking (Schema-
based network)  
According to the expert participants, decision making on the fireground does not, for 
the purpose of effective task performance, support recalling anything and everything. 
Instead incident commanders are expected to rely only on the relevant cues from the 
proceedings of an incident in order to trigger the pattern recognition process (these 
are the “principal cues” discussed in the model in section 5.7). Interestingly, the 
memory triggering and recalling process has been shown to be possible mainly 
through the operations of one of the most powerful cognitive networks in the memory 
— the schema. Virtually everything human beings see, hear or even think about is 
critically dependent on schematically organized information that is stored in long-
term memory (Cooper, 1998; Pollock et al., 2002; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004; 
Cowan, 2008).  
 
For example, expert mathematicians are able to intuitively understand how a/b=c is 
transformed into a=cb because their algebraic schemas tell them so, without the 
need to impose any extra cognitive load on their working memory. In addition, 
schemas are what make it possible that only a single tree and not thousands of 
leaves and branches that make up the tree is remembered; that only a sentence 
rather that the individual words or numerous letters that make up the sentence is 
remembered (Sweller, 1994; van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005). In essence, 
schemas strive to increase the amount of information that can be held in working 
memory, despite its limited holding capacity. This is possible because each schema, 
no matter how complex, often appears as one single element in the working memory 
(see Gobet, 2005 for details on chunking theory). This therefore implies that 
schemas not only organize and store knowledge for future use, they also help to 
significantly reduce working memory load; acting as a “central executive” that 
provides vital information that is required to perform the current tasks (Pollock, 
Chandler and Sweller, 2002) 
 
How then does the organization of this schema influence the pattern recognition 
process? It is important to note that everything firefighters have learnt and 
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experienced is stored in long term memory, which includes information about the 
classes of fire, equipment, water supplies, fire chemistry and behaviour, first aid, 
human behaviour, sectorization, entry control procedure, inter-agency response and 
so on. It is therefore by easily recognizing and understanding the implications of a 
particular cue through the schema-based arrangement that a decision maker is likely 
to be able to respond more promptly. Since the human working memory by its very 
nature cannot process many elements at a given time, it probably holds that 
firefighters are able to intuitively recognize the most plausible cues, goals and 
actions plans because of their well-organized schematic framework for thinking. All 
the participants agreed that they would normally know what to do, depending on the 
particular type of fire encountered. This supports the idea that they perhaps have 
different schemas for fighting different types of fires: house fires, petrol fires, factory 
fires, fires from road traffic collisions, chemical fires etc. For example, one of the 
experienced officers (Paul, ACFS, 32, UK) provided a useful framework from his 
analysis, stating that:   
 
• “Previous incidents contribute to a template 
• [The] template is in your head and forms a framework for thinking 
• You call upon this instinctively 
• The number of templates depends on your level of experience 
• Most of the incidents you go to must fit into at least a [single] template 
• Post-incident briefing helps identify strengths and weaknesses in strategies, 
providing learning points for future incidents”  
                                             (Paul, Assistant Chief Fire Superintendent, 32, UK) 
 
Expertise also lies in knowing which of the schemas to combine in the event of 
encountering novel situations.    
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3.  The manner in which skills were learnt and committed to memory 
determines the quality and fluency of the pattern recognition process  
 
The CDM reports showed that pattern recognition is only realistic when learning has 
actually taken place. In other words, the ability to recall events from memory did not 
seem to occur because experts merely observed how their superiors previously 
managed a particular task. Rather, it is envisaged that proper learning occurred and 
that the lessons learnt were properly committed into a memory space in ways that 
subsequently enhanced ease of recall.  
 
The participants identified two key areas where opportunities for learning can be 
created for the frontline officers. First, through post incident debrief (see also last 
point from Paul’s excerpt above). Dedicating quality time to discuss what went right 
or wrong after an incident was reported as a useful way of establishing learning 
points for officers, particularly the less experienced ones. The main point here is that 
learning points would only be registered in the memory space if the stakeholders 
involved in the learning process are made to be aware of what was learnt in the first 
place. Second, by admitting that mistakes are a part of the learning process, thus 
increasing the error margins for the novice learners (albeit in a controlled manner). 
Four of the highly ranked participants in the UK admitted to learning most of the key 
aspects of the job during their early days as crew commanders. They claimed it was 
some of the mistakes they made back in those days that eventually made them 
stronger and better on the job. The excerpts below illustrate this point better: 
 
I can make a mistake and say, I’m sorry I made a mistake it’s not right, 
whereas when you are new or inexperienced you don’t want to be seen 
making mistakes and you can’t accept making a mistake. And most times 
learning from your mistakes is what counts. If you don’t accept that you made 
a mistake you can’t learn from it because you don’t think you made a mistake 
(Dickson, 23, Crew commander, UK)  
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To say I have not made mistakes would be the wrong thing, I’m one of those 
people that think you have to make mistakes to learn and I’m not frightened 
of making mistakes whereas a lot of my people are. A lot of my peer groups 
don’t volunteer to be the person that’s on the spot, whereas I put myself on 
the spot. And you can criticize me but don’t go too far because tomorrow 
you’ll be on the spot. (Lambert, 26, Watch commander, UK)     
 
The above excerpts therefore suggests that it would be extremely difficult or even 
impossible to recall anything meaningful in the future unless an individual has first 
registered previous events in the memory as they happened at the time they 
occurred, deliberately learned from them and committed the learning points into the 
memory space. 
 
    
 4. Pattern recognition process (I): Current tasks > existing repertoire of 
patterns       Addition of new templates        Adaptive expertise  
  
Incident commanders are often faced with two possible scenarios on the fireground. 
First, when the task constraints and knowledge required in managing a current 
incident exceed existing knowledge in the long term memory. This typically includes 
situations where no pre-stored pattern or templates seem to match proceedings of 
an event, or situations where recognized patterns appear insufficient for solving a 
current problem. A few instances were found across the CDM reports where officers 
encountered incidents that were beyond their routine knowledge for which they were 
compelled to switch from rule-based or adaptive decision making strategy to creative 
problem solving (see section 5.5). Furthermore, evidence from the creative decision 
points showed that adaptability and flexibility are two of the most effective 
requirements in developing creative insights. Hence, in instances where pattern 
recognition seemed to be flawed, incident commanders must possess the ability to 
combine bits and pieces of information from different incidents to make a whole ― a 
process Kaempf, Wolf and Miller (1993) termed story building. For example, to 
develop a workable action plan an officer could pick insights from the schema for 
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“search and rescue”, another from the schema for “fire behaviour” and another from 
the schema for “technical procedures”.    
 
Story building thus appears to be more useful when there is a need to cope with 
incomplete or confusing information, allowing decision makers to connect different 
lines together in order to predict how events might have come about (for details see 
Cohen, Freeman and Wolf, 1996). For example, to construct and test the validity of a 
story regarding, for instance, the possible cause of a fire, an incident commander 
might want to know what substances were last brought into the building, where 
combustible materials are located in the building, what the building is used for, 
whether or not the building has previously experienced any fire outbreak. 
 
As shown in the equation above, this creative ability requires making knowledge-
based decisions, hence is a hallmark of adaptive expertise. The good news is that 
experts are able to contribute to their existing templates after successfully 
constructing and implementing a story into a workable action plan. For example, 
Brown (27, Crew commander, UK) reported a massive factory fire incident involving 
also the crucial task of managing a victim who had suffered severe burns. Brown 
explained that whilst he has previously managed several factory fire incidents as well 
as incidents that required resuscitating people with severe burns, he had never 
managed any incident involving both conditions at the same time. Through the 
insights drawn from managing those two incidents the officer was therefore able to 
create a workable action plan of splitting his crew into two — with one carrying out a 
firefighting task and the other a rescue and salvage task 
  
 
5) Pattern recognition process (II): Existing repertoire of patterns > Current 
tasks        strengthening of templates        Routine expertise.  
 
This second equation explains instances where experts are able to recognize most 
of the elements in the current environment and act accordingly using the rule-based 
or adaptive decision making strategy. Incidents of this category are usually less 
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cognitively demanding than those described in the first equation since pre-stored 
knowledge in experts’ memory is enough to proffer workable solutions to the task 
constraints. The process here may be likened to a magnetic attraction, with the 
schema-based network attracting the relevant cues and ignoring others.  
 
For example, Sammy (crew commander, 8, Nigeria) reported a battery explosion 
incident at a warehouse and explained how managing the incident brought to his 
memory previous gas fire incidents he had managed. In the current incident, the 
officer immediately requested breathing apparatus as soon as he remembered (from 
one of the previous incidents) how he almost fainted for inhaling toxic chemicals 
(Note: a breathing apparatus is regarded as a specialist appliance in Nigeria unlike in 
the UK). Also, Paul (Assistant chief fire, 32, UK) narrated how he recalled from one 
of the previous incidents the need to use a foam tender to fight the current fire 
instead of using ordinary water. The current incident was a massive petrol storage 
fire in which the wastes and oil debris from the fire kept flowing back and polluting 
the river course — making response effort extremely ineffective.  
 
As shown in the equation above, the ability to make decisions based on knowledge 
derived solely from pattern or similarity recognition is arguably a feature of routine 
expertise since no creative problem solving strategy is required. In these 
circumstances (as with the above two examples), the officers only end up 
strengthening existing templates as opposed to adding new ones.   
5.10. DIMENSIONS OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
 
Building on the early works of Polanyi (1962, 1966), Tsoukas (2003) employed the 
analogy of a triangle in contextualizing tacit knowledge. In his analogy, Tsoukas 
(2003) likened the first end of a triangle to the subsidiary features (i.e. informational 
and environmental cues), the second end to the focal target (i.e. the main goal 
pursued by an actor) and the last end to a knower who connects the other two ends. 
It was on this note that Polanyi affirmed that no knowledge is possible without the 
integration of the subsidiary features and the focal target; he therefore referred to all 
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knowledge as personal and all “knowing” as action. In describing his reaction when 
faced with difficult situations on the fireground, one of the officers reported thus: 
 
“It was an unusual incident, but something inside you takes over where you go 
into a mode of professionalism, and it comes because you’ve been doing it for 
that long and [using] the training and the knowledge and experience [you have 
acquired], you go into a firefighter mode” (Brown, 27, Crew Commander, UK) 
 
The “firefighting mode” mode described here is similar to the operations of tacit 
knowledge, which has been conceptualized in most part of the current thesis as the 
act of knowing without knowing how (Polanyi 1962; Nonaka, 1994; Hanabuss, 2000; 
Fessey, 2002; Horberry and Cooke, 2010). Tacit knowledge represents the type of 
knowledge that is difficult to verbalize, or a component of expertise that is highly 
resistant to surface articulation even by the experts themselves (McCaffrey, 2007; 
Eraut, 2004; Maqsood, Finegan and Walker, 2004). It comprises a spectrum of 
conceptual, visual or sensory information that must be effectively utilized in order to 
make sense of something.  
 
Since the current study was mainly focused on eliciting tacit knowledge from expert 
firefighters, it became imperative to specifically search for evidence of this type of 
knowledge across the entire incident reports. The entire CDM transcripts were 
carefully read and specific words, phrases or sentences related to “knowing-what” 
“knowing-how” and “knowing-when” were coded. The content areas (from the 
transcripts) where experts attempted to explain or justify the basis of their 
actions/inactions, using phrases such as “I did this because I know…..” or “you know 
that…..” were also coded. Some of the CDM probe questions were more directly 
related to tacit knowledge elicitation e.g. how did you know the action you took was 
the next thing to do? What knowledge did you use in making those decisions and 
how was it obtained? What do you think novices would have done differently? What 
cues did you rely on in making those decisions? In other cases, information 
regarding experts’ tacit knowledge were seen to emerge from other probe questions 
that were not directly related to tacit knowledge e.g. what goals were you pursuing at 
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each decision point? Were you being creative or were you just following some set of 
rules?  
 
Overall, eight themes emerged from the CDM analysis, which is hereafter termed the 
dimensions of tacit knowledge for ease of reference (Worked examples of thematic 
analyses attached in Appendix F) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIMITS OF CONTROL 
 
 
PRIORITIZATION 
 
DIMENSIONS OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
PRE-PLANNING 
 
 Figure 5.9: Attributes that define experts’ competence (tacit knowledge) in the 
firefighting domain 
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1. CUE DISCRIMINATION 
Cue discrimination is an aspect of tacit knowledge that deals with the ability to 
identify subtle differences and/or similarities between various cues. Since it is not all 
the available cues on the fireground that are eventually needed for making task 
related decisions under time pressure, commanders are often faced with a crucial 
task of focusing on the more relevant cues. However, this act of selecting the 
relevant cues from amongst other available cues ultimately requires having a good 
understanding of the various cues associated with each class of fire and being able 
to discriminate between and within the different cue classes. For example, 
experienced officers by virtue of their cue discrimination skills seemed to understand 
the difference between the colour/texture of smoke that is oozing out from a fuel fire 
(class B fire) and that from a carbonaceous fire (class A fire). They also seemed to 
be aware of the pattern of flame movement for a fire at the different stages (growing 
stage, developing stage and decaying stage) 
 
Why is cue discrimination regarded as a crucial aspect of expertise? There are at 
least five reasons for this:  
 
• The speed with which a particular cue changes over time could be quite slow 
but yet consistent. Hence, failure to make sense of such subtle transitions, as 
early as possible, might end up proving costly. 
 
• The cues may be very similar to each other to the extent that diagnosing them 
becomes a bit challenging (e.g. a backdraft and a flashover). In fact, incident 
commanders might sometimes need to integrate a number of smaller “clues” 
to be able to see what is actually happening  
 
• It is important to note that cue discrimination goes beyond mere identification 
of cues to include, more crucially, the ability to compare and contrast between 
closely related cues. Professional competence is therefore measured by 
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being able to identify both the cues present in a task environment as well as 
the missing cues. 
 
• (iv)The background of the task environment could be noisy and distractful, 
thereby making it difficult for the commanding officer to focus on the most 
relevant cues required for carrying out the right tasks.  
 
• The incident might become so complicated that too many cues increasingly 
begin to command the attention of an incident commander, increasing the 
short-term memory load in the process 
 
But how do experts develop this cue discrimination ability? Previous studies have 
shown that developing the ability to discriminate between cues is mainly possible 
because of the well refined perceptual skills experts have developed over many 
years of consistent practice (Gobet, 2005; Ericsson et al., 2007; Klein, Pliske, 
Crandall and Woods, 2005; Perry and Wiggins, 2008).  For example, in an empirical 
study with firefighters aimed at identifying the rules experts rely upon in determining 
roof “squishiness”, Calderwood, Crandall and Klein (1987) found out, interestingly, 
that no visible rule existed for the experts in making such a judgment call. One of the 
experienced fire-fighters interviewed in the study asserted that “you simply have to 
keep standing on a number of squishy and un-squishy roofs until you are able to 
know the difference between them”.  
 
 
2. PRIORITIZATION 
If one visualizes the firefighting domain as one in which experts are expected to 
make accurate decisions under time pressure and sometimes amidst confusing and 
incomplete information, it becomes easier to appreciate the importance of task 
prioritization in attaining effective performance. For most serious fires, the first 
10mins into the incident is usually the most crucial time as it is when the energy in a 
fire appears to be greatest. It is at this timeframe, also called “the golden hour” in the 
medical literature (see Annibale and Bissinger, 2010) that most of the crucial 
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decisions are made, which implies that doing nothing is never an option in such 
circumstances. Experienced firefighters often strive to attend to the most urgent 
tasks first, especially in more complex fires where a misplaced priority could prove 
disastrous. Task prioritization therefore emphasizes the importance of getting the 
timing of events right since implementing action plans prematurely can jeopardize 
the chance of success while also delaying actions unnecessarily can cause 
irreversible damages to both lives and properties. Knowing “what” to do is hence not 
always as important as knowing “when” to or knowing “which” to do first. In some of 
the reported incidents, the participants showed that they understood the principle of 
task prioritization based on their perception of which task required more urgency e.g. 
firefighting vs evacuation tasks. Experts also seem to know how to prioritize 
resources i.e. they understand which appliance needs requesting first e.g. an aerial 
appliance or foam tender 
 
Furthermore excerpts from the interview transcripts showed that experts were 
always willing to prioritize the saving of human lives over properties in almost all 
circumstances:  
 
“Your initial risk assessment has to be quick. You need to concentrate on the 
most pressing need. Hence the decisions to ask for more help from police and 
other investigation comes after you have made your initial decisions within that 
first 10minutes” (Brown, 27, Crew commander, UK) 
 
“Let’s say this building is on fire now, after making a roll call that some people 
were trapped inside, we will make sure that that life is saved before even fighting 
the fire – to save life first (the life of the victim). So we save lives first, before 
fighting the fire” (Adam, 30, CFS, Nigeria) 
 
“Then we got there we discovered that it is a very heavy fire, so we had to ask for 
more hands and an appliance from another station turned out to the place and we 
were able to extinguish the fire. We did the damping down, we were able to do 
that, and we tried to make up our equipment” (Margareth, 11, FSO, Nigeria) 
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“And in this case, the priorities were saving lives. But to do that, we also have to 
do something about the fire because the fire was starting to prevent us from 
carrying out our own life saving processes. You can sometimes ignore the fire 
and rescue the people but sometimes you can’t and this was one of the incidents 
where you couldn’t ignore the fire, you had to fight the fire and also rescue the 
people at the same time” (Lambert, 26, Watch commander, UK).    
 
It can therefore be inferred that some of the decisions experts found somewhat 
challenging were not necessarily because they lacked knowledge on the actions to 
take, but mainly because they had to get the timing of events right i.e. going either 
offensive or defensive exactly at the right time, requesting extra resources exactly at 
the right time, conducting a fire-break exactly at the right time etc.  
 
 
3. PRE-PLANNING  
It is no longer new that managing and coping with time stress is one of the most 
difficult aspects of task performance on the fireground, especially when higher 
stakes are attached to an incident (Borodzcicz and van Heperen, 2002; Clancy et al., 
2003; Boin and ‘t Hart, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2010). In such circumstances, it become 
extremely important to develop strategies that will allow overall response time 
(thinking time + implementation time) to be significantly reduced. One of the common 
ways through which experts often attempt to more effectively manage time is by pre-
planning, which simply means planning or thinking ahead of time. Through pre-
planning experts are able to draw a mental picture of possible action plans in 
advance of time such that thinking time at the scene of incident is eventually 
reduced, allowing more mental energy to be channeled towards actual task 
performance.  
 
Analyses of the CDM data showed that firefighters in the UK pre-plan by ensuring 
their breathing apparatus sets as well as other personal protective equipment (PPE) 
are worn while enroute to an incident scene. Similarly, findings also revealed that 
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incident commanders (in both countries) sometimes start apportioning tasks to their 
crew while enroute to the scene of an incident, using the information they have 
gathered from a caller as a reference point. The CDM reports also showed that when 
fireground commanders perceive the need to perform a relatively time consuming 
task (e.g. ventilating a building, breaking walls or roofs), they often strive to make all 
the necessary arrangements in advance of time through pre-planning. This includes 
ensuring that the hoses are fully charged and that adequate water is available.  
 
The excerpts below shed more light on the role of pre-planning in the fireground 
decision making process: 
 
“Because of the nature of the topography of the area, the nature of the 
incident as described, and obviously the knock-on effects of getting people at 
3.30 in the morning, moving around to a place of safety and all that that 
entails, I knew that this would be a very complex incident, particularly as 
there were acetylene cylinder confirmed to be involved. That was all what I 
was thinking about on the way for that 10mins” (Troy, 27, Group commander 
and flexi-duty officer, UK)  
 
“When you are in the vehicle, your turn-out slip has told you little of what is 
happening there, i.e. if it is a building on fire or a car on fire. And as an 
experienced officer you will be addressing your men on what to do right down 
from the vehicle. The moment you alight from the vehicle, an officer in charge 
would first come down, he would just survey round under some seconds” 
(Young, 28, CFS, Nigeria)                      
  
But how does pre-planning enhance intuitive decision making? Drawing insights from 
the data/frame sense-making theory (Klein et al. 2006) it is suggested that decision 
makers, upon receiving an initial information about an incident (e.g. from a caller) 
tend to develop a frame — something that serves as a reference point for developing 
an action plan. For example, in one of the incidents reported in the study, Troy 
(Group commander, 27, UK) explained how he concluded the incident was a serious 
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one after receiving a call from the control room requesting him to turn out to the 
incident as a flexi-duty officer. The experienced officer immediately began to develop 
potential plans while driving down to the fireground. The initial information experts 
receive about an incident often generates expectancies, which explains why people 
can initiate an action plan even with only little available information and then adjust 
as they obtain additional information.  
 
It is however important to mention a potential danger of pre-planning (the process of 
generating expectancies) i.e. the fact that it can sometimes lead to fixation — a 
situation where officers are tempted to hold onto their pre-conceived ideas 
(expectancies) by all means, rationalizing and normalizing their proposed plans even 
when there is potential evidence of weaknesses in such plans (Turner, 1976; Weick, 
1993; Roux-dufort, 2005; Feldon, 2007). Furthermore, the source of information from 
which expectancies are developed was also found to be an important factor. For 
example, the outcome of a pre-planned action could be erroneous if the information 
that was used to generate such a plan was based on false alarms (e.g. emotional 
outbursts from callers) rather than on legitimate signals.  
 
4. DOMAIN AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 
Experienced firefighters must possess a wide range of domain knowledge, which 
includes, for example, knowledge on fire behaviour, fire combustion, fire 
chemistry, smoke behaviour, building construction, handling of firefighting 
appliances, water behaviour, ventilation, hose and hosereel, sectorization. 
Understanding how the fireground environment operates as well as the potential 
problems that could possibly arise from such operations is undoubtedly an 
important requirement for expertise. Incident commanders are therefore not only 
expected to know when appliances are working properly (e.g. a pressure pump) 
but also when/why they are malfunctioning. In addition, a good fire-ground 
commander must also be able to balance and negotiate resources effectively as 
events unfold.  
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Following a thematic analysis of the CDM reports, below is a list of some elicited 
knowledge areas as they apply to the firefighting domain: 
 
 Building behaviour: Understanding building construction and architecture 
e.g. wall cracks, roof collapse 
 Fire behaviour: Understanding fire growth and movement, and how fire 
reacts to combustible substances 
 Smoke behaviour: Understanding smoke color, smoke texture and smoke 
density 
 Fuel behaviour: Understanding how fuels reacts to fire and being aware of 
the substances that mostly increase fuel volatility 
 Water behaviour: Understanding the properties of water as an 
extinguishing agent 
 Weather behaviour: Understanding the impact of weather condition (e.g. 
wind) on task performance. For example, knowing that extremely windy 
conditions can affect performance by making the fire spread quicker, and 
that non-windy conditions on the other hand can affect performance by 
making the smoke in the environment static and thereby causing difficulty 
in communication 
 Human behaviour (meta cognition): Understanding how the members of 
public would react to the sight of a fire and how individual firefighters are 
likely to behave under stress 
 Information technology and communications: Understanding how fire 
equipment is being set-up, how their efficiency can be best maximized and 
how they are being dismantled.  
 Multi-agency involvement: Understanding who to involve in a response 
effort and how the activities of the various agencies can be better 
coordinated 
 
The excerpts below show how experts are able to combine some of the above 
variables to demonstrate their understanding of fireground tasks, equipment and the 
environment:     
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“At those point I’m looking at it, I know, I’ve got a measure that if I’ve got a 
house on fire, just a normal standard house with nobody in it, I can do that 
with 2 trucks, 9 people, 2 fire engines, no doubt, that is a bog standard 
measure, I know that. If I’ve got a car on fire I can deal with it with one fire 
engine. So there are basic measures” (Dickson, 23, Crew commander, UK) 
 
“So if the wind is blowing to your side you must use spray, but if the fire is 
going far and you think the spray cannot cover the distance, you can then 
use jet to extinguish”  (Steve, 9, FSO, Nigeria) 
 
So in some cases when I turn up to a fire and the flames are flying out of the 
window, everybody thinks it’s really dangerous; but actually for us we can see 
what is dangerous; potentially everything is visible to us. But if we come to a 
place with black thick smoke where the smoke is not ripping out of the 
windows, that potentially could suddenly go while we were in there [this is 
what is really dangerous], whereas a fire that is already burning is burning 
before we got there we can deal with it because it’s going to get no worse 
(Dickson, 23, crew commander)   
 
5. DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Dynamic risk assessment appeared to be an interesting component of experts’ tacit 
knowledge, generally covering aspects of officers’ behaviour on what is risky/not. 
According to the expert officers, two things could potentially happen if the risk 
assessment process is not properly conducted at a fire scene: people could either 
become excessively risk averse or become overly confident and wanting to take all 
manner of risks. It is important to note that dynamic risk assessment is not just 
limited to assessing and identifying risks within the immediate environment, but also 
making sense of assessed risks and projecting their implications to future states. 
Dynamic risk assessment on the fireground is therefore both a now and a then 
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process that utilizes information about a current state both in solving existing 
problems and in making future predictions.    
 
In suggesting the potential errors novices might have possibly made at each decision 
point, the expert firefighters explicitly identified risk assessment as one of the most 
difficult aspects of task performance and areas of vulnerability for novices. As shown 
in the excerpts below, the participants claimed that the difficulty for novices mostly 
lies in the area of striking a balance between what is tolerable and what is not. 
   
Less experienced officers might not have spotted the water courses were 
being polluted. They might have also want to commit crews into the building, 
which is not a good idea. I did not commit crew into the building because it 
was clear to me from the outset that the risk outweighs the benefit (Patrick, 
32, ACFS, UK) 
 
“The mistake that would have come in here is that probably, they [the less 
experienced officers] would not have punctured the wall because of the risk 
that is involved; they will just stay outside and continue to fight the fire. And 
that also would be dangerous because the fire will continue to burn and 
continue to spread” (Sunny, 29, ACFS, Nigeria) 
   
…… one thing they hadn’t ascertained, the initial crews, was what other 
hazards were in there. So I knew that it was a vehicle workshop, I knew the 
building. I knew it has got an inspection pit, I knew it got lots of things like old 
oil, waste oil, all sorts of things. I also knew because I asked the guy what’s 
upstairs and he told me there were two cylinders up there not acetylene but 
liquid petroleum gas. (Troy, 27, Group commander, UK)  
 
One other interesting thing that emerged from this section concerns experts’ 
disposition towards risks. As shown in the excerpts below, the participants seemed 
not to be intimidated from taking risks (albeit taking calculated risks); rather, they see 
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risk taking as a huge part of their job, claiming the firefighting job, in practice, is far 
from being excessively risk averse : 
 
“The reason why I said a lot of people might not agree with me is that the 
situation was such a long stay, and it was a long time to keep emergency 
resource there for a welfare issue. However, there was a risk of fire if I didn’t 
take that decision” (Adrian, 17, Watch commander, UK) 
 
“The first thing is to enter, if you enter and fail, then you try to do another 
thing. It is not wise to fight a fire from outside at all; you must get to the seat 
of fire, no matter how serious it is. In fact if someone is trapped inside the fire, 
and you are unable to fight the fire where that person is trapped, we have 
equipment that we wear (fire jackets), so we wear to enter and rescue the 
person” (Sammy, 8, FSO, Nigeria) 
 
 
“I thought it was OK for the two guys to go in without having back up. So it’s a 
good decision, they had water, so they had the means of putting it out” (Willy, 
28, Watch commander, UK) 
 
Surprisingly, however, some of the UK participants were found to be particularly 
critical of the risk culture employed in the UK fire service, arguing that the culture 
seems to be encouraging a risk averse behaviour amongst firefighters: 
 
“The decision to leave crews inside the building initially, I could have been 
criticized for that, and I was very mindful of it, that was very much like do or 
don’t I……I don’t like the fire service for the way…..I think we can be quite 
risk averse…..and I don’t like that….I try not to be risk averse, I think we are 
the fire service we are there to take risks for the greater benefit, albeit not 
recklessly” (Darren, 17, Group commander and flexi-duty officer) 
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“One of the controversies was that the crews weren’t that comfortable in 
being that close to cylinders that were potentially involved in fire. I explained 
to them as a HAZMAT officer as well….. it was hard saying for me to say I 
risk assessed this, it’s fine, if we don’t do this that fire is going to come 
through here, it’s probably going to blow the cylinders and it’s going to go out 
to the street. So that was the calculated risk that I took”. (Troy, 27, Group 
commander and flexi-duty officer, UK) 
 
The above supports the underpinning principles of the risk thermostat model (Smith, 
2003), which posits that effective risk management entails getting a balance between 
potential losses and gains associated with risk taking, such that one is not neglected 
over the other. In the words of Adam Smith:  
 
a “one-sided concern for reducing accidents without considering the 
opportunity costs of so doing fosters excessive risk aversion — worthwhile 
activities with very small risks are inhibited or banned. Conversely, the pursuit 
of the rewards of risk to the neglect of social and environmental “externalities” 
can also produce undesirable outcomes” (Smith, 2009, p.1) 
 
It can therefore be inferred that what an individual expert firefighter judges as safe 
(or unsafe) is mostly a function of their risk taking attitude, which is in itself largely 
shaped by their level of experience. This explains why the concept of dynamic risk 
assessment has mostly been associated with experiential knowledge since no 
definite rule exists to indicate the amount of risk that is expected to be taken 
(Tissington and Flin, 2005; Clancy, 2011; Okoli et al., 2015). The competence 
assessment framework that was developed in this study (see table 7.1) strongly 
advocates the need to train novices in becoming more balanced in their risk taking 
attitude. This implies teaching them how to take calculated risks as opposed to being 
too risk averse or being overly reckless. 
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6. PROBLEM DETECTION 
 
Problem detection has been defined as the ability to recognize that events may 
be taking an unexpected or undesirable turn, hence, potentially requiring some 
form of intervention (Klein et al., 2005). The ability to detect problems earlier on in 
an incident ultimately requires seeing the bigger picture and identifying early 
warning signs, even if those signs yet appear casual, under-developed or 
microscopic and difficult to make sense of. Many crisis management scholars 
have suggested that the majority of the “small” disruptions which eventually turn 
out to become critical problems are rarely self-evident at the beginning (Turner, 
1976; Reason, 1990; Smith, 1990; Fink, 2002; Elliot and Smith, 2006; Boin, 
2006). Expertise therefore rests on an officer’s ability to recognize from vague, 
ambivalent and contradictory signals, that something out of the ordinary is 
developing, which might negatively affect task performance. In essence, this 
aspect of tacit knowledge helps ensure that any gap(s) in a potential action plan 
is detected in advance. 
 
The excerpts below shed more light on the importance of problem detection, 
showing how experts were able to pre-empt potential problems and act accordingly 
to prevent their escalation:   
 
“I walked down, looked for the officer in charge, at the same time I saw these 
guys trying to mobilize a firefighting jet in between this house and the next 
door neighbour’s house on an alleyway; to try and take it round the back to 
fight the fire from the back because that’s where the main seat of the fire was. 
Now I haven’t taken over, I haven’t even seen the incident commander at that 
point but I intervened at that point because I know No we won’t do that. …….. 
(Troy, 27, Group commander and flexi-duty officer, UK) 
 
“….and also we were cooling the cylinder because we want to prevent the fire 
from spreading” (Atkinson, 8, FSO, Nigeria) 
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“We had to fight the fire from the rear [so as to block damages] because it was 
spreading towards the rear from the front …..also because the wall may fall 
upon any of the officers if we fight from the front” (Knight, 8, FSO, Nigeria)  
 
On this note, the competence assessment framework developed in this study 
(Table 7.1) suggests the need to include, as part of their training curriculum, tasks 
that will help less experienced officers improve their ability to detect early warning 
signs. This includes being able to spot the presence of combustible materials in a 
building; to detect access difficulties to a building early enough; to identify the 
need, and develop strategies that can help resolve the problem of water supply, 
especially in rural areas etc.  
 
7. LIMITS OF CONTROL/BOUNDARIES OF SKILLS 
One of the easily overlooked aspects of tacit knowledge, yet a crucial skill for 
survival, is that of understanding the boundary of one’s expertise. Irrespective of 
their level of competence or previous success records, expert firefighters are still 
sometimes faced with certain circumstances, mostly external, that can appear 
difficult to control e.g. ensuring a timely availability of specialist appliances, 
working against harsh weather conditions such as wind speed or intense heat etc. 
Hence, understanding the limits of what one is able to control, especially under 
time pressure, will help ensure that precious moments are not wasted in 
experimenting things that might eventually not work.   
 
The CDM transcripts revealed two main areas where experts showed good 
understanding and awareness of their limits of control:  
 
(i) Their willingness to admit that an event has escalated beyond their boundary of 
expertise and therefore requires intervention from more superior officers. The 
participants interviewed in this study were rarely ego-centric in surrendering the 
command and control of an incident to their superior officers if need be, 
suggesting therefore that experts seemed to understand the limits and boundaries 
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of their expertise. This was found to be the case in two situations that proved 
extremely difficult to control — the two officers in question (Marvin, 30, Station 
Manager, Nigeria; Dunham, 13.5, Station Manager, UK) naturally passed the 
baton of leadership to their superior officers (fire chiefs in both cases) as the 
incident escalated.  
 
(ii) Showing the right character — admitting to defeat where and when necessary 
i.e. knowing exactly where to “cease fire”. The excerpt below shows, for instance, 
how a severe school fire defied all possible tactics, despite being supervised by a 
district fire commander, forcing the officer to completely withdraw his crew from 
the building. The fire was caused by a lightning strike, concurrently creating 
multiple fires in three different parts of the building. The officer and his crew 
eventually allowed the building to burn itself down after attempts at saving the 
building proved futile. The incident commander reported thus: 
 
I’ve got to make that call [withdrawing the crews from the building], but it’s my 
judgment as to when to make that call. And I just have to stand back and say 
I have lost this one, even with the resource I’ve got the fire is beyond our 
ability to put it out, it’s in too many places, it’s spreading too quickly because 
fire was everywhere (Darren, 17, Station Manager and district commander, 
UK)                                   
 
Over the years, organizational and behavioural psychologists have attempted to 
understand why individuals usually find it difficult to admit defeat even when there 
are signs suggesting that all hope is lost (Bazerman and Watkins, 2006; Roux 
dufort, 2005; Smith, 2000; McRaney, 2011; Kahneman, 2003; Dunning et al., 
2003). The quest to understand this aspect of human nature generated some new 
insights and provided useful explanations to some of the cognitive biases and 
illusions that drive ego-centric behaviour in humans. One of these psychological 
biases that inflate people’s belief in themselves is the illusion of favourability, 
which suggests that people have an unrealistic positive view about themselves in 
both absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, people tend to highlight their 
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positive abilities and discount their weaknesses, and in relative terms people 
believe they are more honest, smart, capable, intelligent, and insightful than 
others (Messick and Bazerman, 1996). Another psychological bias that tends to 
distort human reasoning is the illusion of optimism, which holds the view that 
people are unrealistically positive about the future relative to others (McKenna, 
1993). That is, people overestimate the likelihood that they will experience “good” 
future events and underestimate the likelihood they will experience the “bad” 
ones. Finally the illusion of control shows how people often attempt to exaggerate 
the extent to which they can control random events (Turner, 1976; Kahneman, 
2011; Gasaway, 2012). Although it is sometimes advisable to think positively 
about one’s self (McKenna, 1993), when these tendencies become extreme they 
can lead to illusions that, while gratifying, can also distort reality and bias decision 
making. 
 
Acknowledging one’s inadequacies, especially in unpredictable or unforeseen 
circumstances should therefore not be seen as a sign of weakness, contrary to 
common belief. In fact, scholars have shown that knowing what one can/cannot 
do can be a useful tool for managing overconfidence and thus a hallmark of 
expertise (Messick and Bazerman, 1996; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Hallinan, 
2011). 
 
8. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
Over the past decades, Peter Salovey and John Mayer have been two of the 
leading experts on the subject of emotional intelligence (Salovey and Mayer, 
1989; Mayer and Salovey, 1993). They defined emotional intelligence as the 
ability to monitor one's own feelings (or emotions) and those of others, using that 
as the basis to guide subsequent actions. 
The participants emphasized the importance of emotional intelligence in managing 
complex fires, stating that although the concept is relatively unpopular in the fire-
fighting domain it remains a crucial virtue that must be possessed by all incident 
commanders. The majority of the participants claimed that whilst the less 
experienced fire-fighters might not necessarily fall short in the area of technical 
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knowledge, they are more likely to struggle in terms of managing not only their 
own emotions, but also that of other crew members and/or the members of the 
public. A range of keywords phrases from the interview transcripts informed the 
coding process for this particular aspect of tacit knowledge. These include: 
doggedness, confidence, ability to cope with pressure, dogmatism, being 
considerate, being energetic, being compassionate, calmness amidst turbulence, 
and being brave.  
 More specifically, findings showed that emotional intelligence is quite important in 
managing cases such as arson and for dealing with some difficult members of the 
public (as mostly found in the Nigerian setting). For example, Adrian (27, Watch 
Commander, UK) explained how the arson case he managed was made possible 
mainly because of his emotional intelligence. See excerpt below: 
“I think what could have easily been overlooked is the condition of the woman. 
The incident might have been left without any support, or it may have been 
dealt with without adequate compassion” 
 
Also, in another incident that involved an urgent need to salvage a victim who had 
suffered about 30% burns, the commander (Brown, 27, Crew Commander, UK), 
from the point of view of emotional intelligence, explained that: 
 
“If you did not have your training and experiences you would have “froze”. A 
man screaming on the floor and the kids are looking down at you; you would 
have frozen. But once you have been put up to that high level of stress, you 
know how to deal with it. And what happens being a firefighter — everything 
around you is going mad, and people are looking to you because they think 
you are the rock. So if you show any sign of weakness then that will be 
reflected on your crew, that will be reflected on people around you; you have 
to give people hope; and that is what we do by standing tall”  
The above excerpt also shows that emotional intelligence (or the ability to “stand 
tall” amidst chaos), just like other metacognitive processes such as sense 
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making, situation awareness, critical thinking, team decision making, gets better 
as people acquire more experience.  
 
5.11. Chapter Summary 
The chapter began by presenting the demographic characteristics of the thirty 
participants, which includes useful background information about, but not limited to 
the participants’ level of education, training and certifications acquired and the 
number of stations served in. Differences were found between the age distribution of 
the UK and Nigerian participants, with the former having a higher mean value and 
lower standard deviation. The chapter also showed how the participants personally 
perceived the job of firefighting, with particular interest on what makes the job a 
complex one. A content analysis of the CDM data revealed seven different criteria 
that defined experts’ perception on what a “challenging” and/or a “memorable” 
incident was. Interestingly, participants did not necessarily define a memorable 
incident on the basis of recency; rather other variables were seen to influence the 
decision of each participant to narrate the particular incident they chose to report. 
 
In examining one of the most important objectives of the study i.e. to identify the 
dominant decision making strategy often employed by fireground commanders in 
solving complex tasks, a categorization construct was adopted that was similar to 
that used by O’Hare et al., (1998) in their study with expert water rafting guides, 
aviation pilots and emergency ambulance dispatchers. Each decision point was 
coded as “option comparison”, “deliberated”, “analog” or “prototype”, depending on 
the source of knowledge applicable to experts at each decision point. Findings from 
the study showed that majority of experts’ decisions fitted into the prototypical or 
pattern recognition strategy across both groups of participants (UK= 88.4%, 
Nigeria=84.6%), suggesting that the officers were mainly assessing the current 
situation against the prototypes they had stored in their memory. The interview 
excerpts also provided additional evidence to suggest that the ability to recognize 
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patterns is one of the greatest hallmarks of expertise, which is also dependent on the 
number of incidents that had been attended and the lessons learnt from them.  
 
The decision points from the study were also analyzed using existing theoretical 
constructs, with each decision point coded as “standard” “typical” or “creative”. 
Findings showed that experts utilized at least one of the three problem solving 
strategies when resolving complex tasks, depending on the nature of the incident. 
The vast majority of decision points across the entire incidents were found to fall 
within the “adapted to suit” (typical) category, accounting for 62.3% and 64.6% of the 
UK and the Nigerian decision points respectively. The above findings gave credence 
to existing notion that experts know the boundaries of their skills and when to apply 
or switch between the three strategies as events unfold. Analysis of the various 
decision points also provided further understanding regarding the sequence of 
conversion that exists between the application of rule, skill and knowledge based 
decisions. For example, rules and procedures were often invoked when performing 
recurrent (routine) aspects of tasks, since expected outcomes are basically similar 
from problem to problem. But in situations where expected outcomes vary from 
problem to problem (non-routine tasks), decision-makers tended to depend less on 
rules/procedures, relying more on their prototypical and creative ability. 
 
Furthermore, the knowledge elicitation process and analyses of the thirty incident 
reports generated 42 different cues commonly sought by the expert firefighters, 
which were then categorized into five classes based on the type of information they 
conveyed to incident commanders. While some cues presented themselves to 
officers in clearly visible ways e.g. smoke colour, intensity of fire, crack on the wall, 
collapsed roof, thickness of the smoke, others were found to be less visible and thus 
required experts to make use of their senses, previous experience and rich domain 
knowledge in gaining a deeper understanding.  
 
The chapter also presented and discussed a decision making model — the 
information filtering an intuitive decision model, which describes how the expert 
officers were able to cope with multiple informational sources on the fireground and 
276 
 
 
 
yet able to make fast decisions in most cases. The model described how expert 
firefighters were able to gather the wide range of informational cues at the fire scene 
and how such information is subsequently filtered to the point that decision makers 
are confident of carrying out their proposed action plans without the need for further 
deliberation. In addition, the IFID model provided additional insight regarding the role 
of intuition in deliberation and in creative decision making.  
The chapter concluded by presenting and discussing eight dimensions of tacit 
knowledge that emerged from the CDM data across the thirty incidents: cue 
discrimination, pre-planning, prioritization, domain knowledge, dynamic risk 
assessment, problem detection, limits of control and emotional intelligence.  
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CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEXTUAL (CULTURAL) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UK AND NIGERIAN FIRE FIGHTERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON TRAINING AND INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN 
6.1. Introduction 
As previously stated, one of the objectives set out in this study was to examine how 
expert firefighters (both in the UK and Nigeria) made difficult decisions while 
managing complex fireground tasks. The initial assumptions were that the difference 
between the two groups would predominantly lie in the aspect of the firefighting 
technology employed by each of the group and that experts across both groups 
would make fireground decisions that are only appropriate to their respective task 
environments (context-based decisions).  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the key cultural differences that were identified 
from the two study areas, both at individual (firefighter) and organizational (fire 
service) levels. Although some of the key differences between the two groups have 
been discussed in the previous chapter, these are again collectively summarized 
here for ease of recall. Following a summary of the key cognitive differences that 
were found to exist between the UK and Nigerian firefighters, a discussion regarding 
the contextual factors that are perceived to have facilitated the cultural differences is 
then presented. This discussion is structured into four themes: cultural context of the 
firefighting equipment and resourcing, cultural context of the approaches to training 
and perceived training needs, cultural context of the firefighting tactics, and cultural 
differences in governmental and environmental influences.  
As a caveat, however, it is worth mentioning that the intention of the analysis in this 
section is not to use any of the two fire services as a benchmark, but rather to 
compare and contrast, where applicable, some of the operational and cultural 
differences that were found to exist between the two groups, from the point of view of 
the participants.   
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6.1.1. The relationship between culture and shared cognition within a 
community of practice 
 
Research on national culture and its impact on organizational performance is not 
new, but can be dated back to the work of Hofstede who examined the cultural 
differences of individuals from across over forty countries between 1967 and 1978 
(Hofstede, 1983). Hofstede’s main proposition was that the way people think is often 
conditioned by the core values underpinning their national culture, meaning that the 
subject of national culture can no longer be relegated to the rear when it comes to 
understanding how people behave within their community of practice. On this note, 
Hofstede (1983) defined culture as the collective programming of the mind that is 
taught to other members of the group as the right way of doing things. Hofstede 
provided some useful analogies regarding how difficult it is to change people’s 
existing cultural mind-set, unless one first detaches them from their culture.   
Culture within the context of this study is understood as the symbolic and learned 
social processes that generate and sustain shared norms and values between 
members of a social group (Schein, 2004). It represents not only national or ethnic 
cultures, but also the easily “taken for granted” procedures that have become part of 
an organization’s daily routines. As noted by Nonaka (1994), individuals often 
internalize the moral values of their organizations as they undergo socialization with 
other members within a community of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991).   
Ample evidence exists to suggest that knowledge in itself, and therefore shared 
cognition within a group, cannot be separated from the context in which it was 
created (Nonaka, 1994; Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Maqsood, Finegan and Walker, 
2004; Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009). This implies that both the creation and sharing 
of knowledge is often deeply embedded in temporal contexts, which include the 
environmental conditions, cultural overtones, and social circumstances that underpin 
people’s actions (or inaction). In the knowledge creation theory the term “context” is 
often referred to as “ba” — a shared space where knowledge is created based on 
the interactions and relationships that exist in a group, often between actors, agents 
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and structures (see Nonaka, 1994 for example). Ba, which is similar to the concept 
of “community of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991), can be physical, virtual, mental 
or any combination of these (Nonaka and Toyama, 2007). Hence, an attempt to 
measure knowledge between two or more groups is likely to pose some challenges, 
since knowledge in itself is strongly bound to culture. It can therefore be implied that 
different “bas” exist for both the UK and the Nigerian firefighters. For example, 
building on the principles of organizational knowledge creation theory, Erden, von 
Krogh and Nonaka (2008) examined the quality of group tacit knowledge based on 
the gaps they identified in the literature pertaining to how individuals and groups 
often utilize tacit knowledge.  
6.1.2 Some similarities, but some differences  
The interview reports in the current study generated a total number of 69 and 65 
decision points for the UK and Nigerian firefighters respectively and analysis of the 
decision points revealed, perhaps, some unexpected similarities in the decision 
making and problem solving strategies of the two groups. For instance, analysis of 
the decision points showed the following estimates between the UK and the Nigerian 
firefighters respectively: 7.2% and 7.7% of the entire decision points were found to 
be made deliberatively; 88.4% and 84.6% were prototypical decisions; 4.3% and 
7.7% were based on analogs; 23.2% and 26.2% fell under the standard category, 
and 62.3% and 64.6% of the decisions were adaptive (see sections 5.4 and 5.5). 
Whilst these statistics can be said to pose some form of surprise, it can also be 
argued that the findings seemed logical when one considers that the decision points 
were actually analysed against the distinct environments in which the decisions were 
made. Analysis of the qualitative transcripts also showed considerable similarities in 
the way experts from the two groups made decisions. The two groups of experts, for 
example, both seemed to understand what cues like wind, temperature, cracked 
walls and collapsed roofs meant, as well as their implications for task performance 
(see section 5.7)   
Despite these similarities, considerable differences were also found across the 
interview reports between the two groups of experts. These are summarized below: 
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In terms of the leadership style used on the fireground (command and control), some 
difference was found to exist between the two groups (see pp. 176). The Nigerian 
fire service tends to be more hierarchical, on average, than its UK counterpart and 
mainly allows the highest ranking officer present at the scene of an incident to take 
over command and control. In the UK, the decision is mostly based on the 
circumstances surrounding an incident. While the most experienced of the officers 
(in terms of length of service) have the right to leadership responsibility in theory (in 
the UK), there are instances where these superior officers allow other lesser ranked 
officers who have gained the best situation awareness to take over overall incident 
command responsibility. It can then be argued that the UK fire service tends to lean 
towards what has generally been termed situational leadership (see Bass, 1990 for 
an overview). Situational leadership is based on the notion that no particular 
leadership style fits all situations, meaning that leaders have the obligation of finding 
the most appropriate balance between their individual and group competencies on 
one hand, and the current proceedings of an incident on the other hand. For 
example, a leader might decide to adopt an autocratic style under time-pressured 
situations and then become more democratic when stakes become less (Bass, 
Avolio and Atwater, 1996). The Nigerian fire service, in contrast, seems to be more 
autocratic in its leadership style, with little or no room for flexibility.     
 
Another aspect of cultural difference that emerged from the study was in terms of the 
goal pursued by officers within the two groups. Although a range of firefighting goals 
were identified and discussed (see Table 5.7, pp. 210-211), that of “reinforcement 
and support” was found to be significantly lower for the Nigerian officers 
(Nigeria=4DPs vs UK=15DPs). Owing to the nature of firefighting, there is little doubt 
that more resources often need to be called upon as an incident escalates. However, 
as popular as the goal of “resource reinforcement and support” appeared in the UK, 
it was not very common amongst the Nigerian firefighters. This can be explained on 
the notion that there are hardly any resources available to call upon even when they 
are needed (this issue is discussed later in this chapter).  
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Analysis of the entire set of decision points also revealed interesting cultural 
differences between both groups of experts. For instance, a list of decision points 
that were peculiar to the Nigerian firefighters but not reported by any of the UK 
firefighters is outlined below (see appendices A and B for full list of decision points): 
 
• Conducting situation assessment upon arriving at the scene of an incident 
• Going back to the nearest fire station to replenish water supplies  
• Taking the nearest available route to the scene of an incident 
• Using breathing apparatus — while the use of breathing apparatus is seen as 
a legal requirement as well as a mandatory obligation in the UK fire service 
(HM Government, 2008), the Nigerian officers uses it only in “exceptional” 
circumstances  
• Crawling into a building (only) with a charged hose to fight a fire  
• Laying two lines of hose (This is an important decision often made when there 
is an urgent need to extinguish a fire from more than one direction. Whilst this 
decision was mentioned 5 times by the Nigerian firefighters, none of the UK 
experts considered it worth mentioning).  
 
Another key difference between the UK and the Nigerian experts emerged in an 
attempt to examine whether options actually existed (See Table 5.5. pp. 193).  While 
six of the participants believed that “options chosen were not necessarily the best, 
but were the best available to the officers at the time”, this was not found to be the 
case for the UK experts. The Nigerian firefighters, in hindsight, believe they could 
have made better decisions if they had the right resources at the time the decisions 
were made.     
 
In the next section, the contextual factors that were perceived to have underpinned 
the aforementioned cultural differences are discussed under four themes:    
6.3. Cultural context of firefighting equipment and resourcing 
Just like their UK counterparts, the Nigerian firefighters believe they have a duty of 
care to members of public, in terms of saving lives and valuable properties. Based 
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on this understanding, they often strive to mitigate and prevent the escalation of fire 
incidents as much as they possibly can and with the resources available to them. 
However, as earlier hypothesized, a major concern that was raised by all the 
Nigerian firefighters relates to the poor condition of the equipment they operate with. 
They claimed that the fire crews are sometimes limited in their operational 
performance due to a lack of modern infrastructure that is able to match the 
challenges of the 21st century fires.  
Based on personal observations and from analyses of the interview reports, a few 
differences were identified in the ways that both groups of firefighters often carry out 
their routine tasks on the fireground, with particular reference to equipment (see 
Table 6.1 below) 
 
Table 6.1: Analysis of the approaches to firefighting between the UK and Nigeria fire services   
Fireground practices                 Modes of operation 
       UK Nigeria 
Protecting officers from inhaling smokes, 
toxic and poisonous substances 
• The use of computerized 
breathing apparatus set 
• Use of handkerchiefs 
(face towels) 
Committing crews into a well alight building 
(offensive firefighting)  
• Breathing apparatus sets  
• Entry control board and 
identification tallies 
• Use of face masks  
• Spraying water on 
firefighters to cool the 
heat around them 
Protecting officers against excessive heat 
and physical injuries 
• Fully kitted PPEs (helmet, 
fire-boots, touch lights, 
fire-jackets, and whistles).  
• Fire breaks (excessive 
release of water to the 
unaffected areas)  
• Spraying water through 
the hose to reduce the 
amount of heat around 
the fireground 
Gaining access to high rise buildings  • Hydraulic platforms  
• Fire helicopters  
• Dry riser systems 
• Use of ladders and hook 
ladders 
Ensuring constant supply of water • Fire engines are 
connected to hydrants  
• The use of two or more 
fire engines for water 
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In the UK, for example: 
• High volume pumps (HVPs) can effectively pump about 7,000 litres of water 
per minute, thereby making sufficient amount of water available for 
firefighting. It can also be used to remove water from a flooded area at the 
same rate, which corresponds to emptying an Olympic sized swimming pool 
in just 3 hours. 
 
• A "Dry riser" is a system of pipe work and valves that enables water to be 
delivered for fire-fighting purposes to all floors in high rise buildings. 
 
• Breathing apparatus sets i.e. self-contained respiratory protective equipment 
are used for interior attacks and are mainly designed to protect firefighters.  
 
In contrast, the Nigerian firefighters often arrive at fire scenes relying solely on water 
in the fire trucks as hydrants do not currently work in the country. They either do not 
exist at all, or do not run where they do exist due to poor water networks (see 
excerpts below). Hence within the Nigerian context where water availability is quite 
challenging, securing and managing water effectively during response operations 
appear to be one of the main goals for incident commanders. In meeting this crucial 
challenge, incident commanders often strive to deploy more than one vehicle at a 
time to fire scenes. Once water in one fire engine is exhausted, it goes back to the 
nearest fire station for replenishing and another fire engine is engaged. However, in 
• High volume pumps 
(HVPs) 
security 
• Going back to stations to 
replenish fire trucks 
Communication between incident 
commanders and control department 
• Wireless radio 
communication 
• Mobile phones 
Managing crowd and creating hazard zones • Use of inner/outer cordons 
• Use of hazard tapes 
• Reliance on security 
agencies to help control 
crowd 
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the event of a massive fire that requires constant water supply (e.g. when there is 
need to run multiple streams of water), incident commanders mostly tend to opt for 
water vendors. These water vendors enter a short term contract with the officers to 
supply all the water needed for firefighting and are then paid in return.  
The excerpts below illustrate the above points more clearly: 
We come for replenishing, that is one of the problems around here. But if there 
are water hydrants around there, the best thing is just to couple our hose and 
other equipment into the hydrant and start to fight fire. You know here cannot 
be compared to where you are talking [overseas], like here now, even though 
they have the hydrants there, are they flowing? Is there water inside? If the 
hydrants are there and the water is not coming in there, it’s nothing. But what 
we do here for now is that if there is fire incident, there is more than one 
vehicle that will attend, and they noticed that the water is not enough, they will 
come back to the station to replenish the tank, and go back. That is the 
system we are using (Adam, CFS, 30, Nigeria) 
  
No hydrants available, if water finishes we have to come back to the station 
and then fire cannot wait for you. The tanker can only take 15,000liters of 
water. Look at Ilorin we have only 2 stations, if fire happens in like Oloje, do 
you think the house will not burn down before we get there? That is why 
when we get there we face problem, people will be stoning us. They will be 
fighting us (Kevin, 8, Watch Commander, Nigeria).  
 
As earlier stated, all the Nigerian participants decried the lack of up-to-date 
firefighting equipment, which they see as a huge blow to the Nigeria Fire Service 
compared to what is available overseas. In lamenting this situation, one of the 
officers explained that:  
If at all now we have something like 12-20 storeys of building on fire, we in 
Kwara State don’t have access to those buildings, we can only get far as 
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much as our ladder can carry us. In fact, if any building is above three storeys, 
believe me, we don’t have anything to do on it (Young, FSO, 8, Nigeria) 
The Nigerian participants identified the following equipment as the most needed in 
the Nigeria fire service: 
• Turntable ladders 
• Aerial ladders for high rise buildings 
• Breathing Apparatus sets 
• Aerial planes 
• Hydraulic platforms 
• Hose layers 
• Automatically coupled hose 
• Automatic line divider 
• Water tenders 
• Foam tenders 
• Modern fire engines (e.g. Pump ladder rescue, Turntable ladder) 
• Brigade response vehicles (BRVs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.1: A face mask that is worn in place of breathing apparatus set 
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Figure 6.2: A rubber boot worn in place of fire safety boots 
 
There is ample evidence indicating a significant difference in the level of firefighting 
equipment and resource capabilities between both countries (see Table 6.1, Fig 6.2 
& Fig 6.4). However, an interesting cultural insight emerged from the analysis of the 
transcripts that seemed to transcend resource capability. A cultural bias against the 
use of breathing apparatus was identified amongst some of the Nigerian firefighters, 
which was traceable to the information they were given at the fire training school. 
One of the officers reported that although they were told the importance of using 
breathing apparatus sets when fighting massive fires, they were also advised on the 
need to constantly ensure they breathe in natural air: 
Sometimes you may not have BA; you have one handkerchief [face towel] to 
cover your nose…..You see in any fire we are always advised to use BA; but 
what we learnt is that to use BA, you will not feel comfortably or enjoy free air 
like this (Sammy, 8, FSO, Nigeria) 
Are these two alternatives (i.e. using BA sets and breathing in natural air) not meant 
to be mutually exclusive? Breathing apparatus is purposely designed to supply 
oxygen to operators so as to support their breathing while performing tasks under 
stringent conditions of excessive heat, smoke. It also serves the purpose of 
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protecting its wearers from inhaling dangerous combustible substances. In none of 
the UK incidents did any of the officers enter a well-alight building without their 
breathing apparatus sets. An important question remains whether or not the Nigerian 
officers would be inclined to use breathing apparatus sets if made available to them?    
 
6.4. Cultural context of firefighting tactics 
Differences were found between the UK and the Nigerian firefighters in terms of the 
firefighting tactics that are employed on the fireground, particularly with how fire 
crews are being committed into a well-alight building. Essentially, the Nigerian 
firefighters adopt a tactic which they termed the “practical firemanship method”. This 
method was shown to have been taught to these firefighters as an acceptable 
template for entering a well alight building. The method was explained in detail by 
one of the participants:    
We believe that thick gas, those toxic gases, would rise up leaving a less 
dense one underneath. You will be able to breathe in that one [the less dense 
gases] so that it would not affect you much. Now you go in with your hose fully 
charged, but you open it little, as that water is coming out from the nozzle, it’s 
coming out with some oxygen, it is that oxygen that you will have to inhale in 
order to sustain you while going in. But as you are going in, you will be 
quenching the little fires you meet on your way while. You also have to make 
sure that you will be using the back of your hand to clear the ground as you go 
into the building. You don’t crawl with your palm on the ground, if this palm 
should touch a livewire, that officer would be electrocuted – because the blood 
nerves is concentrated on this palm more than the back of the hand. If you 
touch a livewire with the back of your hand it will only shake your hand so that 
you can easily manoeuvre the danger. That is how you will now enter and fight 
that fire from your crawling till you believe you can now see clearly you will 
now stand up (Francis, 28, CFS, Nigeria) 
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The above excerpt seems to suggest, inter alia, the extent to which the Nigerian 
firefighters are willing to improvise in the bid to make up for inadequate resources. 
Since the officers cannot afford to be passive they devise strategies with which they 
enter a building — mainly by relying on water coming out of a charged hose as a 
source of oxygen. One might therefore be forced to ask how risky this method is to 
the officers. How risky is it to rely on water from a charged hose to supply oxygen in 
a well alight building? How risky is it to touch live wires with bare hands? How risky 
is it to be under the stringent conditions of a burning building unprotected and 
without the aid of breathing apparatus sets?   
The excerpts below show how some of the Nigerian officers reported carrying out 
their firefighting tasks in a well-alight building: 
“…..for you to stay within a smoke-logged environment you have to cease your 
breathing. And don’t forget, it’s not as if we don’t have equipment that we can use, 
but there is timeline for the equipment. If you go in with BA, under 10mins you will 
exhaust the BA content, and you have to come out. But for you to be there to work 
for about 10-30mins and more, you have to cease your breathing and that is where 
the issue of having a supporting crew pouring water on you comes in, so that if you 
don’t have your BA somebody will be giving you fresh water, directly on you in 
shower form” (Sunny, 29, ACFS, Nigeria) 
 
“And secondly what make us to lie down is that there was a thick smoke. And also 
we use this face mask but it is the manual one. So we use this manual one but we 
still see that this manual one will not prevent our nose from this smoke so we have to 
lie down. But it is because of this smoke that makes us to use this system because 
we can call it a layman’s system” (Steve, FSO, 9, Nigeria) 
 
The above excerpts suggest that the Nigerian officers are culturally used to fighting 
fires without the use of breathing apparatus sets, personal protective equipment or 
entry control procedures. It could thus be argued that the firefighting tactics 
employed by the Nigerian officers are largely contributing to their increased 
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propensity to risk taking, which from the perspective of the UK firefighters might be 
classified as reckless risks. A few studies which have examined the operational 
procedures of firefighting in Nigeria have also shown that the Nigerian firefighters 
often expose themselves to high risks (Esinwoke, 2011; Cobin, 2013).   
In the UK, in contrast, the fire service seems to have a well-defined procedure for 
entering a well-alight building, generally known as entry control procedure. One of 
the UK officers showed that every incident commander or entry control officer (where 
appointed) is obliged to follow this procedure to the letter:  
    
“It was very much a rule that we have a person and another person with an 
electronic board and they monitor the firefighters that are deployed to the 
building, it’s a very safe system and we wouldn’t deviate from that at this fire 
because there was no need to” (Jade, Crew commander, 15, UK) 
 
The officer explained that three levels of entry control often exist on the fireground:  
 
“the rapid deployment, where BA wearers need to be in a building very 
quickly; stage 1, which is the normal level of control and then stage 2 which is 
the increased level of control. Stage 2 applies more to larger incidents that 
are going to last a lot longer. Stage 3 is usually not common and what 
essentially should be a stage 3 is called main control, which applies to huge 
incidents with lots of BA e.g. big buildings, a large hospital or a big factory” 
(Jade, Crew commander, 15, UK) 
  
In the event of switching to a more offensive attack as shown in the above excerpts, 
firefighters are only allowed to enter an engulfed building with the aid of their 
breathing apparatus (BA) sets. The BA wearers are also required to be committed 
into the building in pairs (mainly for safety reasons). This is then followed by setting 
up BA boards which allow the movement of all the officers fighting from the interior to 
be easily monitored. The entry control officer must therefore work closely with the 
overall incident commander to ensure that the risk versus benefits of keeping 
firefighters in the building is continuously assessed. This requires also that escape 
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routes are clearly mapped out and well understood by the committed crews in the 
event of unforeseen circumstances, such as an explosion. Hence with more 
advanced technology and with the quality of training received, some risks are better 
controlled and managed by the UK firefighters.  
 
 
 Fig. 6.3: A smashed windscreen by infuriated members of the public following the 
late arrival of the fire crew 
 
Further on the issue of tactics, the harsh environment where the Nigerian firefighters 
operate sometimes makes it difficult for effective firefighting to take place. Many of 
the participants reported they are often faced with distractions from members of the 
public who want things done their own way. These members of the public often get 
overly aggressive and hail abusive words at the firefighters and sometimes even 
stone them. It is common in Nigeria to stone the fire crews if they, for example, arrive 
to the scene of an incident late or are unable to control a fire (Fig 6.4. shows a 
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smashed windscreen by some enraged public members). Such irrational and 
intimidating behaviour from members of the public therefore poses an important 
question to the Nigerian fire brigade i.e. why can’t the officers just like their UK 
counterparts try to “cordon off” unwanted individuals from the immediate fire scene? 
This simple but important strategy will almost certainly turn out to be an effective way 
of curbing this menace, as it will allow the officers to concentrate on their task 
without fear of being verbally or physically abused.  
 
6.5. Cultural context of the approaches to training and perceived 
training needs  
In the UK, officers are reassessed on their skills every two years to ensure they are 
up-to-date (see excerpt below). During this reassessment process, firefighters are 
put through some refresher courses on different subject areas such as First Aid, 
breathing apparatus and entry control training, HAZMAT training etc. Analysis of the 
CDM reports also showed that all the UK participants have other qualifications and 
certifications, in addition to their firefighting certificates. These include specialized 
training as a BA instructor, HAZMAT adviser, First aider, NVQs, road traffic collision 
instructor, hydraulic drive operator, as well as training in areas such as fire 
investigation, building construction, fire behaviour etc. 
“They are quite extensive, wide range of trainings. You do a continuous 
training and compulsory as well. We look at ourselves every time. We have a 
set programme of training that we have to achieve as operational. e.g. you 
have to have a breathing apparatus training, first aid training. As a manager as 
well you have management training; how to deal with incidents, how to deal 
with people, and how to deal with staff. And all these trainings are continuous, 
you are continuously developing yourself” (Adrian, 17, Watch commander, 
UK) 
 
Unfortunately, the Nigerian firefighters do not have the opportunity to go through 
further training or retraining, a situation that most of the officers attributed to a lack of 
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support from government to fund and support training. Apart from Margareth, 11, 
FSO, who just completed a health and safety training, none of the Nigerian 
participants reported to have acquired any additional certifications aside the three 
they had obtained after training school (basic firefighting certificate of competence, 
ordinary certificate of competence and advanced certificate of competence).  
There also seemed to be inherent weaknesses in the range, quality and the design 
of training received by the Nigerian firefighters. For example, participants stated that 
some fires are not realistic to fight in Nigeria as they have not been trained to fight 
such fires: 
We need to be trained on how to fight chimney fire. Hospital fire is also very 
dangerous, I would personally stay outside, because of life support equipment in 
the hospital, they are highly flammable……… We were not taught how to refill fire 
extinguishers, how to do smoke detectors. More support, knowledge update, new 
equipment on how to fight fire are needed (Atkinson, Watch commander, 8, 
Nigeria) 
In a personal interview with the training commander of one of the states in Nigeria, 
the officer appeared to be sceptical about the approach to training in the Nigerian 
context, claiming that the training they receive is mostly too generic:  
“In the overseas, the training are sectional, either you go on BA, or rescue, or 
how to fight fire, but in Nigeria here, we combine all subjects to make one.  
So we are jack of all trades master of “plenty” (Marvin, CFS/Station manager, 
30, Nigeria)   
Another officer, although acknowledging the fact that officers train regularly in the 
service as expected, mourned the antiquated training procedures currently used in 
the service. He argued that the Nigeria fire service is still backward when they ought 
to be moving with the pace of time and technology:  
By the time we joined fire service, even if there is a cooking gas fire it’s not 
rampant as what is happening now because people were not using gas to 
cook then. There are many vehicles now more than before, so as things are 
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going, the fire service has to be developed so that we move with time. That is 
why I cannot say that we’ve had enough knowledge to combat what may 
happen in future? NO! Because times are changing, so we have to be moving 
with time too (Young, CFS, 28, Nigeria).     
 
 
Figure 6.4: A newly purchased BRV with extremely low pressure. The station 
manager (right) claimed he was not informed prior to the purchase of the vehicle 
 
One of the CDM probe questions in the current study was aimed at eliciting the 
particular training that would have helped the officers perform their tasks better (in 
hindsight). The goal of the question was to identify core training needs for the fire 
service of both cultural groups. To this effect, all the UK participants claimed that the 
training they had received prior to the incident was sufficient in performing their tasks 
and that they cannot think of any additional training they would have needed. This is 
not very surprising considering the quality of training the UK firefighters often receive 
as part of their daily job routine. The author of the current study has had numerous 
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opportunities to physically observe some training and simulation exercise sessions in 
some fire stations in the UK (see Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.6)  
 
Figure 6.5: A search and rescue and BA training exercise in the UK  
 
  
Figure 6.5: A road traffic collision exercise in the UK  
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 In contrast, the Nigerian firefighters, regardless of their positions, stressed the need 
for additional training. They collectively identified some key areas where training or 
retraining is mostly required: 
• International training and courses (certifications) 
• Fire investigation training (FI) 
• Wider level of training to cover other classes of fire such as palm oil 
fires, metal dust fires, gas fires 
• Fire tender training 
• Advanced operational training 
• Refilling fire extinguishers  
• Fixing smoke detectors 
• Managing unusual incidents e.g. Chimney fires, hospital fires 
(highly flammable substances) 
• Fighting fire in a confined space 
• Crowd control 
 
6.6. Cultural differences in governmental and environmental 
influences  
The final theme that emerged from the cultural analysis relates to the role of 
Government in the fire service. The Nigerian firefighters all claimed that the 
Government has failed in its responsibility to show concern for them personally and 
for the service at large, especially considering the fact that it is in the public sector. 
These officers believe they constantly lack support from the government, both on 
welfare issues and with the nature of the technology available to them. As shown 
from the excerpts below it was clear that one of the main problems facing the 
Nigerian fire service, from the point of view of the participants, is the level of 
negligence shown by the government: 
 
296 
 
 
 
“But in Nigeria fire service is not recognized; until it happen before they can 
remember fire service is there – without happening they cannot remember 
fire service in our country” (Kevin, 8, Watch Commander, Nigeria) 
 
“The BA is one of the effective equipment of firefighters, but in Nigeria, let 
me say in Kwara State, we don’t normally use the ones we have in Kwara 
State because you know our Government are not ready to finance. There 
are many in the fire engine, but we don’t normally use it. If you use it and the 
air that is inside get exhausted, who will refill it? So the Government are not 
ready to do such things” (Ryan, FSO, 8, Nigeria) 
 
“Have you ever seen where a graduate would say I would work as a 
firefighter? You can’t hear it because the condition of the service is so poor, 
despite the risk of the job, it is not well catered for in many parts of the state” 
(Francis, 28, CFS, Nigeria) 
 
“The Nigerian fire service also looks to be suffering from low manpower as 
staff turnover tend to be high. It looks like the job is not attractive to a lot of 
people…….we have little equipment but there are no personnel; we have 
shortage of personnel to even make use of the equipment. Most of the fire 
trucks since when they have been parked have had no movement…. If there 
was good equipment you know we will perform better than this” (Steve, 9, 
FSO, Nigeria) 
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 Figure 6.7: A typical classroom in a Nigerian fire training school 
 
However, aside from the governmental support the Nigerian officers claimed they 
lack, another issue that was consistently flagged up was the poor coverage of the 
fire service across states. This means there is a very limited number of fire stations 
that are available to serve the populace. For example, only 3 fire stations currently 
exist in Kwara State, one of the states that was covered in the study with a 
population of over 2.5 million people and 16 local government areas. In another 
study area, Lagos State, which is the largest commercial city in Nigeria with a 
population of 17 million people and 20 local government areas, only has 14 fire 
stations. In fact, as was reported by the participants, most states in Nigeria cannot 
effectively cope with multiple fire incidents happening at the same time. This is not 
only because of the limited number of fire stations available, but also because of the 
wide distance between the fire stations. For instance, when asked what he and his 
crew would do should another incident be reported somewhere else while on their 
way to an incident, the chief fire superintendent at Offa station, Kwara state (Young, 
28, CFS, Nigeria) explained he can at best drop-off one experienced firefighter to 
attempt to manage the new incident, while the rest of the team proceeds to the initial 
scene. He explained that with only one fire engine and six firefighters available to 
serve the whole Offa town and its environs, there is only very little anyone could do. 
 th  32 L d  
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He admitted that, ideally, in such circumstances he is supposed to inform the control 
room at the headquarters to turn out another appliance. Unfortunately, this, he noted, 
is impossible as it takes about 1.30hrs to drive from the Headquarters to his own 
station.    
In the UK, on the other hand, there seems to be a wider coverage of fire stations 
across cities and towns represented in each county. For example, there are currently 
102 well equipped fire stations across the 32 boroughs in London, including one 
independent river station, and 38 fire stations in the West Midlands (which has a 
population of 5.6 million people). These stations are also furnished with modern 
firefighting equipment, based on the author’s personal observation and his 
involvement with a few simulation exercises with the fire crews as a volunteer (see 
Fig 6.5 and Fig 6.6).  
6.7. Chapter Summary  
This chapter reported the findings that emerged from a comparative analysis 
between the UK and the Nigerian fire service, based on evidence from the interview 
transcripts. The differences between the two cultural groups were structured along 
four themes, namely cultural context of the firefighting equipment and resourcing, 
cultural context of the approaches to training and perceived training needs, cultural 
context of the firefighting tactics, and cultural differences in governmental and 
environmental influences. In general, findings showed that while the UK fire service 
appeared to be significantly more advanced than its Nigerian counterpart in the 
aspect of technology, there was more to the cultural differences than technology. 
The firefighting tactics employed by the Nigerian officers were found to be 
completely opposite those used by the UK officers. The practical firemanship method 
that was taught to the Nigerian officers as an improvised way of fighting building fires 
is arguably a high risk method when compared with the entry control procedure often 
employed by the UK officers. Evidence was also found to suggest that the Nigerian 
firefighters are often sceptical about using breathing apparatus and would rather 
prefer inhaling natural air. In addition, excerpts from the study showed that the 
Nigerian firefighters were largely unsatisfied with the quality of training received and 
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the nature of the equipment at their disposal. As a result, a range of training need 
was identified from the point of view of the Nigerian participants.  
Whilst the training outputs developed from the UK experts is believed to be useful for 
the future incident commanders in the UK, the need and opportunity for training was 
mainly found to exist with the Nigerian officers from the evidence presented above.  
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CHAPTER 7 THE COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER FROM EXPERTS TO NOVICES  
 
7.0. INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in chapter 4, one of the strengths of the critical decision method is that 
in addition to its wide use for eliciting experts’ knowledge it also provides an 
opportunity to identify training needs for novices. For the purpose of this study, the 
wide range of knowledge elicited from the thirty expert firefighters (both in the UK 
and Nigeria) was compiled and developed into an instructional framework, which 
was termed the competence assessment framework. In context of this study, an 
instructional design model is a framework for developing lessons that (i) increases 
and/or enhances the possibility of learning (ii) encourages high level of learner 
engagement  
 
Instructional design theorists have shown that the overall aim of knowledge 
elicitation is to provide a framework or guidelines through which knowledge could 
best be exchanged and/or transferred from superior officers to the less experienced 
officers (Pollock et al., 2002; van Merrienboer and Kirschner, 2007; Hoffman and 
Millitello, 2008). Such interactions often create an opportunity to design appropriate 
instructional curricula, thus providing “potential experts” with a focused and extensive 
index of experiential knowledge (Van Merrienboer, 1997; Wipawayangkool and 
Teng, 2014). With the aid of such training protocols and the lessons learnt from 
them, the schemata (action scripts, repertoires and mental models) of the less 
experienced firefighters can then be developed until they are able to support non-
recurrent tasks or attain automaticity in the tasks they are already familiar with (Van 
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Merrienboer, Clark and de Croock, 2002; Feldon, 2007; Ericsson, Prietula and 
Cokely, 2007) 
 
Having identified a range of cognitive skills and knowledge utilized by experts earlier 
in chapter 5, this chapter is focused on evaluating how novice firefighters might be 
able to benefit from the elicited knowledge outputs and possibly propel their learning 
curve towards attaining expertise. The chapter begins by presenting and discussing 
the competence assessment framework, which is a compilation of the skills and 
knowledge elicited from the thirty interviewed experts. Thereafter, the implications for 
learning the elicited knowledge, and more specifically how it can be transferred to 
novice firefighters is discussed, drawing on the extant literature and also from 
evidence provided by the interviewed experts. The chapter then proceeds to propose 
the four component design (4C/ID) model as a useful learning framework. The 
rationale for choosing the 4C/ID over other instructional design models is discussed 
extensively for the benefit of training facilitators or instructional designers who might 
wish to utilize the identified expert knowledge for training purposes (particularly the 
Nigerian fire service where training curricula currently seem to be poorly designed or 
not existing). Two learning theories that have been widely used in the field of 
educational psychology — Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development and the theory 
of situated learning/communities of practice are explored as theoretical basis for the 
proposed 4C/ID model. The chapter then concludes by proposing possible ways of 
assessing novices, drawing on Miller’s (1990) assessment framework and other 
relevant assessment mechanisms in the cognitive load theory literature.   
7.1. THE COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (CAF): A 
SYNTHESIS OF ELICITED EXPERT KNOWLEDGE  
 
Fire training colleges, staff and manpower development centres as well as incident 
command training schools (both the UK and Nigeria) all conduct at least one form of 
assessment that helps them verify the competence level of potential incident 
commanders i.e. prior to a promotion exercise. By so doing, these bodies are faced 
with the crucial tasks of discriminating amongst candidates in the final selection 
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process, providing effective learning strategies that must also motivate and engage 
the learners, as well as evaluating the adequacy of existing training programmes.  
 
Analysis of the CDM transcripts across the entire incidents generated eight 
categories of expert knowing, which were collectively termed dimensions of tacit 
knowledge (See section 5.10 for details). This elicited expert knowledge thus aided 
the development of the competence assessment framework shown in Table 7.1.  
 
Following the nature of the present day crisis, it is almost certain that competence 
needs to be measured across a wider range of parameters, with more emphasis on 
tacit knowledge. The framework is hence based on existing claims that competence 
is best defined by tacit as opposed to explicit knowledge (Polanyi 1962; Anderson, 
1989; Hannabuss, 2000; Bontis, 2001; Eraut 2004; Ritter et al., 2007; Nonaka and 
Krogh, 2009; Wipawayangkool and Teng, 2014).  
 
Table 7.1: The Competence Assessment Framework 
Dimensions of Tacit Knowledge                                       Levels of Assessment 
Cue discrimination Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
• Ability to differentiate between smoke 
colors and their implications 
    
• Recognizing the class of fire involved 
(class A – F) 
    
• Perceiving the smell e.g. gas fire, 
electrical sparks 
    
• Physical damage     
• Ability to make sense of the substance 
burning in a building 
• Understanding where to position fire 
resources based on surrounding 
structure (e.g. if there are houses 
around) 
Domain knowledge Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
• Fire behaviour and combustion     
• Understanding how different building 
types affect fire-fighting e.g. high rise 
buildings and the use of a dry riser 
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• Understanding smoke behaviour 
    
• Knowledge of Water properties     
• Understanding fuel behaviour     
• Understanding how climatic factors 
(e.g. wind direction, temperature) affect 
task performance 
    
• Using the most appropriate Fire-
fighting medium (e.g. fog method, 
spray, main jet, main jet + hose reel) 
    
• Knowing the class of fire involved 
(class A-F) 
    
• Knowledge of the different available 
fire equipment and their use (e.g. 
crane, hose reel, main jets, ladder, cold 
cut cobra, dry riser, ground monitors) 
    
 
• Setting up command structure for 20 
pumps 
• Understanding how to source for water 
in difficult conditions e.g. rural areas 
    
 
 
 
• Cooling combustible gases using hose 
reel 
    
• Laying hoses under time pressure; 
knowing when to run two or more lines 
of hoses 
    
 
• Making sense of when to take over as  
incident commander 
    
 
• Laying ladders using a building as 
reference point. 
    
 
• Entry control procedure (Rapid 
deployment, stage 1, stage 2) 
    
Prioritization Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
• Task sequencing (which task should 
come first?)  
    
• Requesting resources on the basis of 
their urgency 
• Knowing how many lines of hose to 
create 
• Resource mobilization from other 
stations 
    
Emotional Intelligence Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
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• Perceiving the emotions of other team 
members 
    
• Reasoning with the emotions of other 
team members 
    
• Understanding the emotions     
• Managing the emotions of other team 
members 
• Personal traits (self-awareness, self-
will, confidence) 
    
Risk Assessment Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
• Pre-assessment/Pre-planning e.g. 
planning and distributing tasks in 
advance 
    
• The ability to take “calculated” risks 
amidst task constraints e.g. looking for 
the seat of fire 
    
• The ability to spot important hazards 
clearly and timely.  
 
    
Creativity & Improvisation Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
 
• Creative decisions 
    
• Ability to gain access to building within 
tight space 
    
• Ability to source for water in rural     
areas with less hydrants 
    
• Ability to generate other workable 
options 
    
Limits of control/Safety awareness Knows Knows 
how 
Shows 
how 
Does 
• Ability to identify 
 task constraints 
    
• Understanding when to employ an 
offensive/defensive strategy 
    
• Recognizing the boundaries of safety      
• Knowing exactly when to seek support 
from other team members 
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As the name implies, the competence assessment framework was mainly designed 
to serve as a useful tool for assessing performance in the firefighting domain, 
particularly in novices. One of the strengths of the framework is the fact that it is 
conceptualized as a descriptive (naturalistic), as opposed to a prescriptive model — 
meaning that the assessment criteria identified in the framework were directly drawn 
from real-life fire incidents that were directly reported in the study.  
 
In their study involving professional competence in the health sector, Epstein and 
Hundert (2002) identified a lack of consensus in the literature regarding how 
professional competence has mostly been defined and criticized some of the current 
assessment tools used in the medical profession, some of which were claimed to 
have neglected essential aspects of professional practice such as interpersonal 
skills, professionalism, lifelong learning, and the integration of core knowledge and 
skills into clinical practice. Following the gaps identified between theory and practice, 
Epstein and Hundert (2002) proposed a more integrative definition of professional 
competence as:  
 
“the habitual and judicious use of communication, knowledge, technical skills, 
reasoning, emotions, values, and reflection in daily practice for the benefit of 
the individual and community being served” (Epstein and Hundert, 2002, 
p.226)  
 
Building on the above research, the competence assessment framework developed 
in Table 7.1 aims to advance the definition of professional competence by 
incorporating important dimensions of expert (tacit) knowledge. As shown in the 
framework, learning tasks can be developed across the various knowledge 
dimensions. For instance, novices could be trained on how to identify and 
discriminate between a wide range of cues on the fireground, which includes for 
example, the ability to recognize possible smoke colours for the different classes of 
fire. The framework also proposes assessing novices across four different levels 
depending on the learning task that is aimed at (possible methods of assessment are 
discussed later in section 7. 7) 
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It is however important to mention that the framework is only presented as a generic 
assessment tool, one in which facilitators can build upon and adapt to suit their 
various training needs.  
 
7.2. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFERRING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE TO 
NOVICE FIREFIGHTERS  
Although no direct definition for the term “complex skill learning” seems to exist in the 
literature, this study builds upon existing research (e.g. Wulf and Shea, 2002; 
Kirschner and van Merrienboer, 2007) to define it as the type of learning that: (i) 
cannot be mastered in a single session i.e. one that requires a series of training and 
practice sessions until learners are able to transfer what was learnt during training to 
real task performance (ii) requires understanding of how to integrate and coordinate 
a range of implicit and explicit knowledge, including the constituent skills required to 
perform domain tasks.    
 
Five important factors that are perceived to enhance the effectiveness of learning the 
elicited expert knowledge are discussed below: 
1. The training curriculum must be developed to ensure a good balance 
between desired learning expectations and learners’ mental load   
Recent studies on complex skills learning have shown that it is almost impossible to 
design any effective learning instructional framework without ensuring an optimum 
balance between learning contents and the cognitive capabilities of the learners 
(Sweller, 1994; van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004; 
Kirschner and van Merrienboer, 2007). This is the main doctrine of the cognitive load 
theory (CLT) — a theory developed in the 1980s that uses interactions between 
information structures and knowledge of human cognition in the design of training 
curricula (see for example van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005). This body of 
research typically attempts to evaluate the operational dynamics of both working 
memory and long term memory, based on the principle that working memory can 
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store about seven elements but can only utilize 2-4 of those elements at any given 
time (Gobet, 2005; Cooper, 1994; Tulving, 2002; Kahneman, 2011).  
 
In terms of developing an instructional design for the fire service, this study points 
the attention of training facilitators to two major ways through which working memory 
load of the less experienced firefighters could be affected during training. These are: 
intrinsic cognitive load (the amount of element interactivity that is present in learning 
tasks) and extraneous cognitive load (the particular means through which learning 
tasks are taught to the learners). In this context, an element is referred to as “the 
amount of information that must be processed by a learner as a single unit in 
working memory” (Pollock, Chandler and Sweller, 2002). It is therefore important to 
note that intrinsic cognitive load cannot easily be altered as it depends on the 
number of elements (inherent in the learning tasks) that must be processed in 
working memory (Van Merrienboer & Sweller, 2005). Tasks with low element 
interactivity impose low intrinsic cognitive load since, for a task to be understood and 
learnt, only a limited number of elements will need to be processed in working 
memory. Tasks with high element interactivity on the other hand tend to pose more 
learning difficulties because they contain elements that cannot be fully understood in 
isolation, thereby imposing an additional load on working memory (Cooper, 1994; 
Anderson, 2002).  
 
In contrast to intrinsic cognitive load that is directly inherent within learning tasks, 
extraneous cognitive load is comprised of unnecessary loads that are imposed on 
learners, which are not useful for learning. However, unlike intrinsic cognitive load, 
extraneous cognitive load can be altered by using effective instructional 
interventions. For example, by using a combination of auditory (information 
presented in spoken form) and visual diagrams, as opposed to presenting all 
learning contents in written form, working memory load on learners can be reduced 
since mental load would then be shared between the visual and auditory processors 
(Kester et al., 2006). For the purpose of designing learning tasks for firefighters it is 
therefore important to note that extraneous load must be lowered as much as 
possible for learning tasks with high intrinsic load (e.g. carrying out rescue and 
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firefighting tasks). However, if intrinsic load is low then a high extraneous load might 
not be too harmful since the total cognitive load would still be within working memory 
capacity.     
2. Overconfidence in novices must be effectively managed by ensuring they 
devote ample time to learning complex skills        
Learning complex skills certainly requires that a reasonable amount of time is 
invested in the learning process. Starting with the work of Chase and Simon (1973), 
it now appears well established that attaining expertise or developing a reservoir of 
patterns will definitely take years of dedication, hard work and active practice 
(Driskell et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1987; Wong, 2000; Hayashi, 2001; Feldon, 2008; 
Ericsson et al., 2007; Kahneman 2011, p.238). For example, studies of chess 
masters (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet 2005) suggest that at least 10,000 
hours of dedicated practice is required to attain the highest level of performance (this 
is synonymous to about five hours play/day for six years).  
 
Studies on expertise have shown that novices are by their very nature quite 
“energetic” and “enthusiastic” and hence eager to climb the ladder of expertise, but 
sometimes in ways that are rather too ambitious (Baylor, 2001; Dunning et al., 2003; 
Gasaway, 2013). This eagerness, if not well managed, can however lead them to 
begin to downplay the rigours involved in complex skill learning. The term Dunning-
Kruger effect has been used to describe this situation (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; 
Dunning et al., 2003), akin to what Hannabuss (2000) termed unconscious 
incompetence. In their experimental study involving a group of inexperienced 
subjects, Dunning and Kruger (1999) found that unskilled individuals significantly 
over-rated their skills — also known as illusion of superiority (Messick and 
Bazerman, 1996; Kahneman, 2011).  
 
In short, the Dunning-Kruger effect indicates that unskilled individuals often: 
 
• Tend to over-inflate their own level of skill; 
• Fail to recognize genuine skill in others; 
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• Fail to recognize and admit the extent of their inadequacies; 
• Recognize and acknowledge their lack of skill and inadequacies if their 
limitations were eventually revealed to them e.g. through additional training 
 
The current study therefore suggests that the less experienced firefighters should 
ideally first be allowed to obtain adequate training before being tasked with incident 
command responsibilities; this way, their level of overconfidence is also controlled 
implicitly. Either under-rating the complexities of managing real fires or over-rating 
one’s level of skills can prove catastrophic, particularly considering the amount of 
stakes associated with the task of firefighting.  In the words of one of the participants:  
 
“Making people gain experience without training them first could be counter-
productive in the end” (Jade, 15, Crew commander, UK) 
 
Allowing pseudo-experts (inexperienced officers who claim to be experts) to manage 
complex incidents might result in them endangering their lives and those of others, 
particularly when faced with tasks for which they were not trained. In addition, such 
individuals might also find it quite difficult to acknowledge or learn from superior 
officers that have more experience. This situation appears mostly applicable to the 
Nigerian firefighters as it seems necessary to address the firefighting tactics these 
Nigerian officers currently adopt (see evidence provided in section 6.4.) 
3. Tasks must be learnt within the most appropriate environments  
It has been argued that the environment people find themselves in often plays a 
significant role in shaping what/how they learn (Hogarth, 2003). A number of 
scholars have attributed one of the main causes of learning difficulties to the fact that 
training facilitators sometimes fail to consider the appropriateness of the environment 
where actual learning takes place, as well as the type of relationship that exist 
between the learners and their instructors (Van Merrienboer, 1997; Hannabuss, 
2000; Fessey, 2002; Eraut, 2004; Billett, 2010).  
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For the purpose of developing training curricula in the fire service, it is therefore 
suggested that officers who from the outset desire to develop specific skills (e.g. the 
use of hydraulic vehicles, managing road traffic collisions, incident investigation, 
managing incidents related to arson etc.) should be allowed to gain practical 
experience directly from the most “appropriate” stations. The word appropriate in this 
context refers to fire stations that are popular for performing the activities that are 
associated with the desired skills. Each station area or patch (in the firefighting 
language) is slightly different and thus has slightly different balance of risks. This is 
why fire stations are strategically located and positioned at specific catchment areas 
based on the “problem” that seem peculiar to that area (this is the case both in the 
UK and Nigeria).  
 
The implication of the above proposition is that officers will then need to be rotated 
across different fire stations for learning to be effective. To justify this assertion, all 
the participants (both in the UK and Nigeria) agreed that moving from one station to 
another provided good learning experience as well as an opportunity to acquire new 
skills. For example, one of the senior officers (Sunny, 29, Assistant chief fire 
superintendent, Nigeria) reported that working across stations often help officers 
cross-breed ideas more easily, since it then becomes easier to see how officers at 
other stations are likely to approach things.   
 
For example, Willy (28, Watch commander, UK) who has served in eight different 
stations (see Table 5.1) reflected on his multi-station experiences. The officer was 
able to recall the peculiarity associated with every station where he had previously 
served, highlighting the specialized skills he learnt across the stations: 
 
• “Station 1 was a very deprived area so you get a lot of house fires and rubbish 
fires which is associated with that”.  
• “Station 2 is a specialist station you did a lot of motor way RTCs, you also did 
a lot of rescues, and because it had all the big equipment rather than the stuff 
we carry on the fire engine you actually went out to big accidents”.  
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• “Station 3 another deprived area in Birmingham, lots of anti-social behaviour 
so that’ll be really good for experience”.  
• “Station 4, again because it’s quite an affluent area anything that happened 
there is always going to be…..in station 4 everything was a job, you went to 
big houses, expensive houses on fire”.  
• “Station 5 is another deprived area, busy road you know the A45, so a lot of 
road traffic accidents (RTAs) there”.  
• “Station 6 lots of high rise, lots of skit lifts and bins basically being in the city”.  
• Station 7 here is quite varied, again quite a deprived area lots of anti-social 
behaviour”  
 
……..so if you want to put all of these together you get a massive amount of 
[experience]….I mean some of these stations had aerials so you get the 
experience on the hydraulic platforms, experience on all the different…. so you 
have incident support, command units, breathing apparatus. 
 
The majority of the participants, particularly the UK ones, who had served in at least 
one fire station all agreed that working across various stations contributed positively 
to their development as firefighters. The main reason attributed to this was that every 
fire station is peculiar in its own way and perhaps known for a specific type of event, 
which will in turn require gaining particular skill sets. In Nigeria, it is quite difficult to 
work across stations as there are only a few fire stations in most of the States.       
4. The tolerability of error must be properly defined during training sessions   
While declarative knowledge can be acquired by simply being told, procedural 
knowledge is gained by doing (Anderson et al., 1995). Evidence has shown that 
people seem to learn better and thus gain more confidence when allowed to be 
involved in actual task performance i.e. “learning by doing” (Eraut, 2000; Fessey 
2002; Billet 2010; Schon, 1983). It is however important to ensure that this “do it 
yourself approach” is considered alongside the reality that learners are liable to 
make mistakes, especially when the tasks involved are relatively complex. Training 
facilitators must therefore specify from the outset the “margin of error” that is 
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tolerable, based on what is realistic in real-life. The excerpt below also suggests that 
firefighters often learn by acting and then learning from their mistakes when things 
go wrong. The key emphasis is on learning: 
 
So I don’t mind that, and I think the training is about making mistakes and I 
don’t think if I put myself forward in training to make a mistake I should be 
penalized for that, I should be applauded for that otherwise nobody else would 
ever put themselves forward; and I think that is where the fire service is 
missing the trick because if you put yourself forward and it goes wrong then 
people would tell you about it and they will make an issue out of it. Sometimes 
you don’t make an issue of it because the lesson is already learned.                   
(Lambert, 26, Watch commander, UK)       
 
Hence, although competence in any work domain is enhanced when performers are 
confident in carrying out their tasks, it appears that confidence, as well as the 
motivation to act is unlikely to increase unless learners are given a considerable 
level of support and allowed to perform with some degree of “freedom” (King and 
Clark, 2002; Matzler, Bailom and Mooradian, 2007). This is why learning, for less 
experienced personnel, is seen as the amount of support their superior officers are 
willing to give them during training (Vygotsky, 1967; Sweller, Van Merrienboer and 
Paas, 1998; Alias and Gray, 2005). Learning to other less experienced individuals 
also means the type of relationship that exists between the learners and their 
coaches; whether mutually supportive, critical, factional or hostile (Kirschner, 2002; 
Eraut, 2004; Billett, 2010) 
 
The effectiveness of any training exercise in the fire service is thus believed to lie in 
knowing exactly when to increase or reduce the level of support provided to learners. 
While it is encouraged to sometimes allow learners to perform tasks that are slightly 
beyond their zone of proximal development (discussed below), this tendency must 
be well monitored to avoid eroding their motivation, and consequently distorting their 
confidence (Eraut, 2000; Wulf and Shea, 2002). To this, management has an 
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important role to play in understanding the relationships that exist between 
instructional designs and the cognitive capacity of the learners.   
5. Learners must be encouraged to invest in deliberate practice 
A wide range of studies have shown that one of the most effective ways of 
learning new skills is by doing the “unusual” i.e. focusing on the aspects of tasks 
one cannot already perform proficiently (Wulf and Shea, 2002; Charness et al., 
2005; Ericsson, 2006; Zimmerman, 2006; MacMahon et al., 2007; Schempp et 
al., 2007). Deliberate practice is therefore a sustained effort to practice tasks that 
are currently beyond one’s level of competence — stretching beyond the limits of 
one’s comfort zone (Mitroff, Shrivastava and Udwadia, 1987; Driskell, Cooper and 
Moran, 1994; Vygotsky, 1997; Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely, 2007). Broadly, 
deliberate practice involves two kinds of learning: (i) improving upon an existing 
skill and (ii) extending the range of one’s skills.  
 
In their research on complex skill learning, van Merrienboer, Clark and de Croock 
(2002) noted that true experts are known for diverting their attention and effort to 
mastering other non-automatic constituent skills once automaticity has been 
attained on certain skills. Through deliberate practice individuals are thus able to 
develop task specific expertise, much faster than having to wait many years to 
gain experience on the task. However, it is crucially important to emphasize that 
deliberate practice requires quality coaching, mentoring and time investment. 
Continuous deliberate practice and not just conventional practice is the key to 
becoming an expert. For example, in their study with expert golf instructors 
Schempp et al. (2007) stated explicitly that playing golf for fun will not make one a 
world class golfer but that deliberate practice has the potential to do so.  
 
In the next section, two theories that underpin the recommended learning 
framework (i.e. the 4C/ID framework) are discussed in turn:    
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7.3. ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT: VYGOTSKY’S ANALYSIS OF 
LEARNING   
The concept of the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1967) was originally 
developed to link the actual learning process with the mental conditions of learners. 
Vygotsky identified two developmental levels: the actual developmental level and the 
zone of proximal development and argued that learning can only be fully maximized 
if the discrepancies that exist between these two levels are clarified (Vygotsky, 
1978).  Vygotsky’s main line of argument was that the conventional way of assessing 
students’ competence e.g. by focusing excessively on the already established 
mental functions is somewhat incomplete. This traditional assessment measures 
(e.g. through tests or examinations), according to Vygotsky, seems only able to 
evaluate students’ mental abilities on the basis of what they can do on their own 
(Vygotsky, 1997), ignoring what they can do with the support of others (e.g. support 
from their teachers, or collaboration with other peers). The key insight from 
Vygotsky’s framework for this study is therefore that what learners can do with the 
support of others is essentially the best indication of their state of mental 
development when compared to what they can do on their own.  
 
Vygotsky’s idea has transformed the original beliefs of traditional assessment by 
demonstrating that an essential feature of complex skills learning lies in its ability to 
create the zone of proximal development, which he defined as the distance between 
the actual developmental level (which is defined by one’s ability to solve problems 
independently) and potential developmental level (the ability to perform tasks under 
adult guidance or in collaboration with peers). It highlights those psychological 
functions that have not yet fully matured but are in the process of maturation i.e. 
functions that are currently in the embryo hoping to mature tomorrow. In the words of 
Vygotsky, these functions are best described as the “buds” or “flowers” of 
development rather than the “fruits” of development (Vygotsky, 1978, p.86).  
 
In order to better understand the zone of proximal development and how it relates to 
learning and instructional design, Vygotsky (1978) emphasized the role of imitation in 
the learning process. Successfully imitating the basis of experts’ competence allows 
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students to perform a variety of tasks that exceed their own individual capabilities. 
Learners are given the opportunity to achieve more with the support and guidance of 
the more experienced persons than they would normally have achieved unsupported 
(Chaiklin, 2003; Kozulin, 2003). The whole idea is that what a learner can do today 
with the help of others s/he would possibly be able to do independently tomorrow. 
Applying this concept to complex skills learning therefore encourages 
instructors/facilitators to take into account both the matured processes i.e. cycles 
that are already completed as well as those that are currently in their developmental 
stage i.e. the psychological processes and formations that are just beginning to 
develop. 
 
7.4. SITUATED LEARNING, LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION 
AND COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE 
Building on the work of Vygotsky, Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger in the early 1990s 
proposed a new model of learning, particularly for the workplace. The authors 
developed what can best be described as an instructional approach to learning — 
situated learning (Lave and Wenger, 1991). This conceptualization of learning is 
strongly rooted in ethnographic and anthropological perspectives to learning, 
suggesting that students are more inclined to learn by actively participating in the 
actual learning experience. Essentially, situated learning is about creating meaning 
from the real activities of daily living in a way that learning occurs relative to the 
teaching environment. This should be informal through social interaction, rather than 
by a planned or mechanistic process of cognitive transmission. For Lave (1993), 
learning is not necessarily a process of socially shared cognition that subsequently 
results in the internalization of knowledge by an individual, but rather “a process of 
becoming a member of a sustained community of practice (Lave, 1993, p.65). This 
probably explains ongoing initiative of the UK fire service in which most fire stations 
across some parts of the country have been labelled community fire stations 
 
Lave also noted that: 
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 Developing an identity as a member of a community and becoming 
knowledgably skillful are part of the same process, with the former motivating, 
shaping, and giving meaning to the latter, which it subsumes” (Lave, 1993: 65) 
 
Although Lave & Wenger (1991, p.42) did not provide a precise definition for the 
term “communities of practice”, they attempted to explain what it is not. The authors 
noted that a community of practice is not a “primordial culture sharing entity” (p. 98) 
and that the use of the term “community” does not necessarily mean co-presence 
neither does it connote a well-defined, identifiable group or socially visible 
boundaries” (p. 98). Rather communities of practice typically mean “participating in 
an activity system about which participants share understandings concerning what 
they are doing and what that means for their lives and for their communities” (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991, p.98). Even in relatively routine or unskilled work domains, this 
particular theory of learning argues that a considerable level of interaction is still 
needed to get a job done (Lave, 1993). These interactions, division of knowledge 
labour — what Wenger, Erber & Raymond, 1991 called transactive memory — and 
the common understanding through which people appropriate a task were said to be 
the key elements that sustain a community of practice (Wenger, McDermott and 
Snyder, 2002). Erden, Von Krogh and Nonaka (2008) emphasized the tightness of 
the relationships that often exist amongst members of a particular community, 
suggesting that the group actually thrives through sustained mutual engagement on 
a common enterprise that subsequently creates a common repertoire.  
 
In describing the nature of the interactions that take place as well as the quality of 
shared cognition amongst the members of a community, Hoadley (2012, p.288), 
citing the work of Orr (1996) on Xerox photocopier repairmen, described a situation 
in which knowledge was co-constructed by technicians who did not have to rely on 
manuals, standard operating procedures, or what they had been taught formally. 
Instead these performers, through the construction and sharing of stories and 
through joint problem solving, were able to come to understand far more about how 
to repair copiers than the manuals could provide. The type of innovation and learning 
depicted in the above scenario therefore seems to contradict the more instructivist 
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approach in which experts or researchers would generate knowledge that is 
subsequently transmitted to learners. In contrast to the traditional approach to 
learning which often occurs from abstract, out of context experiences such as 
lectures and books, situated learning suggests that learning most effectively takes 
place through the relationships between people, by which learners are able to 
connect prior knowledge with authentic, informal, and often unintended contextual 
learning (van Merrienboer, Clark and de Croock, 2002, p.43). Within the community 
of practice, the role of a student changes from being a beginner to an expert as they 
become more active and immersed in the social community. This therefore suggests 
that the social community matures and learns through collaboration and sharing of 
purposeful, patterned activity (Green, 2006) 
 
Lave and Wenger (1991, p.53) in their seminal work also used the phrase legitimate 
peripheral participation to describe the process of knowledge generation, application, 
and reproduction that constantly take place in communities of practice. Through 
legitimate peripheral participation, learners enter a community and gradually pick up 
its practices. At first, the “newcomers” may participate in less demanding ways, but 
over time, they take up a great deal of the identity of group membership and 
centrality, and more and more of the central practices of the group (Floding and 
Swier, 2012, p.193) 
 
The salient points that can be gleaned from the above learning theories for the 
purpose of this study is that novice firefighters will likely attain expertise much faster 
and more effectively if allowed to learn within a “community of practice” as opposed 
to learning individually — what Lave and Wenger (1991) called the cognitive 
approach to learning. Whilst it is impossible to undermine the role of self-learning in 
the fire service, especially as firefighters (the Nigerian ones in particular) are still 
being examined through the traditional methods of assessment such as written 
examination, collaborative learning remains largely influential.    
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7.5. THE FOUR COMPONENT INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN FRAMEWORK: A 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN FRAMEWORK FOR THE ELICITED 
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE  
While a number of approaches to learning within the professional settings have been 
discussed in the literature (e.g. the Integrated task analysis model, the guided 
experiential learning approach; see Clark et al. 2006 for an overview), some have 
been shown to be flawed in their design (Merrill, 2002). Some of the shortcomings 
that were inherent in  most of the instructional design models available in the early 
90’s were attributed to a lack of alignment between learning objectives, the 
knowledge and skills required to achieve those objectives, and the task-mental 
capacity ratio required to perform the desired tasks (Merrill, 2002; Sarfo and Elen, 
2007). Following this knowledge gap, Van Merriënboer developed an instructional 
framework in the late 90’s which has since proven effective in enhancing transfer of 
knowledge and complex skills especially to novices (see van Merrienboer, 1997; van 
Merrienboer and Kirschener, 2007; Sarfo and Elen, 2007; Kirschner and van 
Merrienboer, 2007). The 4C/ID was primarily designed as a framework for learning 
complex skills in programmes ranging in length from several weeks to several years. 
The 4C/ID is therefore logical in the sense that learners are made to grasp their 
learning tasks at an optimal pace i.e. without under-utilizing or overloading the 
cognitive capacity of learners (Anderson, 1982; van Merrienboer, Clark and Croock, 
2002).  
 
The four component instructional design model is favoured as a learning framework 
in the current study for at least four reasons:   
 
(i)The model builds on the assumption that for learners to be able to understand a 
task in its entirety, tutors must present such a task in its full complexity, incorporating 
as much as possible the key task constraints that are typical of the domain of 
practice. Thus, the design of whole task practice is the focus of the 4C/ID model, 
which it achieves by systematically progressing from a simplified version of a 
learning task to more complex versions (Van Merrienboer, 1997). This practice 
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contrasts other traditional design models that tend to decompose complex tasks into 
chunks that are learned separately and then compiled together to form a whole (see 
Pollock et al., 2002 for details). The 4C/ID model discourages such a fragmented 
approach to complex skill learning e.g. “You won’t understand this now but it will 
really be important to you later”. According to Merrill (2002), decomposing complex 
skills for ease of learning has a tendency of making learners lose sight of the 
relationship between various aspects of the skills being taught (Wulf and Shea, 
2002; van Merrienboer and Kirschner, 2007) 
 
 (ii) The 4C/ID framework pays a close attention to how learners execute specific 
aspects of a task (problem-centred approach) as opposed to assessing performance 
on a broader level (outcome-centric approach). The word problem is used in Merrill’s 
(2002) perspective to describe a wide range of whole-tasks that are representative of 
those that are likely to be encountered in the real-world. The 4C/ID, on this note, 
contrasts with other traditional learning tools where the main focus is often centred 
on achieving positive outcomes with little or no interest in the learning process. Also, 
immediacy of performance is possible with the 4C/ID as instructors could ask 
learners to immediately repeat either a whole task or some aspects of a task that 
were not carried out in conformity with experts’ expectations. By setting up repeated 
tasks for learners, automaticity is achieved and novices are able to solve task related 
problems more intuitively i.e. with minimal mental effort; this way, important feedback 
is not left to a debrief session. The 4C/ID therefore utilizes a “process” based 
feedback (you did it wrong) than an “outcome” based feedback (you got it wrong), 
implying that learners are more likely to discover exactly what went right/wrong in the 
course of task performance (Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006) 
 
 (iii) The 4C/ID makes a clear distinction between supportive information (which is 
presented to learners prior to practice e.g. fire manuals) and just-in-time or 
procedural information (which is presented to learners during practice to help 
perform recurrent aspects of tasks). In a study aimed at teaching novices how to 
troubleshoot electrical circuits, Kester et al (2006) found that cognitive load was quite 
high when both supportive and procedural information were presented to learners 
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prior to task performance, but lower when supportive information was presented 
before task practice and procedural information during practice.  
 
(iv)The 4C/ID ensures that coaches are able to tailor learning tasks to focus on 
specific areas of weaknesses in novices, thereby allowing instructions to produce 
“learning with understanding” (Gobet, 2005). To achieve this, the 4C/ID encourages 
variability in some of the tasks presented to learners, particularly as single problem 
case tasks have been shown to be insufficient in developing cognitive skills in most 
complex work domains such as firefighting (Anderson, 1983; Sweller, Van 
Merrienboer and Paas, 1998). The 4C/ID model therefore allows learners to acquire 
both abstract knowledge (for creative problem solving) and concrete knowledge 
(rule-based or codified knowledge).  
 
7.6. APPLYING THE FOUR COMPONENT INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN 
MODEL AS A LEARNING FRAMEWORK  
The main assumption of the 4C/ID instructional framework is that the environments 
where complex skills are learnt are described in terms of four interlinked components 
(4C): Learning tasks, supportive information, just-in-time information, and part-task 
practice.  7.6.1 Learning tasks  
Learning tasks are real, concrete and meaningful whole-task practices that are 
structured from simple to complex versions and aid knowledge acquisition in 
learners. They typically encourage inductive learning, allowing knowledge and skills 
to be induced from concrete experiences (see Fig 7.1 below). By so doing, learning 
tasks serve the purpose of supporting non-recurrent aspects of tasks (schema 
construction) while also facilitating the development of automaticity in the recurrent 
aspects of the tasks (rule automation). The competence assessment framework 
developed in this study (Table 7.1 above) contains more than 40 distinct learning 
tasks that can be designed for novices, based on perceived training needs.  
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Any training programme aimed at learning complex skills utilizes, more often than 
not, a sequence of learning tasks as its backbone (Vanmerrienboer, Clark and 
Croock, 2002). These learning tasks are essentially performed in a real or simulated 
task environment and provide whole-task practice, as opposed to fragmented 
learning tasks. The learning tasks are also designed in a way that the learners are 
confronted with all constituent skills that make up the whole complex skill. It therefore 
becomes important to ensure that learning tasks are designed to engage learners in 
activities that require them to work directly with the constituent skills, knowledge and 
attitudes. Merrill (2002) pointed out four levels of analysis that must be included 
when designing whole task practice for complex learning:  
 
• The problems to be solved  
• The tasks to be performed by learners in solving particular problems  
• The various operations associated with each of the tasks, and  
• The actions that must be implemented in carrying out the operations.  
 
Merrill (2002) suggested that every instructional design must strive to engage 
learners at these four levels of performance. 
 
Task classes: With the four component instructional design model, task classes 
rather than individual learning tasks are what determine the sequence by which 
training programmes are organized (see Fig 7.1 below). Since learners cannot easily 
be bombarded with highly complex learning tasks at the inception of a training 
session, learning tasks are therefore categorized into distinct task classes, from 
simple to difficult. Once the task classes are defined, the learning tasks are then 
developed for each class in increasing level of difficulty. Hence, by progressively 
increasing task problems the skills of learners gradually improve until they are able 
solve complex problems (Merrill, 2002). Furthermore, sequencing task class also 
ensures that “details” which are not relevant to a particular learning task are not 
presented to learners until when needed. Instructional designs that do not put this 
sequence into consideration have been shown to yield negative learning outcomes in 
terms of performance and learners’ motivation (Sweller, 1994; Eraut, 2004). 
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It is worth mentioning that all tasks within a particular task class are equivalent since 
they can be performed using the same body of general knowledge (i.e. mental 
models and cognitive strategies). When learners begin work on a new task class, it 
becomes crucial to reduce extraneous cognitive load by giving adequate support to 
the learners. The amount of support provided to learners however reduces between 
learning tasks that belong to same task class as learners acquire more expertise ― 
this process has been termed “scaffolding” (Wulf and Shea, 2002; Merrill, 2002; Van 
Merrienboer, Kirschner and Kester, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 7.1: The four component instructional design model (Van merrienboer, Clark 
& de Croock, 2002) 
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7.6.2. Supportive information  
This is the second component of the 4C/ID model and represents information 
supplied to learners to assist them carry out the non-recurrent (or non-routine) 
aspects of a task. Non-recurrent tasks are tasks that require higher cognitive 
reasoning or problem solving skills i.e. tasks for which behaviour varies from one 
problem situation to another. Supportive information, without which it is almost 
impossible to carry out learning tasks, stipulates how to approach problems in a 
domain (cognitive strategies) and how the domain is organized (mental model). It is 
what trainers usually call “theory”, and is often presented to learners in cases, books, 
seminars, worksheets and so on. The main function of supportive information is to 
enhance schema construction; hence, it is presented in such a way that learners are 
able to apply prior knowledge as they acquire new information. By presenting 
supportive information to learners, they are essentially being made to encode such 
information in long term memory (through elaboration) which can then be recalled 
and activated in working memory when needed for task performance (Van 
Merrienboer, Kirschner and Kester, 2003).  
 
Since supportive information is relevant to all learning tasks within the same task 
class, it is presented to learners prior to the commencement of a new task class and 
made available throughout the learning duration. Presenting learners with supportive 
information prior, as opposed to during an exercise is judged to be more productive 
as such information often contains high element interactivity (total amount of 
information that requires processing) which might increase the chance of cognitive 
overload. Expecting trainees to make sense of supportive information while also 
attending to problem tasks has been found to be detrimental to learning, from a 
number of studies (Pollock et al., 2002; Van Merrienboer, Kirschner and Kester, 
2003; Van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005) ― what Sweller (1994) also termed the 
split attention effect.   
7.6.3. Just-in-time information  
In contrast to supportive information, procedural information is embedded in rules, 
explicit knowledge, procedures and standard operations, and required by learners to 
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perform recurrent aspects of the task. They are presented in bits to learners as “how 
to” instructions i.e. direct, step-by-step instructions that specifies to learners how to 
perform routine aspects of behaviour (e.g. process worksheets). The general 
consensus is that the more learners perform recurrent aspects of tasks, the more 
they are able to acquire automaticity over time (Paas and van Merrienboer, 1994). 
Thus, procedural information is presented to learners exactly at the point when such 
information is needed to perform a task, after which it is then allowed to fade away 
for subsequent tasks. It has been demonstrated that learners do better when 
informal support is made available exactly at the point needed than when provided 
prior to the task, especially for routine tasks (Vanmerrienboer, Clark and de Croock, 
2002). Since just-in-time information is presented during task performance, it 
therefore implies that it is presented to learners in a “ready to use” form, with less 
element interactivity (see Kester et al. 2004 for details).  
7.6.4. Part-task practice  
Part task practice provides opportunity for learners to repeatedly practice specific 
tasks, especially the tasks that are inevitable in a particular domain of practice (Sarfo 
and Elen, 2007). Such tasks are consistently repeated throughout the task classes, 
with the hope that they would become “proceduralized” as cognitive rules to the 
learners. Rule automation and strengthening of schemas are hence made possible 
as learners repeatedly carry out and complete part-task practices (Kirschner, 2002; 
Paas et al., 2003). Designing part-task practices can therefore be said to be a vital 
component of the 4C/ID model since it allows knowledge to be gained about a 
particular task/procedure until the performer is able to perform such task intuitively 
i.e. with minimal mental effort (Sweller, 1994). This is a desirable feature of 
expertise: automation frees up working memory capacity for other tasks and, by so 
doing, influences behaviour directly without the need to exert additional load on 
working memory (Hogarth, 2003).    
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7.7. POSSIBLE WAYS OF ASSESSING COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE IN 
NOVICES 
 
Prior research has shown that if people are to learn from their mistakes and 
improve on their performance, then the validity and reliability of the competence 
assessment measures used by training facilitators or licensing bodies must be 
given a closer attention (see Epstein and Hundert, 2002 for detail).  
 
Miller (1990) developed an assessment framework that has been widely used in 
the field of medicine (Fig. 7.2). The framework argues that whilst it can be 
important to test the intellectual knowledge of learners, such an assessment 
method is probably an incomplete tool for appraising expertise, particularly when 
one understands that there is more to the practice of medicine than knowing 
(Miller, 1990). Drawing insights from Miller’s work, each task element on the 
competence assessment framework is proposed to be assessed against at least 
one of the following levels: the “knows” level, the “know-how” level, the “show-
how” level and the “does” level (refer to the competence assessment framework in 
Table 7.1) 
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 Figure 7.2 Miller’s competence assessment framework (Miller, 1990, p.S63) 
 
 Knows level: Firefighters are made to recall facts, principles or theories e.g. 
providing information about fire, water or building properties.  
 
Know-how level: Problem solving ability; the ability to describe procedures e.g. 
explaining how to evacuate trapped victims from a high rise building.   
 
Show-how level: Demonstration of skills required for task performance e.g. 
showing instructors how to communicate with the fire control when requesting 
additional resources. 
 
Does level: Performing real task practice with little or no support from instructors 
or peers e.g. using cold-cut cobra equipment to extinguish a severe fire in a tight 
space.  
Does  
(Action) 
Shows how 
(Performance) 
Knows how 
(Competence) 
Knows (Knowledge) 
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7.7.1. Performance based assessment versus mental load and mental 
effort  
 
Performance: This assessment approach measures competence mainly through 
the outcome of an intellectual exercise e.g. test, oral or written examination etc. It 
is based on the assumption that learners become more liable to mistakes as tasks 
become more complex. For example, instructors can measure performance based 
on the number of answers a learner was able to get correctly or the number of 
errors committed.  
 
Similar to other authors (Sweller, Van Merrienboer and Paas, 1998; Paas, Renkl 
and Sweller, 2004; Van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005) the current study argues 
that the traditional assessment methods used in some domains of practice seem 
to be flawed as they often tend to limit competence to performance assessment 
only. Performance, although directly measurable, is not exactly a true test of 
competence since it is incapable of capturing the cognitive capacity of learners, 
which has been regarded as one of the most important assessment criteria for 
complex skill learning (Merrill, 2002; Pollock et al., 2002; Wulf and Shea, 2002). 
For example, testing the performances of learners through a theoretical 
examination in the fire service might produce misleading outcomes in terms of 
assessing level of competence. A fireman who has an exceptional ability to 
recollect written subjects but poor at performing practical hands-on tasks will most 
likely score a higher mark than another fireman who is adept at performing 
practical tasks but has a phobia for written exams. To therefore compensate for 
the shortcomings in the performance assessment measures, this study suggests 
using mental load and mental effort measures alongside performance measure. 
  
Mental load: This is used to estimate the amount of cognitive load which a task 
exerts on learners, from the point of view of the learners. For example, Paas and 
Van Merrienboer (1994) developed a subjective mental load rating measure using 
a 7-point Likert scale. At the end of each training section instructors can ask their 
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students to rate how difficult the tasks they were presented was, for example, on a 
scale of 1 (extremely easy) to 7 (extremely difficult)   
  
Mental effort: This refers to the cognitive capacity that is actually available to 
accommodate the task demands imposed on learners while learning new skills. 
This assessment measure seems to be a more reliable way of estimating 
cognitive load than the other two methods as it provides more important cognitive 
information. For example, in the process of carrying out a task, two trainees may 
actually arrive at the same correct answer but with significantly different mental 
efforts. This assessment measure is therefore based on the existing assumption 
that expertise increases as people begin to think less analytically, which is evident 
from their ability to perform tasks with minimal mental effort (Chase and Simon, 
1973; Baylor, 2001; Weiss and Shanteau, 2003; Gobet, 2005; Feldon, 2007) 
 
For example, the mental effort of trainees can be assessed on the duration of time 
spent on a particular task, the level of support needed to perform a task, physical 
stress or fatigue and the amount of time learners seemed to be making reference 
to supporting materials etc.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. Conclusions 
With the emergence of expert systems and growing interest in naturalistic/real world 
decision making, researchers became more interested in the content knowledge of 
experts. The need to better understand how proficient individuals perform particular 
tasks in real life was therefore seen as one of the most efficient ways of improving 
the overall level of human performance in high reliability domains. Against this 
background, the current study set out to examine how best to capture expert 
knowledge (of firefighters in particular) and to address some of the misconceptions 
surrounding tacit knowledge elicitation. While some of the challenges of expert 
knowledge elicitation were acknowledged a priori (e.g. issues related to 
unconsciousness and automaticity), the motivation for this study was triggered by the 
need to preserve expert knowledge, to identify the tacit cues used by experts in 
solving complex tasks, to evaluate the decision making strategies used by experts 
on the fireground, to identify training needs for the design of training curricula, and to 
compare and contrast the cognitive and non-cognitive cultural differences between 
the UK and Nigerian fire services.  
 
The study adopted the definition of knowledge as the interaction between 
intelligence (capacity to learn) and situation (opportunity to learn), suggesting that 
people will be unable to update their knowledge banks without the opportunity to 
learn and/or practice The current study was based on the notion that investigators 
ought to find a way of describing what experts do, and then teach this to novices. 
The principle behind this approach is that by carrying out a detailed study on the 
general knowledge, specific information, and reasoning processes used by experts, 
a “model” which exhibits some of the properties of experts can then be developed. 
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Since procedural knowledge and its associated cognitive skills cannot be learned by 
simply being told, but by doing, the study further provided an opportunity to advance 
research beyond the more obvious explicit or rule based what they have learnt. On 
this note, the study emphasized the provision of adequate learning opportunities as 
one of the most important conditions for developing the cognitive skills of novices. 
Eliciting expert knowledge is believed to be insufficient unless such knowledge is 
aimed to be utilized for training purposes. 
    
In order to enhance ease of memory recall and to help experts more effectively 
share what they both know and do, the study utilized a credible knowledge elicitation 
tool known as the critical decision method (CDM). The CDM, being a retrospective 
technique, was deemed most appropriate in the context of this study as other 
techniques such as concurrent protocol analysis or think aloud methods could have 
posed more methodical and ethical challenges. For example, concurrent verbal 
protocol (i.e. asking participants to articulate their thoughts and considerations while 
performing their fighting tasks) could easily interfere with real-time activities and 
distract officers from effectively carrying out their duties. There is also only a remote 
possibility that the knowledge elicitor would be present during these major incidents 
to observe events as they unfold.  
 
Below is a summary of the key findings from the current study, outlined to specify 
how the research questions set out in section 1.2.1 have been answered:     
 
Research Question 1: How do experts utilize their skills in managing complex non-
routine incidents? 
 
1) By utilizing the critical decision method as knowledge elicitation tool, this study 
revealed some of the skills, knowledge and competencies inherent in the expert 
firefighters that were interviewed. The relevance of the study is further underscored 
by the decreasing rate of major fire incidents in both countries, resulting in novices 
not having as much of a window of opportunity to gain real-life experiences as 
before. For this reason, the outputs developed in this study — the competence 
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assessment framework, information filtering and intuitive decision making model, 
critical cue inventory — all appear to be perfectly timed, especially from the point of 
view of the Nigerian fire services. These products are expected to play significant 
roles in enhancing complex skills learning through the design of well-informed 
training and learning tasks. For instance, trainers and facilitators will be able to 
develop a wide range of learning tasks from the elicited expert knowledge (as 
discussed in chapter 7). These knowledge outputs are ultimately aimed at providing 
novice firefighters with opportunities to update their knowledge banks particularly 
with scenarios that address real-life events.  
 
2) Although intuition and analysis were found to be complementary rather than 
competitive, experts tended to use intuition as their default strategy. Findings from 
the study showed that the analytical strategy is only invoked when the intuitive 
system cannot solve a current problem or when there is need to make a conscious 
decision, such as evacuating people to a safe shelter. In contrast to other studies 
that failed to clarify how intuition was being utilized, an intuitive decision for the 
purpose of this study was defined along three dimensions: decision time (decisions 
that took less than a minute), tacit knowledge (decisions that emerged from tacitly 
held knowledge that is difficult to verbalize) and unconscious processing of 
information (mainly prototypical decisions that required minimal mental energy).  
 
3) Another important finding from this study relates to the role of intuition in analytical 
thinking. Studies have shown that deliberation is contextually different from intuition 
i.e. whilst the former operates in the conscious realm, the latter operates in the 
unconscious mode. The model developed in the study revealed that experts often 
use their intuition to decide whether or not to initiate a deliberative process. In other 
words, experts understand when to deliberate on a particular action plan and when 
to intuitively act on their first impression. It therefore appears that experts mostly use 
their intuition to direct analytical thinking, rather than the other way round. By so 
doing, experts also seemed to know when their intuition is likely to betray them.  
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4) The study provided additional insights regarding the role of intuition in creative 
decision making. Notwithstanding the remarkable progress that has been 
experienced in recent years on the subject of intuition, some scholars have criticized 
the extent to which researchers on intuition have emphasized its role in judgment 
making to the detriment of its role in creative thinking. The current study analyzed 
134 decision points and found evidence to support the notion that intuitive insight 
and intuitive judgment represent two different but related routes to intuitive decision 
making (14.5% and 9.2% of all decisions made respectively by the UK and Nigerian 
experts were creative). While the former relates to decisions made during unusual 
circumstances that require improvisation (creative decisions), the latter, intuitive 
judgment, relates to decisions made through pattern recognition ― in which case a 
decision maker assesses an ongoing situation and then matches the cues, goals and 
actions against the repertoire of patterns stored in the memory. Hence, although the 
creative use of intuition was found to be less prominent than its use in judgment 
making, this study demonstrates that problem solving on the fireground involves both 
intuitive insight and intuitive judgment.  
 
5) Analysis of the interview transcripts revealed the role of experiential knowledge in 
coping with the task constraints associated with firefighting. All the experts (both in 
the UK and Nigeria) reported that their ability to put up effective performance amidst 
task difficulties was largely due to their level of experience as well as the quality of 
training they had received in the course of their firefighting career. This justifies why 
they are able to look at a burning building, envision the stairways and then intuitively 
predict what was happening inside, making sense of the implications of such for task 
performance. Experience (rooted in deep domain knowledge) was therefore found to 
be vital in making critical fireground decisions.   
 
6) The study showed that experts usually rely on their experience to generate a 
workable option, which is usually the first and possibly the only option they would 
have to consider. Using the term pattern recognition (a widely utilized concept in the 
field of cognitive psychology) this study posits that experts are able to utilize previous 
knowledge in solving current tasks by carrying out a quick mental scan across the 
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large repertoire of patterns they had stored in their memory. This then allows them to 
select the most appropriate ‘action scripts’ that best suit a current situation. Simply 
put, experienced firefighters often strive to draw from their rich mental model through 
which they are able to describe, explain and predict events. 
 
 
Research Question 2: How can the elicited expert knowledge be transformed into 
useful knowledge outputs that will facilitate learning for potential incident 
commanders?  
 
7) The model developed in this study (the information filtering and intuitive decision 
model) attempts to describe how the thirty experienced firefighters (both in the UK 
and Nigeria) were able to effectively manage various task constraints on the 
fireground, including coping with incomplete and conflicting information. The model 
revealed that the incident commanders were often faced with important tasks of 
collecting, filtering and processing multiple informational cues from various sources 
within a limited timeframe. This is because most of the cues on the fireground rarely 
appear in clearly defined forms, particularly at the initial phase of an incident. Hence, 
regardless of the commanders’ ability to recognize previous incidents, they were also 
able to identify the most important informational cues and to discriminate between 
relevant and irrelevant cues.  
 
8) The model also revealed that experienced officers often initiate response plans 
using the information they have as a starting point (no matter how little), and then 
subsequently rely on additional information to refine and clarify their understanding 
of the problem as events proceed. Nine principal cues were identified in the study 
from which the commanders reportedly drew insights to develop their action plans: 
the class of fire involved (Class A - F), including the colour of smoke each class 
generates; the type of materials present within and without a building (e.g. acetylene, 
carbonaceous substances, electronics); the intensity of the fire; the work the building 
is used for (e.g. garage or mechanic workshop); the cause of the fire (Arson, electric 
spark, lightening); the psychological and emotional states of victims; cracks spotted 
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on the building wall; the layout of the building; presence or absence of individuals in 
the burning building (e.g. trapped victims, disabled individuals, elderly persons) 
.  
9) The ability to differentiate between cues that trigger actions and those that are not 
very relevant (in the form of noise and distraction) was seen as an important aspect 
of expertise. The study therefore emphasized that whilst having too little information 
about an incident could be quite risky, having too much information could even prove 
more dangerous. This implies that a point is reached when acquiring and computing 
more information becomes detrimental to the outcome of a decision.  
 
 
Research Question 3: What cognitive and contextual (cultural) differences exist 
between the UK and Nigerian firefighters, and what/how can the two groups possibly 
learn from each other?  
 
10) In all of the enlisted dimensions through which intuition was measured, intuitive 
decisions appeared to be higher than the analytical strategy (option deliberation) in 
both countries. Specifically 88.4% and 84.6% of the total decision points reported by 
the UK and the Nigerian firefighters respectively were found to be made through 
existing prototypes in the memory, which is based on accumulated experiences of 
having managed numerous fires. The study also revealed that 80% and 72% of the 
total decisions made by the Nigerian and UK officers respectively were made within 
1 min.  
 
11) It is important to emphasize that the UK and the Nigerian firefighters approached 
their firefighting duties uniquely as the two groups differed in their organizational and 
operational setup, thereby making it difficult to directly compare the level of 
effectiveness of the two groups. The notable differences that were found to exist 
between the two groups related more to non-cognitive factors such as (equipment, 
training, staff welfare, crowd control etc.) as opposed to cognitive factors. Comparing 
the decision making and problem solving strategies of the two groups, findings 
showed that a considerable amount of similarities exist. For instance, analysis of the 
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decision points showed the following estimates between the UK and the Nigerian 
firefighters respectively: 7.2% and 7.7% of the entire decision points were found to 
be made deliberatively; 88.4% and 84.6% were prototypical decisions; 4.3% and 
7.7% were based on analogues; 23.2% and 26.2% fell under the standard category, 
and 62.3% and 64.6% of the decisions were adaptive.  
 
12) The Nigerian firefighters reported facing numerous challenges compared to their 
UK counterparts. In contrast to the UK firefighters who struggled to think of any 
aspect of training that had not already been covered either in the incident command 
and control training or as part of the day-to-day training routine at their respective 
stations, the Nigerian firefighters emphasized the need for additional training on 
specific fireground tasks as shown in section 6.2. Furthermore, the Nigerian officers 
all admitted there is a need to restructure the fire service in three important areas: (i) 
improved government support, which includes making significant improvements to 
staff welfare (ii) provision of advanced firefighting equipment that will allow for 
effective firefighting operations (iii) provision of optimum support and funding for both 
in-house and overseas training.  
 
13) The expert knowledge and tacit skills elicited from the study (across both groups) 
were indexed into a competence assessment framework and the four component 
instructional design (4C/ID) model was recommended as an efficient learning 
framework for training instructors. The main assumption of the 4C/ID model is that 
the environments where complex skills are learnt are described in terms of four 
interlinked components (4C): Learning tasks, supportive information, just-in-time 
information, and part-task practice. The implications for transferring expert 
knowledge to novice firefighters were also discussed.  
8.2. Recommendations 
Based on the findings from the study and the gaps identified between theory, policy 
and practice, the following recommendations are made to the various stakeholders 
as shown below:    
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8.2.1. Recommendations for policy and practice 
 
1) Since the ability to effectively conduct dynamic risk assessments on the fireground 
lies in utilizing existing knowledge, which is largely rooted in experience and 
deliberate practice, this study recommends that developing training programmes 
should be done such that novices are taught to use the standard operational 
procedures of the fire service as a tool for informing rather than one for dictating. The 
less experienced officers should be made to engage their “thinking hats” by exploring 
a wider range of options beyond what the fire books would normally stipulate. For 
instance, facilitators could design learning tasks for which novices are only required 
to apply basic firefighting rules and those where applying such rules could appear 
counter-productive. A training procedure that is heavily focused on making rule-
based decisions is therefore believed to risk jeopardizing the creative power of 
learners therefore slowing down their learning curve.  
 
2) Attention has been drawn to the fact that when officers who regularly perform 
operational hands-on tasks are also involved in the training process, they tend to 
unintentionally omit some useful cognitive strategies when communicating and 
teaching complex skills to their students. Specifically it was shown that when health 
experts teach surgical operations to students, they often leave out approximately 
70% of the vital information that should have facilitated students’ understanding 
(Clark, 2014). To make matters worse, these experts are usually unaware of these 
lapses, which can be attributed to the fact that the knowledge they are trying to 
transfer to novices is largely tacit, automated and unconscious. Care should 
therefore be taken when using experts that are heavily involved in operational 
firefighting tasks to train novices. These experts may find it difficult to breakdown 
what they do and know in ways that are easily understandable to novices, and 
continue to teach them “shortcuts” to performing tasks instead.   
 
 
337 
 
 
 
8.2.2. Recommendations to the Nigerian fire service 
 
1) It is surprising, yet true that many Nigerian citizens do not know the emergency 
numbers to call following a fire breakout. This was believed to be a serious issue 
from the point of view of the interviewed Nigerian firefighters for a number of 
reasons: first, the Nigerian officers believe the fire service is being denied its 
mandate to protect the lives and properties of the Nigerian masses each time fire 
incidents occur without the awareness of the fire service. Second, the officers saw it 
as a waste of resources if millions of Naira (Nigerian currency) are continuously lost 
to fire incidents that could have easily been managed, simply because members of 
the public are ignorant of how to reach the fire service.  This issue of poor 
accessibility is one that therefore needs to be addressed urgently. This study 
recommends the need to utilize all available media sources such as national and 
local newspapers, TV and radio adverts, as well as organizing local community 
awareness programmes in order to enlighten the public members on why/how best 
they can reach the closest fire service in case of emergencies. The Lagos state fire 
service (one of the study areas in Nigeria) has currently started a massive public 
awareness campaign in this regard by providing the public members with all the 
contact numbers and details of all the available fire stations within the state. Other 
states in the country are encouraged to emulate this positive step.  
 
2) One of the most appropriate goals for crisis management is learning to prepare for 
as many crises as possible through effective training. Training teaches an 
organization how to cope when a crisis eventually occurs, thereby increasing their 
chance of success. It has been hypothesized that the less vulnerable an organization 
thinks it is, the fewer crises it prepares for, and the more vulnerable it eventually 
becomes when a crisis occurs. The Nigerian fire service must therefore improve their 
attitude towards, and approach to training if any meaningful progress is to be made. 
They must stop seeing training as merely a way of fulfilling their daily work routines 
and start seeing it as an opportunity to ask important questions, such as what if a set 
of crises hit us simultaneously what are we prepared to do? What part of the 
firefighting tasks do we often struggle to cope with? Top managers and policy 
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makers (strategic commanders) in the Nigerian fire service therefore have a huge 
part to play in pushing for this cultural change. The good news, however, as revealed 
from the current study is that the Nigerian officers seemed to be willing to learn new 
skills and work with more advanced firefighting equipment; they are just waiting for 
when this would happen.  
 
3) Drawing insights from the UK fire service, this study recommends incorporating a 
station to station type of training for novice firefighters in Nigeria who may benefit 
from gaining additional skills which may perhaps be impossible with serving in only 
one station. Fire stations are often located strategically, depending on the prevalent 
problem case that is peculiar to an environment. Officers in the UK and a few of the 
Nigerian ones who have served in more than one station admitted that working 
across different stations is an essential part of gaining expertise. Different stations, 
they say, present different challenges. While this inter-station work experience is 
common in the UK, it is perceived as a big challenge in Nigeria because of the very 
limited number of fire stations that exist in major states of the country (see section 
6.4). The starting point is to motivate the Government to establish more fire stations 
and equip them with up-to-date resources. This will also help to reduce the huge loss 
often incurred during fire incidents due to insufficient resources. 
 
8.2.3. Recommendation to the UK fire service  
 
1) Three of the UK senior officers interviewed in the study claimed that the UK fire 
service must go back to the previous mode of promoting officers, which is mainly by 
examination. Until July 2006, the Fire Services Examinations Board were 
responsible for setting and administering national written exams for promotion to the 
ranks of crew commander and watch commander. But now, the service currently 
uses a new method known as “integrated personal development system” (IPDS) 
whereby officers seeking promotion are made to demonstrate their competencies 
based on workplace assessment guidelines. These officers are tested against the 
particular skill sets they desire to develop (practical assessment), from which a 
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decision is then made whether or not they merit being promoted. The problem with 
this new method as noted by the interviewed officers is that the crucial aspect of 
gaining technical knowledge is lost. These officers argued that the newly introduced 
IPDS approach does not accord “potential experts” the opportunity for self-study, 
which is believed to be the basis for gaining technical knowledge (this contrasts the 
previous approach that entailed writing statutory exams). It is therefore 
recommended to the UK fire service to consider incorporating into the promotion 
procedures the writing of statutory examinations or to include a similar method that 
will encourage rigorous self-reading as part of the requirements for promotion.     
 
8.3. Limitations of study 
Just like every other research, the current study has its own limitations: 
 
1) The critical decision method that was utilized as knowledge elicitation tool in this 
study is generally seen as a complex method of inquiry as discussed in section 4.3. 
It involves initiating and maintaining good rapport with participants, listening to fire-
stories, applying cognitive probes, questioning expert judgement where necessary, 
taking field notes and carrying out external observations. As a result, CDM experts 
have suggested involving two or more persons when conducting CDM studies so as 
to reduce the risk of missing out vital evidence. Whilst this appears as a possible 
limitation, conscious efforts were made in this study to manage any potential impacts 
of using one investigator. For instance, an MP3 tape recorder was used during each 
interview session, which made it possible for the author to still take notes and 
observe around.   
   
2) Another possible limitation of the study was the fact that only one knowledge 
elicitation method was employed throughout the data collection process. The critical 
decision method would have perhaps been used along with at least one other 
knowledge elicitation tool such as cognitive interview (CI) or concurrent verbal 
protocol. But as stated in section 4.2.2 it would have almost been impossible to 
follow firefighters to the scene of incidents for ethical and safety reasons, hence the 
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rationale for choosing the critical decision method which uses retrospective reports. 
Moreover it is not entirely certain that utilizing more than one knowledge elicitation 
tool would yield richer outputs   
 
3) Finally, the CDM was found somewhat wanting in attempts to identify and analyse 
the cultural differences between the UK and Nigeria fire fighters. Since analyses of 
cultural differences was part of the objectives of the study, it was eventually carried 
out through “selective coding”. Although the method generated a considerable 
amount of insights in terms of the differences that exist between the two cultural 
contexts, it was perceived that using a framework specifically designed for cultural 
analysis would have yielded more results. This is a challenge that must therefore be 
embraced by knowledge elicitation researchers particularly those within the field of 
naturalistic decision making.     
 
8. 4. Areas for further research  
 
1) One of the greatest criticisms of using retrospective verbalization methods (such 
as the critical decision method) in expert knowledge elicitation has been attributed to 
the problem of memory limitations. This is because the required information from 
experts may not have been encoded in the form that makes them easily accessible 
as verbalizable recollections. For the purpose of future research and as one of the 
solutions to the problems of memory limitations, this study recommends the use of 
stimulated recall procedures. One of the most promising approaches in this regard is 
the use of video-assisted stimulant where participants are actually observing 
themselves undertaking the task for which they are being interviewed. This approach 
will likely help reduce any form of retrospective bias, thus allowing a more reliable 
representation of the recalled incident.     
 
2) Although prior research has suggested that the completeness and accuracy of 
elicited knowledge is largely influenced by the particular knowledge elicitation tool 
used by investigators, only a few studies have thoroughly evaluated or compared the 
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effectiveness of existing knowledge elicitation techniques. A Meta-analysis centred 
on comparing the strengths and weaknesses of various knowledge elicitation 
methods is perceived to be important in order to enhance the educational value of 
the instructional contents generated from experts.   
 
3) While the current research utilized a qualitative approach to examine how expert 
firefighters utilized their intuition in solving complex non-routine tasks, previous 
studies have also utilized a more quantitative approach such as Agor’s Intuitive 
Management survey (Agor, 1989); the International Survey on Intuition instrument 
(Parikh et al., 1994); the Rational Experiential Inventory (Epstein, 1998). Although 
scholars leaning towards the qualitative approach have criticized the use of surveys 
in studying how people make intuitive decisions, this study recommends a hybrid 
method that will utilize both qualitative and quantitative approaches within a single 
study. Due to the multi-faceted nature of intuition as a subject, it is logical to infer that 
the reliability of findings on intuition might be better enhanced using more than one 
single methodology 
 
4) More studies are needed to focus on how firefighters develop expertise within a 
community of practice. This involves researching around the social dimensions of 
learning as opposed to the conventional (cognitive/individualistic) approach to 
studying expertise. NDM researchers can therefore advance research around 
knowledge elicitation to include ethnographic studies on team decision making, 
shared cognition and group tacit knowledge, all within the scope of collaborative 
learning.     
8.5. Plans for dissemination 
 
Research findings from this study are hoped to be effectively disseminated, thereby 
informing decision making and ultimately improving training outcomes in the 
firefighting domain. To this effect, the plans for dissemination are outlined below:  
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• The outputs and findings from the study are expected to benefit from peer 
reviewed publications so as to serve a wider audience. Three papers have 
already been published from the study, with more publications targeted in the 
nearest future. 
 
• Findings from the study are also aimed to be presented at conferences that 
cover related themes. Some of the findings from the study have already been 
presented at two separate conferences in the course of the study: The 
naturalistic decision making conference, Marseille France 2013 and the 
society for risk analysis conference, Istanbul, Turkey, 2014. More 
conferences in the area of cognitive science, knowledge management and 
cultural studies are all potential spots for further dissemination 
 
• Finally, findings from the study are hoped to be published as a complete book 
which will be targeted at the Nigerian fire service. The book will aim to 
synthesise all the knowledge elicitation outputs from the study, with particular 
emphasis on the key lessons that emerged from the cultural comparison 
between the UK and the Nigerian fire service.  
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            1 
 I checked the situation and decided to call for extra assistance- fire engines 
and personnel 
2 
Decision to evacuate people out through the window which is against our 
SOPs 
3 Decision to split crew and manage resources from other stations 
4 Monitor the woman to prevent her from harming herself 
5 
My insistence in keeping the appliances on a welfare issue for a 
 long time 
6 Call for 15 additional pumps 
7 Exterior attack, too dangerous to commit crews 
8 
Decision to climb up to see the sit of the fire as water attack was 
 not getting effective. 
9 Decision to call for specialist appliance- foam attack 
10 Decision on how to get access to the scene of the fire (the building) 
11 Decision on firefighting strategy to employ (firefighting medium) 
12 Decision to request more appliances from 2 to 5 then to 7 
13 Decisions on how to effectively delegate tasks to other personnel 
14 Decision to consider evacuation (defensive attack) 
15 
Decision on stabilizing the patient first while at the same time 
 fighting the fire 
16 Decision to ask for assistance; call the police and a senior firefighter 
17 
Decision to ask the police to take the family of the victim away from the 
scene of the incident to a safe place 
18 Refusal of Fire Chief's order and offering an alternative order 
19 Calling the incident DM team together 
20 Over-ruled shelter location and messages going on at the time 
21 Briefed crew to put on BA on our way 
22 
 Changed plan to use hosereel and smothering on getting to the scene of 
the incident 
23 
 Ensuring the safety of crew by being more defensive
 and ensuring the machine was moved with care 
Appendix A: Decision points: UK Firefighters 
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24 Made up for 2 additional appliance 
25 Decision to use smoldering/hose reel in order to preserve water 
26 Getting enough water  
27 
Dividing the sector further into two because of the scale of activities going 
on 
28 
Putting water inside the building – that is not yet on fire. (Putting a fire 
break) 
29 Get water to the hydraulic platforms 
30 
 To request additional hydraulic platform as the one there was not serving 
enough 
31 
Crew safety by ensuring there are exit plans in case the fire comes through 
to the building. 
32 Put ladders up to the front of the house to reassure people 
33 Send firefighters up to be sure those trapped in the building were OK 
34 Decision to keep the house owners in the bedroom at first  
35 Decision to send 2 firefighters with BA sets 
36 Decision to evacuate people through the ladder 
37 Deploy BA teams 
38 To start resuscitation of the children 
39 Resource the incident gap (Ambulance, fire engines and fire investigation) 
40 Looking at the stability of the house if anything is going to collapse 
41 Fire investigation; trying to determine what caused the fire. 
42 
 I asked the guys to put the BA on and start breathing, while we were still on 
the way  
43  Decision to break the windows to let the gases out.  
44 
 I had to commit 2 firefighters into the incident with BA, but also to let them 
make their own decision once they got inside.  
45 
 I asked the fire appliances that are coming on to the incident to have, the 
first to have breathing air like I did my guys, and the second one to have 
breathing apparatus on them. 
46  Next we got the other services involved, Ambulance, Police, FRIT and 
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SOCO 
47 We used a hose reel and not a main jet 
48 I asked for assistant message once I knew we were under-resourced 
49 Informed crew to get ladders and start carrying out rescue operation 
50 We involved the Police 
51 Decision to rescue those directly above the flat first 
52 
Splitting our resources immediately we arrived at the scene of the incident 
(front and back) 
53 Deploying medical personnel to treat the casualties 
54 Deploy firefighters using a ladder in through the windows 
55 
Using two firefighters instead of more because it’s a small apartment 
(space-wise) 
56 Using main jets instead of hose reels. 
57 Decision as to when to take over from the watch commander 
58 
Decision to leave the crews inside the building after finding out other fire 
sources 
59 Resolving water challenges and sourcing water 
60 Requesting aerial appliance 
61  Requesting extra 10 pumps, and then eventually to 12 
62  Withdrawing the crews because the fire became fierce and unsafe 
63 
Change the existing tactics upon my arrival by changing the firefighting 
position of the crews (i.e. directing the jets from the front door) 
64 Taking charge of the incident without any formal handover  
65 Increasing the number of resources from 6pumps to 10 
66 
Continued to attack the fire by directing a jet against the corridor ground 
floor and breaking 
 the window to jet the cylinders first floor 
67 
Decision not to evacuate the crews 200m despite acetylene cylinder being 
involved 
68 
 Preventing the fire from spreading by confining the fire from either side of 
the building 
401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Looked for the nearest route to the incident 
2 Apportioned task while still in the vehicle, on the way to the incident 
3 
look at what to do to make the work easier- sizing- in this case  
identifying what class of fire it is 
4 Using fireman Axe to break the vehicle in order to get the people out 
5 Decision to call the Road Safety 
6 Go round the building and see where I can begin to fight the fire from 
7 Break into the door to enter the scene 
8 Layout the hose in advance 
9 Find a means of entering the building 
10 
Blocking the other side of the building to prevent fire from affecting  
the next building 
11 Sizing, checking around the building 
12 Finding alternative means of entering the building(breaking wall) 
13 Decision to use our Breathing Apparatus (BA) 
14 Failure to allow Julius Berger fire service to work with us 
15 
Looking for the source of electricity and switching it off from the  
switch board 
16 
Blocking the fire from the last office and not fighting it directly; to  
prevent it from damaging the unaffected offices 
17 
Breaking the door of the office where the fire started to look for the  
seat of the fire 
18 
Fighting the fire from the back of the office where it started and not  
directly on the seat of fire; to avoid the walls falling on us. 
19 Noticing that some areas have not been affected, I withdrew the men 
 (cold cut cobra strategy was used) 
69 Got the fire surrounded at the back of the garden 
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to start fighting the fire from areas that have not been affected. 
20 
Cut off the spread by fighting from areas affected to prevent areas  
unaffected 
21 Use of spray instead of jet. 
22 We firstly laid down the hose and take the end to upstairs 
23 Broke the glass in order to get access to the seat of the fire. 
24 We used jet to fight the fire that day 
25 Sizing, putting things in view 
26 We broke the door to pave way for the passengers to come out 
27 
Immediately we applied water with a chemical 
 (i.e. foam) to extinguish the fire 
28 
Splitted the crew into two, one are fighting the fire, while the other  
were paving way for the passengers to come out 
29 
Tried attacking face to face with water as instructed by the officer in  
charge, but discovered it was not working, so told him we need to 
change strategy 
30 
Approach the scene from the back and not through the entrance 
 because the fire was facing us directly 
31 We used cooling rather than fighting the fire directly. 
32 Cooling the cylinder around the plant to avoid it from exploding 
33 Called for more assistance, assistant message. 
34 Sizing up where I found out it was an electrical spark 
35 Informed NEPA to cut off the light from that area 
36 Found out the need for more water and continuous replenishing 
37 We decided to back the wind to avoid it blowing towards us 
38 Preventing the fire from spreading by fighting those affected 
39 Dividing the line into two 
40 Calling for additional appliances 
41 
Looking for the seat of fire; climbing the roof to see the seat, but 
almost  fell into the fire because of broken beams 
42 Decided to break the wall to enter as it is not possible through the 
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roof 
43 
Water was showered directly on us by other crew members while we 
were inside the smoke-logged room to supply fresh air 
44 
Decision to take risk to stand risk and withstand the smoke pressure,  
ceasing breath 
45 Decision to approach the fire from 2 sources 
46 
Taking the fastest route to the scene of the incident  
(Topography) 
47 We lied down and crawled in to fight the fire 
48 We laid two lines of hose 
49 We cooled the whole tank before leaving the area 
50 We used foam compact to extinguish the fire 
51 
Entered the building by crawling, using the back of my  
hand to feel 
52 
Went into the building with hose fully charged,  
using oxygen from the water to sustain myself 
53 We jet the ceiling to drive away toxic gases 
54 We divided a line of hose into two 
55 
When we received the call, we informed the  
operational men, while on the way we informed  
the police of the fire accident, we also informed  
the head office that a call was made to our station. 
56 
Getting to the scene, we observed and thought about how best to 
control the fire safely, we asked questions from the members of the 
public. 
57 We called for assistant message 
 
58. We thought of how best to get to the scene of the incident; we 
climbed through the roof to  
the seat of the fire. 
59 We had to use full jet in putting out the fire 
60 Taking the easiest and closest route to the incident 
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61 Making 2 streams of hose i.e. 2 lines 
62 
We capped the licking and flowing fuel with  
chemical foam (foam compact) 
63 
We used spray for cooling the burning fire on 
 the summersaulted tanker 
64 
Informed the public members not to use  
their mobile phones when the fuel was licking 
65 
We waited for them to remove the remaining 
 fuel from the tanker before we left. 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Title: Decision making strategies used by Firefighters and the potential for 
training intuitive skills 
 
Interview Date/Time                                        Location  
Duration of Interview  
 
1. GENERAL DATA 
a. Gender 
 
b. Position/Rank:  
c. Year of Experience:  
d. Year of Experience as an Incident Commander:                                                        
  
 
e. What is your highest level of educational? 
 
 
f. Mention the fire service qualifications/certifications you  acquired in the 
course of your  profession till date (if applicable)   
 
 
g. Briefly describe the various fire stations you have worked in, and what 
you did/doing in each 
             
     
 
Appendix C: The full critical decision method interview protocol utilized in the study 
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2. INCIDENT ACCOUNT 
 
a. Please narrate a particular incident where you were personally involved 
in decision making; from the time the alarm was received till the time 
the fire was brought under control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Why did you choose to narrate this particular incident? 
   
 
3. TIMELINE CONSTRUCTION AND DECISION POINTS IDENTIFICATION 
(a) On the basis of the above Incident, please construct a timeline showing how 
various events happened from the time your team arrived the scene to the 
time the fire was brought under control. 
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(b) On the timeline, identify the points where critical decisions were made 
 
Sketch of the timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. COGNITIVE PROBES AND PROGRESSIVE DEEPENING 
A. Cues  
i)  What features were you looking at when you formulated your 
decision? 
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ii) How did you know when to make the decision? 
 
 
 
 
B. Knowledge 
i) Was there any information you used in making this decision? Please 
Explain  
 
 
 
ii) How was it obtained? 
 
 
 
C. Analogues/Prototypes 
(i) Were you reminded of any particular previous experience in which a 
similar decision was made? 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Standard Or Typical Scenario 
i) Does it fit a scenario you were trained to deal with? 
 
 
iii) Were you following any rule? Please elaborate on the rules you were 
following 
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E. Goals 
i)  Were you pursuing any specific goals and objectives at the various 
decision points? Please elaborate on these goals 
 
 
 
 
F. Options 
i) Were there other alternatives available to you other than the ones you 
chose? Please explain 
 
 
 
 
ii) Why were these alternatives considered inappropriate?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G. Experience 
i) What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making 
this decision?  
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ii) What training, knowledge, or information might have helped make the 
decision better? 
 
 
 
 
 
H. Situation Awareness 
i) If you were asked to describe the situation to a relief officer at this 
point, how would you summarize the situation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii) What was the most important piece of information that you used to 
formulate the decision? 
 
 
 
 
I. Decision Making/Time pressure 
i)  How long did it actually take to make this decision? 
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ii) Were you under any time pressure? If yes, why? 
 
 
 
 
J. Errors 
i) What mistakes are likely at this point? 
 
 
 
 
ii) How might a less experienced fire fighter have behaved differently? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO (WHAT IF’S) 
 
a) Briefly explain what you would do if you get to the scene of a serious fire as 
an incident commander, and find out you have very little information about 
what is happening, and yet you have to make decisions as to whether to be 
offensive or defensive in your attack? 
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Appendix F: Examples of worked thematic analysis based on the  
emergent themes approach 
 
 
 
414 
 
 
 
FULL NARRATIVES NARRATIVES FROM 
TRANSCRIPT (CONDENSED MEANING UNIT 
HIGHLIGHTED) 
CODES AND 
CONDENSED 
MEANING 
CATEGORIES 
CUES: Were you seeing any cues/features 
that helped you formulate your decisions? 
  
A: At those point im looking at it, I know, ive got 
a measure that if ive got a house on fire, just a 
normal standard house with nobody in it, I can 
do that with 2 trucks, 9 people, 2 fire engines, no 
doubt, that is a box standard measure, I know 
that. If I’ve got a car on fire I can deal with it with 
one fire engine. So there are basic measures1. 
 
 So when I come to that incident I look at it and 
think, well, that’s 10,000 bigger than a house, I 
know I haven’t got enough to deal with this. So I 
need to make more appliances2, so I chose 5 
partly based on how many I know are in 
Coventry, partly based on how many of the 
officers I would like to have to help me control 
what ive got3. Im looking at the physical size of 
the fire, the intensity of the fire, how close it was 
to the houses4-6. If it was not surrounded by 
houses, probably 5 would have been enough, 
but because it was situated right in the middle of 
all these houses, I got the houses to worry 
about, the people in the houses. So we needed 
more people with me if needed people to 
evacuate. 
1.  Box standard 
measures 
2. Making sense 
of cues 
3. How many 
appliances in 
town 
4.Physical size 
of fire 
5. Intensity of 
fire 
6. How close it 
was to the 
houses 
7. Task 
constraints 
1. Prerequisite 
knowledge 
2. Predictive 
cues 
3. Prerequisite 
knowledge 
4-6 Visible 
cues 
7. Task 
constraints 
TACIT KNOWLEDGE ON CUE: What do you 
mean by intensity of the fire. 
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A: Say for example, I go to a house, and the 
smoke is creeping out the window, the smoke 
coming out of the door, I'm thinking there is a fire 
somewhere burning in the room. Not particularly 
massive, but its something you don’t want in the 
house1. If I turn up to a house, and the window is 
completely fallen out and there is flames leaking 
out there, that’s an intense fire2. If its that bad 
that has got a real hold on it, and opening of 
door and doing different things will affect how the 
whole building reacts3. That is how I look at the 
intensity of the fire. Its visual; if you can actually 
see flames, especially in the building fire, well 
that’s fairly severe2. Normally fires maybe inside 
the building, you will see smoke, you wont 
necessarily see flames. But if you could see 
flames, then it is serious2. You can even make 
that decision on the way. While on the way to 
that incident, you can see the glow in the sky, 
you can see the flame coming up- you are 
already formulating plans in your head what you 
are going to do. So if I cant see anything, I cant 
make any decisions because im thinking this 
might not be anything or might be a small fire, 
but if I can on my way see something, that 
means its quite an intense fire because there is a 
lot going on4. 
1. Smoke 
creeping out of 
window and 
door (dangerous 
but not massive) 
2. Windows 
fallen out and 
flames leaking 
out (intense and 
massive) 
3. How building 
reacts to smoke 
4. Planning 
ahead while on 
the way 
1&2. Cue 
discrimination 
(Tacit 
knowledge) 
3. Domain 
knowledge(Ta
cit knowledge) 
4. Pre-
planning (tacit 
knowledge) 
TACIT KNOWLEDGE: What is the difference 
between smoke and flame? 
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A:  Smoke can clearly kill people, people can die 
from a smoke fire through inhalation. It is more 
smoke that kill people than fire can kill people1. If 
you are in a modern building with double glazed 
windows sealed against cold weather - that is a 
sealed unit, a compartment. And when fire 
develops in a compartment- you can imagine this 
room, the door closed and the fire starts over 
there, there will be flames it will build up, it will 
build up until smokes gather on the ceiling. It will 
slowly lower down until it reaches a point where 
there is no oxygen left in this room. That fire 
would die down but this room is full of flammable 
gases. Immediately you open that door, air will 
tract in, because the fire needs air- because its 
sucked all the air up. Immediately you open the 
door, air will rush in, the fire will reignite, and it 
will reignite all the gases and the whole room will 
set on fire again2. So, that is smoke from bump 
fire- nothing but smoke in a compartment- so if 
it’s not what we call vented. So if we came and 
that window is mashed through, or the window 
was opened and smoke was pouring out and 
there was a door there opened and smoke was 
pouring out- that would be reasonably safe for us 
to enter. But if we could see it was thick-black 
smoke, the door was shot and we could see little 
bit of smoke creeping out or pushing out under 
pressure, we know it is dangerous in here 
because if we open that door the fire will ignite3. 
So then we have to use special techniques to 
cool the gases. So that’s when the hosereels 
1. Smoke kills 
faster 
2. chemistry of 
combustion 
3. smoke 
behaviour 
4. Fire control 
using hosereel 
5. 
Flashover/missi
ng cues 
6. Thickness, 
colour and 
reaction of 
smoke 
7. 
Understanding 
smoke 
behaviour 
8. Colour of 
smoke  
9. Flashover 
and backdraft 
1-2. Pre 
requisite 
knowledge 
3. Cue 
discrimination 
(Tacit 
knowledge) 
4. Domain 
knowledge 
(Tacit 
Knowledge) 
5. Predictive 
cues 
6. Visible cues 
7. Safety 
Culture 
8. Cue 
discrimination 
(Tacit 
knowledge) 
9. Prerequisite 
knowledge 
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comes in handy, spraying a little bit gets it under 
control and so we open the door, and we straight 
away are fighting the fire. We drive the water in 
the air tract where the air is rushing in, and that 
water particle is get carried in to the fire. Its all 
about how we control the fire4. So in some cases 
when I turn up to a fire and the flames are flying 
out of the window, everybody thinks its really 
dangerous; but actually for us we can see what 
is dangerous; potentially everything is visible to 
us. But if we come to a place with black thick 
smoke where the smoke is not ripping out of the 
windows, that potentially could suddenly go while 
we were in there, whereas a fire that is already 
burning is burning before we got there we can 
deal with it because its going to get no worse5.   
You can tell how thick the smoke is, the colour of 
the smoke, how it reacts when you’ve got 
windows or anything6. If we open the door and 
the smoke was coming out and then suddenly 
starts to suck in- then we know the fire is waiting 
to get oxygen so we pull the door shot. You see 
what I mean- it’s a visual signs of what is 
happening in that building. And you get like 
pulsing- sometimes it sucks in and blow out, 
suck in and blow out- again that’s another 
dangerous sign7. The colour of the smoke; if its 
like a thick yellowish-grey that’s a fire that hasn’t 
got enough oxygen- so immediately you open 
the door it will suck oxygen in- its got a potential 
to what we call a ‘flashover’8. There is flashover 
and backdraft. Flashover is when something 
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burns and creates combustible gases and it 
reaches a point where there is enough 
temperature in the room for the gas to ignite. A 
backdraft is when a fire is died down and is just 
waiting for oxygen to come in. so when you open 
the door, the backdraft of air rushes in and the 
fire goes again and the fire rushes out9. That’s a 
couple of terms. 
INFORMATION USED: What information were 
you using to make these decisions? 
  
A: Initially it is training; what I have been taught 
and told1. Q: Does that mean you carry your 
training manual with you? A: No, it is in your 
head. We do have a folder in the truck called the 
fire facts- just got basic facts about certain 
things- information that may be useful if I need 
access to it. Generally, everything is dynamic- im 
using dynamic risk assessment continually2. 
Alongside training is experience- you can be the 
best trained person in the world but if you’ve 
never seen it, that is a little bit more difficult for 
you, isn’t it3. And then obviously, im gathering 
1. Training  
2. Dynamic Risk 
Assessment 
3. Experience 
4. Information 
gathering by self 
by looking 
5. Information 
gathering by 
speaking to 
people 
1. Training 
2. DRA 
3. Limits of 
training 
4&5. 
information 
search (IFID) 
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information myself, im looking, I'm speaking to 
people; im looking at what I can see. Information 
is important as an officer in making decisions; 
you can make a terrible decision without the right 
information4&5. 
RECOGNITION: Did this particular incident 
remind you of previous incidents you have 
managed in the past? 
  
A: Yes, yes, that is generally the case- I mean- it 
may have come from the days of being a fireman 
before I was an officer1. I have attended 
incidents like that; I have seen other officers 
dealing with them- so that kind of thing will 
remind me, I will remember those things- they 
did that it worked, they did that it didn’t work- so 
im not going to do that2. Q: Did this incident 
remind you of anyone in particular? A: Errrm, I 
have been to so many fires like that, probably, 
but I couldn’t tell you of anyone in particular. I 
have been to a lot of various kinds of fires, 
maybe in different situations3. 
1. Fireman to 
officer 
2. What is 
remembered 
3. Many 
incidents 
1. Memory 
space 
(principles of 
rec) 
2. Principles of 
recognition 
3. Prototype 
LEVEL OF NEOVELTY: Does this incident fit a 
scenario you were trained to deal with? 
  
A: Erm, yes it does, not in the difficulties as in 
the access behind the houses and things1. But 
we have done training for small industrial unit, 
things like that how to deal with them, what to 
expect to find in them; so we have done training 
to suit that2, but as every incident is different- 
training is like a generic training that gives you a 
basic knowledge to then adapt to suit what you 
are doing, which is basic for fire services- You 
1. Difficulty in 
access to the 
building 
2. Every 
incident is 
different so 
training is 
generic 
3.Training gives 
1. Task 
constraints 
2. limits of 
training 
3. Limits of 
training 
4. Adaptive 
decisions 
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are given training, then you adapt to suit3. 
 
Q:Are you also trained to know how many 
resources to request? 
A: No, you are not trained for that- nobody sits 
you down and say when you have this incident 
you need this, when you have this incident you 
need that. That is an experience, and you make 
decisions based on what you think you need for 
the incident4. 
you basic 
knowledge to 
then adapt to 
suit what you 
are doing.  
4. Make up of 
resources 
FULL NARRATIVES NARRATIVES FROM 
TRANSCRIPT (CONDENSED MEANING UNIT 
HIGHLIGHTED) 
CODES AND 
CONDENSED 
MEANING CATEGORIES 
NOTES 
(RATIONALE 
FOR  
SELECTING 
CATEGORIES 
CUES: What were you seeing, hearing or smelling (cues) that 
made you make those decisions? 
   A: Immediately I heard the information that that fire was caused by 
spark or upsurge of fire current from the NEPA pole, I know that, for 
safety of lives I need to inform the NEPA to take off the light1. 
Already it is a well alight fire2 that the flame is visible (flame is a 
mass of gas undergoing oxidation). The flame has mixed up with 
oxygen in the surrounding3. The colour of the flame is red4.What 
made me know I had to back the wind is that I watched the direction 
of the wind, the direction it is blowing, so I made the decision to back 
the wind5. 
1. Immediately I 
heard the fire was 
caused by spark or 
upsurge of current 
(Class of fire) 
2. Well alight fire 
3. Visible flames 
4. Flame colour is 
red 
5. Direction the 
wind was blowing 
1. Visible cue 
1. Safety Awareness 
(Tacit Knowledge) 
2. Visible cue 
3. Visible cue 
4. Visible cue 
5. Environmental 
cue 
 
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: How did you obtain the 
knowledge you used in making these decisions? 
   A:  The knowledge I made use, one of it is my experience, my 
experience in firefighting1. I also got information from people, 
onlookers and those living around there, the information I got from 
them helps2. The experience and the knowledge I have got also, in 
the course of my training3, because we were taught many other 
subjects apart from fighting fire, we were taught chemistry of 
combustion, building construction and how the materials used in 
building behaves when they are affected by fire4. 
1. Experience  
2. Information from 
crowd 
3. Training 
4. Subjects covered 
in training 
1-3. Sources of 
Information (IFID) 
4. Nature of training  
RECOGNITION: Did this incident remind you of previous 
incidents you have managed? 
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A: Yes it does, and it helps. There was one like that we attended at 
ICI paint Ikeja, it was during Harmattan also, that was the point when 
I just joined the service and we were there1. So I saw how Harmattan 
wind is controlling that fire then, and I see the decision some of our 
officers took in fighting the fire as at that time, it contributed to my 
own experience2. 
 
1. There was one we 
attended at ICI 
2. Things 
remembered 
(Harmattan fire) 
3. Saw what officers 
were doing then 
1. Analog 
2. What is 
remembered? 
3. Commitment to 
memory (PoR) 
In most cases, 
experts have a wide 
range of incidents 
they have attended 
and this is one of 
the hallmark of 
expertise. However, 
evidence shows that 
they only bring to 
closer view (and 
remembrance) 
incidents that are 
most closest to the 
ones they are 
currently managing.  
LEVEL OF NOVELTY: Will you say that all the training you 
had was enough to handle that incident? 
   A: You know training itself is a process of development, so there is 
need for continuous training no matter the one you have got before; 
locally, overseas and in many other things1. If I say I have experience 
of fighting fire, what of if I want to fight fire in a confined space?2 
What of fighting fire that involves other materials?3 That is why there 
is a need for continuous training as a source of development. For this 
particular incident, what I have got as at that time was enough for me, 
yes, but at the same time that does not stop me from having other 
training4. 
1.Training itself is a 
process of 
development 
2.Fighting fire in a 
confined space 
3. Fire involving 
other materials 
4.What I had was 
enough for me on 
this incident but 
more needed   
1. Definition of 
Training 
2-3. Training 
needed 
4. More training 
needed 
This expert admits 
that the training he 
had was sufficient 
for this incident. 
However more 
training would be 
welcomed - he cited 
examples of 
incidents where 
training would have 
fallen short 
RULES, SOPs & CREATIVITY: Were you following any rule, 
or were you being creative? 
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A: Some are creative, but most of it are following the rules. Like 
when there is a fire in a room now, we were told that the hot air 
normally rise up, so in a room that is well alight with fire, by the time 
you started applying your water and you want to come inside the 
room, in order to be conducive for you, you need to go down, 
because the hot air there has rise up. By the time you go down you 
will be able to penetrate to come in and fight the rest of the fire1. 
Actually it is in our rule that you need to replenish when there is no 
more water2, but at the same time I envisaged that we need a lot of 
water in order to cope with the situation at that time, so I quickly 
went into action to take that decision of seeking for water in good 
time, that is why we were able to put out the fire in quickly3.  
1. Hot air rising up 
when entering a 
room on fire 
(ingress) 
2. It is in our rule to 
replenish water 
3. I envisaged that 
we will need a lot of 
water 
1. Cognitive rule 
(Ingress) 
2. Rule 
(replenishment) (UK 
Vs Nig) 
3. Preplanning (UK 
Vs Nig)  
 
  
